Essays on Mispricing of Equity Securities by Wiley, Jonathan
ESSAYS ON MISPRICING OF EQUITY SECURITIES
By
JONATHAN MARK WILEY
Bachelor of Science in Chemistry
Oral Roberts University
Tulsa, Oklahoma
2005
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration
Oral Roberts University
Tulsa, Oklahoma
2005
Master of Business Administration
Oral Roberts University
Tulsa, Oklahoma
2007
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
July, 2016
ESSAYS ON MISPRICING OF EQUITY SECURITIES
Dissertation Approved:
Dr. Ali Nejadmalayeri
Dissertation Adviser
Dr. John Polonchek
Dr. Ramesh Rao
Dr. Sandeep Nabar
ii
Name: JONATHAN MARK WILEY
Date of Degree: JULY 2016
Title of Study: ESSAYS ON MISPRICING OF EQUITY SECURITIES
Major Field: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Abstract: Mispricing of equity securities is an area of research with many
implications for academicians, individual investors, money managers, and
executives. The first essay in this dissertation explicitly studies the consis-
tency of residual income based measures of mispricing and the second essay
analyzes several determinants of mispricing. The first essay returns to fun-
damental principles of valuation by using multiple implementations of the
residual income model to estimate intrinsic value. Estimates of intrinsic
value are compared to market values and firm years are assigned to valua-
tion deciles using the markets valuation error. Relative valuation decile as-
signments are very robust to different cost of equity specifications and also
to two different earnings and book value specifications. Valuation decile as-
signments are remarkably persistent over time for the most overvalued and
undervalued equities. Application of the valuation deciles to acquisitions
produces results consistent with prior published research, indicating that
the valuation deciles are capturing mispricing. The second essay assigns
firms to valuation deciles for the full 1964–2009 period and examines the
determinants of the observed mispricing. The results show that investors
systematically overvalue scaled R&D expenditures and undervalue scaled
cash flow. In addition, investor sentiment is positively related to overval-
uation. However, when sentiment is high, investors undervalue scaled net
fixed assets. Standard risk explanations for the observed mispricing are not
supported by the results. Altman’s Z-Score, leverage, β, and the standard
deviation of return on assets are all positively related to overvaluation, and
firm age and firm size are negatively related to overvaluation.
iii
Contents
1 Measuring Mispricing 1
1.1 Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Valuation Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Valuation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Calculation of Firm Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.2 Calculation of Firm Specific Overvaluation Measures 20
1.4 Valuation Results and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5 Valuation Deciles Applied to Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.5.1 Introduction and Acquisition Data . . . . . . . . . 68
1.5.2 Relationship Between Overvaluation and Acquisitions 69
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2 Determinants of Mispricing 86
2.1 Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.2 Literature Review of the Effects of Mispricing . . . . . . . 89
2.3 Literature Review of Factors Related to Mispricing . . . . 92
2.3.1 Rational Bubbles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.3.2 Managerial Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.3.3 Firm Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.3.4 Investor Sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.3.5 Risk and Information Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.4 Hypothesis Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.4.1 CEO Compensation Characteristics . . . . . . . . . 112
2.4.2 Firm Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.4.3 Investor Sentiment Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.4.4 Risk and Information Uncertainty Control Variables 116
2.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.5.1 Valuation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
2.5.2 CEO Compensation Characteristics . . . . . . . . . 123
2.5.3 Firm Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
2.5.4 Sentiment Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
2.5.5 Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
2.5.6 Model Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
2.6.1 Baseline Specification Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
2.6.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
iv
2.6.3 Summary of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3 Appendix 155
3.1 Detailed Determinants Tables: Baseline Specification . . . 158
3.1.1 Full Period VERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Baseline Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.1.2 Annual VERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Baseline Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
3.1.3 Full Period eVERR Decile Assignments Used with
the Baseline Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
3.1.4 Annual eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Baseline Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
3.2 Detailed Determinants Tables: Single Digit SIC Industry
Fixed Effects Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
3.2.1 Full Period VERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specification 226
3.2.2 Annual VERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specification 239
3.2.3 Full Period eVERR Decile Assignments Used with
the Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specifi-
cation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
3.2.4 Annual eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specification 265
3.3 Detailed Determinants Tables: Endogeneity Specification . 278
3.3.1 Full Period VERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Endogeneity Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
3.3.2 Annual VERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Endogeneity Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
3.3.3 Full Period eVERR Decile Assignments Used with
the Endogeneity Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
3.3.4 Annual eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Endogeneity Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
v
List of Tables
1 Proportion of Negative IV and eIV Values . . . . . . . . . 23
2 Proportion of Negative Terminal Values . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Selected Summary Statistics for Valuation Measures . . . . 27
4 Correlations Between Valuation Decile Assignments Based
on the Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5 Correlations Between Annual Valuation Decile Assignments 37
6 Bull Market Correlations Between Valuation Decile Assign-
ments Based on the Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7 Bull Market Correlations Between Annual Valuation Decile
Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8 Bear Market Correlations Between Valuation Decile Assign-
ments Based on the Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9 Bear Market Correlations Between Annual Valuation Decile
Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10 Decile Evolution Matrix for Annual capm5 VERR Decile
Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
11 Decile Evolution Matrix for Annual capm5 VERR Decile
Assignments: Percentages Based on Non-Missing Values . 61
12 Descriptive Statistics for Takeover Bids . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13 Acquisition Characteristics by Acquirer or Target Valuation
Deciles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
14 Logistic Regressions for Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
15 Average Coefficients for Logistic Regressions for Acquisi-
tions Using Different Valuation Decile Assignments . . . . 82
16 Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR Full Period Decile Assignments
on Determinants for the Baseline Specification . . . . . . . 140
17 Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR Full Period Decile Assignments
on Determinants with Endogeneity Adjustments . . . . . . 149
18 Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR Decile Assign-
ments on Determinants for the Baseline Specification . . . 159
19 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Ac-
cruals and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
vi
20 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals
and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
21 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
22 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins
Accruals and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
23 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals
and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
24 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
25 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals
and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
26 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
27 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow 184
28 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals
and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
29 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
30 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow 190
31 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Ac-
cruals and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
32 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals
and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
33 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
34 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins
Accruals and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
vii
35 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals
and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
36 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
37 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals
and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
38 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
39 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow 210
40 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals
and Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
41 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
42 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow 216
43 Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR Decile Assign-
ments on Determinants with Industry Fixed Effects . . . . 219
44 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Sloan Accru-
als and Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed
Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
45 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . 229
46 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow,
and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . 231
47 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Collins Ac-
cruals and Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed
Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
48 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . 235
viii
49 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . 237
50 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . 240
51 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . 242
52 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . 244
53 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . 246
54 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . 248
55 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . 250
56 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Sloan Accru-
als and Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed
Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
57 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . 255
58 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow,
and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . 257
59 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Collins Ac-
cruals and Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed
Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
60 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . 261
61 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . 263
ix
62 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . 266
63 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . 268
64 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . 270
65 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . 272
66 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . 274
67 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . 276
68 Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR Decile Assign-
ments on Determinants with Endogeneity Adjustments . . 279
69 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Ac-
cruals and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta,
and Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
70 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals
and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and
Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
71 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . 291
72 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins
Accruals and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN,
Delta, and Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
73 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals
and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and
Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
74 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . 297
x
75 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals
and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and
Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
76 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . 302
77 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . . . . . 304
78 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals
and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and
Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
79 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega 308
80 Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . . . . . 310
81 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Ac-
cruals and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta,
and Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
82 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals
and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and
Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
83 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . 317
84 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins
Accruals and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN,
Delta, and Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
85 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals
and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and
Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
86 Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assign-
ments Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . 323
xi
87 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals
and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and
Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
88 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . 328
89 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . . . . . 330
90 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals
and Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and
Vega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
91 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega 334
92 Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega . . . . . . . 336
xii
List of Figures
1 Evolution of Average Annual Decile Assignments . . . . . 4
2 Evolution of Leverage Ratios from Lemmon et al. (2008) . 5
xiii
List of Exhibits
1 Definitions of the Independent Variables Used in the Pri-
mary Ordered Logistic Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2 Hypotheses Regarding the Expected Determinants of Over-
valuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3 Definitions of the Independent Variables Used in the Or-
dered Logistic Regressions Presented in the Appendix . . . 156
xiv
1 Measuring Mispricing
1.1 Introduction and Motivation
Academicians, individual investors, money managers, and many others
have long sought to properly value shares of stock and to thereby deter-
mine which stocks are overvalued and which stocks are undervalued. Nat-
urally, the proposition that shares of stock in a going concern have value
is uncontroversial. The specific amount of value is more ambiguous and
perhaps the subject of controversy, despite the attempts of academicians
and practitioners over many decades to implement a systematic approach
to valuation. All manner of different approaches to determining value and
assessing overvaluation have been attempted over time, but, surprisingly,
some significant gaps in knowledge remain. This is perhaps due to the fact
that many studies employ valuation techniques as a means to study some
other topic of interest, and therefore the energies of the researchers tend to
be focused on a robustness approach in which the researchers tinker with
assumptions in the valuation model and then check to find out if the main
findings of interest are affected. This approach is in contrast to an approach
which focuses upon the robustness of the valuation measures themselves
and what changes in assumptions do to relative measures of overvaluation
and undervaluation. The end result of this pattern is that a distinct short-
age exists of explicit examinations of what happens to estimates of relative
overvaluation and undervaluation of equities when changes are made in
the inputs of the different valuation models. This study seeks to explic-
itly address some elements of that shortage for the residual income model
specifically.
Meanwhile, although disagreements about stocks’ value in the mar-
ketplace are not required to generate trade in stocks, such disagreements
generally do exist and some trade in stocks results. Columns and articles
in financial magazines and on financial websites regularly dedicate space
to discussing this disagreement by presenting competing arguments side
by side for why the current market price makes a stock overvalued or un-
dervalued. The techniques employed can vary widely, and although some
such articles will present a range of possible values for the stock, the spe-
cific determination of that range is rarely delineated clearly, and the effect
of particular assumptions is often ignored altogether. Another perspective
embraces market efficiency and simply views the current market price as
the best estimate of a stock’s value, regardless of what the financial press
1
says about the matter.
In the midst of this murky world of valuation and the subsequent de-
termination of overvaluation it is sensible to turn to a very brief overview
of a selected set of historical developments in the history of common stock
valuation. Over a century ago, Irving Fisher (1906) examined the nature
of capital and income and concluded that capital derived its value from
the present value of the associated income stream. This philosophy serves
as the foundation for models based upon discounted dividends, earnings,
or residual income. Some of the earliest literature which eventually led to
the valuation approach utilized in this essay focused on attempts to value
goodwill and other intangibles. By 1920 an excess earnings approach was
described in a publication by the I.R.S. for use in handling the valuation
of businesses affected by Prohibition (United States Treasury Department
(1920)). This model employed an estimation of the tangible assets of a
firm and the earnings in excess of the normal return on the tangible assets.
Within a couple of decades Graham and Dodd (1951) presented a valuation
approach which capitalized estimates of future dividends and earnings to
estimate the intrinsic value of a firm’s stock. The issues surrounding the
choice of the capitalization rate were discussed at some length by Graham
and Dodd (1951), as were the issues pertaining to the estimation of the
future dividends and earnings. Perhaps one of the most famous valuation
approaches was formalized by Gordon and Shapiro (1956) with the presen-
tation of the constant growth dividend discount model of firm valuation.
Since the early decades of the theoretical development of the differ-
ent valuation models several developments in finance theory shifted the
approach to valuation. Under certain assumptions Miller and Modigliani
(1961) showed that dividends are irrelevant. As later shown by Ohlson
(1995), with clean surplus accounting and autoregression of abnormal earn-
ings the dividend discount approach can be shown to be equivalent to the
residual income model. This finding meant that some of the earlier ap-
proaches to valuation were not so different from each other as was once
thought, although some of the models may be more forgiving of errors in
assumptions than others. Although various studies implementing valuation
models were performed over the decades, and although some studies were
performed which evaluated the valuation models themselves in one way
or another, an increasing focus upon market efficiency became pervasive
in the finance literature. This emphasis upon market efficiency created
a problem: instead of viewing market deviations from intrinsic value as
estimated by a valuation model to be evidence of overvaluation or under-
valuation, such deviations could be viewed as evidence of poor models. In
effect, valuation models came to be judged by how closely they approxi-
mated the market price, which implicitly assumes that the market is pricing
stocks efficiently. For example, Penman and Sougiannis (1998) evaluated
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truncation biases associated with different valuation models by comparing
the intrinsic values estimated using the models with the market price.
This essay returns to the fundamental concept that shares of stock have
some intrinsic value due to future earnings. Implementations of the resid-
ual income model are employed to generate estimates of intrinsic value.
Estimates of the intrinsic values of stocks using realized earnings and book
value data enable the determination of which stocks were relatively over-
valued and which stocks were relatively undervalued at observed market
prices. This approach using realized earnings makes it possible for a more
fundamental set of questions about the residual income model approach
to valuation to be addressed. How robust are relative valuation measures
to different specifications of the residual income model? How do relative
valuations change over time for stocks?
The return to fundamental principles in this study has produced some
interesting findings. Overall, the relative valuation measures derived from
the residual income estimates of intrinsic value demonstrate a remarkable
degree of stability across various model specifications and in different mar-
ket conditions. An analysis of acquisitions to validate the measures of
relative valuation demonstrates properties consistent with prior research
in many respects.
One finding is that substantially overvalued firms tend to remain over-
valued for a protracted period of time. This effect may be seen in Figure 1.
Beginning in 1964, firms are assigned to valuation deciles for the calendar
year using the capm5 VERR measure employed in this study. Decile one
contains the most relatively undervalued firms during the calendar year,
and decile ten contains the most relatively overvalued firms during the cal-
endar year. Then, the subsequent valuation decile membership for each
firm is determined for every calendar year over the next ten years to the
extent the data is available. This process is rolled forward each year until
it has been applied to every calendar year during the entire 1964–2009 pe-
riod. The resulting decile data is analyzed in event time, with the initial
valuation decile assignment occurring at time T, enabling all of the over-
lapping ten year periods of data over the 1964–2009 period to be aligned
on a uniform ten year time line.
Each line in Figure 1 plots the average decile assignment over ten years
for firms initially assigned to each of the respective valuation deciles. On
average, firms beginning in the most overvalued decile, decile ten, only re-
vert to an average decile assignment of a bit less than seven after ten years.
In general, the most undervalued firms, represented by decile one, revert
to an average decile assignment of over four after five years. Thus, the re-
version of overvalued and undervalued firms on average to more moderate
levels of relative valuation is slower than might be expected. This find-
ing is reminiscent of the findings of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)
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Figure 1
Evolution of Average Annual Decile Assignments
Beginning in 1964, firms are assigned to valuation deciles for the calendar
year using the capm5 VERR measure. Decile one contains the most rela-
tively undervalued firms during the calendar year, and decile ten contains
the most relatively overvalued firms during the calendar year. Then, the
subsequent valuation decile membership for each firm is determined for ev-
ery calendar year over the next ten years to the extent the data is available.
This process is rolled forward each year until it has been applied to every
calendar year during the entire 1964–2009 period. The resulting decile
data is analyzed in event time, with the initial valuation decile assignment
occurring at time T, enabling all of the overlapping ten year periods of
data over the 1964–2009 period to be aligned on a uniform ten year time
line.
Each line plots the average decile assignment over ten years for firms ini-
tially assigned to each of the respective valuation deciles. For example,
firms which are in decile 10 at time T and which remain in the sample
through time T+1 have an average decile assignment of roughly nine and
a half at time T+1. Firms with missing decile assignments at a specified
time horizon are omitted from the average decile assignment depicted on
the graph for that time horizon despite being present at time T.
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Figure 2
Evolution of Leverage Ratios from Lemmon et al. (2008)
This figure is a presentation of Figure 1 from the study by Lemmon et al.
(2008). As described by Lemmon et al. (2008), firms were assigned to four
leverage portfolios each year, and then the average leverage ratio for each
portfolio was tracked over time. The aggregate average of the leverage
ratios for each of the four portfolios at each point relative to the portfolio
assignment date is displayed in each of the plots below.
in a study of capital structure. Lemmon et al. (2008) returned to fun-
damental issues associated with capital structure and found that capital
structure for firms tends to be remarkably persistent. A key figure from
the study by Lemmon et al. (2008) has been presented in Figure 2. As is
evident, just as a return to fundamental issues in capital structure resulted
in the realization that capital structure is quite stable over time, a return
to fundamental issues in relative valuation results in the curious finding
that the most overvalued firms are persistently overvalued on average for
a prolonged period of time, and also that even the most undervalued firms
revert to more moderate levels of relative valuation more slowly than might
be expected.
The mispricing of equity securities has potentially significant implica-
tions. For example, widespread mispricing could be entangled with the
effect of firm size as measured by market value or the book-to-market ratio
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in common asset pricing approaches. The effect of investor sentiment in
investment choices could also relate to mispricing. If mispricing consis-
tently arises from, or may be predicted by, observable factors, lucrative
investment strategies could be employed. As noted above, the data pre-
sented in Figure 1 suggest that mispricing is persistent for several years,
and therefore its effects may not be averaged out using short time horizons.
Significantly, systematic and persistent mispricing is inconsistent with an
efficient market. Random market fluctuations could produce mispricing,
but such random mispricing should not be persistent in an efficient market.
Pricing errors in general could occur in an efficient market, but market effi-
ciency suggests that such pricing errors should be transient as investors buy
undervalued equities and sell or short sell overvalued equities. The system-
atic and long lasting mispricing depicted in Figure 1 is inconsistent with
either of those explanations and is consequently inconsistent with market
efficiency. Robustly measuring mispricing could therefore have extremely
significant theoretical and empirical implications, but robustly measuring
mispricing must necessarily begin by using some theoretical model to find
the value of a firm’s common equity.
Stock valuation models typically focus upon finding the present value
of expected future benefits of ownership. The specific implementations
of that broad construct vary markedly. Some models have focused upon
discounting dividends, while others have focused upon discounting some
measure of cash flows or earnings. The various implementations have uti-
lized different estimates of the discount rate, the relevant time horizon, the
terminal value, etc. This essay will not resolve those differences. Rather,
the goal of this study is to ultimately measure mispricing in a robust man-
ner, and measuring mispricing requires estimating the value of a firm’s
common equity.
To enable the exploration of mispricing, an excess earnings valuation
model is employed to determine the intrinsic value of common stock. The
excess earnings model employed is an implementation of the residual in-
come model, which adds book value to the discounted future earnings in
excess of a required return on equity to find the value of the common
stock. The earnings in excess of the required return on equity are often
also termed abnormal earnings. Other common valuation models use dis-
counted dividends or cash flow. Although forms of the residual income
model have been in existence since at least the early twentieth century,
Ohlson (1995) showed that with clean surplus accounting and autoregres-
sion of the abnormal earnings the dividend discount approach can be shown
to be equivalent to the residual income model. However, the residual in-
come model has a few features which make it more attractive to implement
than various other models. First, the residual income model does not re-
quire that a firm pay dividends, which circumvents a difficulty associated
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with dividend discount models. Second, discounting abnormal or excess
earnings instead of discounting cash flow or dividends makes the resid-
ual income model less sensitive to truncation of the period of time used
in the model. In effect, the terminal value calculation required in finite
implementations carries less weight for the residual income model than it
does for models based upon cash flow or dividends. Third, Penman and
Sougiannis (1998) found that models based upon accruals earnings, such
as the residual income model, did a better job of matching observed stock
prices over finite time horizons than other dividend or cash flow models of
valuation. Fourth, the residual income model tends to minimize the im-
pact of overstating or understating revenues or expenses in a given period.
If earnings are overstated in one period, leading to higher excess earnings
in that period, the book value used in the next period to calculate the
excess earnings for the residual income model will be higher, shifting the
estimated excess earnings in the second period in a downward direction
which at least partially offsets the initial overstatement of earnings for the
first period. The theoretical model for the intrinsic value of common equity
underlying this study is presented in Equation 1. In the following equation,
BVPS represents the book value per share, EPS represents the earnings
per share, and r represents the applicable cost of equity.
IVt = BV PSt +
∞∑
i=1
EPSt+i − (r ∗BV PSt+i−1)
(1 + r)i
(1)
As noted above, the value of the firm’s common equity using the excess
earnings model is the sum of the current book value and the discounted
earnings in excess of a required return on the book value. All valuation
models require strong assumptions, and this model is no different. How-
ever, some valuation models are more sensitive to the assumptions which
are made than others. In the case of the model presented in Equation 1,
the assumptions required fall into two broad categories: assumptions made
by the theory underlying the model, and assumptions required during im-
plementation of the model. The key assumptions made by the theory
underlying the residual income model are that clean surplus accounting
applies, that current period dividends decrease book value but not cur-
rent earnings, and that there is autoregression of the abnormal earnings.
Clean surplus accounting means that all changes in book value arise from
earnings less net dividends, where net dividends refers to the amount of
dividends net of capital contributions. A discussion of the assumptions
required during the implementation of the model is particularly relevant,
as measures of mispricing are subject to the nature of the implementation
assumptions made when the intrinsic value of a firm’s equity is calculated.
Thus, an introduction to those implementation assumptions is in order.
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When considering the empirical implementation of the model in Equa-
tion 1, obviously book values, earnings, and discount rates are required.
To determine the sensitivity of the equity valuation model in Equation 1
to different specifications of book value and earnings, two approaches are
used in this study. The first approach uses realized book values per share
and earnings per share before extraordinary items. The second approach
abandons the use of per share data and values all of a firm’s common equity
by using realized aggregate book values and realized measures of earnings.
In addition, the second approach also uses a different definition of book
value compared to the first approach. The earnings estimate the second ap-
proach uses excludes depreciation and amortization expenses, among other
things.
In the quest for a robust measure of mispricing consideration must be
given to the cost of equity required by the model displayed in Equation
1. Eight different cost of equity specifications are used to determine the
sensitivity of the valuation measures to the choice of the cost of equity.
Additional details regarding the cost of equity figures are discussed in the
Methodology section.
Implementation of the model in Equation 1 requires that a finite period
of time be used. This produces two interrelated issues. First, the choice of a
finite time horizon limits the amount of information included in the model.
Fortunately, because this model is based upon excess earnings instead of
total dividends, cash flows, or earnings, this choice is of less concern for
this model than for some other models. Second, the use of a finite time
horizon requires a terminal value estimation in the place of the infinite
series of excess earnings. Importantly, the terminal value estimation is of
less significance for the excess earnings approach employed than for several
other valuation models. This is the case because the terminal value for this
model incorporates the estimated earnings in excess of the required return,
not the full future earnings, cash flows, or dividends used by some models.
When mispricing measures are calculated using the estimated intrin-
sic values derived from the different model specifications briefly described
above, the results are found to be quite robust. The different model speci-
fications are used to assign firm level observations to valuation deciles. The
valuation deciles are highly correlated across model specifications, decile
assignment methods, and market conditions. This finding, in combination
with the theoretical underpinnings of the model, suggests that the rela-
tive valuation measures developed may be used to address other areas of
research affected by mispricing.
The remaining sections of this essay are organized as follows. Section
1.2 reviews the relevant literature pertaining to the excess earnings ap-
proach to firm valuation. The methodology used in the implementation of
the valuation model to determine firm value and the methodology used in
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the calculation of the valuation measures to determine mispricing are pre-
sented in Section 1.3. The empirical results for the valuation measures and
their robustness across the different specifications are discussed in Section
1.4. The relative valuation measures derived are applied to a sample of
acquisitions to confirm that the results obtained are consistent with prior
literature and to further examine the relationship between relative over-
valuation and acquisitions. Those results are presented in Section 1.5, and
Section 1.6 concludes this essay.
1.2 Valuation Literature Review
In this section the literature relevant to the excess earnings approach to
firm valuation is reviewed. Although the approach has been in use for
nearly a century in one form or another, some of the most significant the-
oretical work was done in the mid-1990s. Despite the passage of time,
some gaps in knowledge about the model remain, particularly in the area
of how different model specifications such as discount rates and alternative
measures of earnings and book values affect relative estimates of valuation.
The review of the literature is mostly laid out in chronological order after
a brief discussion of the reasons behind the selection of the residual income
model.
As discussed in the Introduction, there are other common valuation
models available which use discounted dividends or cash flow. Importantly,
Ohlson (1995) showed that with clean surplus accounting and autoregres-
sion of the abnormal earnings the residual income model may be derived
from the common dividend discount approach to firm valuation. How-
ever, the residual income model has a few features which make it more
attractive to implement than various other models. First, the residual in-
come model does not require that a firm pay dividends, which circumvents
a difficulty associated with implementations of dividend discount models.
Second, combining book value with the discounting of abnormal or excess
earnings instead of discounting total cash flow or dividends makes the resid-
ual income model less sensitive to truncation of the period of time used
in the model. In effect, the terminal value calculation required in finite
implementations carries less weight for the residual income model than it
does for models based upon cash flow or dividends. Third, Penman and
Sougiannis (1998) found that models based upon accruals earnings, such
as the residual income model, did a better job of matching observed stock
prices over finite time horizons than other dividend or cash flow models of
valuation. Fourth, the residual income model tends to minimize the impact
of overstating or understating revenues or expenses in a given period. If
earnings are overstated in one period, leading to higher excess earnings in
that period, the book value used in the next period to calculate the excess
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earnings for the residual income model will be higher, shifting the esti-
mated excess earnings in the second period in a downward direction which
at least partially offsets the initial overstatement of earnings for the first
period. These desirable characteristics of the residual income model com-
pared to dividend and cash flow models led to the selection of the residual
income model for use in this study.
Some of the earliest literature which eventually led to the valuation
approach utilized in this essay focused on attempts to value goodwill and
other intangibles. One of the earliest discussions of the business valuation
of goodwill appeared in the Appeals and Revenue Memorandum 34 from
the I.R.S. (United States Treasury Department (1920)). In that publica-
tion, as well as in other early publications, the focus on goodwill stems
from the attempt to quantify the value contributed by the goodwill or
other intangibles in excess of the value contributed by the tangible assets.
Earnings produced by an enterprise in excess of a normal rate of return
on the tangible assets were attributed to the intangible assets and capi-
talized to determine the value of the intangible assets. Preinreich (1936)
discussed the historical legal developments associated with goodwill and
connected the value of goodwill to excess profits and excess return on
investment. While exploring the implications of depreciation methods,
Preinreich (1938) provided a valuation formula for assets regardless of the
book value and depreciation method used–and the formula provided uti-
lized the book value of the asset and the present value of excess profits
derived from the asset.
In the case of capital budgeting, Peasnell (1981) sought to connect
asset valuations based upon a discounted cash flow approach with valua-
tions based upon accounting profits. If income is interpreted as a profit
in excess of the cost of capital return, Peasnell (1981) showed that the
standard discounted cash flow approach could be transformed into an ap-
proach based upon accounting profits. In a related article, Peasnell (1982)
showed that the net present value of an asset could be defined in terms
of a form of accounting profit in excess of the opportunity cost of capital.
Specifically, finding the economic value of an asset is possible using clean
surplus accounting profits and the appropriate adjustment to account for
capital valuation errors. Clean surplus accounting means that all changes
in book value arise from earnings less net dividends, where net dividends
refers to the amount of dividends net of capital contributions. This abil-
ity to find the economic value of assets by using clean surplus accounting
profits provides a very useful demonstration of the natural link between ac-
counting figures and asset valuation in the capital budgeting case and also
in broader asset valuation cases such as the valuation of common equity.
Penman (1991) found that market-to-book ratios were informative about
the persistence of return on equity (ROE), which has implications for firm
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valuation in the context of excess profit valuation models. Firms with
higher market-to-book ratios were found to be slower to experience re-
version to the median ROE if the beginning ROE was high as well as
faster to experience reversion to the median ROE if the beginning ROE
was low. After discussing the difficulties facing discounted dividend val-
uation models due to the arbitrary nature of dividends and the problems
discounted cash flow valuation models involve by requiring infinite fore-
casts, Penman (1992) focused upon valuation approaches pricing current
earnings with the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio and pricing book values
with the price-to-book (P/B) ratio. When pricing book values, Penman
(1992) emphasized implications of the excess earnings approach to valua-
tion. Specifically, the residual income model indicates that the difference
between price per share and book value per share should be equal to the
present value of the excess, or abnormal, earnings. Penman (1992) also
pointed out one implication of the residual income model is that the ex-
pected growth in book value should drive the connection between price and
current book value. Interestingly, Penman (1992) proposed using different
combinations of P/E and P/B ratios to tease out more refined implications
than those which are provided by either measure alone. In this framework,
P/E ratios are indicative of the level of projected future earnings relative
to present earnings while P/B ratios are indicative of the level of projected
future earnings relative to what book values would be expected to produce.
A series of papers in 1995 examined some of the theoretical underpin-
nings of the excess earnings approach to valuation and its implications.
Ohlson (1995) began with a discounted dividends approach to valuation
and showed that the excess earnings approach to valuation could be de-
rived if clean surplus accounting is assumed, if current dividends reduce
book value but not current earnings, and if the abnormal earnings follow
an autoregressive process. Furthermore, Ohlson (1995) showed that if cur-
rent dividends are assumed to reduce current book values but not current
earnings, then the excess earnings valuation model also possesses the prop-
erty that dividends are irrelevant to the value of the firm as discussed in
Miller and Modigliani (1961). Feltham and Ohlson (1995) showed that
the change in price resulting from a change in earnings is larger for ac-
crued earnings than for cash earnings when the excess earnings valuation
approach is used and the accounting is conservative. Feltham and Ohlson
(1995) defined conservative accounting to be when market value exceeds
book value on average. In addition, Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) analysis
revealed that a larger change in price would result from changes in either
accrued or cash earnings if excess earnings were more persistent.
Articles focusing upon the application of the excess earnings approach
and addressing questions raised by the approach were also published in
1995. If the excess earnings valuation approach is to be used, the forecast
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horizon which is necessary for the model should be examined. When Value
Line forecasts of earnings for one, two, and four years into the future were
used in regressions of price upon the components of an excess earnings
model, Bernard (1995) found that even a four year time horizon lacking a
forecast for year three could explain nearly 70% of the variation in stock
prices. In an article discussing common questions about the models used
by Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995), Lundholm (1995) ad-
dressed issues pertaining to nonaccounting information, dividend signaling,
and the effects of the linear information assumption. An example showed
that nonaccounting information is incorporated in the model via future
earnings. Lundholm (1995) also showed that in the Ohlson model the ef-
fect of dividend signaling upon the stock price is secondary to the impact
of the dividend upon the stock price due to the reduction in available as-
sets used to generate future earnings. Thus, the excess earnings approach
to valuation is not inconsistent with the existence of dividend signaling.
Although the linear information assumption is not necessary for the ap-
plication of the model, Lundholm (1995) demonstrated by example that
the presence of that assumption is necessary to make the dividend policy
irrelevant. Interestingly, Lundholm (1995) noted that to the extent that
conservative accounting consists of understating book value, offsetting in-
creases in excess earnings should be created in the future when the excess
earnings valuation approach is used. However, the Feltham-Ohlson model
was noted as not being robust to some other definitions of conservative
accounting.
A study by Penman and Sougiannis (1998) compared various dividend,
cash flow, and earnings based valuation methods and found that methods
based upon accrual earnings more closely matched observed stock prices
over finite time horizons. In the course of comparing the different methods,
Penman and Sougiannis (1998) utilized an efficient market framework by
measuring valuation accuracy relative to observed prices. The methods
based upon accrual earnings generally exhibit their widest deviation from
observed prices at particularly high or low book-to-price (B/P) or earnings-
to-price (E/P) values.
In a study examining the connections between current ROE, future
ROE, P/B, and P/E ratios, Penman (1996) found that the P/B is related
to future residual income. This result is consistent with the excess earn-
ings approach to valuation. Because of the connection between P/B and
future residual income, P/B is related to future ROE. On the other hand,
Penman (1996) found that E/P ratios did not demonstrate the same level
of relationship to future residual income. Rather, E/P ratios are related
to the difference between present and future ROE values.
In a particularly interesting application of an excess earnings valuation
approach, O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) developed a model using a resid-
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ual income approach over a historical period to determine the economic
value created during that period. The authors noted that one significant
application of this approach would be to combine it with value-based man-
agement. Significantly, in this framework the economic value created may
be calculated by only resorting to an examination of the residual incomes.
An excess earnings valuation approach dependent upon a no arbitrage
condition and clean surplus accounting was detailed by Feltham and Ohlson
(1999). In this updated approach to the earlier models by Ohlson (1995)
and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) the authors moved away from the assump-
tion of risk neutrality. Feltham and Ohlson (1999) noted that the use of
risk-adjusted discount rates, although serviceable in practice, lacked the-
oretical support in the context of the excess earnings valuation approach.
The issue of the impact of the truncation of the period examined when
using the excess earnings valuation approach instead of a cash flow valua-
tion model was also addressed. In applying the excess earnings approach to
valuation, truncation is less problematic if the value of the operating assets
on the books is sufficiently similar to market value and if the value of the
abnormal earnings tend to zero as the time horizon becomes long (Feltham
and Ohlson (1999)). Ohlson (2005) proposed a further modification to the
excess earnings approach to valuation by suggesting that the book values
in the formula be replaced by capitalized earnings. This approach avoids
complications associated with determining the proper book value per share
which may result from the issuance or repurchase of shares and from other
causes of ambiguity regarding the proper measure of book value per share.
The various propositions included in Ohlson’s (2005) study also suggested
that shifting towards the use of capitalized earnings instead of book values
in the excess earnings formula should never result in a worse model.
As the preceding literature review shows, the residual income model has
several very desirable properties as a base valuation model. Ohlson (1995)
showed that with clean surplus accounting and autoregression of the excess
earnings the excess earnings approach to firm valuation is equivalent to the
dividend discount approach. Even with a four year time horizon lacking
year three Bernard (1995) found that a residual income model using Value
Line data could explain a significant portion of variation in stock prices.
The reliance upon excess earnings in the model instead of total earnings
or dividends reduces the effect of the terminal value calculation in finite
period implementations, leading to better performance despite truncation,
as documented by Penman and Sougiannis (1998). However, the impact of
alternative cost of equity and earnings and book value specifications upon
relative valuation measures derived from the model remains to be seen,
and that gap in knowledge is what this study seeks to address.
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1.3 Valuation Methodology
The valuation methodology has been divided into two sections: a section
addressing the calculation of the intrinsic value estimates for firms and
a section detailing the calculation of the valuation error measures. The
intrinsic value estimates are calculated using eight different discount rate
specifications and two different measures of earnings and book values. Es-
timated intrinsic values are then used to calculate valuation error measures
as detailed in the second section. Valuation errors or mispricing naturally
lie along a spectrum. Shares of equity selling at market prices less than in-
trinsic value are undervalued, and shares of equity selling at market prices
greater than intrinsic value are overvalued. However, as intrinsic values
are estimated with uncertainty no matter what model is used, the precise
tipping point between undervalued and overvalued equities is unclear. Nev-
ertheless, with the approach used in this study the valuation measures are
quite clear about which equities are relatively more overvalued or underval-
ued even if the precise tipping point between undervalued and overvalued
is murky for individual equities. Therefore, in the context of this study, be-
cause undervaluation and overvaluation refer to opposite ends of the same
unified valuation spectrum, the most overvalued firms are considered to
be the least undervalued, and vice versa. Consequently, overvaluation is
frequently used to refer to the spectrum of valuation generally for the sake
of convenience.
1.3.1 Calculation of Firm Value
As this study focuses upon the spectrum of valuation ranging from un-
dervaluation to overvaluation, the calculation of firm value is one of the
study’s most important aspects. As noted in the Introduction and Moti-
vation section, an excess earnings approach to firm valuation is utilized.
When implementing the valuation model in Equation 1, various choices
may be made regarding the earnings, book values, discount rates, and
time horizon to use in the abnormal earnings valuation model. Because
the focus of this study is upon determining relative overvaluation, realized
historical values are used for the book values and the earnings figures in
the model instead of relying upon forecasts. This choice of historical, or
realized, results is driven by the focus in this study upon measuring the
intrinsic value of firms in order to assess the extent to which firms were
overvalued or undervalued. In a study by Brown and Cliff (2005) examining
overvaluation and investor sentiment the authors note that the valuation
methodology based on analysts’ forecasts used by Lee, Myers, and Swami-
nathan (1999) produced an intrinsic value measure which responded to
investor sentiment. Estimates of intrinsic value based upon analysts’ fore-
casts are therefore problematic when the true intrinsic value of the firm
14
is desired because sentiment and other biases can influence analysts’ fore-
casts. Put differently, this essay uses historical earnings and book value
figures for the simple reason that the outcomes have actually occurred,
the figures have been audited, and the numbers have been reported–the
earnings and book value numbers used in the model are not projections of
outcomes but actual known outcomes.
Earnings figures, book values per share, and other company data are
obtained from COMPUSTAT through Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). In effect, perfect foresight is assumed to facilitate more direct
measurement of overvaluation and undervaluation. Several types of com-
panies are dropped from further analyses. All valuation data for utilities,
banking, insurance, real estate, and financial trading firms is dropped.
Also, valuation data for all firms with SIC codes from 4950–4991 is dropped,
resulting in the elimination of the miscellaneous sanitary services, steam
and air conditioning supply, irrigation systems, and cogeneration firms with
those SIC codes. Finally, firms with missing SIC codes are dropped. For
firms in the sample with SIC codes the dropped firms correspond to indus-
try groups 31 and 45–49 using the 49 industry groupings available through
Professor French’s website. Following the approach by D’Mello and Shroff
(2000) to perform a finite implementation of the residual income model pre-
sented in Equation 1 produces the valuation formula in Equation 2 which
is applied to the remaining firms in the sample. Equation 2 is as follows:
IVt = BV PSt +
5∑
i=1
EPSt+i − (r ∗BV PSt+i−1)
(1 + r)i
+
TV
r ∗ (1 + r)5 (2)
In Equation 2 the present values of the excess earnings are determined
for a five year time horizon. Because the emphasis in this study is upon
determining overvaluation and undervaluation relative to known earnings
and book value outcomes, annual data is used over the five year time hori-
zon. Annual financial statements are subject to external audits, thereby
increasing the quality of the figures used in the calculation of the intrinsic
value of the firms in the sample following Equation 2. It is important to
note that a finite time horizon implementation of the excess earnings ap-
proach produces representative results using a time horizon with as few as
four years, as noted by Bernard (1995). Furthermore, Feltham and Ohlson
(1999) showed in a theoretical paper that the excess earnings approach
is less affected by truncation if excess earnings tend to zero and if oper-
ating asset book values reasonably approximate market values. In both
cases the importance of the excess earnings terms in the residual income
model is diminished if the conditions are met, producing the result that
an estimated intrinsic value based on a truncated time period can more
accurately approximate the true intrinsic value of a firm despite the trun-
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cation. According to Feltham and Ohlson (1999), this result favors the
residual income approach over a typical cash flow approach, which is not
normally expected to have future cash flows which tend towards zero and
which is not based upon excess cash flows. In an implementation of the
residual income model similar to the one used in this essay, D’Mello and
Shroff (2000) used a five year perfect foresight model with an adjustment
treating the average excess earnings from the last two years of the time
horizon as a perpetuity. This study mirrors that general approach in many
respects. The terminal value calculation is presented below:
TV = {[EPS4 − (r ∗BV PS3)] + [EPS5 − (r ∗BV PS4)]}/2 (3)
To avoid introducing a survivorship bias, firms are not required to have
earnings or book value data for the full valuation period. Consequently,
the intrinsic value of firms with four or fewer years of available data is
calculated by applying the available data to the valuation formula to the
extent possible. As in D’Mello and Shroff (2000), negative terminal values
are set to zero.
A few points of clarification are necessary regarding the implementation
of the model presented in Equation 2. For the purposes of this study,
earnings per share excluding extraordinary items is used as the measure
of EPS. As extraordinary items include such things as costs pertaining to
natural disasters or unforeseeable events which are random, unpredictable,
and unrelated to a company’s line of business, including extraordinary
items in the earnings per share would add random noise to estimates of
overvaluation and undervaluation. Because realized outcomes are used
in this study, adjustments to account for stock splits, etc. are made to
the earnings per share and the book values per share in order to keep
the values used comparable during the finite time horizon in Equation 2.
Similar adjustments are made to the reported market values used in the
calculation of the valuation errors. When implementing Equation 2, only
firms with positive book values per share are utilized. However, because
realized earnings per share and book values per share are used, calculated
firm values per share can be negative if a firm produces sufficiently large
negative abnormal earnings over the finite time horizon. Because negative
calculated firm values for a given point in time include information about
the relative degree of mispricing of the firm’s shares in the market at that
same point in time, negative calculated firm values are allowed to remain
in the sample.
Following methodology similar to D’Mello and Shroff (2000), the cost
of capital value, r in Equation 2, is found using a Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) approach and a Fama-French three factor model approach.
For the CAPM approach, daily return data from the Center for Research in
16
Security Prices (CRSP) and obtained through WRDS is used to calculate
β from the year ending eleven days prior to the data date for the fiscal data
in COMPUSTAT for each stock. A minimum of one hundred daily return
observations is required for the estimated β coefficient to be considered
valid. As in D’Mello and Shroff (2000), the aggregate coefficient method
outlined by Dimson (1979) and modified by Fowler and Rorke (1983) is
utilized when calculating the β for each firm using the daily return data.
The use of daily return data with the CAPM approach enables the estima-
tion of β, and therefore the cost of capital value, r, using company-specific
returns over a time frame which is much closer to the valuation date than if
monthly data were used. The expected market risk premium is calculated
by taking the arithmetic average of the spread between the trailing annual
value-weighted market return from CRSP and the yield for 5-year constant
maturity treasuries using a rolling ten year window ending one month prior
to the valuation date for each company in each year. The beginning of the
first ten year window is April of 1954. The yield for the 5-year constant
maturity Treasuries from the month prior to the valuation date for each
company in each year is used as the riskless rate, with the maturity period
consequently matching the number of years used in the valuation model
described in Equation 2. Finally, the annual discount rate, r, is found using
Equation 4. Subscripts for time and company have been suppressed.
r = rf + (MRPaverage)β (4)
Next, a firm-specific cost of equity capital is created using the Fama-
French three-factor model. The Fama-French approach employed uses
monthly data instead of daily data, adding another dimension of vari-
ability in the discount rate methods employed. The additional variability
in methodology is desirable as assessing the robustness of the relative val-
uation measures to alternative specifications is one of the main focuses
of this essay. Five years of monthly returns for each stock are regressed
upon the three Fama-French factors to determine the sensitivity of each
security to each factor. The five year period for each regression ends one
month prior to the end of the valuation month. Arithmetic averages of
the monthly values for each of the three factors are generated using rolling
ten year windows ending one month prior to the valuation date, and those
averages are used as the expected values for the three factors. The first
month of the first rolling ten year window is January of 1950. Data for the
Fama-French factors is from WRDS courtesy of Professor French’s website.
The one month Treasury bill rate from the month preceding the valuation
month is used as the riskless rate to remain consistent with the calcula-
tion of the excess return on the market factor in the Fama-French data
provided courtesy of Professor French’s website. Monthly cost of equity
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figures are calculated using Equation 5. The resulting monthly expected
return for each security is annualized to find the cost of equity capital ac-
cording to the three-factor model. Subscripts for time and company have
been suppressed in Equation 5.
r = rf + (MRPaverage)β1 + (SMBaverage)β2 + (HMLaverage)β3 (5)
Cost of equity capital figures generated using the CAPM and the Fama-
French three factor model which are outside the range of 3–30% are win-
sorized to lie at the boundary of the range. This is the procedure followed
by Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) when using an analysts’
forecasts valuation model.
To allay concerns about the use of cost of equity capital rates which
themselves presume the validity of a particular model, two additional ob-
servable and market determined time varying rates are applied to all valua-
tions. The first is Moody’s aggregate monthly BAA bond interest rate, and
the second is Moody’s aggregate monthly AAA bond interest rate. Because
these rates are not company specific, rates from the valuation month are
used in the valuation. Both rates are obtained from FRED data provided
by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
The assumption of perfect foresight for the earnings per share and book
values per share while only using cost of equity capital rates contempora-
neous with, or prior to, the valuation date could seem inconsistent. To
address these concerns and to further explore the sensitivity of the main
valuation model in Equation 7 to alternative applications of the cost of
equity capital, appropriate future cost of equity values are also utilized in
addition to the methodology described previously. For this implementa-
tion the abnormal earnings terms are calculated using cost of equity rates
which apply at the time of the earnings. The same four approaches to
the cost of equity discussed previously are employed. Using the CAPM
rate as an example of the future cost of equity capital approach, a firm’s
abnormal earnings term for the end of the first year is found using the
CAPM rate derived from the year ending eleven days before the earnings
for the first year in the model. Similarly, the CAPM rate derived from the
year ending eleven days before the second year of earnings is used in the
abnormal earnings term for the second year. The same approach is applied
to subsequent years as well under this methodology. This approach better
aligns the cost of equity rates used in each abnormal earnings term with
the time period of the excess earnings, and thus this approach is consistent
with perfect foresight on the valuation date applying to the discount rates
in addition to the earnings and book values in the model. When using the
future Fama-French cost of equity rates the rate applied to each of the fu-
ture abnormal earnings terms is the rate derived from the five year period
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ending one month prior to the appropriate year’s earnings. In other words,
the cost of equity used for the abnormal earnings term for year one is the
Fama-French cost of equity estimated using the five year period ending
in the month prior to the earnings used in that abnormal earnings term.
The same convention applies to the other abnormal earnings terms in the
model. For the two aggregate bond interest rate approaches each abnormal
earnings term uses the aggregate bond interest rate for the month associ-
ated with the earnings. Due to the four static discount rates discussed
previously and the use of the four future discount rate methods described
a total of eight different implementations of the five year model presented
in Equation 2 are produced.
To further explore the robustness of the excess earnings approach an-
other version of the model presented in Equation 2 is utilized. Instead of
using earnings per share before extraordinary items, this valuation model
uses an approach based upon EBITDA with various subtractions. There
are two primary differences between the EBDA measure of earnings pre-
sented in Equation 6 and the measure of earnings used in Equation 2. First,
the measure of earnings presented in Equation 6 uses an aggregate measure
of earnings instead of a measure of earnings per share. This generates a
firm level estimate of intrinsic value when used in Equation 7 instead of a
per share estimate of intrinsic value, sidestepping any share related issues
which might arise when using per share data despite using the proper ad-
justments to keep per share data comparable over time. Second, the EBDA
measure of earnings excludes depreciation and amortization. A number of
firms have negative estimated intrinsic values when Equation 2 is used.
By ignoring depreciation and amortization the EBDA measure of earnings
produces estimates of intrinsic value which are less likely to be negative,
providing a means to validate the calculation of negative intrinsic values
derived from the per share methodology. The use of the EBDA measure as
an alternative input when calculating intrinsic value also makes it possible
to test the robustness of the relative valuation measures derived from the
intrinsic value estimates to alternative specifications of earnings and book
values. The EBDA measure of earnings is presented below.
EBDA = EBITDA−XINT − TXT −DV P (6)
In the above equation XINT is the total interest and related expense, TXT
is the total income taxes, and DVP is the total preferred dividends. Also,
the firm’s book value for this model is calculated following the approach to
book value used by Fama and French (1993). The resulting valuation model
is presented in Equation 7, and the relevant terminal value calculation is
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presented in equation 8.
eIVt = BVt +
5∑
i=1
EBDAt+i − (r ∗BVt+i−1)
(1 + r)i
+
TV
r ∗ (1 + r)5 (7)
TV = {[EBDA4 − (r ∗BV3)] + [EBDA5 − (r ∗BV4)]}/2 (8)
The static CAPM, Fama-French, and two Moody’s bond rates described
previously are also used as the discount rates with the implementation of
the excess earnings model presented in Equation 7. This results in four base
variants of the model displayed in Equation 7. As this implementation of
the excess earnings model values all of a firm’s common equity instead of
the value per share, the resulting eIV measure is compared to the total
market value of common equity instead of the price per share. As with
the EPS based model, appropriate future discount rates are employed as
well. This adds another four variants of the eIV measures of firm value.
The same procedure for the future discount rates applied to the regular IV
model is employed for the future discount rates used with the eIV model.
1.3.2 Calculation of Firm Specific Overvaluation Measures
The IV and eIV measures discussed in the prior section are used to cal-
culate corresponding measures of firm specific overvaluation. The main
measure of firm specific overvaluation is calculated using this formula:
V ERRt =
Pt − IVt
Pt
(9)
In Equation 9, Pt represents the market price per share reported for the
end of the valuation month. Market prices are adjusted to account for the
effects of stock splits, etc. The VERR measure of firm specific overvalu-
ation therefore finds the deviation of the market price per share from the
intrinsic value of the firm per share scaled by the market price per share.
The market price is used in the denominator of the VERR measure instead
of scaling by the IVt to address the problem of negative estimated intrinsic
values. For firms with positive intrinsic values, VERR values greater than
zero theoretically represent overvaluation, and VERR values less than zero
theoretically represent undervaluation. Firms with negative intrinsic val-
ues should be overvalued at any price, and using the market price in the
denominator in the VERR calculation preserves the meaning of the VERR
measure’s directionality and magnitude for firms with negative intrinsic
values.
The formula for finding the firm specific market valuation error using
the EBITDA based approach is analogous to the VERR formula. It is
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presented below:
eV ERRt =
MVt − eIVt
MVt
(10)
For this valuation measure adjusting for stock splits is not necessary as
the full market value of the firm’s common equity is employed to match
the firm value calculated by the eIVt measure. In the same manner as
above, positive eVERR measures theoretically correspond to overvaluation
in this framework, and negative eVERR measures theoretically correspond
to undervaluation.
The number of observations for the VERR measure with valid valuation
data and the time horizon involved varies slightly with the cost of equity
approach employed. For the static CAPM cost of equity the final VERR
sample spans the 1964–2009 period and includes 134,205 firm years. The
static Fama-French cost of equity approach produces a final VERR sample
of 117,523 firm years with valid valuation data over the 1960–2009 period.
Both of the static aggregate bond interest rate approaches to the VERR
calculation result in 135,054 firm years spanning the 1960–2009 period. The
static CAPM methodology produces VERR data over a smaller number of
years due to the use of the 5-year constant maturity Treasuries as the
riskless rate in the CAPM equation and in the calculation of the market
risk premium. As expected, the use of the future discount rate approach
discussed previously has an impact upon the number of firm years for the
CAPM and Fama-French methodologies used in the VERR calculation.
The future CAPM discount rate approach results in a VERR sample size of
130,828 firm years over the 1964–2009 period, while the future Fama-French
discount rate approach produces a final VERR sample of 117,364 firm years
over the 1960–2009 period. The number of firm years and sample period
are unchanged for the two future aggregate bond interest rate approaches
to the VERR calculation.
The number of observations for the eVERR measure with valid val-
uation data and the time horizon involved also varies slightly with the
cost of equity approach employed. For the static CAPM cost of equity
the final eVERR sample spans the 1964–2009 period and includes 122,044
firm years. The static Fama-French cost of equity approach produces a
final eVERR sample of 106,831 firm years with valid valuation data over
the 1960–2009 period. Both of the static aggregate bond interest rate ap-
proaches to the eVERR calculation result in 122,364 firm years spanning
the 1960–2009 period. The static CAPM methodology produces eVERR
data over a smaller number of years due to the use of the 5-year constant
maturity Treasuries as the riskless rate in the CAPM equation and in the
calculation of the market risk premium. As expected, the use of the fu-
ture discount rate approach discussed previously has an impact upon the
number of firm years for the CAPM and Fama-French methodologies used
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in the eVERR calculation. The future CAPM discount rate approach re-
sults in a eVERR sample size of 119,265 firm years over the 1964–2009
period, while the future Fama-French discount rate approach produces a
final eVERR sample of 106,697 firm years over the 1960–2009 period. The
number of firm years and sample period are unchanged for the two future
aggregate bond interest rate approaches to the eVERR calculation.
1.4 Valuation Results and Robustness
Table 1 presents the proportion of negative IV or eIV produced by the
excess earnings models when the intrinsic firm values are calculated. Re-
sults are organized by valuation model and discount rate. As discussed
previously, the four discount rates consist of a CAPM discount rate, a
Fama-French discount rate, and two discount rates using Moody’s aggre-
gate monthly bond interest rates. To denote the intrinsic values calculated
using the appropriate future discount rates to find the present values of
the future abnormal earnings the suffix F5 is used. To explore the nature
of the negative intrinsic values in more detail the intrinsic value measures
are subdivided by long-term debt. Long-term debt is used to subdivide the
intrinsic values for three reasons. First, long-term debt has a longer time
horizon which should more closely match the longer time horizon used
in the valuation model than short-term debt would. Second, long-term
lenders should exert a monitoring influence upon firms in order to protect
the value of their loans, and the monitoring influence should produce lower
proportions of negative intrinsic values among long-term borrowers when
intrinsic values are estimated using actual earnings and book value out-
comes. Third, potential lenders should be more wary of making long-term
loans to firms with shaky long-term prospects, indicating that the propor-
tion of firms with negative intrinsic values should be higher among firms
without long-term debt. The FS sample represents the full IV and eIV in-
trinsic value sample using the discount rate specified for the row. The LTD
sample represents only those observations consisting of intrinsic values for
firms which report some amount of long term debt in COMPUSTAT on
the valuation date. Data for NLTD observations in Table 1 represent the
proportion of intrinsic value observations for which the reported amount of
long term debt in COMPUSTAT is zero. Finally, some calculated intrinsic
values correspond to firms with missing values for the long term debt field
in COMPUSTAT. Those observations are denoted by MLTD.
Naturally, a negative IV or eIV value implies an overvalued firm. For
the IV model of the value of a share of a firm’s stock the portion of the
sample with negative IV values is less than 14% in all cases. As one might
expect, the highest proportion of negative eIV values is slightly below the
highest proportion of negative IV values. This no doubt results from the
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Table 1
Proportion of Negative IV and eIV Values
The cost of equity approaches used in the calculation of the IV and eIV are
presented in the left column, with capm5 referring to the use of the static CAPM
discount rate and the five year implementation of the IV or eIV valuation model.
The capmF5 refers to the use of future CAPM rates to discount the future excess
earnings portion of the IV or eIV valuation model. Similar interpretations apply
to the other discount methods listed in the table.
The data for each discount method is subdivided into four rows by total long-
term debt (LTD). The FS sample includes all observations using the specified
discount method, the LTD sample includes only valuation observations for com-
panies which reported positive long-term debt at the time of valuation, the
NLTD sample includes only observations for firms which reported zero long-
term debt at the time of valuation, and the MLTD sample includes the re-
maining observations for companies with missing total long-term debt values in
COMPUSTAT at the time of valuation. Finally, the PctNeg, calculated for both
the IV and eIV, reports the percentage of negative IV and eIV observations
out of the total number of observations for the specified discount method and
total long-term debt sample.
IV eIV
LTD Tobs NegObs PctNeg Tobs NegObs PctNeg
capm5 FS 134,205 10,969 8.17 122,044 7,511 6.15
capm5 LTD 110,440 7,876 7.13 100,815 5,070 5.03
capm5 NLTD 23,536 3,068 13.04 20,996 2,424 11.55
capm5 MLTD 229 25 10.92 233 17 7.30
ff5 FS 117,523 8,300 7.06 106,831 5,758 5.39
ff5 LTD 97,490 6,015 6.17 88,894 3,949 4.44
ff5 NLTD 19,830 2,266 11.43 17,729 1,798 10.14
ff5 MLTD 203 19 9.36 208 11 5.29
baa5 FS 135,054 10,415 7.71 122,364 7,060 5.77
baa5 LTD 111,132 7,495 6.74 101,075 4,795 4.74
baa5 NLTD 23,693 2,896 12.22 21,056 2,250 10.69
baa5 MLTD 229 24 10.48 233 15 6.44
aaa5 FS 135,054 10,314 7.64 122,364 6,950 5.68
aaa5 LTD 111,132 7,421 6.68 101,075 4,717 4.67
aaa5 NLTD 23,693 2,869 12.11 21,056 2,219 10.54
aaa5 MLTD 229 24 10.48 233 14 6.01
capmF5 FS 130,828 10,162 7.77 119,265 6,841 5.74
capmF5 LTD 107,991 7,348 6.80 98,786 4,654 4.71
capmF5 NLTD 22,608 2,788 12.33 20,246 2,171 10.72
capmF5 MLTD 229 26 11.35 233 16 6.87
continued on the next page
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Table 1 – continued from the previous page
IV eIV
LTD Tobs NegObs PctNeg Tobs NegObs PctNeg
ffF5 FS 117,364 8,275 7.05 106,697 5,613 5.26
ffF5 LTD 97,390 5,978 6.14 88,803 3,846 4.33
ffF5 NLTD 19,771 2,278 11.52 17,686 1,754 9.92
ffF5 MLTD 203 19 9.36 208 13 6.25
baaF5 FS 135,054 10,415 7.71 122,364 7,024 5.74
baaF5 LTD 111,132 7,497 6.75 101,075 4,775 4.72
baaF5 NLTD 23,693 2,896 12.22 21,056 2,235 10.61
baaF5 MLTD 229 22 9.61 233 14 6.01
aaaF5 FS 135,054 10,299 7.63 122,364 6,903 5.64
aaaF5 LTD 111,132 7,409 6.67 101,075 4,690 4.64
aaaF5 NLTD 23,693 2,866 12.10 21,056 2,199 10.44
aaaF5 MLTD 229 24 10.48 233 14 6.01
exclusion of depreciation and amortization expenses in the calculation of
eIV, among other differences. The results from the IV and eIV models
generally follow the same order in terms of the proportion of negative values
across the different discount approaches. Significantly, the portion of the
sample with some amount of long term debt displays a lower proportion
of negative IV values than those observations in the NLTD category for
each discount approach. The data in Table 1 is therefore consistent with
long-term lenders exerting a monitoring influence and avoiding firms with
shaky prospects since firms with long-term debt exhibit lower proportions
of negative intrinsic values compared to firms without long-term debt. The
fact that the observed pattern in the proportion of negative intrinsic values
matches what is expected indicates that the negative intrinsic values are in
fact capturing meaningful features of companies, and the data is consistent
with long term debt either constraining extreme overvaluation or being less
available to extremely overvalued firms. The same pattern is observed for
the eIV model with the different discount rates.
An examination of Table 1 also reveals that the use of future discount
rates has relatively little effect upon the proportion of negative IV or eIV
values compared to the static discount rate of the same type. Although the
effect is minimal, the use of future discount rates to find the present values
of the excess earnings sometimes results in a smaller proportion of negative
IV or eIV values. This means that the negative IV and eIV values are
typically not the result of using static discount rates.
As negative terminal values are set to zero, an examination of the pro-
portion of the sample affected is appropriate. The data in Table 2 shows
the proportion of the sample for which negative terminal values are initially
calculated before being set to zero. Consistent with what is expected, IV
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Table 2
Proportion of Negative Terminal Values
The cost of equity approaches used in the calculation of the IV and eIV are
presented in the left column, with capm5 referring to the use of the static CAPM
discount rate and the five year implementation of the IV or eIV valuation model.
The capmF5 refers to the use of future CAPM rates to discount the future excess
earnings portion of the IV or eIV valuation model. Similar interpretations apply
to the other discount methods listed in the table.
The data for each discount method is subdivided into four rows by total long-
term debt (LTD). The FS sample includes all observations using the specified
discount method, the LTD sample includes only valuation observations for com-
panies which reported positive long-term debt at the time of valuation, the
NLTD sample includes only observations for firms which reported zero long-
term debt at the time of valuation, and the MLTD sample includes the re-
maining observations for companies with missing total long-term debt values in
COMPUSTAT at the time of valuation. Finally, the PctNeg, calculated for the
terminal values for both the IV and eIV, reports the percentage of negative
terminal values subsequently set to zero out of the total number of observations
for the specified discount method and total long-term debt sample.
IV eIV
LTD Tobs NegObs PctNeg Tobs NegObs PctNeg
capm5 FS 134,205 54,014 40.25 122,044 30,883 25.30
capm5 LTD 110,440 43,759 39.62 100,815 23,377 23.19
capm5 NLTD 23,536 10,167 43.20 20,996 7,442 35.44
capm5 MLTD 229 88 38.43 233 64 27.47
ff5 FS 117,523 54,153 46.08 106,831 34,105 31.92
ff5 LTD 97,490 45,081 46.24 88,894 27,295 30.71
ff5 NLTD 19,830 8,993 45.35 17,729 6,755 38.10
ff5 MLTD 203 79 38.92 208 55 26.44
baa5 FS 135,054 46,956 34.77 122,364 24,865 20.32
baa5 LTD 111,132 37,864 34.07 101,075 18,588 18.39
baa5 NLTD 23,693 9,023 38.08 21,056 6,232 29.60
baa5 MLTD 229 69 30.13 233 45 19.31
aaa5 FS 135,054 43,557 32.25 122,364 22,880 18.70
aaa5 LTD 111,132 34,930 31.43 101,075 16,942 16.76
aaa5 NLTD 23,693 8,562 36.14 21,056 5,894 27.99
aaa5 MLTD 229 65 28.38 233 44 18.88
capmF5 FS 130,828 50,372 38.50 119,265 27,380 22.96
capmF5 LTD 107,991 41,158 38.11 98,786 20,834 21.09
capmF5 NLTD 22,608 9,138 40.42 20,246 6,491 32.06
capmF5 MLTD 229 76 33.19 233 55 23.61
continued on the next page
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Table 2 – continued from the previous page
IV eIV
LTD Tobs NegObs PctNeg Tobs NegObs PctNeg
ffF5 FS 117,364 53,286 45.40 106,697 32,884 30.82
ffF5 LTD 97,390 44,520 45.71 88,803 26,374 29.70
ffF5 NLTD 19,771 8,692 43.96 17,686 6,454 36.49
ffF5 MLTD 203 74 36.45 208 56 26.92
baaF5 FS 135,054 46,535 34.46 122,364 24,738 20.22
baaF5 LTD 111,132 37,580 33.82 101,075 18,555 18.36
baaF5 NLTD 23,693 8,890 37.52 21,056 6,139 29.16
baaF5 MLTD 229 65 28.38 233 44 18.88
aaaF5 FS 135,054 42,935 31.79 122,364 22,703 18.55
aaaF5 LTD 111,132 34,454 31.00 101,075 16,885 16.71
aaaF5 NLTD 23,693 8,419 35.53 21,056 5,774 27.42
aaaF5 MLTD 229 62 27.07 233 44 18.88
valuations have a higher proportion of negative terminal values than eIV
valuations. This result makes sense due to the fact that IV valuations
exclude more expenses in the earnings figure used in the terminal value
calculation compared to the eIV valuations, thereby resulting in more
negative terminal values. A pattern is evident with the discount rates and
the proportion of negative terminal values. The use of aggregate bond dis-
count rates results in lower proportions of negative IV and eIV valuations
compared to the use of the CAPM or Fama-French discount rates. Since
the expected earnings values in the terminal value calculations become
higher with higher cost of equity estimates, more negative terminal values
for the CAPM and Fama-French cost of equity methods are produced. Al-
though the proportion of negative terminal values in Table 2 ranges from
approximately 17% to over 46%, the results are unsurprising. As the resid-
ual income model is based upon excess earnings, the terminal values in
the model may be negative even if the firm has positive earnings. If the
realized earnings are less than the required return on the equity capital
for the two years used in the terminal value calculation a negative termi-
nal value results, even if the realized earnings are positive. Importantly,
the terminal values are based upon the residual, or abnormal, earnings
instead of total earnings, cash flows, or dividends. This distinction means
that terminal values are much smaller in magnitude compared to the total
estimated value than is the case for discounted cash flow or discounted
dividend models which use the full cash flow or dividends to estimate the
terminal values.
Abbreviated summary statistics for the VERR and eVERR overvalua-
tion measures are presented in Table 3. By construction, an overvaluation
measure equal to zero results when the market value matches the intrinsic
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Table 3
Selected Summary Statistics for Valuation Measures
The cost of equity approaches used are presented in the left column, with capm5 referring to the use of the static CAPM discount
rate and capmF5 referring to the use of future CAPM rates to discount the future excess earnings. Similar interpretations apply to
the other discount methods listed in the table. The selected summary statistics which result from the use of each discount method
are subdivided into four rows by total long-term debt (LTD). The FS sample includes all VERR or eVERR observations using the
specified discount method, the LTD sample includes only valuation observations for companies which reported positive long-term
debt at the time of valuation, the NLTD sample includes only observations for firms which reported zero long-term debt at the time
of valuation, and the MLTD sample includes the remaining observations for companies with missing total long-term debt values in
COMPUSTAT at the time of valuation. Finally, the P05 and P95 columns represent the 5th and 95th percentiles of the VERR or
eVERR overvaluation measure for the specified discount method and total long-term debt sample.
VERR eVERR
LTD Tobs Mean Median P05 P95 Tobs Mean Median P05 P95
capm5 FS 134,205 7.540 0.418 −3.233 1.098 122,044 −0.916 0.083 −5.937 1.054
capm5 LTD 110,440 6.321 0.378 −3.459 1.069 100,815 −1.076 −0.014 −6.417 1.001
capm5 NLTD 23,536 13.329 0.599 −2.059 1.206 20,996 −0.156 0.470 −3.129 1.255
capm5 MLTD 229 0.411 0.663 −1.490 1.144 233 0.128 0.557 −2.024 1.085
ff5 FS 117,523 11.953 0.465 −2.761 1.065 106,831 −0.761 0.181 −5.117 1.018
ff5 LTD 97,490 10.248 0.439 −2.891 1.039 88,894 −0.871 0.117 −5.481 0.974
ff5 NLTD 19,830 20.453 0.586 −2.048 1.180 17,729 −0.218 0.467 −3.212 1.214
ff5 MLTD 203 0.315 0.673 −1.663 1.063 208 −0.024 0.556 −2.927 1.021
continued on the next page
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Table 3 – continued from the previous page
VERR eVERR
LTD Tobs Mean Median P05 P95 Tobs Mean Median P05 P95
baa5 FS 135,054 12.078 0.297 −2.356 1.097 122,364 −0.768 −0.130 −4.549 1.041
baa5 LTD 111,132 10.948 0.254 −2.518 1.066 101,075 −0.914 −0.249 −4.872 0.986
baa5 NLTD 23,693 17.491 0.492 −1.522 1.217 21,056 −0.077 0.318 −2.468 1.263
baa5 MLTD 229 0.393 0.556 −0.850 1.134 233 0.035 0.358 −1.403 1.060
aaa5 FS 135,054 11.763 0.238 −2.887 1.096 122,364 −1.026 −0.244 −5.453 1.038
aaa5 LTD 111,132 10.501 0.190 −3.083 1.065 101,075 −1.193 −0.380 −5.865 0.982
aaa5 NLTD 23,693 17.796 0.455 −1.924 1.222 21,056 −0.236 0.261 −3.001 1.264
aaa5 MLTD 229 0.312 0.525 −1.145 1.137 233 −0.068 0.293 −1.808 1.061
capmF5 FS 130,828 11.107 0.351 −2.560 1.089 119,265 −0.782 −0.037 −4.912 1.037
capmF5 LTD 107,991 9.375 0.313 −2.723 1.061 98,786 −0.926 −0.135 −5.277 0.986
capmF5 NLTD 22,608 19.489 0.529 −1.672 1.200 20,246 −0.086 0.368 −2.679 1.242
capmF5 MLTD 229 0.375 0.582 −1.003 1.148 233 0.009 0.461 −2.162 1.062
ffF5 FS 117,364 12.572 0.416 −2.041 1.069 106,697 −0.543 0.103 −3.873 1.014
ffF5 LTD 97,390 11.473 0.391 −2.129 1.041 88,803 −0.634 0.037 −4.131 0.966
ffF5 NLTD 19,771 18.114 0.541 −1.568 1.180 17,686 −0.094 0.404 −2.451 1.215
ffF5 MLTD 203 0.336 0.614 −1.456 1.054 208 −0.070 0.500 −2.550 1.030
baaF5 FS 135,054 12.848 0.274 −2.341 1.098 122,364 −0.831 −0.167 −4.648 1.040
baaF5 LTD 111,132 11.796 0.228 −2.476 1.066 101,075 −0.975 −0.291 −5.014 0.984
baaF5 NLTD 23,693 17.905 0.480 −1.578 1.220 21,056 −0.149 0.296 −2.608 1.264
baaF5 MLTD 229 0.324 0.523 −0.915 1.137 233 −0.054 0.337 −1.756 1.060
continued on the next page
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Table 3 – continued from the previous page
VERR eVERR
LTD Tobs Mean Median P05 P95 Tobs Mean Median P05 P95
aaaF5 FS 135,054 12.807 0.207 −2.860 1.099 122,364 −1.107 −0.300 −5.608 1.037
aaaF5 LTD 111,132 11.682 0.157 −3.024 1.066 101,075 −1.271 −0.438 −6.012 0.979
aaaF5 NLTD 23,693 18.206 0.436 −2.001 1.224 21,056 −0.329 0.231 −3.251 1.266
aaaF5 MLTD 229 0.223 0.492 −1.249 1.140 233 −0.199 0.270 −2.060 1.062
29
value, and positive overvaluation measures are produced when the market
value exceeds the intrinsic value. For all full VERR samples the mean value
is larger than the median value, and that pattern holds for all of the VERR
subsamples aside from the MLTD subsamples. For all full eVERR samples
the mean value is smaller than the median value, and that pattern holds
for all of the eVERR subsamples. The omission of depreciation and amor-
tization expenses in the calculation of the eIV used in the eVERR formula
tends to increase the eIV intrinsic values on average, accounting for the
lower mean and median values for the eVERR samples and subsamples
compared to the VERR samples and subsamples. Large positive VERR
and eVERR values are generated for firms with negative intrinsic values,
indicating that such firms are overvalued. Similarly, extremely negative
VERR and eVERR values are generated for firms with intrinsic values far
in excess of the market value, indicating that such firms are undervalued.
The similarities in the 5th and 95th percentiles for each of the full VERR
and eVERR samples and also for each of the VERR and eVERR subsam-
ples indicate that the VERR and eVERR measures are generally similar
in scale overall regardless of the discount method or measure of earnings
applied.
Consistent with the proportion of firms with negative IV and eIV re-
sults in Table 1, the results in Table 3 show that observations in the LTD
category appear to be tilted towards less extreme overvaluation compared
to observations in the NLTD category. This is reflected in the lower medi-
ans and lower 5th and 95th percentiles for the VERR and eVERR measures
of overvaluation in the LTD subsample compared to the NLTD subsample.
This pattern remains regardless of the use of static or future discount rates.
Different numbers of total observations are reported in Table 3 for the
different discount methods. Observations are not required to have valid
data for all discount methods to be included in the dataset. For exam-
ple, the full ff5 (Fama-French discount rate and five year perfect foresight
valuation period) sample contains about seventeen thousand fewer observa-
tions than the capm5 (CAPM discount rate and five year perfect foresight
valuation period) sample. This is due to the longer time period required
preceding the valuation date to estimate the Fama-French discount rate us-
ing monthly data compared to estimating the CAPM discount rate using
daily data as described in the methodology section.
The purpose of using several different implementations of the excess
earnings valuation model is to determine the extent to which the model
is robust to different specifications. The data suggests that the use of dif-
ferent discount rates and different measures of earnings produce broadly
similar distributional characteristics for the VERR and eVERR overvalu-
ation measures. The next set of tables further explores the robustness of
the excess earnings model of intrinsic value to alternative specifications of
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discount rates and earnings measures.
To the extent that a range of possible levels of overvaluation exists,
the magnitudes of overvaluation measures are relevant. However, the vari-
ety of specifications used and the fact that every possible valuation model
requires assumptions means that firm specific valuation measures derived
from different underlying valuation specifications may be difficult to com-
pare. For example, underestimating the appropriate discount rate for a
firm with positive excess earnings would tend to make the firm appear
more undervalued than it would appear with a specification involving a
higher discount rate. However, if that underestimation is consistent across
firms, the relative valuation ordering of the firms with each valuation mea-
sure may be largely unaffected despite the error in the numerical valuation
estimate. Furthermore, firms with negative estimated intrinsic values pro-
duce high values of VERR and eVERR, which is a reflection of the fact
that such firms are considered to be highly overvalued at any price given
the negative estimate of the intrinsic value. To address these issues VERR
and eVERR deciles are employed. Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) em-
ployed valuation quantile ranks of a value-to-price ratio when the valuation
measure was used as an explanatory variable to better handle outliers and
nonlinearities. The use of deciles in the present study preserves more of the
information contained in the VERR and eVERR measures than would be
retained with the use of quantiles. One important objective of this study
is to determine the robustness of the valuation model to different specifi-
cations. By using valuation deciles instead of quantiles differences which
result from the various model specifications are easier to delineate than
would be the case if quantiles were used. In short, the use of valuation
deciles instead of quantiles makes finding differences between the model
specifications more likely, which would make the valuation approach em-
ployed appear to be less robust. Consequently, the use of valuation deciles
subjects the different model specifications to a harsher standard than the
use of valuation quantiles would.
For each valuation measure observations with valid valuation data are
assigned to deciles using two different approaches. First, for each valuation
measure all observations for the entire sample period with valid valuation
data are assigned to deciles. Decile one contains the most undervalued
firm years during the entire sample period, and decile ten contains the
most overvalued firm years during the entire sample period. Second, for
each valuation measure decile assignments are made on an annual basis.
For each calendar year all valuation observations for the specified valua-
tion measure are assigned to valuation deciles, with decile one representing
the most undervalued firm observations in that calendar year and decile
ten representing the most overvalued firm observations in that calendar
year. This process is applied to all calendar years with data available for
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the valuation measure. The valuation measure decile assignments gener-
ated by either the full period or annual approach may be compared across
the different model specifications. Such comparisons between decile as-
signments make it possible to determine the level of agreement in relative
valuation between the different valuation specifications without resorting
to absolute comparisons. To perform the decile assignment comparisons
this study uses the correlations between the decile assignments made using
the different valuation measures. Naturally, when performing decile assign-
ment comparisons using decile correlations full sample decile assignments
are compared to other full sample decile assignments, and annual decile
assignments are compared to other annual decile assignments.
The study by Frankel and Lee (1998) related a residual income model to
stock returns. Their methodology used both analysts’ forecasts and histor-
ical return on equity figures to generate different intrinsic value estimates.
As part of the analysis performed, Frankel and Lee (1998) correlated value
ranks with price ranks using Fama-French discount rates. Although the
correlation of price ranks with value ranks is not entirely dissimilar to
the approach used in the present study, it differs in several key respects.
First, current period return on equity figures were used to project book
values and earnings into the future in the Frankel and Lee (1998) study,
while this study employs realized historical values. Second, Frankel and
Lee (1998) correlated value ranks with price ranks while this study corre-
lates overvaluation decile assignments with each other using different model
specifications.
The first set of decile correlations is presented in Table 4. The cor-
relations in Table 4 represent the correlations between decile assignments
made for all observations over the full sample period. Panel A of Table 4
displays the correlations between the different VERR measures. The high-
est decile correlations are 0.99 and involve the use of the constant Moody’s
bond rates or the future Moody’s bond rates to discount the abnormal
earnings in the excess earnings model used in the VERR calculation. The
lowest correlation in Panel A is 0.82 and it is the correlation between
VERR decile assignments based upon the excess earnings model using the
static Fama-French discount rate and the excess earnings model using the
future Moody’s AAA bond interest rates as the discount rates. The use
of a static CAPM discount rate produces nearly the same VERR decile
assignments as the use of the future CAPM discount rates in the valuation
model, with the VERR decile correlation being 0.89. A similar comparison
for the method employing the static Fama-French cost of capital and the
method employing the time-varying Fama-French cost of capital results
in a correlation coefficient of 0.84 for the VERR deciles. Overall, all of
the VERR decile assignments made relative to the full sample period are
highly correlated with each other. Concerns about the specification of the
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Table 4
Correlations Between Valuation Decile Assignments Based on the Full Sample
Observations are assigned to deciles using the VERR and eVERR measures of overvaluation which result from each of the eight
discount methods employed. When making the decile assignments the full sample over the entire period is used to generate the
decile boundaries. Panel A presents the Spearman correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR
measures. Panel B presents the Spearman correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight eVERR measures.
Panel C presents the Spearman correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures and the
eight eVERR measures.
Panel A: VERR Decile Correlations
VERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.90 0.89
ff5 0.87 1.00 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.82
baa5 0.92 0.85 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.87 0.98 0.97
aaa5 0.91 0.85 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.87 0.98 0.98
capmF5 0.89 0.83 0.93 0.93 1.00 0.89 0.92 0.92
ffF5 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.89 1.00 0.87 0.86
baaF5 0.90 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.87 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.89 0.82 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.86 0.99 1.00
continued on the next page
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Table 4 – continued from the previous page
Panel B: eVERR Decile Correlations
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.84 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.80 0.88 0.87
ff5 0.84 1.00 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.78
baa5 0.90 0.82 1.00 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.97 0.97
aaa5 0.89 0.81 0.99 1.00 0.91 0.84 0.97 0.97
capmF5 0.86 0.78 0.92 0.91 1.00 0.86 0.90 0.90
ffF5 0.80 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.86 1.00 0.84 0.84
baaF5 0.88 0.80 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.84 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.87 0.78 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.84 0.99 1.00
Panel C: Decile Correlations Between VERR and eVERR Deciles
VERR
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 0.85 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.69 0.77 0.76
ff5 0.72 0.84 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69
baa5 0.74 0.66 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.68 0.80 0.80
aaa5 0.73 0.66 0.80 0.81 0.74 0.67 0.79 0.80
capmF5 0.72 0.65 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.70 0.76 0.77
ffF5 0.67 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.81 0.71 0.72
baaF5 0.71 0.63 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.66 0.80 0.80
aaaF5 0.69 0.62 0.76 0.78 0.72 0.65 0.79 0.80
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valuation model are alleviated.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the decile correlations for decile assign-
ments based upon the different specifications of discount rates used in the
eIV calculations which form the basis of the eVERR measure. As in Panel
A, the highest decile assignment correlations are between the models em-
ploying the two different static Moody’s discount rates and the two models
employing the future discount rates based upon Moody’s aggregate bond
interest rates. The lowest decile correlation with deciles assigned using
the full sample period is 0.78 and represents the correlation between decile
assignments based upon eVERR measures using the static Fama-French
discount rate and either the future Moody’s AAA aggregate interest rates
or the future CAPM approach to discount the future abnormal earnings.
As expected, the static and future CAPM discount rate eVERR decile cor-
relation results are similar to those reported in Panel A, with the eVERR
decile correlation being 0.86. The eVERR decile assignment correlation
for the static and future Fama-French discount rates is 0.79. Once again,
the decile assignments are highly correlated using the eVERR measure and
the full sample period to make the decile assignments. A comparison of
the decile correlations from Panels A and B of Table 4 reveals that the
eVERR measures presented in Panel B tend to produce decile correlations
which are sometimes slightly lower than the comparable decile correla-
tions using the VERR measures presented in Panel A. The slightly lower
decile correlations sometimes observed between the eVERR decile assign-
ments correlated in Panel B relative to the comparable decile correlations
in Panel A between the VERR decile assignments are likely the result of
the additional heterogeneity introduced by the exclusion of the deprecia-
tion and amortization in the measure of earnings used in the eIV formula
forming the basis of the eVERR calculation.
The correlations between decile assignments based upon the VERR and
eVERR measures are presented in Panel C of Table 4. Interestingly, when
correlating the decile assignments across the VERR and eVERR measures
the highest correlation observed is between the VERR and eVERR decile
assignments based upon IV and eIV intrinsic value estimates utilizing
the static CAPM discount rate. That decile correlation rate is 0.85. The
VERR and eVERR measures using the static Fama-French, future CAPM,
and future Fama-French discount rates produce decile correlations which
are only slightly lower. The lowest decile correlation is from VERR deciles
using the Fama-French discount rate and eVERR deciles using the future
values of Moody’s AAA bond interest rates as the discount rate. For decile
correlations across the VERR and eVERR measures the correlations are
again substantial, particularly when CAPM or Fama-French discount rates
are applied.
One possible concern might be that decile assignments might be less cor-
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related if the decile assignments are made annually. Using the full sample
period to make decile assignments, as was done in Table 4, could allow the
decile assignments of the models to appear highly correlated as a result of
the models identifying periods of overvaluation and undervaluation across
time. This would mean that the models might not be sensitive enough to
differentiate between overvalued and undervalued firms at a given point in
time. To address this concern, annual decile assignments are generated for
each VERR and eVERR valuation measure as discussed previously, and
the decile correlations are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 displays correlation patterns which are similar to those pre-
sented in Table 4. The maximum and minimum VERR decile assignment
correlations reflected in Panel A of Table 5 generally match the valuation
methods producing the maximum and minimum decile assignment corre-
lations from Panel A of Table 4. The maximum VERR decile correlation
is 0.99, and the minimum VERR decile correlation is 0.81. The minimum
VERR decile correlation is between the static Fama-French decile assign-
ments and the future Moody’s AAA bond interest rate decile assignments
or the capmF5 future discount rate decile assignments. The correlation
between the decile assignments using the VERR measure employing the
static CAPM and the decile assignments using the future CAPM is sim-
ilar to the comparable decile correlation using deciles generated for the
full period. Changing from assigning observations to deciles using the
full sample to assigning observations to deciles on an annual basis has lit-
tle effect upon the decile assignment correlation between the static and
future Fama-French implementations of the VERR measure. The main
result from Panel A is that the VERR decile assignments are again highly
correlated if annual decile assignments are used instead of overall decile
assignments.
An examination of Panel B from Table 5 reveals patterns and results
consistent with the results of the decile correlations using the full pe-
riod. The eVERR measures using the static or future implementations
of Moody’s BAA and AAA bond interest rates produce the highest decile
correlations. The lowest decile correlation is between the eVERR measure
using the static Fama-French discount rate and the eVERR measure us-
ing either the future AAA discount rate or the capmF5 future discount
rate. The decile correlation between the eVERR measures using the static
and future implementations of the CAPM is 0.89, which is slightly lower
than in Panel A. The eVERR decile correlation for the static and future
permutations of the Fama-French discount rate are slightly lower than the
analogous VERR correlation in Panel A. Clearly, the use of annual decile
assignments instead of decile assignments for the entire period has little
effect upon the degree of correlation between the different eVERR decile
assignments. A comparison of the decile correlations from Panels A and
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Table 5
Correlations Between Annual Valuation Decile Assignments
Observations are assigned to deciles using the VERR and eVERR measures of overvaluation which result from each of the eight
discount methods employed. When making the decile assignments the necessary decile boundaries are generated for each calendar
year using all available observations for that calendar year. Panel A presents the Spearman correlations between the decile assign-
ments made using each of the eight VERR measures. Panel B presents the Spearman correlations between the decile assignments
made using each of the eight eVERR measures. Panel C presents the Spearman correlations between the decile assignments made
using each of the eight VERR measures and the eight eVERR measures.
Panel A: VERR Decile Correlations
VERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.84 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.90
ff5 0.84 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.81
baa5 0.93 0.83 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.87 0.98 0.98
aaa5 0.92 0.83 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.98 0.98
capmF5 0.91 0.81 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.94 0.93
ffF5 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.88 1.00 0.86 0.86
baaF5 0.91 0.82 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.86 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.90 0.81 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.86 0.99 1.00
continued on the next page
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Panel B: eVERR Decile Correlations
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.81 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.81 0.90 0.89
ff5 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.78
baa5 0.92 0.81 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.84 0.98 0.98
aaa5 0.91 0.80 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.84 0.98 0.98
capmF5 0.89 0.78 0.94 0.93 1.00 0.85 0.93 0.93
ffF5 0.81 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.85 1.00 0.84 0.84
baaF5 0.90 0.79 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.84 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.89 0.78 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.84 0.99 1.00
Panel C: Decile Correlations Between VERR and eVERR Deciles
VERR
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 0.81 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.64 0.74 0.74
ff5 0.66 0.80 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
baa5 0.73 0.62 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.65 0.78 0.78
aaa5 0.72 0.62 0.78 0.79 0.73 0.64 0.77 0.78
capmF5 0.73 0.62 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.67 0.76 0.76
ffF5 0.66 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.79 0.70 0.70
baaF5 0.71 0.61 0.77 0.78 0.73 0.64 0.78 0.79
aaaF5 0.70 0.60 0.76 0.78 0.72 0.63 0.78 0.79
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B of Table 5 reveals that the eVERR measures tend to produce decile
correlations in Panel B which are sometimes slightly lower than the com-
parable decile correlations in Panel A using the VERR measures. Overall,
the effect is minor.
The correlations between annual decile assignments based upon the
VERR and eVERR measures are presented in Panel C of Table 5. As in
the case of the full period decile assignments, the highest decile correlation
is between the VERR and eVERR measures derived from intrinsic values
calculated using the static CAPM discount rate, and the correlation is
0.81. The decile correlations between the VERR and eVERR measures
which both employ the static Fama-French, future CAPM, or future Fama-
French discount rates are not far behind. The lowest decile correlation is
0.60, and it again results from a paring of a Fama-French based model with
a model utilizing future values of Moody’s AAA bond interest rates as the
discount rates. Altogether, the results from the annual decile correlations
confirm the results from the full period decile correlations. The annual
decile assignments for the VERR and eVERR measures are highly and
reliably correlated regardless of the discount methods specified.
The preceding discussion of decile correlations demonstrates the sub-
stantial agreement between the decile assignments based upon the VERR
and eVERR measures with different discount rate specifications. To in-
crease the robustness of that finding, additional decile correlations are cal-
culated. Although the full period decile correlations and annual decile
correlations produce very similar results, VERR and eVERR decile corre-
lations might vary in strength with different market conditions. To address
that concern decile correlations are calculated separately for bull and bear
markets. For the full sample period, the years 1956–1957, 1962, 1966,
1969–1970, 1973–1974, 1981–1982, 1987, 2000–2002, and 2007–2009 are
assigned to the bear market category. Observations in all remaining cal-
endar years in the sample are assigned to the bull market category. Decile
assignments are first made using the full sample period with all observa-
tions from both bull and bear markets. Second, decile assignments are
made for each calendar year.
The first subset of the data examined is for the bull market sample.
Decile breakpoints for the different valuation measures are determined us-
ing the full sample, including both bull and bear markets, over the full
period. Observations are then assigned to the relevant valuation deciles.
The resulting decile correlations are presented in Table 6. As before, Panel
A presents VERR decile correlations, Panel B presents eVERR decile cor-
relations, and Panel C presents decile correlations between VERR and
eVERR decile assignments. The maximum decile correlation using the
different versions of the VERR measure is 0.99, and it is the decile corre-
lation between the VERR measure using the static Moody’s AAA interest
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Table 6
Bull Market Correlations Between Valuation Decile Assignments Based on the Full Sample
Observations from calendar bull market years are assigned to deciles using the VERR and eVERR measures of overvaluation which
result from each of the eight discount methods employed. When making the decile assignments the full sample over the entire
period, including both bull and bear markets, is used to generate the decile boundaries. Panel A presents the Spearman correlations
between the decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures. Panel B presents the Spearman correlations between
the decile assignments made using each of the eight eVERR measures. Panel C presents the Spearman correlations between the
decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures and the eight eVERR measures.
Panel A: VERR Decile Correlations
VERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.89 0.88
ff5 0.87 1.00 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.82
baa5 0.92 0.85 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.87 0.98 0.97
aaa5 0.91 0.85 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.87 0.98 0.98
capmF5 0.89 0.82 0.93 0.93 1.00 0.89 0.92 0.92
ffF5 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.89 1.00 0.87 0.87
baaF5 0.89 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.87 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.88 0.82 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.99 1.00
continued on the next page
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Panel B: eVERR Decile Correlations
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.79 0.86 0.85
ff5 0.84 1.00 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.78
baa5 0.89 0.82 1.00 0.99 0.91 0.84 0.97 0.97
aaa5 0.89 0.81 0.99 1.00 0.91 0.84 0.97 0.97
capmF5 0.85 0.77 0.91 0.91 1.00 0.85 0.90 0.90
ffF5 0.79 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.85 1.00 0.84 0.84
baaF5 0.86 0.79 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.84 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.85 0.78 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.84 0.99 1.00
Panel C: Decile Correlations Between VERR and eVERR Deciles
VERR
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 0.84 0.71 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.68 0.75 0.75
ff5 0.70 0.83 0.70 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.68
baa5 0.72 0.66 0.80 0.80 0.74 0.67 0.79 0.79
aaa5 0.71 0.65 0.79 0.80 0.73 0.66 0.78 0.79
capmF5 0.70 0.63 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.69 0.75 0.75
ffF5 0.65 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.80 0.70 0.71
baaF5 0.67 0.62 0.76 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.78 0.79
aaaF5 0.66 0.60 0.75 0.76 0.70 0.64 0.77 0.78
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rate and the static Moody’s BAA interest rate as the cost of capital. The
use of the future values of the interest rates when discounting the abnor-
mal earnings produces the same decile correlation for the VERR measure.
The lowest decile correlation reported in Panel A is 0.82, and it results
from deciles assigned using the static Fama-French rates in the IV model
calculations required by the VERR measure being correlated with deciles
assigned using either the future Moody’s AAA interest rate or the future
CAPM rates in the IV model calculations required by the VERR mea-
sure. The decile correlation between the static CAPM (Fama-French) and
the future CAPM (Fama-French) implementations of the VERR measure
produce a decile correlation of 0.89 (0.83). The correlations between the
full period VERR decile assignments are therefore largely unaffected by
restricting the correlation sample to bull market periods.
Panel B of Table 6 presents results which are extremely similar to the
results in Panel A of Table 6. The highest decile correlations result from
correlations between eVERR decile assignments made using either static
or future values of Moody’s AAA and BAA interest rates when calculating
the eIV. The lowest correlation is between the static implementation of
the Fama-French discount rate in the eIV formula and the capmF5 future
discount rate, and it is 0.77. Decile correlations from different combinations
of eVERR decile assignments utilizing static and future CAPM and Fama-
French discount rates in the eIV calculation all produce decile correlations
of 0.77 or better. Full period bull market eVERR decile assignments are
all highly correlated, regardless of the discount rate used. A comparison
of the decile correlations from Panels A and B of Table 6 again reveals
that the eVERR measures in Panel B tend to produce decile correlations
which are sometimes slightly lower than the comparable decile correlations
in Panel A using the VERR measures, but the differences are small.
The final panel in Table 6 presents the decile correlations between the
VERR and eVERR measures for bull market periods using the full sample
to establish the decile assignments. As was observed previously, when
correlating the decile assignments across the VERR and eVERR measures
the highest correlation observed is between the VERR and eVERR decile
assignments based upon IV and eIV intrinsic value estimates utilizing the
static CAPM discount rate. In this case that decile correlation rate is 0.84.
The VERR and eVERR measures using the static Fama-French, future
CAPM, and future Fama-French discount rates produce decile correlations
which are only slightly lower, with decile correlation values of 0.83, 0.80,
and 0.80 respectively. The lowest decile correlation observed in Panel C
of Table 6 is 0.60, and it is once again the correlation between the static
Fama-French VERR implementation and the Moody’s AAA bond interest
rate implementation of the eVERR measure. Again, the decile assignments
are highly positively correlated overall.
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Table 7
Bull Market Correlations Between Annual Valuation Decile Assignments
Observations from calendar years considered bull market years are assigned to deciles using the VERR and eVERR measures of
overvaluation which result from each of the eight discount methods employed. When making the decile assignments the necessary
decile boundaries are generated for each calendar year using all available observations for that calendar year. Panel A presents
the Spearman correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures. Panel B presents the
Spearman correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight eVERR measures. Panel C presents the Spearman
correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures and the eight eVERR measures.
Panel A: VERR Decile Correlations
VERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.83 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.83 0.90 0.89
ff5 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.81
baa5 0.92 0.83 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.87 0.98 0.98
aaa5 0.92 0.83 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.98 0.98
capmF5 0.90 0.81 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.94 0.94
ffF5 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.88 1.00 0.87 0.87
baaF5 0.90 0.82 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.87 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.89 0.81 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.87 0.99 1.00
continued on the next page
43
Table 7 – continued from the previous page
Panel B: eVERR Decile Correlations
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.80 0.89 0.88
ff5 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.78
baa5 0.91 0.81 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.85 0.98 0.98
aaa5 0.91 0.80 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.84 0.98 0.98
capmF5 0.89 0.78 0.94 0.93 1.00 0.85 0.93 0.93
ffF5 0.80 0.79 0.85 0.84 0.85 1.00 0.85 0.84
baaF5 0.89 0.79 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.85 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.88 0.78 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.84 0.99 1.00
Panel C: Decile Correlations Between VERR and eVERR Deciles
VERR
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 0.80 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.64 0.72 0.73
ff5 0.65 0.80 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64
baa5 0.71 0.62 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.64 0.77 0.78
aaa5 0.71 0.61 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.63 0.76 0.77
capmF5 0.72 0.61 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.66 0.75 0.76
ffF5 0.65 0.63 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.78 0.70 0.70
baaF5 0.70 0.60 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.65 0.78 0.78
aaaF5 0.69 0.59 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.64 0.77 0.78
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As a robustness check the correlations between overvaluation decile
assignments during bull market periods is examined using annual decile
assignments instead of using the complete sample over the full sample pe-
riod to assign the observations to deciles. The resulting decile correlations
are presented in Table 7. When using the annual decile assignments and
examining the bull market sample the highest VERR decile correlation
once again results from the use of the Moody’s BAA and AAA bond in-
terest rates as the discount rates. Both the static Moody’s BAA and AAA
VERR decile correlation and the future Moody’s BAA and AAA VERR
decile correlation are 0.99, as shown in Panel A. The lowest correlation ob-
served in Panel A is 0.81, and it results from correlating the VERR deciles
produced through the use of the static Fama-French and future Moody’s
AAA bond interest rates or the static Fama-French and capmF5 future
discount rates in the IV model. The decile correlation between the static
CAPM and future CAPM based VERR measures is slightly higher than
it was when the deciles are generated using the full sample period instead
of annually. The static Fama-French and the future Fama-French discount
rate approaches to the VERR measure produce the same result regardless
of whether annual or full period decile assignments are used. Using annual
decile assignments instead of overall decile assignments has little effect
upon the VERR valuation decile assignments during bull market periods.
The trend of little change continues after an examination of Panel B
of Table 7. The maximum eVERR decile correlations during bull markets
using annual deciles are essentially unchanged compared to the prior eV-
ERR decile correlations previously discussed in Tables 4, 5, and 6. The
minimum valuation decile correlation in Panel B of Table 7 is 0.78, which
is slightly higher than it is for the bull market eVERR decile correlations
based upon full sample decile assignments as displayed in Table 6. Cor-
relations between eVERR measures employing either the static or future
implementations of the CAPM or Fama-French cost of capital are all 0.78
or higher. Evidently the choice of annual decile assignments during the
bull market years does little to alter the correlations between the decile
assignments produced by the different permutations of the eVERR mea-
sure. In addition, a comparison of the decile correlations from Panels A
and B of Table 7 again reveals that the eVERR measures in Panel B tend
to produce decile correlations which are sometimes slightly lower than the
comparable decile correlations in Panel A using the VERR measures, but
the correlations are still high for both panels.
The largest decile correlation found between annual VERR and eVERR
decile assignments during bull markets is 0.80, and it is the correlation
between the VERR and eVERR measures generated using either the static
CAPM discount rate or the static Fama-French discount rate to find the
relevant IV and eIV values. The correlations presented in Panel C of
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Table 7 also show that the VERR and eVERR decile assignments are
only slightly below the maximum VERR and eVERR correlation when the
future CAPM or future Fama-French discount rates are used for both the
VERR and eVERR models. This demonstrates the robustness of the decile
assignments to different earnings or discount rate specifications during bull
market periods when the decile assignments are made annually.
After determining that the valuation decile correlations are largely un-
affected by bull market periods it is sensible to determine if the valuation
decile correlations are substantially impacted by bear market periods. To
address that topic decile assignment correlations for observations during
bear market periods are presented in Table 8. In Table 8 the decile cor-
relations are based upon decile assignments made using the full sample of
bear and bull market data for the full period. As usual, the highest decile
correlations for the VERR measures are between the versions of the model
using the static Moody’s BAA and AAA interest rates as the discount rate
or the future Moody’s BAA and AAA interest rates as the discount rate.
Those decile correlations are 0.99. The lowest VERR decile correlation
presented in Panel A is 0.82, and it once again results from the decile cor-
relation between the VERR measure using the static Fama-French discount
rate and the VERR measure using the future Moody’s AAA bond interest
rate as the discount rate. Importantly, the static and future CAPM imple-
mentations of the VERR measure produce a decile correlation of 0.91. The
analogous Fama-French VERR decile correlation is 0.86. From the results
presented in Panel A of Table 8 it is clear that VERR decile correlations
during bear market periods correspond well to the decile correlations ob-
served during the entire time period.
The second panel of Table 8 presents the decile correlations for the
eVERR measures. The highest decile correlation reported is again 0.99,
and it is the decile correlation between the versions of the eVERR mea-
sure employing static Moody’s BAA and AAA discount rates and also the
versions of the eVERR measure employing the future Moody’s BAA and
AAA discount rates. The lowest correlation (0.79) reported in Panel B is
once more the decile correlation between the eVERR measures employing
the static Fama-French discount rate and the future Moody’s AAA interest
rate. The static and future variants of the CAPM eVERR measures pro-
duce a decile correlation of 0.89, and the static and future variants of the
Fama-French eVERR measures produce a slightly lower decile correlation
of 0.83. It is apparent that the decile correlations for the variants of the
eVERR measure are highly correlated during bear market periods when
the deciles are assigned using the full sample period. When decile corre-
lations from Panels A and B of Table 8 are compared, it is clear that the
eVERR measures in Panel B tend to produce decile correlations which are
sometimes slightly lower than the comparable decile correlations in Panel
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Table 8
Bear Market Correlations Between Valuation Decile Assignments Based on the Full Sample
Observations from calendar bear market years are assigned to deciles using the VERR and eVERR measures of overvaluation which
result from each of the eight discount methods employed. When making the decile assignments the full sample over the entire
period, including both bull and bear markets, is used to generate the decile boundaries. Panel A presents the Spearman correlations
between the decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures. Panel B presents the Spearman correlations between
the decile assignments made using each of the eight eVERR measures. Panel C presents the Spearman correlations between the
decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures and the eight eVERR measures.
Panel A: VERR Decile Correlations
VERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.85 0.93 0.91
ff5 0.88 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.82
baa5 0.92 0.84 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.87 0.98 0.96
aaa5 0.92 0.84 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.87 0.98 0.98
capmF5 0.91 0.85 0.94 0.93 1.00 0.90 0.92 0.91
ffF5 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.90 1.00 0.86 0.85
baaF5 0.93 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.86 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.91 0.82 0.96 0.98 0.91 0.85 0.99 1.00
continued on the next page
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Table 8 – continued from the previous page
Panel B: eVERR Decile Correlations
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.83 0.92 0.90
ff5 0.85 1.00 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.79
baa5 0.91 0.81 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.85 0.97 0.96
aaa5 0.91 0.82 0.99 1.00 0.92 0.85 0.98 0.97
capmF5 0.89 0.81 0.93 0.92 1.00 0.88 0.91 0.90
ffF5 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.88 1.00 0.84 0.82
baaF5 0.92 0.81 0.97 0.98 0.91 0.84 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.90 0.79 0.96 0.97 0.90 0.82 0.99 1.00
Panel C: Decile Correlations Between VERR and eVERR Deciles
VERR
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 0.86 0.72 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.69 0.80 0.79
ff5 0.74 0.85 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.70
baa5 0.77 0.67 0.83 0.84 0.78 0.69 0.82 0.83
aaa5 0.77 0.67 0.82 0.84 0.77 0.68 0.82 0.83
capmF5 0.78 0.69 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.74 0.79 0.79
ffF5 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.74 0.73
baaF5 0.77 0.66 0.80 0.82 0.75 0.67 0.83 0.83
aaaF5 0.75 0.64 0.79 0.81 0.74 0.65 0.82 0.83
48
A using the VERR measures, but the differences are minor.
The decile correlations between the VERR and eVERR measures for
the bear market sample using full period decile assignments are presented
in Panel C of Table 8. As has been the case in the prior decile correlation
tables, the highest decile correlation between VERR and eVERR measures
results when both the VERR and eVERR measures utilize a static CAPM
discount rate. The decile correlation observed in that case is 0.86. The low-
est decile correlation is again produced when a static Fama-French discount
rate is used in the VERR calculation and a future Moody’s AAA interest
rate is used as the discount rate in the calculation of the eVERR. The
resulting decile correlation is 0.64. The decile correlations between the
VERR and eVERR measures using future CAPM discount rates, static
Fama-French discount rates, and future Fama-French discount rates are
0.85, 0.85, and 0.83 respectively. Taken together, the decile correlation re-
sults in Panel C indicate that the decile assignments are highly correlated
across valuation measures and discount rate specifications during bear mar-
ket periods when the deciles are assigned using the entire bull and bear
sample.
Finally, Table 9 presents the decile correlations for the bear market
sample using annual decile assignments. This once again serves to address
concerns that the valuation deciles assigned using the full sample might be
highly correlated as a result of broad market trends more than differences in
individual factors. As might be expected at this point, the highest VERR
decile correlations are observed between the VERR measures using the
static implementations of Moody’s BAA and AAA interest rates and also
the VERR measures using the future implementation of Moody’s BAA and
AAA interest rates. Both correlations are 0.99. The lowest bear market
VERR decile correlation using annual decile assignments is the correlation
between the static Fama-French VERR model and the future Moody’s
AAA based VERR model. That decile correlation is 0.81, which is similar
to the results reported in Panel A of the prior tables. The decile correlation
between the static CAPM discount rate and future CAPM discount rates
variants of the VERR model is 0.91. The comparable decile correlation
for the two Fama-French approaches is 0.83. As these results are similar
to those presented previously for either the full sample or the bull market
sample it is clear that the annual decile assignments during bear market
periods produce approximately the same level of correlations between the
VERR valuation deciles as the full sample or the bull market sample.
Panel B of Table 9 shows the eVERR decile correlations for the bear
market sample using annual decile assignments. The decile correlation
between the versions of the eVERR measure employing static Moody’s
BAA and AAA discount rates and also the decile correlation between the
versions of the eVERR measure employing the future Moody’s BAA and
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Table 9
Bear Market Correlations Between Annual Valuation Decile Assignments
Observations from calendar years considered bear market years are assigned to deciles using the VERR and eVERR measures of
overvaluation which result from each of the eight discount methods employed. When making the decile assignments the necessary
decile boundaries are generated for each calendar year using all available observations for that calendar year. Panel A presents
the Spearman correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures. Panel B presents the
Spearman correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight eVERR measures. Panel C presents the Spearman
correlations between the decile assignments made using each of the eight VERR measures and the eight eVERR measures.
Panel A: VERR Decile Correlations
VERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.85 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.84 0.93 0.92
ff5 0.85 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.81
baa5 0.93 0.83 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.86 0.98 0.97
aaa5 0.94 0.83 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.85 0.99 0.98
capmF5 0.91 0.82 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.87 0.93 0.92
ffF5 0.84 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.87 1.00 0.84 0.83
baaF5 0.93 0.83 0.98 0.99 0.93 0.84 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.92 0.81 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.83 0.99 1.00
continued on the next page
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Panel B: eVERR Decile Correlations
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 1.00 0.83 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.82 0.93 0.92
ff5 0.83 1.00 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.79
baa5 0.93 0.81 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.84 0.98 0.97
aaa5 0.93 0.81 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.83 0.99 0.98
capmF5 0.91 0.80 0.94 0.93 1.00 0.85 0.93 0.92
ffF5 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.85 1.00 0.82 0.81
baaF5 0.93 0.80 0.98 0.99 0.93 0.82 1.00 0.99
aaaF5 0.92 0.79 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.81 0.99 1.00
Panel C: Decile Correlations Between VERR and eVERR Deciles
VERR
eVERR capm5 ff5 baa5 aaa5 capmF5 ffF5 baaF5 aaaF5
capm5 0.82 0.67 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.65 0.77 0.77
ff5 0.69 0.82 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67
baa5 0.76 0.64 0.80 0.81 0.76 0.65 0.80 0.80
aaa5 0.76 0.64 0.79 0.80 0.75 0.64 0.80 0.81
capmF5 0.75 0.65 0.77 0.78 0.81 0.68 0.77 0.77
ffF5 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.81 0.70 0.70
baaF5 0.75 0.63 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.64 0.80 0.81
aaaF5 0.74 0.61 0.78 0.79 0.73 0.62 0.80 0.81
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AAA discount rates are 0.99. In addition, the decile correlation between
the versions of the eVERR measure employing the static Moody’s AAA
and the future Moody’s BAA discount rates is also 0.99. Those correla-
tions are the highest eVERR decile correlations found. The lowest decile
correlation is 0.79, and it is the correlation between the eVERR measure
using the static Fama-French discount rate and the eVERR measure using
the future AAA bond interest rate from Moody’s. The decile correlations
between static and future CAPM or Fama-French versions of the eVERR
measure are all 0.80 or higher. The eVERR decile correlations are not af-
fected negatively when examining bear market conditions and annual decile
assignments. Furthermore, the decile correlations from Panels A and B of
Table 9 illustrate that the eVERR measures in Panel B tend to produce
decile correlations which are sometimes slightly lower than the comparable
decile correlations in Panel A using the VERR measures. However, the
differences are small.
The final panel of Table 9 presents the decile assignment correlations
across VERR and eVERR measures for the bear market sample with an-
nual decile assignment. The findings are essentially the same as they have
been for Panel C in the other correlation tables. The highest decile corre-
lation between the VERR and eVERR measures, 0.82, is produced when
both measures utilize either the static CAPM or the static Fama-French
discount rate. The decile correlations between the VERR and eVERR
measures when both are based upon future CAPM discount rates or future
Fama-French discount rates are only slightly lower. As has usually been
the case for the VERR and eVERR decile correlations, the lowest decile
correlation is the result of decile assignments using the static Fama-French
discount rate for the VERR model and the future Moody’s AAA interest
rates for the eVERR model. That correlation is 0.61. Given the VERR
and eVERR decile correlations in Panel C of Table 9, the use of annual
decile assignments while restricting the sample to bear market periods has
little effect upon the agreement across the valuation models when assigning
firms to valuation deciles each year.
To broadly summarize the results of Tables 4 to 9, valuation decile
assignments are robust to the use of different discount methods in the
calculation of IV and eIV and they are also robust to separating the
sample into bull and bear market periods. Furthermore, the valuation
decile assignments display a high degree of correlation regardless of whether
decile assignments are made over the full sample period or annually. Decile
assignment correlations for full period decile assignments are very similar to
decile assignment correlations using annual decile assignments. This high
degree of decile correlation across the range of valuation implementations
tested allays concerns about the robustness of using decile assignments to
quantify the relative overvaluation of firms when the ideal discount rate,
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Table 10
Decile Evolution Matrix for Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Beginning in 1964, firms are assigned to valuation deciles for the calendar year using the capm5 VERR measure. Decile
one contains the most relatively undervalued firms during the calendar year, and decile ten contains the most relatively
overvalued firms during the calendar year. Then, the subsequent valuation decile membership for each firm is determined
for every calendar year over the next ten years to the extent the data is available. This process is rolled forward each year
until it has been applied to every calendar year during the entire 1964–2009 period. The resulting decile evolution data is
presented in event time, with the initial valuation decile assignment occurring at time T, enabling all of the overlapping
ten year periods of data over the 1964–2009 period to be aligned on a uniform ten year time line.
Each panel displays data for a different time horizon, with Panel A presenting decile membership percentages for a one year
horizon and Panel J presenting decile membership percentages for a ten year horizon. Initial decile assignments are listed
in the first column of each panel. The percentage of firms initially in a given valuation decile at time T which are in each
valuation decile at the specified time horizon for the panel may be found by reading across the row for the initial valuation
decile of interest. For example, in Panel A, 47.1% of firms initially assigned to decile one are in decile one a year later, and
18.6% of firms initially assigned to decile one are in decile two a year later. Because firms drop out of the sample over time
after the initial decile assignment, the proportion of firms for each initial decile assignment with missing valuation decile
assignments at the specified time horizon is presented in the M column.
continued on the next page
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Table 10 – continued from the previous page
Panel A: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+1
Decile at Time T+1
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 10.16 47.08 18.63 9.25 5.61 3.45 2.31 1.56 0.98 0.54 0.42
2 10.98 19.94 25.89 18.15 10.54 5.95 3.98 2.41 1.28 0.60 0.28
3 10.57 9.47 19.20 20.15 16.41 11.11 6.24 3.61 2.06 0.89 0.29
4 9.96 5.55 11.83 17.94 18.79 15.60 10.09 5.72 3.04 1.13 0.35
5 10.39 3.61 7.35 11.97 16.30 18.12 15.48 9.50 4.88 1.90 0.51
6 10.04 2.40 4.75 7.59 11.87 16.33 19.25 15.46 8.48 3.19 0.66
7 10.09 1.74 2.74 4.54 7.35 12.11 17.81 20.87 15.53 5.83 1.39
8 9.94 1.24 1.66 2.59 3.97 6.69 11.22 19.19 26.25 14.51 2.74
9 10.54 0.62 0.77 1.02 1.59 2.44 4.49 9.28 20.20 37.80 11.27
10 16.10 0.46 0.30 0.32 0.43 0.53 0.72 1.54 3.80 15.53 60.28
Panel B: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+2
Decile at Time T+2
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 16.58 32.00 15.76 10.10 7.63 5.61 4.32 3.44 2.41 1.35 0.80
2 19.63 16.24 17.76 13.72 10.51 7.64 5.72 4.21 2.56 1.42 0.59
3 19.75 10.03 14.78 14.66 12.35 9.57 7.58 5.26 3.50 1.86 0.66
4 18.98 7.33 11.52 13.61 13.37 11.89 9.63 6.72 4.14 2.08 0.75
5 19.22 5.29 8.41 11.66 12.53 12.98 11.49 8.87 5.65 2.92 0.98
6 19.65 4.32 6.63 8.63 10.64 12.55 12.83 10.95 8.18 4.27 1.35
7 19.44 3.55 4.66 6.40 8.66 11.17 12.81 13.39 11.25 6.44 2.22
8 20.20 2.96 3.52 4.35 5.74 7.96 10.90 13.85 16.04 10.75 3.73
9 21.31 1.91 2.08 2.50 3.27 4.57 6.36 9.62 15.74 21.92 10.71
10 28.73 1.02 0.87 0.77 1.01 1.28 1.93 3.13 5.72 15.01 40.53
continued on the next page
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Panel C: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+3
Decile at Time T+3
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 21.86 23.37 13.25 9.96 7.69 6.52 5.56 4.91 3.48 2.19 1.20
2 26.76 13.18 13.60 11.33 9.58 7.70 6.36 4.88 3.62 2.13 0.85
3 27.38 9.05 12.42 11.53 10.51 9.37 6.94 5.49 4.26 2.14 0.89
4 27.15 7.37 10.34 11.21 11.09 9.93 8.50 6.42 4.44 2.50 1.05
5 27.02 6.32 8.55 10.12 10.43 10.37 9.65 7.67 5.45 3.11 1.32
6 28.12 5.23 6.66 8.82 9.48 10.41 10.24 8.75 6.91 3.82 1.56
7 28.06 4.49 5.97 6.88 8.41 9.48 10.57 9.73 8.54 5.48 2.39
8 29.48 3.85 4.17 5.08 6.13 7.59 9.47 11.06 10.98 8.47 3.70
9 31.09 3.21 3.09 3.27 3.76 5.04 6.25 8.73 12.19 14.37 9.01
10 39.86 1.54 1.34 1.17 1.45 1.90 2.49 3.66 5.82 12.53 28.26
Panel D: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+4
Decile at Time T+4
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 26.57 16.81 10.89 8.98 8.03 7.00 6.39 6.06 4.54 3.18 1.54
2 32.64 10.57 11.28 9.94 8.14 7.83 6.78 5.30 4.07 2.42 1.04
3 33.66 8.32 10.41 9.83 9.16 8.19 7.04 5.68 4.32 2.32 1.09
4 33.82 7.00 9.02 9.58 9.93 8.85 7.81 5.67 4.58 2.52 1.21
5 34.23 6.16 8.05 9.22 9.17 9.15 7.93 6.50 5.26 2.91 1.42
6 35.65 5.82 6.86 7.72 8.53 8.42 8.61 7.44 5.70 3.75 1.50
7 35.92 5.21 6.34 7.28 7.77 8.14 8.02 7.86 6.54 4.63 2.29
8 37.52 4.62 5.12 5.41 6.07 7.22 7.97 8.18 8.11 6.33 3.44
9 40.14 3.87 3.67 3.35 3.96 4.95 6.15 7.39 8.74 10.04 7.73
10 49.78 1.96 1.54 1.63 1.66 2.07 2.81 3.68 5.34 9.75 19.78
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Table 10 – continued from the previous page
Panel E: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+5
Decile at Time T+5
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 30.83 13.40 9.60 8.04 7.66 7.19 6.65 6.41 5.24 3.50 1.48
2 37.62 8.48 9.79 8.82 7.95 7.04 6.75 5.51 4.46 2.59 0.99
3 39.33 7.03 9.34 8.94 8.20 7.57 6.94 5.12 3.99 2.39 1.15
4 40.09 6.89 7.89 8.45 8.52 8.05 7.11 5.51 3.96 2.32 1.21
5 40.38 6.02 7.34 8.36 8.19 7.99 7.05 5.97 4.53 2.80 1.35
6 42.07 5.52 6.37 7.32 7.87 7.74 7.37 6.14 4.83 3.11 1.66
7 42.73 5.18 6.51 6.59 6.71 7.23 7.08 6.45 5.38 3.82 2.33
8 44.84 5.00 5.26 5.37 5.49 6.33 6.64 6.67 6.32 5.01 3.06
9 48.10 4.06 3.54 3.55 4.11 4.52 5.45 5.93 6.84 7.43 6.48
10 58.57 2.22 1.78 1.92 1.72 2.11 2.49 3.26 4.48 7.71 13.74
Panel F: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+6
Decile at Time T+6
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 36.52 12.20 8.39 7.63 7.12 7.05 6.09 5.77 4.86 2.90 1.47
2 42.79 7.59 9.03 8.20 7.78 6.51 5.87 5.06 3.89 2.36 0.92
3 44.28 6.39 8.08 8.08 7.53 7.22 6.42 5.09 3.63 2.15 1.13
4 45.03 6.14 7.38 8.02 7.47 7.02 7.18 4.90 3.55 2.10 1.22
5 45.55 5.77 6.75 7.38 7.49 7.30 6.86 5.31 3.73 2.68 1.19
6 47.26 4.84 6.37 6.83 7.50 6.81 6.39 5.60 4.36 2.56 1.48
7 48.16 4.79 5.60 5.72 6.26 6.80 6.45 6.11 4.74 3.36 2.01
8 50.75 4.51 4.72 5.11 5.03 5.72 5.92 5.81 5.48 4.37 2.58
9 54.78 3.70 3.35 3.44 3.61 4.17 4.72 4.99 5.80 6.04 5.39
10 64.74 1.98 1.84 1.72 1.73 2.07 2.19 2.93 4.16 6.31 10.34
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Table 10 – continued from the previous page
Panel G: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+7
Decile at Time T+7
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 42.13 11.48 7.47 7.17 6.73 6.32 5.53 5.13 4.09 2.56 1.38
2 48.03 6.71 8.44 7.12 6.80 6.30 5.64 4.72 3.26 2.03 0.92
3 49.22 5.95 7.17 7.44 7.10 6.74 5.85 4.51 3.11 1.91 0.99
4 49.87 5.42 6.70 7.44 7.01 6.84 6.01 4.51 3.32 1.84 1.04
5 50.21 5.12 6.49 6.77 7.13 6.51 6.17 4.62 3.66 2.27 1.06
6 51.81 4.24 5.66 6.27 6.51 6.42 6.30 5.26 3.92 2.35 1.27
7 52.87 4.28 5.12 5.68 5.88 5.73 6.03 5.34 4.32 2.91 1.86
8 55.73 3.81 4.55 4.67 4.70 5.40 5.40 5.09 4.74 3.73 2.19
9 60.23 3.17 2.94 3.18 3.43 3.81 4.22 4.65 5.03 5.03 4.30
10 68.97 1.99 1.71 1.69 1.62 2.09 2.13 2.66 3.64 5.31 8.19
Panel H: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+8
Decile at Time T+8
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 47.24 10.33 7.47 6.61 6.25 5.52 5.09 4.57 3.58 2.16 1.18
2 52.71 6.39 7.04 6.77 6.27 5.98 5.23 4.25 2.91 1.56 0.89
3 53.71 4.94 6.89 6.68 6.61 6.06 5.47 4.10 2.91 1.74 0.89
4 54.24 5.07 5.84 6.65 6.38 6.33 5.67 4.23 2.88 1.83 0.87
5 54.77 4.70 5.57 6.44 6.28 6.19 5.48 4.56 3.05 1.98 1.00
6 56.26 3.98 5.11 5.86 6.12 5.93 5.58 4.43 3.52 2.06 1.15
7 57.32 3.75 4.70 5.22 5.33 5.39 5.59 4.52 3.82 2.71 1.63
8 60.14 3.48 4.13 4.28 4.54 4.96 4.66 4.62 4.34 2.96 1.90
9 64.82 2.62 3.05 2.78 3.03 3.39 3.87 4.28 4.23 4.34 3.58
10 72.37 1.95 1.49 1.66 1.63 1.95 2.33 2.45 3.34 4.46 6.39
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Table 10 – continued from the previous page
Panel I: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+9
Decile at Time T+9
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 51.79 9.48 6.81 6.12 5.44 5.26 4.79 4.15 3.27 1.76 1.12
2 56.78 5.87 6.53 6.36 5.51 5.40 4.70 3.94 2.52 1.53 0.87
3 57.90 4.73 6.15 5.79 6.20 5.90 4.81 3.52 2.59 1.62 0.79
4 58.48 4.06 5.61 6.14 6.03 5.75 5.13 3.80 2.79 1.51 0.70
5 58.94 4.30 5.31 5.77 5.97 5.57 4.78 4.17 2.74 1.66 0.80
6 60.58 3.61 4.39 5.31 5.61 5.41 5.42 3.86 2.93 1.88 1.00
7 61.44 3.44 4.25 4.86 4.81 4.82 5.09 4.34 3.41 2.18 1.36
8 63.92 3.15 3.57 4.08 4.06 4.70 4.25 4.28 3.61 2.71 1.68
9 68.97 2.27 2.55 2.71 2.92 3.12 3.49 3.74 3.72 3.49 3.02
10 75.13 1.84 1.60 1.51 1.67 1.74 2.16 2.15 3.20 3.90 5.10
Panel J: Percentage in Each Decile at Time T+10
Decile at Time T+10
Decile at T M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 56.14 8.73 5.97 5.37 5.32 4.84 4.48 3.70 2.79 1.63 1.03
2 60.71 5.45 5.71 5.81 4.93 5.13 4.39 3.42 2.41 1.30 0.74
3 61.67 4.05 5.74 5.69 5.68 5.18 4.42 3.23 2.29 1.33 0.70
4 62.03 3.98 5.10 5.72 5.57 5.06 4.48 3.67 2.39 1.37 0.63
5 62.67 3.60 5.04 5.41 5.35 5.37 4.44 3.53 2.41 1.42 0.75
6 64.25 3.26 4.12 5.05 5.03 4.97 4.76 3.60 2.62 1.52 0.82
7 65.21 3.09 3.78 4.33 4.50 4.63 4.70 3.75 2.83 2.05 1.12
8 67.74 2.85 3.28 3.72 3.99 4.05 4.00 3.70 3.07 2.23 1.35
9 72.47 1.99 2.27 2.38 2.65 2.94 3.10 3.23 3.54 2.98 2.44
10 77.76 1.75 1.41 1.46 1.49 1.59 2.09 2.10 2.93 3.32 4.10
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earnings specification, or decile assignment period is unclear.
The robustness of the valuation decile assignments to different model
specifications does not provide information about the persistence of the
decile assignments over time. To examine this issue transition matrices are
generated. In the transition matrices, annual static CAPM VERR decile
assignments are tracked over time. The static CAPM VERR approach is
used in order to incorporate a firm specific risk adjustment without invok-
ing the size and book-to-market connections inherent in the Fama-French
discount model. Although the decile assignments using the Fama-French
approach are very similar to the decile assignments using the CAPM ap-
proach, it is possible that mispricing may account for some degree of the ob-
served premiums associated with the size and book-to-market factors. The
size and book-to-market factors in the Fama-French approach are therefore
more prone to being affected by mispricing itself, whereas using the CAPM
methodology to estimate the cost of equity avoids that issue. The use of
the static CAPM approach based upon a company specific discount rate
applicable at the valuation date instead of using different future discount
rates for each abnormal earnings term is consistent with the methodologies
used in prior research (see D’Mello and Shroff (2000), Dong et al. (2006),
and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999)) and results in a larger sample
of available data to use with the transition analyses.
Beginning in 1964, firms are assigned to valuation deciles for the calen-
dar year using the capm5 VERR measure. As before, decile one contains
the most relatively undervalued firms during the calendar year, and decile
ten contains the most relatively overvalued firms during the calendar year.
Then, the subsequent valuation decile membership for each firm is deter-
mined for every calendar year over the next ten years to the extent the
data is available. This process is rolled forward each year until it has been
applied to every calendar year during the entire 1964–2009 period. Table
10 presents the resulting decile evolution data in event time, with the initial
valuation decile assignment occurring at time T, enabling all of the over-
lapping ten year periods of data over the 1964–2009 period to be aligned
on a uniform ten year time line.
Each panel of Table 10 displays data for a different time horizon, with
Panel A presenting decile membership percentages for a one year horizon
and Panel J presenting decile membership percentages for a ten year hori-
zon. Initial decile assignments are listed in the first column of each panel.
The percentage of firms initially in a given valuation decile at time T which
are in each valuation decile at the specified time horizon for the panel may
be found by reading across the row for the initial valuation decile of inter-
est. For example, in Panel A, 47.1% of firms initially assigned to decile one
are in decile one a year later, and 18.6% of firms initially assigned to decile
one are in decile two a year later. Because firms drop out of the sample
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over time after the initial decile assignment, the proportion of firms for
each initial decile assignment with missing valuation decile assignments at
the specified time horizon is presented in the M column.
Naturally, Table 10 shows that firms initially assigned to a valuation
decile move to other valuation deciles over time on average. Interestingly,
initial decile assignments are more persistent than would be expected if
the measures of relative overvaluation are merely picking up short term
fluctuations in market prices. Based upon the results in Panel A, after one
year about 60% of firms in the most overvalued decile remain in the most
overvalued decile. Similarly, over 47% of firms in the most undervalued
decile remained in the same decile one year after the initial decile assign-
ment. Panel E shows that by five years after the initial decile assignment
the proportion of missing values relative to the initial decile assignment
periods ranges from about 31% to about 59%, with overvalued firms ex-
iting the sample in greater quantities than undervalued firms. Firms may
be missing at a given time horizon as a result of the passage of time. Over
time some firms go bankrupt while others are acquired, liquidated, or taken
private. Some firms may simply lack the the data necessary to calculate
the capm5 VERR valuation measure at a particular time horizon, result-
ing in a missing value. Even after five years the sample of firms initially
assigned to the tenth decile remains skewed towards the most overvalued
valuation deciles, and the firms in the most undervalued initial valuation
decile similarly remain skewed towards the undervalued valuation deciles.
After ten years, data from Panel J indicates that well over half of the most
undervalued firms have exited the sample. This is unsurprising due to the
passage of time and the fact that the years at the end of the 1964–2009
sample period do not have ten years of future decile assignments. Of the
firms which remain, Panel J shows that the proportion of firms originally
assigned to the first decile which remain in the first decile is over 1.8 times
as high as the proportion of firms originally assigned to the first decile
which have migrated to the fifth decile (8.73/4.84). A similar compari-
son of the firms originally assigned to the tenth decile reveals that the
proportion of firms originally assigned to the tenth decile which remain
in the tenth decile is slightly less than 2.0 times as high as the propor-
tion of firms originally assigned to the tenth decile which have migrated to
the sixth decile (4.10/2.09). Clearly decile assignments are persistent over
time.
The decile membership percentages for each row at each time horizon
which are displayed in Table 10 are based upon all firms assigned to the
initial decile of interest at time T. A transition matrix table with reported
decile membership percentages based upon only the non-missing values for
each initial decile assignment at each time horizon is presented in Table
11. In short, Table 10 presents the percentage of all firms initially assigned
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Table 11
Decile Evolution Matrix for Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments: Percentages Based on
Non-Missing Values
Beginning in 1964, firms are assigned to valuation deciles for the calendar year using the capm5 VERR measure. Decile
one contains the most relatively undervalued firms during the calendar year, and decile ten contains the most relatively
overvalued firms during the calendar year. Then, the subsequent valuation decile membership for each firm is determined
for every calendar year over the next ten years to the extent the data is available. This process is rolled forward each year
until it has been applied to every calendar year during the entire 1964–2009 period. The resulting decile evolution data is
presented in event time, with the initial valuation decile assignment occurring at time T, enabling all of the overlapping
ten year periods of data over the 1964–2009 period to be aligned on a uniform ten year time line.
Each panel displays data for a different time horizon, with Panel A presenting decile membership percentages for a one year
horizon and Panel J presenting decile membership percentages for a ten year horizon. The decile membership percentages
presented in the panels of this table are calculated using only those firms which have valid decile assignments at the end
of the specified time horizon for each panel. Initial decile assignments are listed in the first column of each panel, and the
proportion of firms with non-missing decile assignments which are in each valuation decile at the end of the specified time
horizon may be found by reading across the row for the valuation decile of interest. For example, in Panel A, 52.4% of firms
initially assigned to decile one which have valid decile assignments a year later are again in decile one, and 20.7% of firms
initially assigned to decile one which have valid decile assignments a year later are in decile two. Because firms drop out
of the sample over time after the initial decile assignment, the proportion of firms with valid decile assignments diminishes
with longer time horizons. To provide context, the proportion of firms with initial decile assignments which have valid
decile assignments after the specified time horizon is presented in the NM column for each initial decile assignment. For
instance, according to Panel A, 89.8% of firms initially assigned to decile one have valid decile assignments one year later.
continued on the next page
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Table 11 – continued from the previous page
Panel A: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+1
Decile at Time T+1
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 89.84 52.41 20.74 10.30 6.24 3.84 2.58 1.74 1.09 0.60 0.46
2 89.02 22.40 29.08 20.39 11.84 6.68 4.47 2.70 1.44 0.68 0.31
3 89.43 10.59 21.47 22.53 18.35 12.42 6.98 4.03 2.31 0.99 0.32
4 90.04 6.17 13.13 19.93 20.86 17.33 11.21 6.36 3.38 1.25 0.39
5 89.61 4.03 8.20 13.35 18.19 20.22 17.27 10.60 5.44 2.12 0.57
6 89.96 2.66 5.28 8.43 13.19 18.15 21.39 17.19 9.43 3.54 0.73
7 89.91 1.93 3.05 5.05 8.17 13.47 19.81 23.22 17.27 6.48 1.55
8 90.06 1.37 1.85 2.87 4.41 7.43 12.46 21.31 29.15 16.11 3.04
9 89.46 0.69 0.86 1.14 1.77 2.73 5.01 10.37 22.58 42.25 12.59
10 83.90 0.54 0.36 0.38 0.51 0.63 0.86 1.83 4.53 18.51 71.85
Panel B: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+2
Decile at Time T+2
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 83.42 38.36 18.89 12.11 9.15 6.72 5.18 4.12 2.89 1.62 0.95
2 80.37 20.21 22.10 17.07 13.07 9.50 7.12 5.24 3.18 1.77 0.73
3 80.25 12.50 18.42 18.26 15.39 11.93 9.44 6.56 4.36 2.31 0.82
4 81.02 9.05 14.22 16.79 16.50 14.67 11.88 8.30 5.10 2.57 0.92
5 80.78 6.55 10.41 14.44 15.51 16.07 14.23 10.98 7.00 3.61 1.21
6 80.35 5.37 8.25 10.74 13.24 15.62 15.97 13.63 10.18 5.32 1.68
7 80.56 4.40 5.79 7.94 10.75 13.86 15.91 16.63 13.96 8.00 2.76
8 79.80 3.71 4.41 5.45 7.19 9.97 13.65 17.36 20.10 13.48 4.68
9 78.69 2.43 2.64 3.17 4.16 5.81 8.09 12.22 20.00 27.86 13.62
10 71.27 1.43 1.23 1.08 1.41 1.79 2.70 4.39 8.03 21.07 56.87
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Table 11 – continued from the previous page
Panel C: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+3
Decile at Time T+3
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 78.14 29.91 16.96 12.75 9.84 8.34 7.12 6.28 4.46 2.81 1.53
2 73.24 18.00 18.57 15.47 13.08 10.51 8.69 6.67 4.95 2.91 1.16
3 72.62 12.46 17.10 15.88 14.48 12.91 9.56 7.56 5.87 2.94 1.23
4 72.85 10.12 14.20 15.38 15.22 13.63 11.67 8.82 6.10 3.43 1.44
5 72.98 8.65 11.72 13.86 14.29 14.21 13.22 10.50 7.47 4.26 1.81
6 71.88 7.28 9.27 12.26 13.19 14.48 14.24 12.17 9.61 5.31 2.18
7 71.94 6.24 8.29 9.56 11.69 13.18 14.69 13.52 11.87 7.62 3.32
8 70.52 5.46 5.92 7.21 8.70 10.77 13.43 15.68 15.57 12.02 5.25
9 68.91 4.66 4.49 4.75 5.46 7.31 9.07 12.66 17.69 20.85 13.07
10 60.14 2.56 2.22 1.95 2.41 3.15 4.13 6.08 9.68 20.83 46.99
Panel D: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+4
Decile at Time T+4
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 73.43 22.90 14.83 12.23 10.93 9.53 8.70 8.26 6.18 4.34 2.10
2 67.36 15.69 16.75 14.76 12.08 11.62 10.07 7.87 6.04 3.60 1.54
3 66.34 12.53 15.69 14.81 13.80 12.34 10.61 8.56 6.51 3.49 1.64
4 66.18 10.58 13.62 14.48 15.00 13.38 11.80 8.57 6.92 3.81 1.84
5 65.77 9.37 12.23 14.02 13.95 13.91 12.06 9.89 7.99 4.42 2.15
6 64.35 9.05 10.67 12.00 13.25 13.09 13.37 11.56 8.86 5.82 2.34
7 64.08 8.13 9.89 11.36 12.13 12.71 12.51 12.27 10.21 7.23 3.57
8 62.48 7.40 8.20 8.66 9.72 11.56 12.75 13.10 12.98 10.13 5.51
9 59.86 6.47 6.12 5.60 6.62 8.26 10.27 12.35 14.60 16.78 12.92
10 50.22 3.89 3.06 3.25 3.31 4.12 5.59 7.33 10.64 19.42 39.39
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Table 11 – continued from the previous page
Panel E: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+5
Decile at Time T+5
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 69.17 19.37 13.87 11.63 11.08 10.39 9.61 9.27 7.58 5.05 2.14
2 62.38 13.60 15.70 14.13 12.75 11.28 10.82 8.83 7.16 4.15 1.59
3 60.67 11.58 15.40 14.74 13.52 12.48 11.43 8.44 6.57 3.94 1.90
4 59.91 11.50 13.17 14.10 14.22 13.43 11.87 9.20 6.62 3.87 2.01
5 59.62 10.09 12.32 14.02 13.73 13.41 11.83 10.02 7.60 4.70 2.26
6 57.93 9.54 10.99 12.63 13.58 13.35 12.72 10.60 8.34 5.37 2.87
7 57.27 9.04 11.37 11.50 11.72 12.62 12.36 11.26 9.39 6.67 4.07
8 55.16 9.07 9.54 9.74 9.94 11.48 12.04 12.09 11.46 9.08 5.55
9 51.90 7.82 6.82 6.83 7.91 8.71 10.49 11.43 13.18 14.31 12.49
10 41.43 5.37 4.29 4.63 4.14 5.10 6.02 7.87 10.81 18.61 33.17
Panel F: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+6
Decile at Time T+6
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 63.48 19.22 13.22 12.02 11.22 11.11 9.59 9.09 7.65 4.57 2.31
2 57.21 13.26 15.79 14.33 13.60 11.39 10.25 8.85 6.80 4.12 1.62
3 55.72 11.47 14.51 14.50 13.51 12.96 11.53 9.13 6.51 3.86 2.02
4 54.97 11.17 13.42 14.59 13.58 12.77 13.05 8.91 6.47 3.82 2.22
5 54.45 10.60 12.39 13.56 13.75 13.41 12.60 9.75 6.85 4.92 2.18
6 52.74 9.18 12.09 12.95 14.22 12.90 12.11 10.62 8.27 4.86 2.81
7 51.84 9.24 10.81 11.04 12.07 13.12 12.44 11.78 9.14 6.48 3.88
8 49.25 9.16 9.58 10.38 10.21 11.61 12.03 11.80 11.12 8.87 5.24
9 45.22 8.19 7.41 7.61 7.97 9.21 10.45 11.04 12.84 13.35 11.93
10 35.26 5.61 5.21 4.87 4.91 5.86 6.22 8.30 11.79 17.90 29.33
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Table 11 – continued from the previous page
Panel G: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+7
Decile at Time T+7
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 57.87 19.84 12.91 12.39 11.62 10.93 9.56 8.87 7.07 4.42 2.39
2 51.97 12.92 16.25 13.71 13.09 12.13 10.85 9.08 6.28 3.91 1.78
3 50.78 11.72 14.12 14.64 13.98 13.28 11.52 8.88 6.13 3.77 1.95
4 50.13 10.82 13.36 14.85 13.99 13.64 11.98 8.99 6.63 3.67 2.07
5 49.79 10.27 13.03 13.60 14.32 13.07 12.39 9.27 7.35 4.57 2.13
6 48.19 8.81 11.74 13.01 13.50 13.32 13.07 10.91 8.13 4.88 2.63
7 47.13 9.07 10.86 12.05 12.47 12.16 12.79 11.33 9.17 6.17 3.94
8 44.27 8.60 10.27 10.54 10.61 12.21 12.21 11.50 10.71 8.42 4.95
9 39.77 7.98 7.38 8.00 8.64 9.57 10.62 11.69 12.65 12.65 10.81
10 31.03 6.42 5.51 5.46 5.22 6.73 6.85 8.56 11.74 17.10 26.41
Panel H: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+8
Decile at Time T+8
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 52.76 19.59 14.16 12.52 11.84 10.46 9.64 8.66 6.78 4.10 2.24
2 47.29 13.52 14.89 14.33 13.25 12.64 11.06 8.98 6.15 3.29 1.88
3 46.29 10.67 14.89 14.42 14.28 13.09 11.81 8.85 6.29 3.77 1.93
4 45.76 11.09 12.77 14.54 13.94 13.84 12.39 9.25 6.29 3.99 1.91
5 45.23 10.39 12.31 14.23 13.88 13.68 12.12 10.07 6.74 4.37 2.21
6 43.74 9.11 11.68 13.40 13.99 13.55 12.77 10.13 8.05 4.71 2.62
7 42.68 8.80 11.01 12.24 12.48 12.64 13.11 10.60 8.95 6.35 3.82
8 39.86 8.73 10.36 10.73 11.39 12.45 11.68 11.59 10.88 7.42 4.77
9 35.18 7.43 8.66 7.90 8.62 9.64 11.01 12.18 12.03 12.35 10.19
10 27.63 7.05 5.37 6.02 5.91 7.05 8.43 8.86 12.07 16.12 23.12
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Table 11 – continued from the previous page
Panel I: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+9
Decile at Time T+9
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 48.21 19.66 14.14 12.70 11.28 10.91 9.94 8.61 6.77 3.66 2.33
2 43.22 13.57 15.11 14.71 12.74 12.48 10.88 9.12 5.83 3.54 2.02
3 42.10 11.24 14.62 13.75 14.73 14.02 11.42 8.37 6.14 3.84 1.88
4 41.52 9.78 13.51 14.79 14.52 13.84 12.37 9.15 6.71 3.64 1.69
5 41.06 10.48 12.93 14.05 14.53 13.56 11.64 10.15 6.68 4.03 1.94
6 39.42 9.16 11.12 13.47 14.24 13.73 13.75 9.80 7.44 4.76 2.53
7 38.56 8.93 11.03 12.62 12.46 12.50 13.20 11.24 8.85 5.66 3.52
8 36.08 8.74 9.89 11.30 11.26 13.03 11.77 11.86 10.00 7.50 4.65
9 31.03 7.32 8.21 8.74 9.41 10.06 11.26 12.05 11.98 11.24 9.72
10 24.87 7.41 6.42 6.06 6.72 6.99 8.67 8.64 12.88 15.67 20.53
Panel J: Percentage of Non-Missing Observations in Each Decile at Time T+10
Decile at Time T+10
Decile at T NM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 43.86 19.91 13.60 12.25 12.13 11.04 10.21 8.43 6.36 3.71 2.36
2 39.29 13.87 14.53 14.80 12.54 13.05 11.17 8.71 6.15 3.32 1.88
3 38.33 10.58 14.99 14.85 14.81 13.51 11.53 8.44 5.99 3.48 1.83
4 37.97 10.48 13.42 15.05 14.68 13.33 11.80 9.66 6.30 3.61 1.67
5 37.33 9.65 13.50 14.50 14.34 14.38 11.89 9.47 6.45 3.80 2.02
6 35.75 9.12 11.54 14.12 14.06 13.91 13.31 10.06 7.33 4.25 2.29
7 34.79 8.89 10.88 12.44 12.93 13.30 13.51 10.79 8.14 5.89 3.23
8 32.26 8.85 10.17 11.53 12.38 12.57 12.41 11.48 9.52 6.91 4.18
9 27.53 7.23 8.25 8.66 9.63 10.69 11.26 11.75 12.86 10.83 8.85
10 22.24 7.89 6.34 6.54 6.71 7.15 9.40 9.43 13.15 14.93 18.46
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to a valuation decile which are in each valuation decile at the time horizon
of interest, while Table 11 presents the percentage of all firms initially
assigned to a valuation decile and which have valid valuation data at the
end of the time horizon of interest which are in each valuation decile at
the end of that time horizon. Thus, with the exception of the denominator
used in calculating the decile membership percentages, the steps followed
to create Tables 10 and 11 are the same. Although the results in Table
11 are fundamentally the same as the results in Table 10, the presentation
of the proportion of non-missing decile assignments for each time horizon
in Table 11 facilitates the evaluation of the relative proportion of firms
in each valuation decile at each time horizon. Consequently, it may be
seen in Panel E of Table 11 that five years after the decile assignment
period over 33% of firms with valid valuation decile assignments initially
assigned to the tenth decile are once again in the tenth valuation decile.
In contrast, for firms with valid decile assignments in both periods that
figure is less than 20% for firms initially assigned to the first decile which
are once again in the first decile after five years. For firms which remain in
the sample after ten years, Panel J shows that about 47% of firms initially
assigned to the tenth decile are still in one of the three most overvalued
deciles at the end of the period. A similar proportion of firms initially
assigned to the first decile which remained in the sample during the ten
year time horizon are in one of the bottom three valuation deciles after the
ten years. If the average valuation decile membership for firms beginning in
each initial decile is calculated at each time horizon and plotted, the result
is Figure 1, which is presented in the prior Introduction and Motivation
section. Figure 1 is therefore constructed as the weighted average decile
membership for the firms with valid valuation decile assignments at each
time horizon which were initially assigned to the valuation deciles at time
T.
Clearly, when firms are assigned to valuation deciles based upon the
capm5 VERR valuation measure and tracked over time the results are re-
markably persistent. From the perspective of an efficient market general
mispricing could be explained as being random or a pricing error which
will be arbitraged away. In the case of random mispricing, random fluc-
tuations in market prices may produce deviations between intrinsic value
and market prices. If such deviations from intrinsic value are random,
firms assigned to valuation deciles at one point in time would be expected
to be randomly distributed across valuation deciles in subsequent periods.
This is evidently not the case, as initial decile assignments are persistent
and long lasting. In the case of pricing errors generally, efficient market
theory indicates that pricing errors should be arbitraged away. Investors
should buy more of the undervalued equities and sell or short sell over-
valued equities–leading to a correction in market prices. In that scenario
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valuation decile assignments ought to be short-lived as the pricing errors
are eliminated through the actions of investors in the marketplace. The
persistence of the initial valuation decile assignments over time which may
be seen in the panels of Tables 10 and 11 is inconsistent with market effi-
ciency. Rather, the data indicates that some firms are systematically and
consistently overvalued or undervalued for protracted periods of time, rais-
ing questions about the causes of the systematic and persistent mispricing.
Persistent mispricing also has ramifications for asset pricing studies, as
mispricing may overlap with other common asset pricing factors.
1.5 Valuation Deciles Applied to Acquisitions
1.5.1 Introduction and Acquisition Data
The prior section demonstrated that market valuation error decile assign-
ments based upon the application of realized earnings and book values to
a residual income model are highly positively correlated with each other
across specifications employing numerous different discount rates, two dif-
ferent earnings and book value measures, annual or full period decile as-
signment methods, and both bull and bear market conditions. Thus the
relative valuation measures developed are highly robust. However, the con-
sistency of the relative valuation measures with prior research findings is
also important. Acquisitions provide a convenient framework for examin-
ing measures of overvaluation because overvalued firms have an incentive
to use their overvalued stock to fund acquisitions instead of using cash, in-
dicating that overvaluation should directly influence the financing choices
of firms pursing acquisitions.
One study which examined overvaluation and acquisitions was per-
formed by Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) and employed
a residual income valuation model based on analysts’ forecasts. The ex-
istence of a published study using an approach related to the one in this
essay provides a unique opportunity to simultaneously validate the mea-
sures of relative valuation in this essay through comparison to published
results and to enhance the literature on the topic of acquisitions by using
actual earnings and book value outcomes in the valuation process instead
of analysts’ projections. Therefore, to examine the validity of the relative
valuation measures a study of overvaluation as it relates to acquisitions is
performed. The results from an analysis of the takeover market support the
validity of the relative measures of valuation developed in this essay and
add confidence that the valuation decile assignments are indeed capturing
overvaluation as intended.
As noted above, the role of overvaluation in the takeover market has
been studied by Dong et al. (2006) using an analysts’ forecast valuation
model. As a means of comparing the nature of the valuation decile as-
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signments previously discussed in this essay with published research, an
examination of takeover bids and mergers is performed. Data for takeover
bids is obtained from SDC Platinum for the period 1978-2009. The end
date in 2009 is selected in order to ensure that the valuation measures em-
ployed have the potential to include a full five years of realized outcomes.
Similar to the procedure in Dong et al. (2006), the sample of takeovers
is restricted by additional requirements. First, the value of the merger or
takeover is required to be at least $10 million. Second, when multiple of-
fers were made by a specific acquirer for a particular target only the first
offer is included in the sample. Third, return data in CRSP is required
for at least one day during the period beginning five days before the an-
nouncement date and ending five days after the announcement date. This
restriction more closely aligns the requirements applied in this essay with
the requirements applied by Dong et al. (2006), facilitating the comparison
of the results in this essay with the results from Dong et al. (2006) for the
purpose of validating the relative measures of overvaluation in this essay.
Descriptive statistics for the acquisitions data are presented in Table 12.
The sample of takeover bids consists of 4,861 offers between 1978 and 2009.
The individual offer values used in the calculation of the mean offer value
are adjusted for inflation, and the offer values are in millions of dollars as
of the end of 2009. Overall, about 83% of takeover offers in the sample
were successful, and about 29% of takeover offers involved only cash as the
payment.
1.5.2 Relationship Between Overvaluation and Acquisitions
To enable an examination of the role of overvaluation in acquisitions, the
sample of takeover bids is combined with the valuation decile assignments
discussed previously. This reduces the number of acquisitions in the final
dataset since valuation data is not available for all acquiring or target firms.
The acquirer and the target are not both required to have valid valuation
data for a takeover offer to be included in the univariate analysis. Conse-
quently, the number of total observations present in the univariate data for
the acquirers differs from the total number of observations present in the
univariate data for the target firms. The univariate statistics presented in
Table 13 follow an approach similar to the one used by Dong et al. (2006).
However, a few important differences between the univariate approach
used by Dong et al. (2006) and the univariate approach used in this study
should be noted. In the study by Dong et al. (2006), firms were separated
into quintiles by their price-to-value (P/V) ratios. As the valuation mea-
sures presented previously in this essay utilize deciles, deciles are employed
in the univariate analysis. Also, as the decile assignments are made on the
basis of the VERR or eVERR measures in this study, the precise nature of
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Table 12
Descriptive Statistics for Takeover Bids
The number of takeover bids per year in the sample is presented below.
For each year the mean offer value is calculated using inflation adjusted
deal values expressed in terms of dollar values at the end of 2009. The
percentages of successful, hostile, tender offers, merger bids, all cash bids,
all stock bids, and bids using a mixture of financing are presented.
Mean Tender Merger All All
Offer Successful Hostile Offers Bids Cash Stock Mixed
Year Tobs Value (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1978 14 1,134.2 85.7 14.3 42.9 57.1 50.0 42.9 7.1
1979 8 779.9 50.0 12.5 50.0 50.0 87.5 12.5 0.0
1980 26 854.2 80.8 11.5 23.1 76.9 15.4 7.7 76.9
1981 91 1,435.2 71.4 14.3 22.0 78.0 4.4 0.0 95.6
1982 81 552.2 66.7 12.3 24.7 75.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
1983 107 374.2 76.6 11.2 21.5 78.5 0.9 0.0 99.1
1984 131 679.5 74.0 6.1 28.2 71.8 6.1 4.6 89.3
1985 131 825.3 71.8 9.9 28.2 71.8 49.6 20.6 29.8
1986 142 621.6 78.9 8.5 32.4 67.6 53.5 21.8 24.6
1987 132 544.9 75.0 9.1 23.5 76.5 41.7 21.2 37.1
1988 134 588.0 62.7 12.7 34.3 65.7 53.7 15.7 30.6
1989 126 624.4 71.4 6.3 21.4 78.6 34.9 32.5 32.5
1990 91 537.6 78.0 3.3 16.5 83.5 40.7 22.0 37.4
1991 79 421.8 74.7 1.3 7.6 92.4 12.7 51.9 35.4
1992 86 368.7 84.9 2.3 9.3 90.7 19.8 46.5 33.7
1993 127 487.5 81.9 2.4 11.0 89.0 27.6 41.7 30.7
1994 185 389.8 81.1 6.5 13.0 87.0 27.0 47.6 25.4
1995 215 664.4 84.2 7.4 15.3 84.7 23.7 48.8 27.4
1996 243 848.8 86.8 6.2 15.2 84.8 20.2 43.6 36.2
1997 322 975.1 89.8 4.0 16.1 83.9 16.5 48.4 35.1
1998 328 1,657.2 93.6 1.2 14.9 85.1 20.4 46.6 32.9
1999 367 2,494.0 84.5 3.5 16.3 83.7 25.9 43.9 30.2
2000 333 2,102.5 84.7 2.4 19.8 80.2 25.8 41.4 32.7
2001 230 1,135.1 85.7 1.3 17.0 83.0 24.3 37.8 37.8
2002 133 1,159.7 85.7 1.5 22.6 77.4 33.1 28.6 38.3
2003 158 1,130.0 92.4 2.5 17.1 82.9 31.0 27.8 41.1
2004 155 2,600.8 94.8 1.9 6.5 93.5 29.7 27.7 42.6
2005 150 2,696.8 89.3 1.3 8.7 91.3 37.3 22.0 40.7
2006 165 2,566.0 89.1 1.8 8.5 91.5 50.3 15.8 33.9
2007 160 1,741.1 86.9 0.0 16.9 83.1 46.9 13.8 39.4
2008 124 2,165.7 76.6 2.4 23.4 76.6 48.4 21.0 30.6
2009 87 2,750.4 82.8 1.1 31.0 69.0 31.0 25.3 43.7
Total 4,861 1,328.1 83.2 4.6 18.2 81.8 28.6 32.2 39.2
the measure of overvaluation in this study differs from the measure used by
Dong et al. (2006). Perhaps the most significant difference pertains to the
frequency and timeliness of the valuation measures this study uses com-
pared to the valuation measures used by Dong et al. (2006). Since Dong
et al. (2006) used an analysts’ forecasts model to find firm value it was
possible for them to calculate the value of the firm for the month before
the announcement date. As this study is based upon a perfect foresight
model using realized earnings data, firm valuations are annual. The valua-
tion data for the acquiring firm associated with a transaction is taken from
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the end of the nearest fiscal year ending on or before the announcement
date, and the same approach is used for the target firm associated with
the transaction. Although it is possible for the valuation data used in this
study to be closer to the announcement date than it was in Dong et al.
(2006), in general the valuation data used in this study is expected to be
markedly less fresh. This means that the measures of overvaluation in this
study use market prices in the VERR and eVERR calculations from sub-
stantially before the announcement date of the acquisition in most cases,
resulting in market prices which are even less likely to be contaminated by
the acquisition announcement than in Dong et al. (2006) in most cases.
Importantly, the use of realized earnings data and book values in the
valuation models produces an additional effect for the target firms. If an
acquisition bid is successful, much of the future earnings data becomes
unavailable. Since the valuation measures are calculated using whatever
earnings data is available for a given firm instead of requiring that data
be available for the full five years, which would produce a survivorship
bias, target firms which are successfully acquired have valuation measures
preceding the announcement date based upon very few future earnings fig-
ures, if any. As Equation 2 demonstrates, in the absence of future earnings
data the measure of firm value becomes the book value of the firm. In
effect, the firm value used to calculate the VERR and eVERR measures
for many of the target firms is therefore solely the result of the target firm’s
book value when an acquisition bid is successful. Even in this case, the
decile assignments used to sort the target firms are not purely driven by
the market-to-book ratio since the decile assignments are generated using
the full valuation sample over the full period. Specifically, the valuation
decile assignments are full sample valuation decile assignments generated
using the entire set of valuation data discussed in prior sections of this
study instead of limiting decile assignments to the acquisition offer sample
alone.
In all cases the decile assignments are based upon valuation measures
employing the static CAPM discount rate for each firm. The static CAPM
approach is used in order to incorporate a firm specific risk adjustment
without invoking the size and book-to-market connections inherent in the
Fama-French discount model. Although the decile assignments using the
Fama-French approach are very similar to the decile assignments using
the CAPM approach, it is possible that mispricing may account for some
degree of the observed premiums associated with the size and book-to-
market factors. The size and book-to-market factors in the Fama-French
approach are therefore more prone to being affected by mispricing itself,
whereas using the CAPM methodology to estimate the cost of equity avoids
that issue. Additionally, Dong et al. (2006) reported results based upon a
valuation implementation utilizing a CAPM discount rate, and using the
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static CAPM approach to estimate the cost of equity in this essay more
closely approximates the primary cost of equity choice made by Dong et al.
(2006), facilitating comparisons between the findings in this essay with
published research.
The results in Table 13 are divided into four panels. Panel A presents
characteristics of takeover offers grouped by the target’s VERR decile as-
signment. As the target firms become progressively overvalued the propor-
tion of takeover offers employing only cash as the form of payment appears
to decline for the most overvalued targets, but the difference between the
10th and 1st deciles is not statistically significant. Increasing levels of over-
valuation of the target firm appear to loosely correspond to an increased
proportion of takeover offers employing only stock as the form of payment,
but the difference between the 10th and 1st deciles is not statistically sig-
nificant.
Panel B of Table 13 continues with the univariate analysis of takeover
bids assigned to valuation deciles on the basis of the target’s eVERR valu-
ation decile assignment. In this case, the difference in the frequency of all
cash payment between the 10th and 1st deciles is statistically significant at
the 5% level. The frequency of all stock payment, however, demonstrates a
statistically significant difference at the 10% level between the 10th and 1st
valuation deciles. More overvalued target firms exhibit higher frequencies
of all stock payment and lower frequencies of all cash payment.
Switching to the univariate analysis using valuation deciles for the
firms making the acquisition offers, Panel C organizes the transactions into
groups based upon the VERR decile assignment of the acquiring firm in
each offer. In this panel the proportion of transactions funded entirely with
cash generally declines as the acquirers become progressively more over-
valued. As would be expected, the proportion of acquisition offers funded
entirely with stock is higher for acquirers which are more overvalued. The
difference between the frequencies reported for the 10th and 1st deciles is
statistically significant at the 1% level for both the frequencies of all cash
payment and the frequencies of all stock payment.
Moving to eVERR valuation decile assignments for firms making an
acquisition offer produces the results in Panel D of Table 13. The results
for the frequency of all cash payment are statistically significant at the 1%
level, with the most overvalued acquirers less frequently making all cash
offers. The frequency of all stock payment increases by 36.9% when moving
from the 1st decile to the 10th decile, and the difference is statistically
significant at the 1% level.
Similar to the approach in Dong et al. (2006), logistic regressions are
performed to model the choice of full cash funding, full stock funding,
tender offers, hostile takeover bids, and the success of the takeover offer for
the acquisition dataset. The explanatory variables included in the logistic
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Table 13
Acquisition Characteristics by Acquirer or Target Valuation Deciles
The sample of acquisition offers from 1978-2009 is merged with valuation data and the specified valuation decile assignments
generated previously are used to separate the sample of acquisitions into groups in each panel. In all cases the decile
assignments are based upon valuation measures employing the static CAPM discount rate for each firm. The static CAPM
approach incorporates a firm specific risk adjustment while more closely approximating the cost of equity choice made by
Dong et al. (2006). The mean valuation measure for the acquisition sample is presented for each decile category. The
frequency of all cash, all stock, tender, hostile, and successful offers are presented for each decile category. The difference
between the tenth and first deciles is presented, and p-values for two sample t-tests are at the bottom of each panel.
Mean Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
VERR All Cash All Stock Tender Offer Hostile Successful
Decile Tobs Measure (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel A: Acquisitions Assigned to Deciles Using Target’s capm5 VERR Valuation Decile Assignment
1 29 −6.279 31.034 17.241 34.483 10.345 68.966
2 115 −0.800 32.174 21.739 35.652 6.957 82.609
3 179 −0.209 41.899 17.877 35.196 6.145 82.682
4 258 0.115 37.984 22.093 28.682 6.977 87.209
5 283 0.335 37.809 22.261 29.682 8.127 83.392
6 295 0.491 38.983 28.814 28.475 5.424 87.458
7 358 0.622 37.151 28.771 20.391 3.631 84.916
8 330 0.747 36.364 33.030 22.121 2.727 91.515
9 256 0.881 19.531 43.750 14.844 2.734 87.109
10 102 1.238 18.627 24.510 5.882 2.941 58.824
Difference 10-1 7.517 −12.407 7.268 −28.600 −7.404 −10.142
p-value 0.000 0.202 0.387 0.004 0.226 0.317
continued on the next page
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Table 13 – continued from the previous page
Mean Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
eVERR All Cash All Stock Tender Offer Hostile Successful
Decile Tobs Measure (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel B: Acquisitions Assigned to Deciles Using Target’s capm5 eVERR Valuation Decile Assignment
1 30 −9.131 36.667 23.333 30.000 10.000 63.333
2 34 −2.159 32.353 26.471 26.471 8.824 82.353
3 97 −0.915 36.082 13.402 37.113 7.216 77.320
4 160 −0.407 37.500 17.500 25.625 4.375 78.125
5 199 −0.044 34.673 25.126 30.653 7.035 88.945
6 285 0.205 35.439 22.105 29.474 9.123 82.456
7 349 0.405 38.682 24.069 29.226 5.158 84.527
8 441 0.590 38.776 28.798 24.036 3.855 90.249
9 424 0.771 32.311 37.264 19.575 1.887 88.679
10 166 1.107 15.663 39.759 10.241 3.012 77.711
Difference 10-1 10.238 −21.004 16.426 −19.759 −6.988 14.378
p-value 0.000 0.032 0.067 0.032 0.231 0.139
continued on the next page
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Table 13 – continued from the previous page
Mean Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
VERR All Cash All Stock Tender Offer Hostile Successful
Decile Tobs Measure (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel C: Acquisitions Assigned to Deciles Using Acquirer’s capm5 VERR Valuation Decile Assignment
1 85 −4.502 37.647 15.294 25.882 8.235 81.176
2 129 −0.924 35.659 13.178 27.132 4.651 85.271
3 143 −0.217 44.056 13.986 27.972 7.692 82.517
4 179 0.122 41.341 9.497 34.078 2.793 83.799
5 219 0.334 44.292 16.438 29.224 5.023 80.822
6 285 0.489 42.456 21.053 28.421 7.368 85.263
7 321 0.624 37.695 24.922 29.595 5.296 86.916
8 326 0.749 37.730 28.221 23.926 4.601 84.356
9 306 0.891 23.203 47.059 19.281 3.922 84.641
10 237 1.220 11.392 54.430 11.814 2.110 86.920
Difference 10-1 5.722 −26.255 39.136 −14.068 −6.126 5.743
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.054 0.233
continued on the next page
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Table 13 – continued from the previous page
Mean Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
eVERR All Cash All Stock Tender Offer Hostile Successful
Decile Tobs Measure (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel D: Acquisitions Assigned to Deciles Using Acquirer’s capm5 eVERR Valuation Decile Assignment
1 96 −8.116 27.083 20.833 15.625 6.250 84.375
2 138 −2.203 42.029 12.319 32.609 7.246 86.232
3 129 −0.977 33.333 17.054 26.357 3.101 83.721
4 196 −0.397 40.816 18.878 37.245 6.633 86.224
5 235 −0.051 41.277 18.298 31.489 9.787 81.277
6 230 0.193 42.174 18.261 28.696 4.348 83.043
7 292 0.396 39.041 27.397 25.000 6.507 84.247
8 300 0.586 31.667 29.333 23.333 3.667 84.667
9 251 0.776 23.904 43.028 15.139 3.586 80.478
10 182 1.195 13.187 57.692 12.637 0.549 89.011
Difference 10-1 9.310 −13.897 36.859 −2.988 −5.701 4.636
p-value 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.505 0.027 0.293
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regressions are chosen to approximate the study by Dong et al. (2006)
in order to facilitate comparisons between that study and the results in
this essay. Therefore, the variables included in the logistic regressions
are market-to-book ratios for the acquirer and the target, valuation decile
assignments for the acquirer and the target, a dummy variable to capture
the effect of diversifying acquisitions, the relative size of the acquirer to the
target, the size of the target, the leverage of the acquirer, dummy variables
for offer year, and dummy variables for one digit SIC industry groups. A
brief discussion of the different variables will clarify the similarities and
differences in the methodologies followed by Dong et al. (2006) and this
study.
Most of the differences between the methodology employed by Dong
et al. (2006) and the methodology this study follows revolve around the
valuation date of the overvaluation measures and the way the valuation
measures are included in the logistic regressions. Dong et al. (2006) con-
verted the market-to-book and price-to-value ratios into relative values
between 1 and 100 by first ranking the sample among all CRSP stocks
each month. In this essay, actual market-to-book ratios are used in the
logistic regressions, and they are calculated at the valuation date for each
firm. The valuation date for each firm is the data date for the fiscal data
in COMPUSTAT which is on or before the announcement date. Static
CAPM valuation decile assignments for the acquirer and target firms are
used as the valuation measures, and decile assignments are made using
the full sample of 1964–2009 valuation data. As in Dong et al. (2006),
the dummy variable for diversifying acquisitions is set to one if the tar-
get and acquirer share the same three-digit COMPUSTAT SIC code and
zero otherwise. The relative size is calculated as the logarithm of the ratio
of the market values for the acquirer and the target, with market values
calculated on the valuation date corresponding to the valuation data for
each firm. Target size is the logarithm of the target’s market size on the
valuation date. Leverage is calculated by dividing the acquirer’s total li-
abilities by total assets on the valuation date. As in Dong et al. (2006),
dummy variables are included for the offer year and dummy variables for
single digit SIC industry groups are used.1
For the purposes of this study the most important explanatory vari-
ables are the valuation decile assignments and the most important logistic
regressions are those relating to the use of cash payment or stock payment.
Overvalued firms have an incentive to use their stock as a means of financ-
ing an acquisition instead of using cash. Thus, the acquirer’s valuation
decile is expected to be negatively related to cash payment and positively
1Dong et al. (2006) used dummy variables for two digit SIC industry groups, but
a logistic regression using two digit SIC industry groups with the modifications to the
other variables in this study failed to converge.
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related to stock payment as it is in Dong et al. (2006). The relative valu-
ation of the target firm was found by Dong et al. (2006) to be positively
related to stock payment and not statistically significant at the 5% level for
cash payment, and similar results are expected for this essay. The results
from Dong et al. (2006) indicate that the market-to-book variables should
be negatively related to cash payment and positively related to stock pay-
ment. The diversifying and relative size variables are also expected to
follow the patterns in Dong et al. (2006), yielding positive relationships
with all cash payment and negative relationships with all stock payment.
Target size and leverage produced mixed levels of significance in the study
by Dong et al. (2006), and therefore no clear expectations are established
for this study.
The results are presented in Table 14. In Panel A VERR valuation
decile assignments are used as the valuation measures for the acquirer and
the target for each takeover bid. Once again, VERR decile assignments are
generated using the full sample of valuation data over the entire period of
the study discussed previously, and thus decile assignments are not limited
solely to the takeover sample. The results presented in Panel A show that
the levels of target and acquirer overvaluation are both negatively associ-
ated with cash being the sole payment method in the offer. On the other
hand, valuation decile assignments for the target and the acquirer are both
positively related to the use of only stock as the proposed method of pay-
ment in a takeover offer. This means that increasingly overvalued acquirers
are more likely to use only stock and it is more likely that stock alone will
be used as the proposed payment as the target firm becomes increasingly
overvalued. The coefficients for the target and acquirer decile assignments
are statistically significant at the 1% level. In Panel B the logistic regres-
sions are performed again using eVERR valuation decile assignments. The
directionality of the relationship between the valuation deciles of the tar-
get and the acquirer and the choice of only cash or only stock as payment
remains the same as in Panel A. The coefficients for the valuation deciles of
the acquirer and the target when modeling the use of solely cash financing
and solely stock financing are all statistically significant at the 5% level,
with most of them significant at the 1% level.
An evaluation of the coefficients for the variables other than the val-
uation measures for the cash and stock logistic regressions in Panels A
and B of Table 14 produces somewhat more mixed results compared to
Dong et al. (2006). Neither the target nor the acquirer’s market-to-book
ratio is statistically significant at the 5% level in the cash or stock logistic
regressions in Panels A and B. The dummy variable for diversifying ac-
quisitions is generally statistically insignificant, whereas it was positively
related to cash payment and negatively related to stock payment in Dong
et al. (2006). The directional impact of relative size upon cash or stock
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Table 14
Logistic Regressions for Acquisitions
The sample of acquisition offers from 1978-2009 is merged with valuation data. Firm valuations are found using the static
CAPM discount approach. Decile assignments are made using the full valuation sample. If the acquirer and target have the
same three-digit SIC code in COMPUSTAT the diversifying variable is set to one, with zero assigned otherwise. Relative
size is the logarithm of the ratio of the market values for the acquirer and target. Target size is the logarithm of the target’s
market value. Leverage is the acquirer’s total liabilities scaled by total assets. Dummy variables are included for offer year
and one digit SIC industry groups. The p-values are reported below each coefficient.
Panel A: VERR Decile Assignments Used as Valuation Measures (Dependent Variable = 1 if Yes, 0 Otherwise)
Cash Stock Tender Offer Hostile Success
Target M/B −0.022 0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 0.000 −0.135 −0.054 0.000 0.001
0.064 0.685 0.872 0.558 0.848 0.869 0.007 0.274 0.789 0.718
Acquirer M/B −0.010 −0.000 0.006 0.003 −0.074 −0.054 0.004 0.004 −0.001 −0.001
0.158 0.966 0.053 0.402 0.000 0.006 0.434 0.329 0.723 0.668
Target Decile −0.116 −0.116 0.129 0.129 −0.172 −0.160 −0.190 −0.145 −0.076 −0.078
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.018 0.016
Acquirer Decile −0.120 −0.119 0.224 0.221 −0.034 −0.004 −0.064 −0.064 0.038 0.038
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.171 0.880 0.172 0.172 0.186 0.185
Diversifying −0.162 −0.066 −0.065 0.229 0.134 0.136 −0.073 −0.017 −0.004 −0.036 0.131 0.144 −0.162 −0.176 −0.180
0.122 0.546 0.550 0.033 0.241 0.235 0.505 0.883 0.975 0.861 0.553 0.515 0.205 0.191 0.182
Relative Size 0.212 0.236 0.235 −0.129 −0.163 −0.164 0.082 0.087 0.107 −0.407 −0.384 −0.386 0.339 0.357 0.359
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Target Size −0.053 −0.024 −0.024 0.006 −0.061 −0.061 0.020 0.081 0.094 0.277 0.313 0.320 0.049 0.102 0.100
0.124 0.520 0.525 0.868 0.119 0.122 0.588 0.037 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.232 0.026 0.028
Leverage 0.743 0.462 0.463 −1.681 −1.369 −1.377 0.937 0.569 0.713 0.897 1.134 1.114 −0.334 −0.268 −0.264
0.007 0.119 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.063 0.023 0.104 0.064 0.068 0.312 0.449 0.456
Intercept −1.152 20.637 20.437 −0.472 −1.987 −1.980 −1.904 −1.147 −1.418 −3.769 −13.846 −13.403 0.991 0.774 0.781
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.092 0.089
N 2,208 2,071 2,071 2,208 2,071 2,071 2,208 2,071 2,071 2,208 2,071 2,071 2,208 2,071 2,071
Pseudo-R2 0.172 0.193 0.193 0.153 0.196 0.197 0.073 0.086 0.089 0.075 0.075 0.073 0.079 0.080 0.081
continued on the next page
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Table 14 – continued from the previous page
Panel B: eVERR Decile Assignments Used as Valuation Measures (Dependent Variable = 1 if Yes, 0 Otherwise)
Cash Stock Tender Offer Hostile Success
Target M/B −0.017 −0.002 0.002 −0.000 −0.036 −0.015 −0.205 0.007 0.002 −0.004
0.140 0.673 0.448 0.976 0.025 0.299 0.002 0.138 0.794 0.374
Acquirer M/B 0.000 0.001 0.000 −0.000 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.000 0.001 0.001
0.513 0.247 0.869 0.590 0.410 0.219 0.521 0.659 0.473 0.489
Target Decile −0.078 −0.076 0.153 0.153 −0.098 −0.084 −0.185 −0.189 0.100 0.103
0.008 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004
Acquirer Decile −0.073 −0.075 0.161 0.164 −0.055 −0.057 −0.080 −0.073 −0.041 −0.044
0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.029 0.097 0.133 0.174 0.145
Diversifying −0.104 −0.055 −0.056 0.257 0.189 0.196 −0.117 −0.088 −0.088 0.014 0.086 0.106 −0.132 −0.138 −0.147
0.345 0.632 0.629 0.022 0.114 0.103 0.304 0.457 0.455 0.950 0.708 0.647 0.324 0.330 0.300
Relative Size 0.231 0.260 0.263 −0.152 −0.198 −0.200 0.059 0.066 0.070 −0.434 −0.419 −0.428 0.413 0.405 0.410
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.044 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Target Size −0.060 −0.029 −0.029 −0.005 −0.072 −0.071 0.007 0.033 0.037 0.263 0.286 0.284 0.044 0.030 0.029
0.094 0.451 0.456 0.893 0.075 0.080 0.860 0.404 0.346 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.300 0.527 0.536
Leverage 0.713 0.495 0.468 −1.548 −1.089 −1.056 0.758 0.532 0.490 0.977 0.938 1.043 −0.475 −0.329 −0.383
0.013 0.118 0.141 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.098 0.129 0.083 0.143 0.107 0.164 0.379 0.309
Intercept 108.120 39.613 39.104 −0.239 −1.812 −1.844 −1.793 −1.017 −1.066 −9.164 −10.773 −10.372 0.773 0.476 0.505
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.541 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.322 0.297
N 2,049 1,885 1,885 2,049 1,885 1,885 2,049 1,885 1,885 2,049 1,885 1,885 2,049 1,885 1,885
Pseudo-R2 0.179 0.190 0.191 0.161 0.188 0.188 0.073 0.078 0.079 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.092 0.095 0.096
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payment for acquisitions in Panels A and B of Table 14 matches the results
from Dong et al. (2006), but the coefficients and significance levels for the
target’s size do not support clear inferences–yielding somewhat weaker re-
sults for the relationship between the target’s size and stock payment than
documented by Dong et al. (2006). However, leverage is negatively related
to stock payment and statistically significant at the 1% level across specifi-
cations in Panels A and B. The negative relationship between the acquirer’s
leverage and stock funding for acquisitions is more strongly supported in
Table 14 than it was in the study by Dong et al. (2006).
Overall, the application of the valuation decile assignments from this
study produces relative valuation results which are consistent with the
findings of Dong et al. (2006) when data from the takeover market is eval-
uated. More overvalued acquirers are more likely to utilize only stock as
the source of financing for a transaction, and more overvalued acquirers are
less likely to use only cash as the source of financing. This consistency with
prior research on the takeover market helps to establish the validity of the
methodology employed in this study to generate the valuation measures
and to assign firms to valuation deciles.
To further examine the robustness of the findings associated with the
acquisition sample a meta-analysis is performed of the stock and cash logis-
tic regressions in Table 14 using all of the different valuation decile assign-
ments generated. A total of thirty-two different valuation decile measures
are applied to the stock and cash logistic regressions. Those measures
are the product of two different valuation model implementations, the IV
and eIV models, with eight different cost of equity measures and both full
period and annual valuation decile assignments. The thirty-two different
valuation decile assignments generated are used to run thirty-two sets of
the stock and cash logistic regressions analogous to the first six columns of
logistic regression results presented in Table 14. For the logistic regressions
which did not include the valuation deciles for the acquirer and the target
only two different logistic regressions are produced in the meta-analysis.
The two different logistic regressions in those cases are the result of the
differences in the construction of the market-to-book ratios.
The results of the meta-analysis are presented in Table 15. Two sets
of t-statistics are presented in the table. The AVG t-statistic is the simple
average of the t-statistics produced by each underlying logistic regression.
The FM t-statistic is the t-statistic for the average of each of the coefficients
estimated across all of the different logistic regressions. Of particular inter-
est is the fact that the acquirer decile is negatively related to cash being the
sole payment method for acquisitions and positively related to stock being
the sole payment method for acquisitions. The AVG t-statistic shows that
those results are statistically significant at the 1% level on average across
the thirty-two different sets of logistic regressions. The FM t-statistic shows
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Table 15
Average Coefficients for Logistic Regressions for Acquisitions
Using Different Valuation Decile Assignments
Logistic regressions for acquisitions are performed as in Table 14 using
multiple valuation measures. A total of thirty-two different VERR and
eVERR valuation decile assignments are used. The coefficients reported in
the table represent the average of the coefficients resulting from the logistic
regressions performed using each of the different valuation decile assign-
ments. The FM t-statistic is the t-statistic for the average of the coefficients
estimated across the different logistic regressions. The AVG t-statistic is
the simple average of the t-statistics produced by each underlying logistic
regression.
VERR and eVERR Decile Assignments Used as Valuation Measures
(Dependent Variable = 1 if Yes, 0 Otherwise)
Cash Stock
Target M/B −0.019 −0.001 0.001 −0.000
FM t-statistic −4.496 −4.799
AVG t-statistic −0.157 −0.260
Acquirer M/B −0.005 0.000 0.003 0.002
FM t-statistic 0.009 3.405
AVG t-statistic 0.473 0.270
Target Decile −0.082 −0.081 0.156 0.156
FM t-statistic −22.413 −21.081 53.220 52.856
AVG t-statistic −3.110 −3.023 5.169 5.135
Acquirer Decile −0.080 −0.080 0.152 0.151
FM t-statistic −20.271 −21.135 23.016 23.962
AVG t-statistic −3.531 −3.509 6.182 6.124
Diversifying −0.133 −0.056 −0.056 0.243 0.162 0.166
FM t-statistic −12.567 −12.781 38.734 37.028
AVG t-statistic −0.504 −0.497 1.356 1.387
Relative Size 0.221 0.235 0.237 −0.140 −0.164 −0.166
FM t-statistic 81.551 75.635 −37.343 −38.675
AVG t-statistic 7.386 7.412 −4.769 −4.802
Target Size −0.057 −0.045 −0.045 0.000 −0.047 −0.047
FM t-statistic −27.103 −27.203 −18.917 −19.526
AVG t-statistic −1.176 −1.159 −1.174 −1.159
Leverage 0.728 0.533 0.524 −1.614 −1.323 −1.319
FM t-statistic 57.680 55.653 −61.194 −50.544
AVG t-statistic 1.727 1.692 −4.132 −4.109
Intercept 53.484 24.589 24.298 −0.355 −1.844 −1.850
FM t-statistic 11.418 11.446 −81.910 −95.305
AVG t-statistic 72.141 70.696 −4.123 −4.122
N 2 32 32 2 32 32
that the estimated coefficients are highly consistent across the thirty-two
sets of logistic regressions, with the t-statistics of the average of the co-
efficients indicating that the coefficients generated are different from zero
at the 1% level of statistical significance. The findings in Table 15 there-
fore show that the results of the application of the valuation deciles to
acquisitions are robust to the use of the different valuation methodologies
employed in this study. This outcome provides support for the robustness
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of the relative valuation measures derived using different discount rates,
decile assignment periods, and model specifications.
1.6 Conclusion
Reliably measuring mispricing is of interest to money managers, investors,
academicians, and many others. Studies employing a residual income val-
uation model to study some topic of interest have typically followed a
robustness approach to the assumptions required by the residual income
valuation model. In this approach the valuation model’s assumptions are
altered and the main findings for the topic of interest are examined to de-
termine if they are affected. Although appropriate for the studies in which
it is used, the approach described leaves unanswered questions about what
happens to relative measures of mispricing as the assumptions utilized are
altered. The present study answers some of those questions by focusing
upon correlations between the relative measures of mispricing derived from
the residual income model as the discount rates, decile assignment meth-
ods, and earnings and book value measures are altered.
The robustness of the relative valuation measures to alternative speci-
fications is tested in several ways. First, two different measures of earnings
and book values are used, generating the IV and eIV series of estimates of
intrinsic value. Second, eight different discount rates are used in the gener-
ation of both the IV and eIV estimates of intrinsic value, and the resulting
VERR and eVERR measures of mispricing are then converted into relative
measures of mispricing by assigning firms to valuation deciles using both
annual and full period decile assignments. The lowest decile correlation
is 0.82 across discount methods with the full period VERR decile assign-
ments. The lowest decile correlation is 0.78 for the full period eVERR
decile assignments, and the lowest full period VERR with eVERR decile
assignment correlation is 0.62. Similar results are obtained with annual
decile assignments, annual or full period bull market decile assignments,
and annual or full period bear market decile assignments.
As the results indicate, assigning firms to valuation deciles using the es-
timated VERR and eVERR produces relative measures of valuation which
are not sensitive to the choice of discount rate or model specification. The
first four discount rates used are static implementations of the CAPM,
Fama-French three factor model, and two aggregate bond market interest
rates. The second four discount rates used are alternative implementa-
tions of the first four discount rates which allow the rates to vary over
time by using a contemporaneous discount rate for each abnormal earn-
ings term. Even the application of discount rates which are not company
specific have little impact upon the relative measures of valuation arising
from the VERR and eVERR valuation decile assignments.
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To test the ability of the relative valuation measures to capture the
degree of overvaluation a study of acquisitions from the takeover market is
performed. The results are consistent with published research, with over-
valued acquirers statistically significantly less likely to pay all cash for an
acquisition and statistically significantly more likely to use all stock to fund
an acquisition. A meta-analysis of the acquisition data is performed using
all of the different variations of the decile assignment methods, discount
rates, and earnings and book value measures. Across all of the different val-
uation decile assignments the results demonstrate on average a statistically
significant and negative relationship between the acquirer’s overvaluation
and all cash payment and a statistically significant and positive relationship
between the acquirer’s overvaluation and all stock payment.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is that annual decile assignments
are highly persistent over time, contrary to what would be expected with
random deviations of market prices from intrinsic values. Using the capm5
VERR decile assignments, fully 18% of the most overvalued firms with ten
years of subsequent valuation data at the time of the initial decile assign-
ment are in the most overvalued decile ten years later. Similarly, nearly
20% of the most undervalued firms with ten years of subsequent valuation
data at the time of the intial decile assignment are in the most undervalued
decile ten years later. The slow convergence of market values with intrinsic
values indicates that mispricing detected by the decile assignments is not
due solely to random market price fluctuations at the time of the decile
assignment. To the extent that random mispricing exists at any given
time it is not inconsistent with market efficiency. However, random mis-
pricing would not be persistent, and therefore the observed persistence in
mispricing argues against random price fluctuations as the causal factor.
If mispricing is not random, arguments in favor of market efficiency indi-
cate that investors should take actions which lead to the elimination of the
mispricing by buying the undervalued equities and selling or shorting the
overvalued equities. Consequently, the observed persistence in mispricing
is hard to rectify with an efficient market, which suggests that any mis-
pricing should be transient or random. Since the observed mispricing is
systematic and long lasting, the findings in this essay open new avenues
for additional research into the factors driving the observed mispricing.
Importantly, persistent mispricing calls into question common factors
used in asset pricing. For example, systematic mispricing affects the market
values of firms, and that may influence the impact of size effects measured
using market values. As overvaluation and undervaluation affect market
values, systematic and long lasting overvaluation and undervaluation are
likely related to factors derived from market-to-book ratios as well. Thus,
the persistence in mispricing this study documents lays the foundation
for future research into asset pricing models to study the extent to which
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common asset pricing factors are driven by the underlying mispricing.
In summary, the relative valuation measures derived from decile assign-
ments using scaled valuation errors between market values and intrinsic
values estimated via the excess earnings model with realized earnings and
book values are remarkably robust to alternative specifications. This study
contributes to the literature by systematically and explicitly examining
the impact of several model specification choices upon estimates of relative
overvaluation using the residual income model. The evidence shows that
the valuation deciles produce results in agreement with prior published re-
search on acquisitions using other estimates of overvaluation. Furthermore,
the observed mispricing is systematic and persistent over very long time
horizons. With these robust measures of relative mispricing it is possible to
study the determinants of mispricing and to re-examine asset pricing top-
ics such as the size and book-to-market effects, opening important areas of
future research.
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2 Determinants of Mispricing
2.1 Introduction and Motivation
The first essay examines the robustness of several measures of mispricing
based upon an abnormal earnings valuation model and demonstrates the
robustness of the valuation measures to different discount rates and model
specifications. The mispricing observed in the first essay is found to be
remarkably persistent. In one approach examined by the first essay, firms
are annually assigned to valuation deciles. For firms with at least ten years
of valuation data, 33.4% of the firms assigned to the most overvalued val-
uation decile at the beginning of a ten year period are in the top two most
overvalued deciles ten years later. Additionally, 33.5% of firms with at
least ten years of valuation data which begin the ten year period assigned
to the most undervalued decile are in the two most undervalued deciles
ten years later. If mispricing is random, as would be expected in a fully
efficient market, firms in one valuation decile at the valuation date would
be expected to be randomly distributed across the valuation deciles at a
later date. That is not what is observed in the data. Rather, the most
overvalued firms remain stubbornly overvalued while the most underval-
ued firms remain stubbornly undervalued–even after ten years. This is a
theoretical puzzle, as the persistence of the mispricing indicates that it is
systematic in nature. What are the determinants of this mispricing?
Mispricing may be related to rational factors. Under this view, the
mispricing measured in the first part of this study may have arisen due to
the rational actions of managers and investors given the incentives and in-
formation available to them. For example, managerial compensation based
upon short term results produces an incentive for the manager to increase
the performance of the firm now at the expense of the firm later, and this
could induce inflated stock prices now. Empirical evidence provided by
Badertscher (2011) indicates that firms engage in earnings management to
prolong periods of overvaluation for significant periods of time, and that
the forms of earnings management employed get progressively destructive
as time elapses. Managers therefore pursue courses of action which tend
to prolong periods of overvaluation while ultimately proving destructive
for the firm. This finding is unsurprising when viewed through the lens of
Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of overvalued equity–what manager would
last long at his job if he publicly announced that his firm’s stock needed
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to decline in value to match his firm’s prospects? Rather, a manager who
finds himself at the helm of an overvalued firm is likely to make decisions
which appear to support his firm’s current level of valuation, even if the
scheme eventually unravels.
Another possible source of mispricing arises from ambiguity. Specifi-
cally, firms with harder to value assets or ambiguous prospects are more
prone to mispricing in a rational framework for the simple reason that it
is more difficult for managers and investors to arrive at an accurate esti-
mate of firm value. To the extent that mispricing arising from intangible
factors is related to the difficulty in estimating the value of the intangi-
ble factors, an efficient market may well misprice such factors on average,
leading to larger pricing errors for firms more exposed to intangible factors.
However, in such a scenario an efficient market would not be expected to
systematically overvalue or undervalue such factors on average.
Unfortunately, the very nature of intangible factors makes them diffi-
cult to observe, let alone properly value. To surmount this challenge, three
proxies for intangible factors are used in this study: advertising, research
and development (R&D), and intangible assets on the balance sheet. Ad-
vertising increases brand awareness and makes consumers and investors
more aware of a firm’s products and services. The precise amount of value
added by advertising is less clear, as competitive factors, market trends,
and demographic shifts can all affect the utility of advertising expenditures,
creating the potential for mispricing. Scaled intangible assets from the bal-
ance sheet are also used as a proxy for the intangible components of firm
value. Since intangible assets on the balance sheet are largely composed of
the amount paid for acquisitions in excess of the target firm’s assets, the
intangible assets represent some form of intangible value the acquiring firm
believes to exist. As many firms which have engaged in acquisitions can at-
test, that estimate of value can be very difficult to assess–and very wrong.
R&D expenditures provide the third proxy for intangible factors leading to
mispricing. A major reason why R&D spending is generally expensed in-
stead of capitalized is the difficulty in assessing its value. Spending money
on R&D may result in profitable future products or services, but it may
also result in no special advantage in the marketplace if the competition
develops similarly attractive products or services.
Mispricing may be due to the effect of irrational actions or behavioral
biases of managers or investors. In this framework, investor or manage-
rial overconfidence may be related to the mispricing measured in the first
essay. Measures of investor sentiment are expected to demonstrate a rela-
tionship to mispricing from this perspective, and it is possible that investor
sentiment also affects how investors and managers interpret other factors.
As an example, investor sentiment may affect the degree to which intan-
gibles such as R&D are incorrectly valued, leading to larger mispricing
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than would be expected only from the difficult valuation associated with
the R&D expenditures. In this sense sentiment may have a more direct
impact upon mispricing by inducing overconfidence in managers and in-
vestors generally, and it may also lead to overconfidence in the assessment
of what would otherwise be considered to be rational causes of mispricing
as discussed above. Additionally, behavioral biases or other traits such
as limited attention by investors may cause investors to focus too much
on some firm characteristics while not focusing enough on others, leading
to systematic mispricing of certain firm characteristics. As an example,
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2011) developed a theoretical model in which
investors focusing their limited attention upon earnings as a whole would
likely undervalue cash flows. This drives the inclusion of cash flow, ac-
cruals, and net property, plant, and equipment (net fixed assets) in the
analyses in this essay.
If behavioral biases are involved, investors may not merely misprice
intangible factors on average but they may also systematically overvalue
some intangible factors and undervalue others. Although rational inter-
pretations of the effect of intangible factors upon mispricing indicate that
intangible factors may well produce increased mispricing, systematically di-
rectional mispricing of tangible or intangible factors is more consistent with
behavioral biases and market inefficiency. For example, investors may not
merely misprice R&D spending–overconfidence or other behavioral biases
may cause them to systematically overvalue it. In fact, the overvaluation of
scaled R&D expenditures is the most consistent and robust finding in this
essay. Such strongly directional mispricing of any tangible or intangible
factor is difficult to rectify with an efficient market.
The different possible determinants of mispricing produce varied, but
important, implications. If characteristics of managerial compensation are
found to be determinants of mispricing, alternative compensation practices
may be preferable. This affects corporate policy decisions. Mispricing re-
lated to intangibles suggests that there may be a cost associated with the
intangibles beyond what is normally considered by managers, and if the
mispricing of an intangible factor is consistently directional instead of ran-
dom, it is difficult to reconcile such a pattern with an efficient market.
Such an outcome has implications for asset pricing models and portfolio
choices of investors. Sentiment related factors found to be associated with
mispricing imply that irrational investment behavior may lead to overval-
uation or undervaluation of stocks, and those outcomes may affect the real
choices of rational managers. Irrational managers may also find themselves
caught up in sentiment driven decision making, producing suboptimal de-
cisions. Furthermore, mispricing driven by sentiment suggests that it may
be preferable for rational investors to alter their portfolio allocations in
various ways as investor sentiment fluctuates.
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The most important results in this study pertain to cash flow, sen-
timent, the interaction between investor sentiment and net fixed assets,
R&D spending, and risk control variables. On average, investors tend to
undervalue scaled cash flow, which is consistent with the theoretical model
detailed by Hirshleifer et al. (2011). Limited attention investors do a poor
job valuing cash flows, and therefore they undervalue firms with high cash
flow. When relative overvaluation is assessed across a period of years,
investor sentiment is positively related to overvaluation with three differ-
ent measures of sentiment. This finding supports the effect of sentiment
upon the assessments of firm value made by investors–positive sentiment
makes investors have a more rosy view of the prospects of firms, leading to
overvaluation. The effect of sentiment also extends to how investors value
net fixed assets, with investors susceptible to undervaluing net fixed assets
when sentiment is positive and overvaluing net fixed assets when sentiment
is negative. One of the most robust findings in this essay using is that in-
vestors systematically overvalue R&D spending. The fact that investors
consistently overvalue R&D spending instead of randomly mispricing it
indicates that there are market inefficiencies in the valuation of R&D ex-
penditures. In short, investors are much too optimistic about the spending
firms do on R&D. This has implications for market efficiency and possibly
for profitable investment strategies. Finally, several risk control variables
consistently exhibit a positive relationship with overvaluation. This means
that undervalued equities cannot be explained as having higher risk using
several common risk proxies. Such results are inconsistent with an efficient
market.
The remaining sections of this study are organized in the following
manner. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature pertaining to the effects
of mispricing, while Section 2.3 reviews the literature about factors related
to mispricing. Hypotheses are developed in Section 2.4. The methodology
used in the preparation of the components of the determinants analyses is
discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents the aggregate results of the
analyses and the robustness of the results, and Section 2.7 concludes the
study.
2.2 Literature Review of the Effects of Mispricing
The primary focus of this essay is upon the determinants of mispricing.
As mispricing may influence firm behavior, a discussion of the effects of
mispricing will help to motivate the analyses performed in this essay. Im-
portantly, managerial choices may exacerbate or alleviate the effects of
mispricing. Because the excess earnings approach to firm value is applied
in this study using realized earnings and book values, managerial actions
which affect the subsequent performance of a firm will influence the mea-
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sure of mispricing used in this study.
Jensen (2005) explored the agency costs associated with substantially
overvalued equity and discussed mechanisms by which a combination of
various factors can produce toxic results for a substantially overvalued
firm. The nature of managerial compensation is one related factor. As
managerial compensation is often linked to certain financial market out-
comes, managers have an incentive to engage in behavior achieving the
desired outcomes in the financial markets–but the means employed may
ultimately prove to be destructive. For example, managers may engage in
earnings management in order to hit earnings targets and to earn bonuses.
Significantly, Jensen (2005) notes that the nature of overvaluation is
such that it is not generally possible for an overvalued firm to achieve results
which would justify the price being paid for the firm’s stock. In an attempt
to escape from the debacle, overvalued firms are likely to set about pursuing
acquisitions, risky projects, earnings management, etc. in an attempt to
justify the level of valuation. These actions may jeopardize the value of
the underlying business, resulting in an eventual dissipation of more than
just the original overvaluation but also the value of the underlying business
as the firm’s actions damage the firm’s viability in the long run. If other
firms in the industry are similarly overvalued, the situation may be worse.
Each firm in the industry may well be judged relative to the other firms
in the industry. The result is that each firm thinks that something can
be done to justify the overvaluation, leading to competitive pressure to
achieve impossible results. The problem is perhaps most clearly expressed
by Jensen (2005) when he noted the impossibility of an executive arguing
to a board of directors that the firm’s stock price needed to go down.
Managerial responses to overvalued equity have been associated with
the accruals anomaly, as in Kothari, Loutskina, and Nikolaev (2009). Kothari
et al. (2009) find that managerial attempts to sustain the overvaluation of
their firm results in accruals management, and firms engaging in accruals
management tend to also be investing in acquisitions, capital expenditures,
and R&D. As accruals management cannot forever increase the reported
earnings of a firm, the effort to manage accruals in order to support the
overvaluation produces negative abnormal returns in the future. Investor
and possibly managerial optimism pertaining to the prospects of the firm or
the withholding of adverse information about the prospects of the firm was
suggested by Kothari et al. (2009) as possible causes of the overvaluation.
As managers seek to justify excessive market valuations they are under
pressure to demonstrate results satisfying the expectations of the market.
A study by Badertscher (2011) examined the types of earnings management
utilized by overvalued firms and found that overvalued firms transition
from one form of earnings management to another over time. Specifically,
Badertscher (2011) examined the number of consecutive years a firm was
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in the most overvalued quintile and found that accruals management in-
creased substantially during the first two years while real transactions man-
agement remained comparatively minor. For firms in the most overvalued
quintile for three to five consecutive years, real transactions management
increased in magnitude while accruals management declined. For firms in
the most overvalued quintile for five consecutive years the amount of real
transactions management dominated the amount of accruals management.
The total earnings management increased the longer a firm resided in the
most overvalued quintile. In the case of firms engaging in non-GAAP ac-
cruals management, firms in Badertscher’s (2011) study exhibited larger
real transactions management in the year before they resorted to the non-
GAAP accruals management, with a large proportion of firms engaging
in the non-GAAP accruals management being overvalued at the time of
the non-GAAP accruals management and in the year following. Taken to-
gether, these patterns suggest that firms engage in earnings management
to prolong periods of overvaluation for significant periods of time, and that
the forms of earnings management employed get increasingly destructive
as time passes.
Mispricing also warps a firm’s investment practices. Polk and Sapienza
(2009) examined the extent to which firms cater to market mispricing by
altering their investment practices. In their study discretionary accruals
serve as the proxy for mispricing. The concept underlying this study is
the notion that if investors sufficiently overvalue a firm’s investments then
a firm may cater to market preferences by making investments which are
actually not worth the cost, leading to a positive market response which
may outweigh the losses ultimately associated with the poor investment.
Polk and Sapienza’s (2009) model suggests that longer periods of overval-
uation and shorter investor time frames increase the incentive for firms
to engage in poor investments, with longer periods of undervaluation and
shorter investor time frames decreasing the incentive for firms to engage
in positive investments. Put simply, overvalued firms make investments
that should be avoided and undervalued firms decline investments that
should be undertaken. Although it would be tempting to connect this re-
sult purely to the ability of overvalued firms to raise funds through the sale
of overvalued equity, Polk and Sapienza (2009) found that this effect is not
solely driven by the impact of stock issuance upon investment. Rather,
the measure of overvaluation used by Polk and Sapienza (2009) remained
positively related to investment after controlling for equity issuance. Inter-
estingly, firms with higher R&D intensity were found to have investment
levels which responded more to overvaluation. These findings again sug-
gest that overvalued firms may engage in behavior which destroys firm
value later, and firms with harder to value prospects may be more prone
to catering to the market with their investment choices.
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Given the above discussion of the effects of mispricing it is important to
note the ways in which those effects could relate to the overvaluation mea-
sures used in this study. Returning to the point made by Jensen (2005),
substantial levels of overvaluation experienced by a firm imply that the
overvalued firm cannot produce results commensurate with market ex-
pectations. In that case, using realized results in the calculation of the
valuation measures in this study should indeed show overvalued firms to
be overvalued as their subsequent earnings fail to live up to the market’s
expectations. As managerial actions to manage earnings may temporarily
increase reported earnings subsequent to the time when a firm is overval-
ued, the valuation measures employed may underestimate the full level of
overvaluation during the early years when a firm is overvalued. Eventually
the effects of the accruals management, real transactions management, and
poor investment choices due to catering will come home to roost. Realized
earnings over the five year time horizon employed in the valuation models
in this study will eventually include the period of time when poor prior
managerial choices have begun to adversely affect earnings in subsequent
periods. Thus, the research reviewed above leads to the conclusion that
the valuation models employed in this study should successfully classify
overvalued stocks either due to the excessive nature of the overvaluation
making it impossible for a firm to produce results supporting the market’s
valuation or due to the destructive choices managers make in response
to their firm’s market value. Put differently, a substantially overvalued
firm would not be expected to be able to generate high enough abnormal
earnings to counterbalance the excessive nature of the overvaluation. The
shortfall in abnormal earnings should therefore correspond to lower intrin-
sic value estimates using the methodologies discussed in the first essay,
resulting in such firms appearing overvalued using the relative valuation
measures employed in this essay. Alternately, if a firm’s managers make
destructive choices due to the overvalued nature of the company’s equity
the effect of the destructive choices upon the future abnormal earnings
should ensure that the company’s equity will appear relatively overvalued
when the excess earnings valuation models are applied.
2.3 Literature Review of Factors Related to Mispric-
ing
A natural extension of measuring mispricing is to identify the determi-
nants of mispricing. Figure 1 shows that the most overvalued firms remain
overvalued for a prolonged period of time on average. The transition ma-
trices presented in Tables 10 and 11 add more detail to that finding. The
persistence of the mispricing for the most relatively overvalued and the
most relatively undervalued firms indicates that the mispricing is not due
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to random market mispricing at each point in time, suggesting that there
are underlying factors driving the mispricing. However, the determinants
of mispricing are not clearly understood in the literature, although a sub-
stantial amount of research has been performed in areas relating directly
or indirectly to the topic. As mentioned previously, there are explanations
for mispricing which focus upon rational behavior and explanations for
mispricing which focus upon irrational behavior. In some cases the expla-
nations proposed blur the line between the two philosophical approaches
to explaining mispricing. For the sake of convenience, the literature re-
view has been broken up into sections according to general topic areas.
The broad topic areas include rational bubbles, managerial incentives, firm
characteristics, investor sentiment, and risk and information uncertainty.
2.3.1 Rational Bubbles
An irrational bubble, such as a market-wide mania, is perhaps easier to
imagine than a rational bubble. The notion that investors may behave
irrationally, and that such irrational behavior may affect equity prices,
is certainly not new. Investor sentiment and psychological factors could
contribute to irrational bubbles, and investor sentiment and psychological
factors are discussed in greater detail later. A rational bubble could result
in mispricing despite everyone behaving rationally. For example, if a bubble
provides sufficiently high gains relative to the probability of a collapse in
each period it is possible for investors to rationally decide to continue
investing (Blanchard and Watson (1982)). The evidence and conditions
for rational bubbles are discussed in the following review of the relevant
literature.
A number of studies have examined the concept of rational bubbles the-
oretically and empirically. In the theoretical framework explored by Diba
and Grossman (1987), rational stock bubbles can only begin on the first
trading date of a stock. An expansion of the model which was presented
in Diba and Grossman (1988b) led to the conclusion that rational bubbles
in stock prices could only begin on the first day of trading and they would
not occur again if the bubble burst at some point in the future. Impor-
tantly, Diba and Grossman (1988b) noted that rational bubbles imply a
focus upon one or more irrelevant factors or a focus upon relevant factors
in an inappropriate way. Although the model’s implications are limited,
the connection between irrelevant factors or inappropriate interpretation of
relevant factors and the existence of rational stock bubbles has implications
for the determinants of mispricing. Relevant factors which are difficult for
market participants to assess could perhaps lead to flawed interpretations
of the otherwise relevant factors. An empirical analysis of data for the
Standard and Poor’s Composite Stock Price Index was presented in Diba
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and Grossman (1988a), and the authors concluded that the results did not
support the existence of explosive rational bubbles, although some of the
test results were mixed.
Blanchard and Watson (1982) suggested that one possible explanation
for a rational bubble involves progressively larger deviations from funda-
mental value with the possibility of the bubble collapsing in each period.
If the increased gains due to the bubble are sufficiently high to outweigh
the risk of the bubble’s collapse, investing in the stock may still be ra-
tional. Under that framework Blanchard and Watson (1982) were able to
show that the rational bubble did not violate a typical no arbitrage con-
dition. Instead, Blanchard and Watson (1982) compared rational bubbles
to Ponzi schemes, which implies that having investors with shorter time
horizons coupled with the presence of new investors makes the existence of
rational bubbles possible. If an asset’s fundamentals are difficult to assess,
Blanchard and Watson (1982) suggested that the asset will be more prone
to experience bubbles as market participants rely upon prior price move-
ments as an assessment tool instead of actually assessing fundamentals.
This implies that stock prices in firms with more opaque prospects may be
more subject to the formation of rational bubbles, leading to misvaluation.
By the same logic, the authors noted that the difficulty in assessing fun-
damentals which may lead to a bubble also makes it difficult to determine
if a bubble has indeed formed.
A pair of empirical papers published in 2005 further examined the exis-
tence of rational bubbles in stock prices. Data for the Standard and Poor’s
500 index was analyzed by Koustas and Serletis (2005), and the authors
found sufficient evidence of fractional integration between stock prices and
dividends to reject the null hypothesis of the existence of rational bubbles.
The use of a fractional integration approach allows the relationship be-
tween stock prices and dividends to maintain a long-run equilibrium while
sustaining mean-reverting deviations in the short run. Cun˜ado, Gil-Alana,
and de Gracia (2005) applied a fractional integration approach to the NAS-
DAQ stock index during the period commonly considered the technology
bubble and reported mixed results. Their tests failed to reject the null
hypothesis of rational bubbles when monthly data were used. However,
Cun˜ado et al. (2005) showed that using daily or weekly data resulted in a
rejection of the null hypothesis of rational bubbles. The authors suggested
that the difference in results may have been driven by a short sample pe-
riod or by data aggregation in the case of monthly data obscuring market
adjustments over shorter time horizons.
In a theoretical paper studying the effect of short sale constraints upon
rational bubbles, Kocherlakota (2008) demonstrated that rational bubbles
could exist with exogenously or endogenously determined short sale con-
straints. In the case of exogenously determined short sale constraints,
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Kocherlakota (2008) demonstrated that certain alterations to the short
sale constraints in an economy could produce a rational bubble for an as-
set with infinite life. For endogenously determined short sale constraints
Kocherlakota (2008) showed that bubbles in assets and bubbles in short
sale constraints were interrelated.
A near-rational bubble framework presented in Lansing (2010) pro-
duced results consistent with stock market data observed in the United
States. In Lansing’s (2010) near-rational framework, the price-dividend
ratio no longer has the positive drift typically associated with rational
bubbles. Also, investors in the near-rational model use prior information
to make a combined forecast including both the fundamental and bub-
ble components of prices instead of projecting each component separately.
Simulation results for Lansing’s (2010) model were largely consistent with
statistical properties of observed price-dividend ratios in the United States,
suggesting that near-rational bubbles may exist.
2.3.2 Managerial Incentives
Managers make decisions on a regular basis which have significant impli-
cations for firm value, and they make those decisions while faced with
compensation based incentives. Managerial incentives thereby affect the
decisions made by the managers. Managerial decision making could re-
late to investments in R&D, acquisitions, expansions of property, plant,
and equipment, or any number of other things. Some managerial deci-
sions may relate to earnings management or other destructive practices.
Investors must attempt to assess the decisions made by managers in order
to properly value the equity of firms. If managers invest more in R&D, for
example, the intangible nature of R&D may lead to more mispricing by in-
vestors struggling to properly assign value to the expenditures. Managers
may also manipulate earnings in order to maximize their compensation due
to higher equity prices in the short term, leading to more equity mispricing
as a result of choices made by managers. Because of the role managerial
compensation plays in incentivizing managers to make decisions which ul-
timately affect the ability of investors to accurately value firms, a review
of the relevant literature is included below.
Some forms of managerial compensation may spur responses to investor
speculation which involve earnings management. In the case studied by
Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005), managers may have incentives to
focus upon the short term for the sake of current investors at the expense
of future investors. Bolton et al. (2005) note that overconfident investors
may not fully study all aspects of a firm’s position, and their overcon-
fidence in their own opinion of a firm’s position can create speculative
differences in opinion which drive trading and overvaluation. In the model
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put forth by Bolton et al. (2005), market value is the result of fundamental
value and a speculative option. The authors note that the value of the
speculative option component increases with expected future differences of
opinion between investors. In the presence of short sale constraints, if a
sufficiently large proportion of investors fail to thoroughly study a firm’s
position and yet they are overconfident in their assessment of the firm’s
value, manipulation of the firm’s earnings may cause the overconfident
prospective investors to overvalue the company. The overvaluation by the
overconfident prospective investors may be more than enough to offset the
rational investors’ declining assessment of the firm’s value due to the earn-
ings manipulation. The examples presented by Bolton et al. (2005) show
that this can lead to incentives for a manager to engage in some level of
earnings manipulation in order to maximize the value of the firm to cur-
rent shareholders, and that earnings manipulation would also be expected
to maximize the value of the manager’s compensation. The result is that
managers may rationally pursue a policy which increases the current stock
price and thereby their own compensation and which accomplishes these
outcomes by generating overvaluation through the exploitation of the na-
ture of overconfident investors.
The specific effects of option compensation upon managerial actions
can depend upon several factors. A theoretical paper by Carpenter (2000)
showed that managerial responses to option compensation may lead to
more risk taking or less risk taking depending upon the scenario. Ac-
cording to Carpenter’s (2000) framework, far out of the money options
generally incentivize risk taking on the part of managers while increasing
the number of options held by managers can induce the managers to reduce
risk under certain circumstances. Empirical evidence presented by Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen (2006) linked vega, the sensitivity of a CEO’s wealth
to the stock’s volatility, to the firm’s investment decisions, corporate focus,
and leverage. If a firm’s CEO has a higher vega the authors of the study
found that the firm tends to invest more in R&D and less in fixed assets,
the firm tends to be more focused, and the firm employs more leverage. In
contrast, Coles et al. (2006) found that the results for delta, the sensitivity
of the CEO’s wealth to the stock price, indicated that a higher delta was
associated with less investment in R&D, more investment in fixed assets,
and less leverage. Taken together, Carpenter’s (2000) analysis and Coles
et al.’s (2006) findings indicate that corporate decisions made by managers
are affected by the incentives created by the managers’ compensation pack-
ages. For example, managers with far out of the money options in their
compensation packages tend to take more risks, and managers with high
vega invest more in R&D while managers with high delta invest less in
R&D. Therefore, managers’ choices about investments in R&D, fixed as-
sets, and other areas can be affected by factors such as delta and vega.
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Changes in the investment decisions of managers can result in firms with
investments which are harder or easier for investors to value. Firms with
harder to value investments may be subject to higher levels of mispric-
ing relative to subsequently realized results. Consequently, factors such as
delta and vega which affect managerial decisions about investments may
be related to mispricing.
Some forms of compensation for managers, particularly for CFOs, have
been shown by Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) to be related to the risk of a
stock price crash. The risk of a stock price crash increases as the dollar
value of a CFO’s option incentives becomes more sensitive to the company’s
stock price. Kim et al. (2011) found that the increased stock price crash
risk applied specifically to companies in non-competitive industries, which
the authors identified using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Of particular
interest is the fact that CEO option incentives were more weakly related
to crash risk than CFO option incentives, and both CEO and CFO stock
incentives had no effect upon crash risk (Kim et al. (2011)). The mecha-
nism proposed by Kim et al. (2011) through which the crash risk may be
increased centers around managers, and CFOs in particular, withholding
negative information to maintain higher stock prices.
Firms with dual-class share structures provide evidence that managers
with disproportionate voting rights relative to cash flow rights engage in
activities which reduce firm value (Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009)). Ma-
sulis et al. (2009) found that managers with disproportionate voting rights
received excess pay, were more likely to make value destroying acquisitions,
and made capital investments which were less beneficial to regular share-
holders. This data suggests that giving managers voting rights in excess of
cash flow rights may result in poorer results and poorer shareholders than
would otherwise be the case. As value destroying activities would affect
the subsequent earnings of a firm, it is again possible that the nature of
managerial investment in the firm may affect the extent to which the firm
appears overvalued based upon realized results.
2.3.3 Firm Characteristics
The characteristics a firm has can affect the ability of investors to accu-
rately determine the value of the firm. Mispricing may result from the
difficulty investors encounter in attempting to value different firm char-
acteristics, it might arise from behavioral biases which cause investors to
value firm characteristics incorrectly, or it might arise from investors bas-
ing their evaluations upon incorrect data. The relevant literature relating
firm characteristics to mispricing is discussed below.
By their very nature intangible assets are harder to value than tangible
assets. The inherently challenging process of accurately assessing the value
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of intangible investments in areas such as advertising and R&D indicates
that intangible assets are likely to be related to the mispricing of equities
compared to actual earnings and book value outcomes. Put differently,
the difficulty associated with determining the impact of intangible assets
upon future earnings and book values indicates that investors are likely to
generate less accurate estimates of firm value when significant quantities of
intangible assets are involved. For example, investments in R&D may or
may not produce more valuable products or services in the future–leading
to unclear financial outcomes for firms making larger investments in R&D.
Less accurate estimates of firm value should result in more mispricing of eq-
uities for firms with more intangible assets. Investments in tangible assets
may also be related to mispricing. On the one hand, it should be easier for
investors to assess how the prospects of a firm relate to the firm’s tangible
assets. On the other hand, although the firm’s prospects associated with
its tangible assets should be easier for investors to value compared to the
firm’s intangible assets, there is still no guarantee that investors will esti-
mate the value of tangible assets correctly. The relevant literature relating
intangible assets and other firm characteristics to mispricing is reviewed
below.
Advertising and R&D expenditures are commonly considered to pro-
duce intangible assets. Advertising expenditures are expected to build
brand recognition and image, which ideally produces better long term sales
and customer relationships, while R&D expenditures are expected to result
in new products and services which may be sold to a company’s customers
in the future or which may be used to improve a company’s operations.
The intangible nature of the benefits of these expenditures makes them
difficult to value accurately. By relating scaled changes in advertising and
R&D expenditures to the cumulative abnormal return of a stock Bublitz
and Ettredge (1989) showed that investors treat advertising expenditures
as expenses rather than investments in nearly all cases, with nondurable
goods companies being a possible exception. Evidence for the long term
view of R&D expenditures was mixed, although R&D expenditures ap-
peared to be viewed as long term in one testing specification using all
firms or durable goods firms (Bublitz and Ettredge (1989)). Also, Bublitz
and Ettredge (1989) found that R&D expenditures were viewed as longer
term than advertising expenditures. Although these results indicate that
investors incorporate advertising and R&D expenditures when evaluating
stocks, it is not certain if they do an accurate job of doing so.
Nejadmalayeri, Mathur, and Singh (2013) examined the impact of ad-
vertising upon corporate bond liquidity and credit spreads and focused
upon the visibility effect of advertising and the sensitivity of a firm’s sales
to advertising. Increased visibility from advertising was found to decrease
credit spreads slightly while increasing bond liquidity somewhat, suggesting
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that increased visibility may add some value for bondholders (Nejadmalay-
eri et al. (2013)). Complicating the analysis was the finding that the im-
pact of visibility and the sensitivity of sales to advertising (sales-advertising
sensitivity) upon credit spreads and bond liquidity varied depending upon
the relative visibility and sales-advertising sensitivity characteristics of the
firm. For example, higher sales-advertising sensitivity was related to a
bigger increase in the credit spread for low visibility firms than for high
visibility firms (Nejadmalayeri et al. (2013)). Taken together, these results
suggest that the impact of advertising upon firm value depends significantly
upon a firm’s industry and the sensitivity of its sales to its advertising ef-
forts.
Competition in R&D was evaluated in a theoretical context by Das-
gupta and Stiglitz (1980). Under the assumption of certainty of discovery
employed by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) competition in R&D could in-
duce excessive investment in R&D by one firm seeking to prevent other
firms from making similar investments. As noted by the authors, this sug-
gests that competition in R&D may well be present even though only one
firm is investing in R&D. Assuming uncertainty of discovery led Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1980) to conclude that a low elasticity of demand could result
in excessive investment in R&D. The possibility of firms engaging in exces-
sive R&D investment to prevent other firms from entering implies that the
payoff of R&D expenditures may be unclear. If moderate R&D expendi-
tures result in new products or services not offered by other companies then
it is possible that a firm engaging in that investment may reap abnormal
profits. On the other hand, if a firm engages in excessive R&D investment
to prevent competitors from pursuing similar research, then the abnormal
profits earned later may be less valuable than the expenditures made to
secure them.
Announcements of increases in R&D expenditures have been evaluated
relative to the impact upon stock prices. The results presented by Chan,
Martin, and Kensinger (1990) indicate that an announcement of increased
R&D spending is accompanied by an increase in the stock price. This
positive effect on the stock price was noted across stocks reporting earn-
ings increases and stocks reporting earnings decreases (Chan et al. (1990)).
This does not suggest that the market views all increases in R&D spend-
ing equally. Chan et al. (1990) found that firms in high-tech industries
in their sample generally experienced a positive stock price change after
announcing the increase while firms in low-tech industries in their sam-
ple more frequently experienced negative stock price changes following the
announcement. One finding in the study by Chan et al. (1990) was that
outspending the industry on R&D produced a positive effect for high-tech
firms. As might be expected, announcements of increases in R&D spending
are viewed as value relevant information by market participants. However,
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the study by Chan et al. (1990) does not address the extent to which the
response of market participants correctly values the announced change in
R&D expenditures.
In a broader exploration of various firm announcements, Woolridge and
Snow (1990) analyzed a sample of firms announcing joint ventures, R&D
investments, capital expenditures, and diversification activities and found
that cumulative abnormal returns for the announcement periods were pos-
itive on average for each category and generally statistically significant.
In aggregate, Woolridge and Snow (1990) found that the cumulative ab-
normal returns for joint venture and R&D announcements appeared to be
somewhat larger than the cumulative abnormal returns for diversification
or capital expenditure announcements. Whether or not the positive cu-
mulative abnormal returns observed were in fact justified by the changes
in the prospects of the firms subsequent to the announcements was not
addressed. This leaves open the possibility that market participants may
incorrectly account for such announcements due to difficulties assessing the
value of the changes in the prospects of the firm or for other reasons.
The ideal competitive response by one firm to another firm’s increase in
R&D spending is influenced by industry structure and the extent to which
changes in R&D spending are viewed favorably. Specifically, Sundaram,
John, and John (1996) found that although the average net announce-
ment effect for increases in R&D spending was essentially zero for the
announcing firms the effect for subsamples defined using the nature of the
competition yielded different results. When competitors match strategies
the announcement effect was found to be negative, but when competitors
accommodate strategies the announcement effect was found to be positive
(Sundaram et al. (1996)). Furthermore, Sundaram et al. (1996) found that
the preferred response for the competitors depended upon how the mar-
ket responded to the firm’s announcement. These findings suggest that
the valuation of R&D expenditures may be challenging for market partic-
ipants to assess as industry structure and competitive responses influence
the value of investments in R&D.
With a sample of firms from the United Kingdom and an implementa-
tion of a residual income model Green, Stark, and Thomas (1996) studied
the valuation of R&D expenditures and their results suggested that market
participants view R&D spending as capital expenditures. In the framework
used by Green et al. (1996) the residual income utilized was contempora-
neous to the market value used in the model specification. In addition, the
measure of earnings used in the residual income calculation excluded R&D
and extraordinary items, and only one year of earnings was used. With
that specification and under certain assumptions the authors employed,
scaled R&D expenses were sometimes found to be positively related to
the value of the firm for the years studied (Green et al. (1996)). Because
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Green et al. (1996) used the scaled difference between market value and
book value as the dependent variable in their model, their results suggest
that market values include the effect of R&D–but their results do not nec-
essarily indicate that the market properly values the R&D expenditures.
Instead, it is possible that the positive relationship which they observed in
some cases between R&D and the scaled market value in excess of book
value might be the result of mispricing.
Under GAAP R&D expenditures are expensed in the year in which they
are incurred. Because R&D expenditures may add long-term value to the
organization, some studies have suggested that R&D expenditures should
instead be capitalized. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) formed estimated values
of the R&D capital of publicly traded companies and adjusted earnings for
the expensing of R&D and found that net annual investment in R&D and
the amount of R&D capital were related to stock prices. The estimated
R&D capital generated by Lev and Sougiannis (1996) was also found to be
positively related to subsequent returns when the R&D capital was scaled
by the market price. The authors interpreted this finding to be indicative of
the mispricing of R&D capital, and the relationship was stronger for firms
with larger concentrations of estimated R&D capital. These findings again
support the notion that the market views R&D expenditures as relevant
to the value of a firm, but the results also suggest that R&D expenditures
may be related to misvaluation.
The difficulties associated with the valuation of R&D expenditures as
it applies to software development are illustrative of some of the difficulties
investors may face normally when evaluating R&D investments. Interest-
ingly, Aboody and Lev (1998) found that analysts’ forecast errors increased
with higher levels of software capitalization–despite the fact that the au-
thors also found evidence that changes in capitalized software development
costs were more strongly related to returns than fully expensed develop-
ment costs. This finding suggested that the market viewed the capitalized
costs as value relevant. For software firms the relative benefits of cap-
italization compared to expensing of software development costs depend
upon how fast intangible investments are growing relative to the size of
the firm’s ROE (Aboody and Lev (1998)). Of particular interest for this
study is the finding that the market’s reaction to the software development
costs of expensing firms was delayed by two to three years, as evidenced by
a positive relationship between software development expenses and stock
returns over that time horizon (Aboody and Lev (1998)). This suggests
that market participants may respond slowly to the unclear valuation in-
formation inherent in software development costs in particular and possibly
R&D spending in general.
A study of asset revaluations for Australian firms found that the revalu-
ation of intangible assets was positively related to share prices but that the
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results for property, plant, and equipment depended upon the industry in-
volved (Barth and Clinch (1998)). For nonfinancial firms Barth and Clinch
(1998) found that revaluations of property, plant, and equipment were pos-
itively related to the stock price. Barth and Clinch (1998) noted that even
untimely revaluations appeared to be viewed as relevant by the market. In
their study, a two period implementation of an abnormal earnings model
based upon analysts’ forecasts for two years and assuming that the firm’s
projected abnormal earnings for the second period continued on in perpe-
tuity was used. With that estimate of firm value in hand, Barth and Clinch
(1998) found that revaluation of intangibles was positively associated with
the estimated value of nonfinancial firms while revaluation of property,
plant, and equipment was negatively associated with the estimated value
of nonfinancial firms. The difference in the sign of the association between
the revaluations of property, plant, and equipment and the market price
or the estimated value of the firm is of particular interest. Specifically,
it is possible that the market incorrectly incorporates the revaluation in-
formation associated with property, plant, and equipment, and therefore
there may be a relationship between reported values of property, plant,
and equipment and firm misvaluation.
In order to study the effect of the capitalization of intangible assets
upon stock prices Ely and Waymire (1999) examined data from the pre-
SEC era. Using their sample of firms, Ely and Waymire (1999) found that
capitalized intangibles were not statistically significantly related to stock
prices, but more capitalized intangibles made earnings less strongly related
to stock prices. The authors also found evidence that rights-based intangi-
bles, such as patents, and other capitalized intangibles being amortized or
revalued at lower levels was positively associated with stock prices (Ely and
Waymire (1999)). However, the net effect of those capitalized intangibles
on prices remained unclear due to Ely and Waymire’s (1999) finding that
the interaction between earnings and intangibles continued to produce a
negative relationship with stock prices. As the sample firms in the study
were under a very different regulatory regime, it is uncertain the extent
to which the results remain applicable today. Nevertheless, the results are
suggestive. It is possible that market participants still view certain types of
intangibles, such as patents, as being value relevant. The extent to which
the market accurately or inaccurately prices intangibles would likely im-
pact the mispricing suggested by the results of the valuation model used
in this study compared to market prices.
An examination of R&D intensity and subsequent stock returns per-
formed by Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) found evidence of a
positive association between R&D and subsequent stock returns for stocks
with large values of R&D relative to market value. Importantly, Chan
et al. (2001) found that this effect appeared to be driven by the relatively
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poor prior returns of the stocks in the category, although the pattern re-
mained after adjusting for size and the book-to-market ratio. The authors
postulated that this result may be driven by growth investors no longer
seeing such firms as attractive investments while value investors are avoid-
ing those types of firms altogether (Chan et al. (2001)). Interestingly, a
similar pattern was found for high levels of advertising relative to mar-
ket value in which firms with high levels of advertising relative to market
value exhibited higher subsequent returns over a three year period and had
poorer prior returns. It is particularly important to note that Chan et al.
(2001) found that R&D measured relative to sales produced a much less
persuasive relationship between R&D intensity and subsequent returns.
Overall, these results imply that market mispricing of the R&D expendi-
tures may be what drives the association between higher levels of R&D
spending relative to market value and subsequent returns.
The challenges associated with the valuation of intangible assets typ-
ically relate to the fact that predicting the extent to which intangible
assets may affect the prospects of a firm may be particularly difficult.
A theoretical paper which assumed that intangible investments randomly
become capital found that such an approach could explain the volatility
puzzle (Danthine and Jin (2007)). The random accumulation of capital
from intangible investments induces more valuation volatility than earn-
ings volatility (Danthine and Jin (2007)). Higher market volatility unac-
companied by high earnings volatility would be expected to produce larger
measured misvaluation due to the use of a residual income valuation model.
Intangible investments may be related to the mispricing measures discussed
previously.
Various aspects of behavioral finance relate to how investors perceive
or evaluate information. Some of the topics in behavioral finance which
may impact how investors evaluate firm characteristics are overconfidence,
biased self-attribution, and limited attention. For example, some of the
areas mentioned serve to influence the extent to which ambiguous infor-
mation, such as the value relevance of a firm’s R&D expenditures, may
be related to mispricing. Furthermore, some areas may influence how in-
vestors incorporate firm characteristics such as cash flows when assessing
the values of firms.
Investor overconfidence has been studied as an explanation for phe-
nomena such as overreactions in the stock market. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1998) defined overconfidence relative to an investor’s as-
sessment of his privately generated information, such as when an investor
puts too much faith in the accuracy of his analysis of a firm’s financial
statements or other information. This overconfidence then leads market
prices to overreact (Daniel et al. (1998)). Biased self-attribution is when
an investor interprets subsequent information which agrees with his assess-
103
ment in a way which increases his confidence but he is slow to decrease his
confidence when subsequent information arrives which disagrees with his
assessment. Daniel et al. (1998) found that momentum in the short-term
and reversals in the long-term could result from biased self-attribution.
The impact of overconfidence and biased self-attribution is likely to be
larger when investors evaluate more ambiguous information (Daniel and
Titman (1999)). Using the book-to-market ratio as a proxy for growth
options and therefore ambiguity, stocks with lower book-to-market ratios
exhibited more momentum effects (Daniel and Titman (1999)). This find-
ing suggests that firms with larger proportions of intangible assets may be
more subject to the overreaction resulting from overconfidence and biased
self-attribution. Daniel and Titman (1999) specifically noted that the sub-
jectivity involved in valuing intangible assets should make companies with
more intangible assets subject to more misvaluation.
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) developed a theoretical
model of asset pricing which incorporated investor mispricing due to over-
confidence. Their model suggested that fundamental-to-price ratios have
predictive power for returns because the ratios can capture both risk and
misvaluation (Daniel et al. (2001)). Of particular note is the conclusion
by Daniel et al. (2001) that in their framework fundamental-to-price ratios
should have higher predictive power for firms with more ambiguous values.
Daniel et al. (2001) also pointed out that making industry relative adjust-
ments to measures of mispricing could obscure a portion of any mispricing
originating at the industry level. Consequently, industries with more con-
centrated intangible investments may be harder to value, resulting in more
misvaluation driven by overconfidence which might not be readily detected
if the measure of misvaluation is assessed relative to the industry itself.
A theoretical model focusing on limited investor attention was devel-
oped by Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2011). According to this model, the
limited attention of investors can cause them to inadequately incorporate
information about earnings when attention is low or to inadequately in-
corporate information about accruals or cash flows when they focus their
limited attention on earnings as a whole (Hirshleifer et al. (2011)). Of
particular significance is the notion discussed by Hirshleifer et al. (2011)
that market prices will be generated by the weighted average of the views
of both attentive and inattentive investors, implying that arbitrage may
be insufficient to correct mispricing as the price the attentive investors be-
lieve to be appropriate would appear mispriced to the inattentive investors.
Furthermore, Hirshleifer et al. (2011) noted that investors who focus their
limited attention upon earnings exclusively would likely undervalue firms
with high cash flow or low accruals and overvalue firms with low cash flow
or high accruals because the investors would be ignoring the additional data
relevant to future earnings contained in cash flows and accruals. Since this
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result suggests that investors with limited attention may not incorporate
all relevant sources of information when forming expectations of future
earnings, the limited attention of investors could be a source of valuation
error detected by the overvaluation measures used in the present study as
the limited attention investors’ earnings expectations would then deviate
more from realized earnings results in the future.
Taboga (2011) studied aggregate market valuation using euro zone
stock market data and earnings-to-price ratios and found that cyclical
fluctuations in earnings could affect the extent to which stocks appeared
overvalued. If adjustments accounting for cyclical fluctuations were made
to earnings, Taboga (2011) found that an estimate of the likelihood that
the market was overvalued in terms of the earnings-to-price ratio could
be created. Interestingly, Taboga’s (2011) model was able to present fea-
tures consistent with lower adjusted earnings-to-price ratios preceding the
crash in 2008 to 2009. The findings derived from this approach suggest the
possibility that investors may not properly value earnings resulting from
cyclical fluctuations in the economy at large. Put another way, investors
may project a cyclical fluctuation in earnings into the future, resulting
in periods with gaps between perceived valuations and valuations derived
from earnings adjusted for the cyclical fluctuations.
2.3.4 Investor Sentiment
Investor sentiment may drive some component of mispricing. If investors
experience a period of optimism they may be more prone to seeing the
world through rose-colored glasses, leading them to overvalue the prospects
of firms. Conversely, investors experiencing a period of pessimism may
have a more gloomy outlook which biases their assessments of firm value
in a downward direction, producing the undervaluation of firms relative to
future outcomes. Although sentiment may affect the stock market broadly,
it may also affect firms with different characteristics in different ways. The
remainder of this section briefly reviews the relevant investor sentiment
literature.
Measures of sentiment have been found to be related to mispricing and
long-run returns. Using a set of pricing errors for the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average provided by Bakshi and Chen (2005) as a measure of intrin-
sic value, Brown and Cliff (2005) found a positive relationship between
overvaluation and sentiment as measured using data from Investors Intel-
ligence. High levels of investor sentiment were also shown to precede lower
returns over a multi-year time horizon for the market as a whole (Brown
and Cliff (2005)). In a footnote discussing their use of pricing errors from
Bakshi and Chen (2005), Brown and Cliff (2005) noted that the approach
of Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) produced an intrinsic value mea-
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sure which responded to sentiment. As the intrinsic value measure used by
Lee et al. (1999) was based upon analysts’ forecasts, that finding is per-
haps unsurprising as analysts could be influenced by investor sentiment in
the market. Brown and Cliff (2005) found that sentiment was negatively
related to returns for the market as a whole, for large firms, and for low
book-to-market firms over time horizons from one to three years in length
despite controlling for various other factors commonly employed in asset
pricing. Negative sentiment was not found to be as strongly or consistently
significant in long-horizon return regressions, pricing error regressions, or
the cointegration analyses performed, leading Brown and Cliff (2005) to
conclude that sentiment may have an asymmetric impact. Overall, these
findings support the use of realized results instead of analyst forecasts when
exploring the impact of investor sentiment and the findings also support
the long-term effects of sentiment upon returns.
One of the inherent challenges in studying the effect of investor sen-
timent is determining an appropriate measure of investor sentiment. As
a means of measuring investor sentiment, Baker and Wurgler (2006) con-
structed an index of investor sentiment from the following factors: a mea-
sure of the average closed-end fund discount, a detrended NYSE share
turnover measure, the number of initial public offerings, the first-day re-
turns on initial public offerings, the share of equity issues relative to total
equity and long-term debt issues, and a measure of the dividend premium.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) found that lagged sentiment was negatively re-
lated to the returns of smaller, younger, distressed, more volatile, and
unprofitable firms when long-short portfolios were constructed using those
characteristics. Similar results were observed when long-short portfolios
were constructed for firms which did not pay dividends or which were
experiencing very high sales growth compared to moderate sales growth,
or very low sales growth compared to moderate sales growth (Baker and
Wurgler (2006)). These results were interpreted to be consistent with the
actions of speculators in an environment with more limited arbitrage op-
portunities, with the results for sales growth extremes suggesting that firms
with harder to value prospects were more subject to the impact of investor
sentiment. These findings suggest that sentiment may play a role in the
overvaluation of certain types of stocks, which suggests that sentiment may
be associated with the overvaluation measures discussed previously.
The differential impact of sentiment upon stocks with varying levels of
exposure to arbitrage efforts was explored by Baker and Wurgler (2007).
The key notion in this study was that relative valuations for different types
of stocks can be affected differently by sentiment. Baker and Wurgler
(2007) suggested that harder to value stocks would have values which are
most positively influenced by high investor sentiment and most negatively
influenced by low investor sentiment. That conclusion is consistent with
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other literature reviewed so far. Interestingly, Baker and Wurgler (2007)
also suggested that it is possible that firms with more stable and easily val-
ued prospects might actually be undervalued in periods of high sentiment
and overvalued in periods of low sentiment–with the latter case arising as
investors experiencing low sentiment seek safety. When the performance
of portfolios formed on the basis of volatility was examined during months
following high or low investor sentiment, some evidence consistent with the
differential effects of sentiment emerged, although this approach assumed
that volatility is a proxy for the degree to which stocks might be difficult
to value and harder to arbitrage (Baker and Wurgler (2007)). Thus, peri-
ods of high sentiment may not uniformly induce overvaluation, but rather
such periods might induce overvaluation in some stocks and possibly even
undervaluation in others.
An examination of the actions of managers can illuminate the degree
to which managers believe they are engaging in timing the market when
they make certain decisions. To perform such an analysis, Jenter (2005)
examined the personal portfolio decisions of managers and found that man-
agers behave in a manner which suggests that the managers are respond-
ing to what they perceive to be mispricing. Specifically, managers of firms
with low book-to-market (B/M) ratios engage in substantial net selling
compared to managers of firms with high B/M ratios after controlling for
various other factors, and managers of firms with high B/M ratios engage
in more buying compared to the managers of the low B/M firms (Jen-
ter (2005)). Importantly, a positive correlation between equity issuance
and insider equity sales was found. Overall, these results tend to suggest
that managers attempt to time the market with their own portfolios, and
that managers of firms issuing equity may well perceive their firms as be-
ing overvalued. To the extent firms with low B/M ratios may be more
prone to have made larger intangible investments, the literature reviewed
previously regarding sentiment and the manner in which investors value
intangible investments suggests that managers of low B/M firms may be
correctly assessing that their firms are overvalued when they issue equity
while simultaneously reducing their personal holdings.
Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) generated a measure of mispricing based
upon characteristics of overconfidence and style investing by creating a
long-short portfolio using firms issuing or repurchasing debt or equity. The
rationale behind this choice was that firms repurchasing debt or equity
were expected to be undervalued by this approach, and firms issuing debt
or equity were expected to be overvalued by this approach, and thus the
factor constructed was titled UMO (Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010)). As this
methodology is related to initial public offerings, it is connected indirectly
to the sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Hirsh-
leifer and Jiang (2010) showed that their proxy for mispricing, UMO, was
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statistically significantly related to monthly excess returns for portfolios
analyzed using a Fama-MacBeth approach with the standard three factor
model and also with momentum, leverage, or investment factors separately
added to the three factor model. The consistently positive association of
the UMO factor with returns was viewed as evidence of financing decisions
being informative about mispricing more broadly due to sentiment in fa-
vor of certain investment styles or overconfidence (Hirshleifer and Jiang
(2010)). Thus, the results obtained are suggestive that mispricing may
result from overconfidence or shifting investor preferences for certain char-
acteristics, and financing choices may be the result of managerial responses
to the mispricing. Under this view, financing choices are less likely to be a
determinant of mispricing than to be determined by mispricing.
In a study of the impact of sentiment upon more diversified firms, Iyer
and Nejadmalayeri (2014) suggested that investors may seek out diversi-
fied firms when investor sentiment is more pessimistic. Iyer and Nejad-
malayeri (2014) proposed that this is the result of constrained investors
seeking safety in the face of pessimistic sentiment. In findings consistent
with that view, Iyer and Nejadmalayeri (2014) reported that the discount
experienced by diversified firms is lower during pessimistic periods. This
finding is broadly consistent with the notion that sentiment may produce
opposite valuation effects upon different types of firms as noted in Baker
and Wurgler (2007). This implies that firm-level characteristics related
to diversification may influence the extent and direction of the impact of
sentiment upon overvaluation.
One challenge in constructing a measure of investor sentiment from
market data is the possibility for alternative explanations of the fluctua-
tions in the factors which are being used as indicators of investor senti-
ment. For example, initial public offerings may cluster at points in time
with higher market prices as managers use prior equity issues to gauge the
proper time to sell stock. Such a pattern would argue against initial public
offerings being used as a part of the measure of investor sentiment devel-
oped by Baker and Wurgler (2006) and discussed above. Examinations
of the decisions managers make with their own portfolios can illuminate
whether or not managers believe their company’s stock to be overvalued
when they issue it, which relates to the extent to which equity issuance
can be viewed as an indicator of overvaluation.
It was noted previously that the number of initial public offerings was
used as a part of the sentiment measure developed by Baker and Wurgler
(2006). However, Schultz (2003) argued that the number of initial public
offerings could occur in patterns which ex-post appear to be indicative of
market timing behavior but which are actually consistent with an efficient
market, which the author termed pseudo market timing. The crux of
Schultz’s (2003) approach is that managers may use the market prices
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themselves as indicators of when equity should be issued. Thus, Schultz
(2003) proposed that as prices rise and prior initial public offerings perform
well more managers decide to issue equity. If that assumption is true
and if initial public offering returns are positively correlated across issuing
firms then pseudo market timing results (Schultz (2003)). Importantly,
this model suggests that initial public offerings will appear to cluster when
market prices are high. To the extent that this causes concerns about using
initial public offerings as components of a sentiment index the concerns may
be alleviated by resorting to more direct measures of sentiment, which
has been done in studies such as Brown and Cliff (2005) and Iyer and
Nejadmalayeri (2014).
2.3.5 Risk and Information Uncertainty
Estimated mispricing may also be the result of risk or information un-
certainty. If uncertainty about a firm’s prospects is high, the stock may
appear to be more mispriced relative to realized outcomes. Higher levels
of information uncertainty may increase the range of firm values estimated
by investors, potentially leading to more measured mispricing. Investors
facing information uncertainty may also rely excessively upon private in-
terpretations of the uncertainty, facilitating larger pricing errors. Risk may
also relate to measures of mispricing. If estimates of intrinsic value do not
properly account for risk, measures of mispricing may be driven by hetero-
geneity in risk across firms. Firms which appear to be undervalued may be
more risky, and firms which appear to be overvalued may be less risky. The
topics of risk and uncertainty as they relate to mispricing are discussed in
the following paragraphs.
The interconnections between overconfidence, information uncertainty,
and stock returns were examined by Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005). Jiang
et al. (2005) used several proxies for information uncertainty, including
firm age, return volatility, trading volume, and equity duration. The moti-
vation behind Jiang et al.’s (2005) study was the idea that overconfidence
should play a bigger role in the valuation of stocks for which information
uncertainty is higher because investors will overconfidently rely upon their
private interpretations of the uncertain scenario. Interestingly, Jiang et al.
(2005) found that stocks with low prior returns exhibit a stronger neg-
ative association with the degree of information uncertainty while stocks
with high information uncertainty experience larger price and earnings mo-
mentum effects over the next month. An examination of portfolio returns
indicated that the momentum effect for the high information uncertainty
firms diminishes substantially after the next quarter (Jiang et al. (2005)).
The results of this study suggest that firms with poor recent returns and
high information uncertainty are likely to continue to underperform over
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the next month. Although the time horizon of Jiang et al.’s (2005) study is
clearly much shorter than the time horizon employed by the overvaluation
models in the present study, the results suggest that investor overconfidence
in an environment of information uncertainty can contribute to mispricing.
When current stock prices more accurately reflect future earnings less
mispricing will be observed using measures of mispricing based upon actual
future earnings and book values. Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatacha-
lam (2002) studied the effect of institutional ownership upon the connection
between the stock price and future earnings, and in their study they used
several variables to control for aspects of the information environment.
Size was used by Jiambalvo et al. (2002) as a proxy for the information
environment. Larger firms are generally expected to have better infor-
mation availability and more earnings consistency, supporting the use of
size as a proxy for the information environment. In addition, because firms
with more leverage have bigger incentives to manage earnings to meet debt
covenant restrictions, Jiambalvo et al. (2002) included leverage in order to
control for the lower earnings predictability which can result from earnings
management. Because both size and leverage may serve as proxy variables
for the information uncertainty which affects the ability of investors to ac-
curately assess and incorporate future earnings prospects into a firm’s stock
price, it is likely that size and leverage are related to mispricing measured
using actual future earnings and book values. Jiambalvo et al. (2002) also
included measures of earnings scaled by assets and the standard deviation
of return on assets (earnings scaled by assets) as control variables in a
number of their analyses. More earnings volatility would be expected to
diminish the extent to which stock prices accurately reflect future earnings.
Naturally, this suggests that the information uncertainty or risk produced
by more volatile earnings may explain mispricing measured relative to re-
alized outcomes. As earnings become more volatile investors have a harder
time properly assessing the future prospects of firms, producing more mis-
pricing when intrinsic values estimated using realized future earnings and
book values are compared to market prices.
One very important issue in assessing estimations of overvaluation is
whether the estimated overvaluation is in fact due to risk instead of mis-
pricing. Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) performed an analysis using
a residual income valuation approach based upon analysts’ forecasts and
found a strong positive relationship between stock returns around quarterly
earnings announcements and value-to-price quintile ranks from a prior pe-
riod. The use of value-to-price quintile ranks by Ali et al. (2003) as an
independent variable in one model instead of using raw value-to-price val-
ues is not unlike the use of valuation decile assignments in the present
study, although the present study uses valuation decile assignments as the
dependent variable. Ali et al. (2003) also regressed their raw value-to-price
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measure upon various risk factors to determine the extent to which risk
could account for the estimated value to price discrepancy, and the factors
assessed included the following: beta, involatility, the debt-to-equity ratio,
size, the number of analysts, analysts’ forecast dispersion, the standard
deviation of past return on assets, the implied industry cost of capital, the
book-to-price ratio, the long-term growth projection from I/B/E/S, Alt-
man’s Z-Score, and estimated expected return. The results reported by Ali
et al. (2003) were mixed regarding whether risk factors could explain the
value to price measure used. To further explore the issue, Ali et al. (2003)
regressed cumulative three year size adjusted returns on the value-to-price
measure and the risk factors already mentioned, and the value-to-price
measure remained positively related to the long-term returns despite the
risk factors included in the regression. This finding suggested that risk
measures cannot explain the predictive power of the value-to-price ratio.
In other regression analyses, Ali et al. (2003) reported that the relation-
ship of their value-to-price measure with future returns was driven by the
component of the estimated firm value arising from the projected future
residual incomes.
There are a few important ways in which the present study varies from
the study performed by Ali et al. (2003). First, the present study utilizes
realized incomes instead of analysts’ forecasts. This distinction has partic-
ular importance due to the possibility that valuation models based upon
analysts’ forecasts may be affected by investor sentiment, as mentioned by
Brown and Cliff (2005). Second, the study by Ali et al. (2003) focused
upon examining risk based explanations for the observed value-to-price ra-
tios, while this study includes additional independent variables which may
drive overvaluation. Specifically, this study examines the effect that factors
relating to managerial incentives, firm characteristics, investor sentiment,
and risk and information uncertainty have upon overvaluation.
2.4 Hypothesis Development
The review of literature in the previous section suggests that certain fac-
tors may be determinants of overvaluation. It is important to note that
in the context of this study undervaluation and overvaluation refer to op-
posite ends of the same unified valuation spectrum. Therefore, the most
overvalued firms are considered to be the least undervalued, and vice versa.
This section formalizes the hypotheses which have been identified regard-
ing the possible determinants of overvaluation. In some cases the literature
is unclear or divided about the likely directional effect of a proposed de-
terminant of overvaluation. Some proposed determinants may be related
to misvaluation generally, allowing for those proposed determinants to be
associated with both overvalued and undervalued stocks. For the sake of
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convenience, the hypotheses developed below will be presented in approxi-
mately the same order as the topics discussed in the previous section which
reviewed the factors related to mispricing.
2.4.1 CEO Compensation Characteristics
Managerial compensation characteristics may be a determinant of over-
valuation as different compensation structures may create incentives for
managers to engage in different investment behaviors and possibly earnings
management. Coles et al. (2006) found that a CEO with a high sensitivity
of the CEO’s wealth to the volatility of the stock (vega) invested more
in R&D and less in fixed assets. Because the intangible nature of R&D
expenditures would reasonably be expected to make firm valuation more
difficult, executive compensation may be related to misvaluation by affect-
ing the choices of managers. This hypothesized connection between the
vega of managers and overvaluation is a second order effect as the impact
upon overvaluation is derived from the choices of managers. One specific
area of managerial choice is to pursue or avoid expenditures on R&D.
Thus, the vega of managers is expected to produce an effect on overvalua-
tion through the choices made by managers, with the R&D channel serving
as one possible mechanism through which vega may affect overvaluation.
The first null and alternative hypotheses are the following:
H10: Ceteribus paribus, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the volatility
of the stock is unrelated to overvaluation.
H1A: Ceteribus paribus, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the volatility
of the stock is related to overvaluation.
The second null and alternative hypotheses relating managerial com-
pensation to the overvaluation measures employed in this study may be
derived from Coles et al. (2006). In that study, a CEO with a high sensi-
tivity of the CEO’s wealth to the stock price (delta) invested less in R&D
and more in fixed assets. As this combination of investment choices would
be expected to result in less ambiguous prospects for a firm, such invest-
ment choices would be expected to result in less mispricing generally. Due
to the reduced investments in R&D, to which investors may overreact, man-
agerial delta is expected to be related to overvaluation. As with managerial
vega, the effect of managers’ delta upon overvaluation is expected to flow
through the effects of the choices made by managers, including through
the R&D channel. This means that delta is expected to be a second order
issue. The second null and alternative hypotheses are the following:
H20: Ceteribus paribus, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the stock
price is unrelated to overvaluation.
H2A: Ceteribus paribus, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the stock
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price is related to overvaluation.
2.4.2 Firm Characteristics
Although managerial incentives have been discussed as potentially influ-
encing expenditures upon intangible assets such as R&D, thereby exacer-
bating mispricing, the direct impact of intangible assets upon mispricing
may also be explored. The literature reviewed previously supports the idea
that intangible assets may be related to mispricing. Evidence presented by
Woolridge and Snow (1990), Chan et al. (1990), Sundaram et al. (1996),
Green et al. (1996), and Lev and Sougiannis (1996) indicates that market
participants view R&D spending to be value relevant. A study by Ali et al.
(2003) found that visibility from advertising was associated with decreased
credit spreads, suggesting a lower assessment of risk for bondholders. In-
terestingly, Aboody and Lev (1998) found that analysts’ forecast errors
increased with more R&D capitalization, which highlights the difficulty
in properly assessing the degree of value relevance of R&D. Stock price
increases were shown by Chan et al. (1990) to accompany announced in-
creases in R&D expenditures. Given the realized earnings valuation models
used in this study, elevated stock prices resulting from the announced in-
creases in R&D would still be compared to an estimated firm value with
largely the same realized earnings data as the prior estimation period,
likely resulting in a positive relationship between R&D expenditures and
the overvaluation measures used in this study. A similar result is expected
for advertising expenditures. The resulting hypotheses are stated below:
H30: Ceteribus paribus, advertising expenditures are unrelated to overval-
uation.
H3A: Ceteribus paribus, advertising expenditures are positively related to
overvaluation.
H40: Ceteribus paribus, R&D expenditures are unrelated to overvaluation.
H4A: Ceteribus paribus, R&D expenditures are positively related to over-
valuation.
Barth and Clinch (1998) examined asset revaluations for Australian
firms and found that revaluations of property, plant, and equipment for
nonfinancial firms were positively related to the stock price. This finding
is particularly notable due to their additional finding that the revaluation
of property, plant, and equipment was negatively associated with the es-
timated value of nonfinancial firms. This divergence in the response of
the estimated value and the corresponding market response indicates that
property, plant, and equipment may also be related to overvaluation. On
one hand, the results presented by Barth and Clinch (1998) imply that the
asset revaluations they examined led to more overvaluation as the stock
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price responded positively while the estimated value responded negatively.
On the other hand, one of the themes throughout the literature review pre-
sented previously regarding intangible assets is that intangible assets may
be subject to more misvaluation due to the more ambiguous nature of the
prospects associated with the intangible assets in comparison to tangible
assets such as fixed assets. This line of thought suggests that investments
in property, plant, and equipment should lead to more accurate valuations
generally as the prospective returns are more certain. In other words, in-
vestors respond to new information about fixed assets on the balance sheet
in a way which results in overvaluation, yet the more tangible nature of
fixed assets should make fixed assets easier for investors to value than in-
tangible assets. The curious overvaluation of equity which results from the
revaluation of property, plant, and equipment calls into question the ability
of investors to accurately value property, plant, and equipment generally,
suggesting that investments in property, plant, and equipment may be re-
lated to overvaluation. To explore this issue further, the following null and
alternative hypotheses are formed:
H50: Ceteribus paribus, investments in property, plant, and equipment are
unrelated to overvaluation.
H5A: Ceteribus paribus, investments in property, plant, and equipment
are related to overvaluation.
As mentioned in the literature review, Daniel and Titman (1999) noted
that the subjectivity associated with intangible assets should result in more
misvaluation. This suggested effect was linked to overconfidence and bi-
ased self-attribution on the part of investors. Daniel et al. (2001) presented
a theoretical model which ultimately suggested that fundamental-to-price
ratios should have more predictive power for firms with more ambiguous
values, implying that higher concentrations of intangible assets may be
related to larger amounts of mispricing. A study by Jiang et al. (2005)
considered the impact of overconfidence and the magnitude of information
uncertainty and found that stocks with high information uncertainty ex-
perienced stronger price and earnings momentum effects over a short time
horizon, and stocks with low prior returns experienced a stronger negative
relationship with the information uncertainty. Taken together, these stud-
ies imply that higher levels of intangible assets should be related to higher
levels of misvaluation. The following null and alternative hypotheses result
from that assessment:
H60: Ceteribus paribus, intangible assets are unrelated to overvaluation.
H6A: Ceteribus paribus, intangible assets are related to overvaluation.
In a paper considering the effects of limited investor attention Hirsh-
leifer et al. (2011) proposed that firms with high cash flow or low accruals
might be undervalued by investors while firms with low cash flow or high ac-
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cruals might be overvalued by investors. Therefore a negative relationship
may exist between cash flow and overvaluation and a positive relationship
may exist between accruals and overvaluation. The hypotheses which re-
sult are as follows:
H70: Ceteribus paribus, cash flow is unrelated to overvaluation.
H7A: Ceteribus paribus, cash flow is negatively related to overvaluation.
H80: Ceteribus paribus, accruals are unrelated to overvaluation.
H8A: Ceteribus paribus, accruals are positively related to overvaluation.
2.4.3 Investor Sentiment Variables
Prior research indicates that investor sentiment may be related to overvalu-
ation. Brown and Cliff (2005) found that investor sentiment was positively
related to overvaluation as measured using pricing errors for the Dow Jones
Industrial Average which were obtained by Bakshi and Chen (2005). In-
terestingly, Brown and Cliff (2005) found evidence which suggested that
negative and positive investor sentiment might influence overvaluation in
an asymmetric manner. Baker and Wurgler (2006) constructed a sentiment
index using various factors and found that lagged sentiment was negatively
related to the returns of smaller, younger, distressed, more volatile, and
unprofitable firms, and similar findings were reported for firms which did
not pay dividends or firms with very high or very low sales growth. Baker
and Wurgler (2006) concluded that these findings were consistent with the
effects of limited arbitrage opportunities. Subsequently, Baker and Wurgler
(2007) suggested that firms with harder to value prospects would be more
subject to the effects of investor sentiment. This implies that sentiment
may interact with intangible assets or other firm characteristics to super-
charge misvaluation arising from the ambiguity associated with the value of
the intangible assets or other firm characteristics. According to Baker and
Wurgler (2007), firms with more stable prospects may become underval-
ued during periods with positive investor sentiment as investors seek other
options and may become overvalued during periods of negative investor
sentiment as investors seek safety. If the proportion of property, plant,
and equipment is related to the stability of a firm’s prospects, investor
sentiment may affect the impact of property, plant, and equipment upon
overvaluation by making firms with significant proportions of net fixed as-
sets undervalued during periods of optimistic investor sentiment. Overall,
these findings imply that investor sentiment may directly influence over-
valuation and also affect how other data is perceived by investors, thereby
changing the impact of R&D expenditures and other firm characteristics
upon overvaluation as investor sentiment fluctuates. The hypotheses about
the relationship between investor sentiment and overvaluation are below:
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H90: Ceteribus paribus, investor sentiment is unrelated to overvaluation.
H9A: Ceteribus paribus, investor sentiment is positively related to over-
valuation.
H100: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
advertising expenditures is unrelated to overvaluation.
H10A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
advertising expenditures is positively related to overvaluation.
H110: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
R&D expenditures is unrelated to overvaluation.
H11A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
R&D expenditures is positively related to overvaluation.
H120: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
property, plant, and equipment is unrelated to overvaluation.
H12A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
property, plant, and equipment is negatively related to overvaluation.
H130: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
intangible assets is unrelated to overvaluation.
H13A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
intangible assets is positively related to overvaluation.
H140: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
cash flow is unrelated to overvaluation.
H14A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
cash flow is negatively related to overvaluation.
H150: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
accruals is unrelated to overvaluation.
H15A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and
accruals is positively related to overvaluation.
2.4.4 Risk and Information Uncertainty Control Variables
As discussed in the Literature Review of Factors section, risk and infor-
mation uncertainty may explain some portion of mispricing, leading to
relationships between risk and information uncertainty and the relative
measures of overvaluation used in this study. Jiambalvo et al. (2002) used
several variables to control for the information environment while perform-
ing a study of the impact of institutional ownership upon the extent to
which market prices reflect future earnings. Some of the variables included
by Jiambalvo et al. (2002) in various analyses were firm size, leverage, the
standard deviation of return on assets, and a measure of scaled earnings.
Firm size was found to be positively related to the extent to which market
prices reflect future earnings, meaning that market prices tend to more
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accurately reflect future earnings for larger firms. This suggests that mis-
pricing should be larger for smaller firms, although the direction of the
mispricing is unclear. The resulting hypotheses are as follows:
H160: Ceteribus paribus, firm size is unrelated to overvaluation.
H16A: Ceteribus paribus, firm size is related to overvaluation.
In addition, Jiambalvo et al. (2002) showed that leverage and the stan-
dard deviation of return on assets were often negatively related to the
extent to which market prices reflect future earnings. These findings indi-
cate that leverage and the standard deviation of return on assets should
be related to mispricing. If leverage and the standard deviation of return
on assets capture some dimension of risk which is not captured by other
variables or incorporated in the measures of mispricing, then it is possible
that leverage and the standard deviation of return on assets may be neg-
atively related to overvaluation. This would mean that more risky firms
appear to be undervalued using the relative valuation measures employed
by this study when in fact such firms are more risky. If the information
uncertainty effect of leverage and the standard deviation of return on assets
is dominant, firms with more leverage and more volatile return on assets
will experience more mispricing, although the direction of the mispricing
is not as clear under this approach. Interestingly, a measure of earnings
scaled by assets was generally negatively related to subsequent returns in
the study by Jiambalvo et al. (2002). If earnings are persistent, a negative
relationship between a measure of return on assets and subsequent returns
suggests that return on assets may be negatively related to overvaluation
as market prices decline while earnings persist. The hypotheses which re-
sult are as follows:
H170: Ceteribus paribus, leverage is unrelated to overvaluation.
H17A: Ceteribus paribus, leverage is negatively related to overvaluation.
H180: Ceteribus paribus, the standard deviation of return on assets is un-
related to overvaluation.
H18A: Ceteribus paribus, the standard deviation of return on assets is
negatively related to overvaluation.
H190: Ceteribus paribus, return on assets is unrelated to overvaluation.
H19A: Ceteribus paribus, return on assets is negatively related to overval-
uation.
If investors face higher levels of information uncertainty when they eval-
uate a firm, it should be difficult for them to form an accurate assessment
of the firm’s prospects. It is reasonable to conclude that the increased
difficulty in accurately assessing a firm’s prospects will produce increased
mispricing. Jiang et al. (2005) used firm age, the standard deviation of
returns, and average stock turnover as proxies for information uncertainty.
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Importantly, Jiang et al. (2005) found that firms with high information
uncertainty earned lower future returns, and the authors suggested that
this was consistent with overconfidence on the part of investors evaluating
firms with high information uncertainty. This suggests that information
uncertainty has an asymmetric effect on mispricing by making firms with
high information uncertainty more overvalued, leading to poorer future re-
turns. If information uncertainty affects returns through a risk channel
instead, firms with high information uncertainty should yield higher sub-
sequent returns to compensate for the higher risk. The risk interpretation
indicates that firms with higher information uncertainty should appear to
be undervalued relative to subsequent outcomes if the estimates of intrin-
sic value do not fully account for all sources of risk relating to informa-
tion uncertainty. Therefore, an investor overconfidence interpretation and
a risk interpretation of the relationship between information uncertainty
upon overvaluation produce different predictions, making the relationship
an empirical issue. The hypotheses are as follows:
H200: Ceteribus paribus, firm age is unrelated to overvaluation.
H20A: Ceteribus paribus, firm age is related to overvaluation.
H210: Ceteribus paribus, the standard deviation of returns is unrelated to
overvaluation.
H21A: Ceteribus paribus, the standard deviation of returns is related to
overvaluation.
H220: Ceteribus paribus, stock turnover is unrelated to overvaluation.
H22A: Ceteribus paribus, stock turnover is related to overvaluation.
It is possible that firms which appear to be undervalued according to
the relative measures of overvaluation used in this study are actually more
risky firms. Similarly, firms which appear to be overvalued relative to
future earnings and book values may actually be less risky. In a study
evaluating the residual income model’s ability to predict future stock re-
turns, Ali et al. (2003) used several proxies for firm risk. Some of the risk
proxies included by Ali et al. (2003) have already been discussed in some
form, such as firm size, scaled measures of debt, and the standard devi-
ation of return on assets. However, two additional proxies for firm risk
used by Ali et al. (2003) are Altman’s Z-Score and beta. Results reported
by Ali et al. (2003) showed that firms with higher values of Altman’s Z-
Score and beta appeared to be more undervalued using their measures of
valuation. Those results are consistent with interpreting the appearance
of overvaluation and undervaluation as being related to differences in risk.
In other words, firms which appear undervalued are somewhat more risky
and firms which appear overvalued are somewhat less risky. Therefore, in
light of those results the hypotheses for Altman’s Z-Score and beta are as
follows:
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H230: Ceteribus paribus, Altman’s Z-Score is unrelated to overvaluation.
H23A: Ceteribus paribus, Altmans’s Z-Score is negatively related to over-
valuation.
H240: Ceteribus paribus, beta is unrelated to overvaluation.
H24A: Ceteribus paribus, beta is negatively related to overvaluation.
From the discussion in this section it should be clear that theoretical
reasons exist for why various factors might be related to the measures of
overvaluation used in this study. The next section of this study develops
the methodology and models needed to test the hypotheses which have
been articulated. The overvaluation measures derived previously are used
in conjunction with the characteristics discussed in this section to more
fully explore the determinants of overvaluation.
2.5 Methodology
In the first essay the scaled deviation of market value from intrinsic value is
used to assign firms to valuation deciles, creating relative measures of valu-
ation. In order to better capture the true value of firms, the intrinsic value
estimates use actual future earnings and book value data. Importantly,
the results in the first essay demonstrate that the firms which are the most
overvalued initially remain overvalued on average over time, and the firms
which are the most undervalued initially remain undervalued on average
over several years. This persistence in overvaluation and undervaluation
indicates that the overvaluation and undervaluation relative to subsequent
earnings and book value data are not primarily driven by random market
mispricing at the time the mispricing is measured. If the mispricing being
measured is merely the result of random market pricing errors at each point
in time, the most overvalued firms would be randomly distributed across
the valuation deciles in subsequent periods instead of remaining overvalued
over time, and similar logic would apply to the most undervalued firms.
Therefore, as the mispricing measured is not solely driven by random mar-
ket pricing errors, studying the determinants of mispricing is warranted.
In the course of studying the determinants of mispricing, this essay
employs the valuation decile assignments developed in the first essay as
the measure of mispricing. Since undervaluation and overvaluation refer
to opposite ends of the same unified valuation spectrum, the most overval-
ued firms are considered to be the least undervalued, and vice versa. For
the sake of convenience, the valuation decile assignments are often simply
referred to as measures of overvaluation. The most relatively undervalued
firms are assigned to the first decile, and the most relatively overvalued
firms are assigned to the tenth decile.
Valuation deciles are used for a few reasons. First, the scaled deviation
of market value from intrinsic value is subject to outliers, and the VERR
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and eVERR data also exhibit substantial skewness, as may be seen in the
means and percentile data in Table 3. Assigning firms to valuation deciles
using the scaled deviation of market value from intrinsic value solves the
problem of outliers and skewed VERR and eVERR data. In a regres-
sion of size adjusted announcement returns on independent variables, Ali
et al. (2003) used value-to-price quintile ranks as an independent variable
to better handle outliers and nonlinearities in the relationship. Thus, using
valuation deciles in the present study to solve the problem of outliers and
skewed data is similar to the approach used by Ali et al. (2003). However,
using valuation deciles allows for more variation in the data than is allowed
with the value-to-price quintile ranks used by Ali et al. (2003). Second,
employing valuation deciles makes determinant analyses based upon differ-
ent VERR or eVERR measures more directly comparable as all valuation
decile assignments share the same scale. Third, the use of valuation deciles
facilitates the study of determinants of mispricing in a relative sense. In
other words, using valuation decile assignments makes it possible to deter-
mine the extent to which the determinants of mispricing make some firms
more overvalued or more undervalued relative to other firms.
The preceding Literature Review of Factors and Hypothesis Develop-
ment sections discuss factors and control variables which are relevant to the
study of the determinants of mispricing. The independent variables iden-
tified in the Hypothesis Development section fit into four groups: CEO
compensation characteristics, firm characteristics, investor sentiment vari-
ables, and control variables. Because valuation decile assignments are used
as the measure of overvaluation, ordered logistic regressions of valuation
decile assignments on the determinants of mispricing are performed. There-
fore, the general form of the analyses is the following:
Decile = f(CEO compensation characteristics, firm characteristics,
investor sentiment variables, and control variables) (11)
Studying the determinants of mispricing using ordered logistic regres-
sions of the general form presented in Equation 11 requires that valuation
data be matched with the determinants identified in the Hypothesis De-
velopment section and with the control variables. This section details the
construction of the combined valuation and determinants sample, includ-
ing the methodology used for the valuation measures, CEO compensation
characteristics, sentiment data, company characteristics, and control vari-
ables. Focusing on audited financial results in order to generate the highest
quality estimate of intrinsic value using actual financial outcomes produces
valuation data which is available annually for firms in the sample. The main
sample period is from 1964–2009 due to the availability of the valuation
data, but data for some of the determinants is not available during that full
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period. CEO compensation data is available from 1992–2010, extending
beyond the valuation sample period but substantially limiting the early
sample period. The Investors Intelligence measure of investor sentiment is
available from 1963–2014, fully covering the valuation sample period. The
measure of sentiment described in Baker and Wurgler (2007) begins in 1965
and spans the remainder of the valuation sample period. The American
Association of Individual Investors sentiment data begins in 1987 and con-
tinues through the valuation sample period. The availability of cash flow
and accruals data depends upon the calculation method used, with one
method producing at least some data covering the full valuation sample
period and the other method beginning in 1987 and continuing throughout
the remainder of the valuation sample period. The specific details of the
preparation of the data are presented in the sections below.
2.5.1 Valuation Measures
As discussed above, this essay uses the valuation decile assignments de-
veloped in the first essay as the measures of relative overvaluation used
in the analyses of the determinants of mispricing. Valuation decile assign-
ments are therefore used as the dependent variable in the general model
presented in Equation 11. The main valuation measure employed in this
essay is the set of full period decile assignments derived from the VERR
measure calculated with intrinsic values estimated using the static CAPM
discount rate for each firm. The static CAPM approach is used in order to
incorporate a firm specific risk adjustment without invoking the size and
book-to-market connections inherent in the Fama-French discount model.
Although the decile assignments using the Fama-French approach are very
similar to the decile assignments using the CAPM approach, it is possible
that mispricing may account for some degree of the observed premiums
associated with the size and book-to-market factors. The size and book-
to-market factors in the Fama-French approach are therefore more prone to
being affected by mispricing itself, whereas using the CAPM methodology
to estimate the cost of equity avoids that issue.
In order to produce the full period valuation decile assignments all the
static CAPM VERR figures across the 1964–2009 period are grouped to-
gether and then separated into valuation deciles. The first valuation decile
contains the most relatively undervalued firm observations and the tenth
valuation decile contains the most relatively overvalued firm observations.
Using the full set of observations over the 1964–2009 period when assigning
firms to valuation deciles makes the resulting decile assignments relative
measures of valuation for the full time period since each firm observation is
compared to the decile boundaries derived from the full sample when the
decile assignments are made. Thus, firms at each point in time are assigned
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to valuation deciles using decile thresholds derived from all observations
over the full 1964–2009 period.
Assigning firms to full period valuation deciles using the CAPM based
VERR measure and the full 1964–2009 time period could cause the decile
assignments to be driven by broad market mispricing in some time peri-
ods. This could affect the determinants which appear to be statistically
significantly related to mispricing. Specifically, analyses of determinants
using full period decile assignments may indicate that determinants which
capture broad market conditions are driving mispricing, possibly obscur-
ing the effect of other determinants driving mispricing over shorter time
periods. To examine the robustness of the main results using the full pe-
riod decile assignments, VERR decile assignments made annually are also
used in a series of analyses. With this approach the static CAPM discount
rate is again employed in the calculation of the intrinsic value used in the
VERR formula, but firms are assigned to valuation deciles annually. As
VERR estimations are performed at the end of the month in which each
fiscal year ends, all VERR calculations from within a calendar year are
grouped together and separated into valuation deciles. Decile one contains
the most relatively undervalued equities, and decile ten contains the most
relatively overvalued equities. Using annual decile assignments shifts the
focus from mispricing which may be driven by broad market factors to-
wards mispricing which may be caused by other factors. For example, if
investor sentiment affects mispricing, using full period decile assignments
as the dependent variable in the analyses would be expected to more fully
capture that impact because sentiment is more variable over broad time
horizons and market conditions. Using annual decile assignments in the
determinants analyses allows for less heterogeneity in investor sentiment
values since all VERR measures within a given year will have one of twelve
different dates because each company’s annual VERR measure is estimated
at the end of the month in which the company’s fiscal year ends. Conse-
quently, although the main valuation measure employed in this study is
the set of full period VERR decile assignments using the static CAPM
discount rate approach, annual VERR decile assignments are also used for
robustness, and the corresponding results are presented in the Appendix.
The sample of static CAPM VERR observations converted into full period
and annual decile assignments consists of 134,205 observations.
In the Appendix, two additional valuation decile assignment variables
are used in the determinants analyses as the dependent variable. The
eVERR measures developed in the first essay are based upon alternate
specifications for earnings and book values compared to the earnings and
book values specifications used in the estimation of the VERR measures.
Therefore, two of the sets of valuation decile assignments generated from
the eVERR measures are used to study the determinants of mispricing
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in order to more fully examine the robustness of the results obtained to
the use of alternate specifications of earnings and book values in the es-
timation of intrinsic value. Both eVERR decile assignment variables em-
ploy the static CAPM discount rate for each firm when performing the
calculations to generate the eVERR figures. The first eVERR measure
corresponds to the full period decile assignments using the VERR mea-
sure to assign firms to deciles. For this set of eVERR decile assignments
all observations over the full 1964–2009 period are grouped together and
then assigned to valuation deciles, with the first decile containing the most
relatively undervalued equities and the tenth decile containing the most
relatively overvalued equities. The second eVERR measure corresponds
to the annual decile assignments made using the VERR measure to assign
firms to deciles. For this dependent variable all eVERR measures within a
calendar year are assigned to valuation deciles. The discussion in the pre-
ceding paragraph regarding the implications of assigning firm observations
to VERR based valuation deciles over the full period or annually apply to
the two eVERR based valuation decile assignments as well. The sample of
static CAPM eVERR observations converted into full period and annual
decile assignments consists of 122,044 observations.
2.5.2 CEO Compensation Characteristics
The characteristics of managerial compensation are identified in the Lit-
erature Review of Factors and in the Hypothesis Development sections as
likely being related to overvaluation. In particular, the sensitivity of the
executive’s wealth to the volatility of the stock (vega), and the sensitivity
of the executive’s wealth to the stock price (delta), are hypothesized to
be related to mispricing. Vega and delta data are obtained from Professor
Naveen’s website, with the data covering the period 1992–2010 and includ-
ing delta and vega for various executives. The vega and delta measures
provided by Professor Naveen were calculated using Execucomp data fol-
lowing methodologies developed by Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al.
(2006).
The delta and vega obtained from Professor Naveen’s website are matched
with data from Execucomp to separate out the data for CEOs specifically.
In some cases delta and vega are included for multiple CEOs for a given
year. When that occurs, the average of the deltas and vegas is used. Be-
cause delta and vega are hypothesized to affect overvaluation by influencing
the decisions of managers in areas such as R&D, using the average of the
deltas and vegas for multiple CEOs during a year better reflects the in-
centives which may have affected managerial decisions during that period.
The final set of delta and vega data consists of 29,427 observations, and
both delta and vega are rescaled to be in terms of millions of dollars of
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change in the executive’s wealth relative to the change in the stock price
or the volatility of the stock. The rescaling is performed to facilitate the
interpretation of the resulting coefficients in the analyses without affecting
the inferences.
2.5.3 Firm Characteristics
As detailed in the Hypothesis Development section, various firm character-
istics have been hypothesized to be related to overvaluation. To test these
hypotheses, various variables are constructed. Research and development
expenditures (COMPUSTAT variable XRD) are scaled by the average to-
tal assets during the fiscal year to obtain the measure of R&D used in
most of the analyses. The average total assets is computed as the aver-
age of the total assets at the end of the fiscal year and the total assets at
the end of the prior fiscal year. The average total assets during the year
is used to better match the periodic nature of R&D expenditures given
that total assets figures taken from balance sheets are point estimates. An
average total assets figure therefore better matches the level of assets as-
sociated with the R&D expenditures during the fiscal year. Missing values
of R&D expenditures are treated as zeros. The same procedure is followed
when using the advertising expenditures (COMPUSTAT variable XAD)
to compute the advertising measure used in the analyses. For robustness,
R&D expenditures are also scaled by sales in some analyses to provide an
alternative measure of R&D intensity.
Scaled values of net property, plant, and equipment and intangible as-
sets are also calculated. The corresponding COMPUSTAT variables for
net property, plant, and equipment and intangible assets are PPENT and
INTAN, respectively. Because the net property, plant, and equipment and
intangible assets figures are obtained for the end of the fiscal year, the
total assets figure for the end of the fiscal year is used when scaling the
variables. This approach to scaling matches the point estimates of intangi-
ble assets and net property, plant, and equipment with the corresponding
point estimate of total assets.
Two different measures of cash flow and accruals are utilized. The
first set of measures is calculated using the approach documented by Sloan
(1996). Following that method, cash flow and accruals are calculated as
follows:
ACCSloan = (4ACT−4CHE)−(4LCT−4DLC−4TXP )−DP (12)
CFSloan = OIADP − ACCSloan (13)
The abbreviations in the equations above refer to the COMPUSTAT vari-
able names, where ACT is total current assets, CHE is cash and cash
124
equivalents, LCT is total current liabilities, DLC is total debt in current
liabilities, TXP is income taxes payable, DP is depreciation and amorti-
zation expense, and OIADP is operating income after depreciation. The
data required to calculate the cash flow and accruals measures following
Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for firms prior to mid-1970, and very
consistently thereafter. The second set of measures is calculated using the
approach documented by Collins, Gong, and Hribar (2003). Following that
method, cash flow and accruals are calculated as follows:
CFCollins = OANCF −XIDOC (14)
ACCCollins = IBC − CFCollins (15)
In the above equations the COMPUSTAT variables are provided. OANCF
is the net cash flow from operating activities and XIDOC is the cash flow
from extraordinary items and discontinued operations. IBC is the income
before extraordinary items. The data required to calculate the cash flow
and accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporad-
ically for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and
consistently thereafter. The accruals and cash flow measures calculated
following both Sloan (1996) and Collins et al. (2003) are scaled by average
total assets before being used in the analyses. The average total assets
during the year is used to better match the periodic nature of cash flow
and accruals given that total assets figures taken from balance sheets are
point estimates. An average total assets figure therefore better matches
the level of assets associated with the cash flow and accruals during the
fiscal year.
2.5.4 Sentiment Variables
Three sources of sentiment data are used for this study. The first source
of sentiment data is from Investors Intelligence. The Investors Intelligence
data spanned the period from January of 1963 through the beginning of
March of 2014, beyond the end of the valuation sample period. For the
period from January of 1963 through November of 1963, data is available
once per month. For the period from December of 1963 through May of
1969, data is available on a bi-weekly basis. The data is available on a
weekly basis for the remainder of the data available. Sentiment data from
Investors Intelligence ending within a calendar month is averaged to pro-
duce a monthly sentiment measure. The specific measure of sentiment used
to construct the monthly average is the difference between the percentage
bullish and the percentage bearish. As a result of the data availability, for
most of the sample period the monthly average is constructed from the
weekly difference. The use of a monthly average allows time for investor
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sentiment to be reflected in market prices by incorporating sentiment data
over a period of weeks. Also, using a monthly average makes it possible
to more closely align the estimation periods across all three measures of
investor sentiment.
The second source of sentiment data is the monthly orthogonalized
sentiment measure described in Baker and Wurgler (2007). The data is
obtained from Professor Wurgler’s webpage. The orthogonalized sentiment
measure is available from July of 1965 until December of 2010, beyond the
end of the valuation sample period.
The third and final source of sentiment data is obtained from the Amer-
ican Association of Individual Investors (AAII). AAII conducts a weekly
sentiment survey of its members, with data beginning in July of 1987 and
extending beyond the end of the valuation sample period. The sentiment
data is downloaded from the AAII website. Data for one week in 1996 is
missing. The difference between the percentage bullish and the percent-
age bearish is used as the measure of sentiment, and a monthly sentiment
measure is constructed as the average of all of the weekly sentiment figures
dated during each calendar month. As noted above, the use of a monthly
average allows time for investor sentiment to be reflected in market prices
by incorporating sentiment data over a period of weeks. Also, using a
monthly average makes it possible to more closely align the estimation pe-
riods across all three measures of investor sentiment, as the Baker-Wurgler
measure of sentiment is available monthly.
2.5.5 Control Variables
Several measures to control for risk are constructed and used in the anal-
yses. In a study of the relationship between institutional ownership and
the relationship between stock prices and future earnings Jiambalvo, Raj-
gopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) included firm size and leverage in their
analyses. For this study, size is defined to be the natural logarithm of total
assets and leverage is defined to be total liabilities scaled by total assets.
Jiambalvo et al. (2002) also included a measure of the standard deviation
of return on assets. In the present study return on assets is calculated
using the average total assets described above, and the standard deviation
is calculated using the five fiscal years ending on the valuation date, with
a minimum of three return on asset figures required. Return on assets is
also included as a control variable in the analyses.
When Jiang et al. (2005) studied the connection between information
uncertainty and expected returns, several variables to account for infor-
mation uncertainty were included. Firm age, the standard deviation of re-
turns, and stock turnover were employed by Jiang et al. (2005) as measures
of information uncertainty. Investors faced with information uncertainty
126
may have a more difficult time accurately assessing the value of firms, lead-
ing to a connection between information uncertainty and mispricing. To
control for the effects of information uncertainty, firm age, the standard
deviation of returns, and stock turnover are included as control variables in
the analyses. Using the approach taken by Jiang et al. (2005), firm age is
defined in the present study to be the total number of months the stock ap-
peared in CRSP prior to and including the valuation month. The standard
deviation of returns is calculated using the standard deviation of the nat-
ural log of daily returns during the two month window ending eleven days
before the valuation date, which is the last day of the valuation month.
The turnover for the stock is calculated to be the average of the percent-
age turnover for each day during the six month period ending eleven days
before the valuation date. The estimation methodologies for the standard
deviation of returns and turnover are similar to the methodologies used
by Jiang et al. (2005), and the estimation period ends eleven days before
the valuation date to match the methodology used in the estimation of the
CAPM discount rate used in the valuation measures.
Two additional control variables are used in the analyses. Altman’s
Z-Score is calculated as a variable to control for the uncertainty associated
with default risk, and it is computed following the formulation presented
in Altman (2000) of the original model introduced by Altman (1968). The
CAPM beta derived for the first essay of this study is also included as a
variable to control for risk.
2.5.6 Model Specifications
Three different general specifications are used for the ordered logistic re-
gressions, and two different models are used for each general specification.
The first general specification is the baseline specification for the indepen-
dent variables which is used to generate the primary results reported in
this study. Within the baseline specification for the independent variables
there are two models which are used to perform the ordered logistic re-
gressions. The first model includes scaled advertising (AD), scaled R&D
(R&D/A), scaled net fixed assets (PPENT), scaled intangible assets (IN-
TAN), scaled cash flow (CF), scaled accruals (ACC), investor sentiment
(Sent), several interaction terms between firm characteristics and investor
sentiment (AD*Sent, R&D*Sent, PPENT*Sent, INTAN*Sent, CF*Sent,
and ACC*Sent), Altman’s Z-Score (AltZ1), firm age (Age), firm size (Size),
the standard deviation of returns (StdRet), stock turnover (Turnover), the
standard deviation of return on assets (StdROA), the stock’s β (Beta),
return on assets (ROA), and leverage (Leverage). The first baseline speci-
fication model omits delta and vega because the limited availability of the
delta and vega data significantly reduces the sample period. The model is
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presented below in Equation 16:
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ11(R&Di,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ13(INTANi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (16)
The second model adds delta (Delta) and vega (Vega) to the model pre-
sented in Equation 16. The model which results is presented below in
Equation 17:
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t + γ2Deltai,t + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t + γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ11(R&D/Ai,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ13(INTANi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (17)
The second general specification adds single digit SIC industry fixed
effects to the baseline specification models. Industry fixed effects are in-
cluded in this specification because it is possible that industry effects may
drive some of the overvaluation which is observed.2 Aside from the addi-
tion of the single digit SIC industry fixed effects, the same combinations
of variables are used for the two industry fixed effects specification models
as are employed for the two baseline specification models. In the model
equations for the industry fixed effects specification, Equations 18 and 19,
the industry fixed effects are represented by the addition of the vector of
industry dummy variables to the baseline models in Equations 16 and 17.
2An ordered logistic regression with firm level fixed effects has been attempted, but
the model failed to converge.
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The models used in the industry fixed effects specification are as follows:
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ11(R&D/Ai,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ13(INTANi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t
+ θIndDUM + εi,t) (18)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t + γ2Deltai,t + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t + γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ11(R&D/Ai,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ13(INTANi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + θIndDUM + εi,t) (19)
The third general specification incorporates several adjustments to ad-
dress potential endogeneity concerns, producing the endogeneity specifica-
tion models. Specifically, three issues arise which are related to the baseline
specification approach described so far. First, it is possible that vega and
delta could be affected by managers seeking particular compensation pack-
ages when their firms are overvalued. Second, one possible concern with
the scaled intangible assets in the ordered logistic regressions is that over-
valued firms may engage in more acquisitions, thereby potentially creating
an endogeneity problem for the scaled intangible assets. To address both
potential endogeneity problems lagged values of vega, delta, and scaled
intangible assets are used as the independent variables in the endogeneity
specification models. Third, scaling R&D by assets may be cause for con-
cern due to the fact that higher R&D spending reduces earnings, thereby
reducing assets in the long run and affecting both the earnings and book
value components of the residual income model. To address that concern
R&D spending is scaled by sales for the endogeneity specification models.
Aside from the adjustments made to delta, vega, scaled intangible assets,
and scaled R&D spending, the same combinations of independent variables
are used for the two endogeneity specification models as are employed for
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the baseline specification models. The resulting endogeneity specification
models are presented below, with the endogeneity specification models in
Equations 20 and 21 corresponding to the baseline specification models in
Equations 16 and 17 after the endogeneity adjustments described:
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Si,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t−1 + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ11(R&D/Si,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ13(INTANi,t−1 ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (20)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t−1 + γ2Deltai,t−1 + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Si,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t−1 + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t + γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ11(R&D/Si,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ13(INTANi,t−1 ∗ Senti,t) + γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (21)
The baseline, industry fixed effects, and endogeneity specifications are
used to generate ordered logistic regression analyses of the determinants of
mispricing. In order to generate the ordered logistic regression analyses of
the determinants of mispricing the valuation deciles, CEO compensation
characteristics, firm characteristics, sentiment variables, and control vari-
ables discussed previously are used to implement the models depicted in
Equations 16 through 21. Although the main focus in this study is upon
the baseline specification encompassing the models in Equations 16 and
17, the alternative models in Equations 18 through 21 make it possible to
illuminate the robustness of the findings to adjustments applied to the inde-
pendent variables and models used in the analyses. In the following section
the methodology discussed in this section is applied to the preparation of
the independent and dependent variables and the subsequent results from
the ordered logistic regression analyses are summarized and discussed.
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2.6 Results
The first essay documents the existence of mispricing relative to intrinsic
values calculated using future realized earnings and book values. Impor-
tantly, the mispricing documented is persistent, with the most overvalued
firms remaining overvalued on average for several years and the most under-
valued firms remaining undervalued on average for several years. Persistent
mispricing is inconsistent with the observed mispricing being driven solely
by random market pricing errors. If market pricing errors are completely
random the most overvalued and undervalued firms at one point in time
should be evenly distributed across the mispricing spectrum in subsequent
periods. That is not what is observed, as Figure 1 and Tables 10 and 11
clearly show. Thus, the observed mispricing of equity securities is not fully
driven by random market pricing errors, indicating that some other factors
are the determinants of mispricing.
A review of prior literature supports a series of hypotheses about po-
tential determinants of the observed mispricing. Naturally, mispricing eq-
uity securities must result in the equity securities being either undervalued
or overvalued. Since undervaluation and overvaluation refer to opposite
ends of the same unified valuation spectrum, the most overvalued firms
are considered to be the least undervalued, and vice versa. For the sake
of convenience, overvaluation is used in this section to refer to mispric-
ing as the results are discussed because the term overvaluation helpfully
indicates the directionality of the mispricing. Thus, determinants which
decrease overvaluation may be viewed as increasing undervaluation, and
vice versa.
The discussion of the results presented in this section is subdivided into
subsections according to the specifications discussed in the Methodology
section. The main results are from the baseline specification and are dis-
cussed first. Ordered logistic regressions following the models displayed
in Equations 16 and 17 are performed using the full period static CAPM
VERR decile assignments as the dependent variable. Equation 16 and
Equation 17 are both estimated with each of the six combinations of the
two measures of cash flow and accruals with the three measures of investor
sentiment. The detailed results of those ordered logistic regressions are
presented in Tables 19 through 24 in the Appendix. In this section, Table
16 summarizes those detailed results. The average coefficients and average
t-statistics for the ordered logistic regressions following Equation 16 with
the full period static CAPM VERR valuation decile assignments used as
the dependent variable are presented in Table 16, with results reported
separately for each of the three measures of investor sentiment. The same
procedure is followed for the ordered logistic regressions employing the
model in Equation 17 with the full period static CAPM VERR valuation
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decile assignments used as the dependent variable, and the summarized
results are also presented in Table 16.
The robustness of the primary baseline specification results is explored
by considering the additional details from the single digit SIC industry
fixed effects specification and the endogeneity specification. Ordered logis-
tic regressions are performed for the single digit SIC industry fixed effects
specification using the full period static CAPM VERR decile assignments
as the dependent variable in the models given in Equations 18 and 19. Or-
dered logistic regressions are performed for each of the six combinations of
the two measures of cash flow and accruals with the three measures of in-
vestor sentiment. The detailed results are presented in Tables 44 through
49 in the Appendix. Ordered logistic regressions are performed for the
endogeneity specification using the full period static CAPM VERR decile
assignments as the dependent variable in the models given in Equations
20 and 21. Ordered logistic regressions are performed for each of the six
combinations of the two measures of cash flow and accruals with the three
measures of investor sentiment. The detailed results are presented in Ta-
bles 69 through 74 in the Appendix. In this section, Table 17 summarizes
those detailed results. The average coefficients and average t-statistics for
the ordered logistic regressions following Equation 20 are presented in Ta-
ble 17, with results reported separately for each of the three measures of
investor sentiment. The same procedure is followed for the ordered logis-
tic regressions employing the model in Equation 19, and the summarized
results are also presented in Table 17.
There are several findings for the determinants of mispricing which are
robust to the use of the different specifications. Investors systematically
overvalue scaled R&D spending, undervalue scaled cash flow, and are prone
to overvaluing equities when sentiment is high. In addition, investors un-
dervalue scaled property, plant, and equipment (net fixed assets) when sen-
timent is high, as indicated by the negative coefficients for the interaction
term between sentiment and net fixed assets across the results evaluated
for the three specifications. Finally, risk cannot account for the observed
mispricing. Financial distress, leverage, β, and the standard deviation of
return on assets are all positively related to overvaluation, meaning that
the overvalued firms are actually more risky on average than the under-
valued firms. Older and larger firms also tend to be undervalued, further
challenging any possible risk explanation for the apparent mispricing.
Valuation measures and determinants data are constructed and com-
bined to create the final dataset by following the approach detailed in the
Methodology section. The dependent variable of interest is the set of val-
uation decile assignments generated from the VERR measure estimated
using the static CAPM discount rate and with the decile thresholds estab-
lished across the full 1964–2009 sample period. Thus, the results presented
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Exhibit 1
Definitions of the Independent Variables Used in the Primary
Ordered Logistic Regressions
The independent variables used in the ordered logistic regressions are de-
fined below. The dependent variables used in the ordered logistic regres-
sions are available for the 1964–2009 period. A more detailed period of
availability through the end of 2009 is indicated in parentheses when nec-
essary.
Panel A: CEO Compensation Characteristics Variables
Vega = the average of the change in wealth (in millions) for a 0.01
change in the firm’s volatility of returns for all CEOs during
the fiscal year (1992–2009)
Delta = the average of the change in wealth (in millions) for a 1%
change in the firm’s stock price for all CEOs during the fiscal
year (1992–2009)
Panel B: Firm Characteristics Variables
AD = advertising expense scaled by average assets for the fiscal
year
R&D/A = R&D expense scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
R&D/S = R&D expense scaled by sales for the fiscal year
PPENT = total net property, plant, and equipment scaled by assets
INTAN = total intangible assets scaled by assets
CF = cash flow scaled by average assets for the fiscal year, with
cash flow calculated following Sloan (1996) (1964–2009) or
Collins et al. (2003) (1987–2009)
ACC = accruals scaled by average assets for the fiscal year, with
accruals calculated following Sloan (1996) (1964–2009) or
Collins et al. (2003) (1987–2009)
Panel C: Investor Sentiment Variables
Sent = investor sentiment for the month, with sentiment measured
as either the monthly average of the difference between the
bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors Intel-
ligence, the monthly Baker-Wurgler sentiment index (July
1965–2009), or the monthly average of the weekly difference
between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII
(July 1987–2009)
AD*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
advertising scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
R&D/A*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
R&D scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
continued on the next page
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R&D/S*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
R&D scaled by sales for the fiscal year
PPENT*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
total net property, plant, and equipment scaled by assets for
the fiscal year
INTAN*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
intangible assets scaled by assets for the fiscal year
CF*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
cash flow scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
ACC*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
accruals scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
Panel D: Risk and Information Uncertainty Control Variables
AltZ1 = the Z1 version of Altman’s Z-Score
Age = the total number of months the stock appeared in CRSP
prior to and including the valuation month
Size = the natural logarithm of total assets
StdRet = the standard deviation of the natural log of daily returns
during the two month window ending eleven days before the
end of the valuation month
Turnover = the average of the percentage turnover for each day during
the six month period ending eleven days before the end of
the valuation month
StdROA = the standard deviation of return on assets using the five fiscal
years ending at the end of the valuation month
Beta = the CAPM β estimated following Dimson (1979) as modified
by Fowler and Rorke (1983) using daily return data from
the year ending eleven days before the end of the valuation
month
ROA = net income scaled by average assets
Leverage = total liabilities scaled by assets
in this section all use the full period static CAPM VERR valuation decile
assignments as the dependent variable.
Results presented in the Appendix are separated by specification and
dependent variable. The set of full period static CAPM VERR valua-
tion decile assignments is the first dependent variable used for each spec-
ification’s results in the Appendix because it is the primary dependent
variable used in this study. The second dependent variable used for each
specification’s results in the Appendix is produced by assigning firms to
valuation deciles using annual decile thresholds with the static CAPM de-
rived VERR measure for each year in the 1964–2009 period. The third
and fourth dependent variables used for each specification’s results in the
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Appendix mirror the approaches used for the first and second dependent
variables while using the eVERR valuation measures instead of the VERR
valuation measures. The results for the analyses employing the second,
third, and fourth dependent variables are provided in the Appendix for
the sake of completeness. However, the first dependent variable, the valua-
tion decile assignments obtained using the static CAPM discount approach
to calculate the VERR measure and the full sample decile thresholds to
assign firms to valuation deciles, is the focus of the analysis in this section.
As discussed in the Methodology section, two measures of cash flow and
accruals and three measures of investor sentiment are used as independent
variables across the ordered logistic regressions. Cash flow and accruals
are calculated following Sloan (1996) and also Collins et al. (2003). The
data required to calculate the cash flow and accruals measures following
Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for firms prior to mid-1970, and very
consistently thereafter, while the data required to calculate the cash flow
and accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporad-
ically for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and
consistently thereafter. The three measures of investor sentiment are de-
rived from sentiment data from Investors Intelligence, sentiment data from
Baker and Wurgler (2007), and sentiment data from AAII. The Investors
Intelligence data is available for the full 1964–2009 period corresponding
to the capm5 VERR and eVERR valuation decile assignments, while the
sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007) begins in the middle of
1965 and the sentiment data from AAII begins in the middle of 1987.
Exhibit 1 defines the independent variables used in the ordered logistic
regressions which provide the results analyzed in this section. As not all
independent variables are available for the full time period, Exhibit 1 also
includes information about the time period for which each independent
variable is available prior to the end of 2009 if the independent variable
is not available for the full 1964–2009 period. Panel A displays the CEO
compensation characteristics variables, Panel B displays the firm charac-
teristics variables, Panel C displays the investor sentiment variables, and
Panel D displays the risk and information uncertainty control variables.
The precise time periods and samples for the data used in the ordered
logistic regressions are the result of the intersection of the data availability
for the explanatory variables and the dependent variables. Thus, because
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals and the AAII
measure of investor sentiment are only available beginning in 1987, or-
dered logistic regressions using those independent variables are based upon
somewhat more limited datasets. Similarly, delta and vega data are only
available beginning in 1992, which again significantly reduces the dataset
utilized for the ordered logistic regressions including delta and vega. For
the VERR and eVERR measures used as the dependent variable with the
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Sloan (1996) measures of cash flow and accruals in the baseline and indus-
try fixed effects specifications there are a bit less than 82,000 observations
in the dataset, with about 56,000 observations remaining in the dataset
when the AAII measure of sentiment is used and about 16,000 observa-
tions remaining when delta and vega are used as independent variables.
For the VERR and eVERR measures used as the dependent variable with
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals in the baseline
and industry fixed effects specifications there are approximately 55,000 ob-
servations in the dataset, with about 16,000 observations remaining when
delta and vega are used as independent variables. The number of obser-
vations is slightly lower for the robustness specification due to the use of
lagged variables. The detailed specification tables in the Appendix pro-
vide the number of observations used for each individual ordered logistic
regression performed.
To facilitate the evaluation of the results discussed in this section, Ex-
hibit 2 summarizes the hypotheses presented in the Hypothesis Develop-
ment section. The hypotheses in Exhibit 2 are organized in a manner
consistent with the presentation in the Hypothesis Development section,
with Panel A presenting the hypotheses pertaining to CEO compensation
variables, Panel B presenting the hypotheses pertaining to firm character-
istics variables, Panel C presenting the hypotheses pertaining to investor
sentiment variables, and Panel D presenting the hypotheses pertaining to
the risk and information uncertainty control variables. As the results are
discussed in this section the hypotheses listed in Exhibit 2 are referenced
by number for convenience and brevity.
The results and analysis for this study are presented in the sections
below. First, the baseline specification results for the ordered logistic re-
gressions using the full period static CAPM VERR valuation deciles as the
dependent variable are discussed. Second, the robustness of the main find-
ings is evaluated using the results obtained from employing the industry
fixed effects specification and the endogeneity specification with the full
period static CAPM VERR valuation deciles as the dependent variable.
2.6.1 Baseline Specification Results
Table 16 summarizes the baseline specification results of interest. The two
baseline specification models are estimated using either the Sloan (1996)
or Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals and each of the
three measures of investor sentiment. This produces six different ordered
logistic regressions for each of the two models presented in Equations 16 and
17 with the static CAPM VERR decile assignments used as the dependent
variable. The six corresponding tables in the Appendix which present the
individual ordered logistic regression results are Tables 19 through 24. For
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Exhibit 2
Hypotheses Regarding the Expected Determinants of
Overvaluation
Panel A: Hypotheses for CEO Compensation Characteristics
H10: Ceteribus paribus, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the volatility of
the stock is unrelated to overvaluation.
H1A: Ceteribus paribus, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the volatility of
the stock is related to overvaluation.
H20: Ceteribus paribus, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the stock price is
unrelated to overvaluation.
H2A: Ceteribus paribus, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the stock price is
related to overvaluation.
Panel B: Hypotheses for Firm Characteristics
H30: Ceteribus paribus, advertising expenditures are unrelated to overvaluation.
H3A: Ceteribus paribus, advertising expenditures are positively related to
overvaluation.
H40: Ceteribus paribus, R&D expenditures are unrelated to overvaluation.
H4A: Ceteribus paribus, R&D expenditures are positively related to overvaluation.
H50: Ceteribus paribus, investments in property, plant, and equipment are unre-
lated to overvaluation.
H5A: Ceteribus paribus, investments in property, plant, and equipment are related
to overvaluation.
H60: Ceteribus paribus, intangible assets are unrelated to overvaluation.
H6A: Ceteribus paribus, intangible assets are related to overvaluation.
H70: Ceteribus paribus, cash flow is unrelated to overvaluation.
H7A: Ceteribus paribus, cash flow is negatively related to overvaluation.
H80: Ceteribus paribus, accruals are unrelated to overvaluation.
H8A: Ceteribus paribus, accruals are positively related to overvaluation.
Panel C: Hypotheses for Investor Sentiment Variables
H90: Ceteribus paribus, investor sentiment is unrelated to overvaluation.
H9A: Ceteribus paribus, investor sentiment is positively related to overvaluation.
H100: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and advertis-
ing expenditures is unrelated to overvaluation.
H10A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and advertis-
ing expenditures is positively related to overvaluation.
H110: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and R&D ex-
penditures is unrelated to overvaluation.
H11A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and R&D ex-
penditures is positively related to overvaluation.
H120: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and property,
plant, and equipment is unrelated to overvaluation.
H12A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and property,
plant, and equipment is negatively related to overvaluation.
continued on the next page
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H130: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and intangible
assets is unrelated to overvaluation.
H13A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and intangible
assets is positively related to overvaluation.
H140: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and cash flow
is unrelated to overvaluation.
H14A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and cash flow
is negatively related to overvaluation.
H150: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and accruals
is unrelated to overvaluation.
H15A: Ceteribus paribus, the interaction between investor sentiment and accruals
is positively related to overvaluation.
Panel D: Hypotheses for Risk and Information Uncertainty Control Variables
H160: Ceteribus paribus, firm size is unrelated to overvaluation.
H16A: Ceteribus paribus, firm size is related to overvaluation.
H170: Ceteribus paribus, leverage is unrelated to overvaluation.
H17A: Ceteribus paribus, leverage is negatively related to overvaluation.
H180: Ceteribus paribus, the standard deviation of return on assets is unrelated to
overvaluation.
H18A: Ceteribus paribus, the standard deviation of return on assets is negatively
related to overvaluation.
H190: Ceteribus paribus, return on assets is unrelated to overvaluation.
H19A: Ceteribus paribus, return on assets is negatively related to overvaluation.
H200: Ceteribus paribus, firm age is unrelated to overvaluation.
H20A: Ceteribus paribus, firm age is related to overvaluation.
H210: Ceteribus paribus, the standard deviation of returns is unrelated to overval-
uation.
H21A: Ceteribus paribus, the standard deviation of returns is related to
overvaluation.
H220: Ceteribus paribus, stock turnover is unrelated to overvaluation.
H22A: Ceteribus paribus, stock turnover is related to overvaluation.
H230: Ceteribus paribus, Altman’s Z-Score is unrelated to overvaluation.
H23A: Ceteribus paribus, Altmans’s Z-Score is negatively related to overvaluation.
H240: Ceteribus paribus, beta is unrelated to overvaluation.
H24A: Ceteribus paribus, beta is negatively related to overvaluation.
each measure of investor sentiment there are therefore two ordered logistic
regressions following Equation 16: one using the Sloan (1996) measures of
cash flow and accruals and one using the Collins et al. (2003) measures
of cash flow and accruals. The same is true for the ordered logistic re-
gressions following Equation 17. Each column in Table 16 presents the
average coefficients and average t-statistics across the two ordered logistic
regressions produced by employing the two different measures of cash flow
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and accruals in the model specified near the bottom of the table with the
specified measure of investor sentiment. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 16 sum-
marize the coefficients and t-statistics for the baseline specification results
of interest using the Investors Intelligence measure of investor sentiment,
columns 3 and 4 summarize the results using the Baker-Wurgler measure
of investor sentiment, and columns 5 and 6 summarize the results using
the AAII measure of investor sentiment. The tables in the Appendix which
contain the individual ordered logistic regression results which are averaged
together to produce each column of Table 16 are listed at the bottom of
each column.
An examination of columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 16 reveals that both
vega and delta are generally positively related to overvaluation on average.
The coefficient for vega, which is a measure of the sensitivity of the CEO’s
wealth to changes in the firm’s volatility of returns, is positive and statisti-
cally significant on average at the 10% level when the Investors Intelligence
measure of sentiment is used, and positive and statistically significant on
average at the 5% level or better when the Baker-Wurgler or AAII measure
of investor sentiment is used (H1). The coefficient for delta, which is a mea-
sure of the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in the firm’s stock
price, is positive and statistically significant on average at the 5% level
across results for all three measures of investor sentiment (H2). The pos-
itive and statistically significant coefficients for vega and delta on average
in the baseline specification results support rejection of the null hypotheses
of no relationship between vega and delta and overvaluation (H1 and H2).
These results indicate that CEO compensation incentives, as represented
by vega and delta, have an impact upon the overvaluation of the firm. As
discussed in the Literature Review and Hypothesis Development sections,
delta and vega likely affect overvaluation by altering the choices made by
managers, and some choices made by managers, such as investments in
R&D, alter the ability of investors to accurately value firms. Interestingly,
based upon the substantially larger coefficients for vega compared to delta
despite the similar magnitudes for both variables, vega has a larger impact
upon overvaluation than delta. This indicates that option based compen-
sation, which drives vega, is more prone to producing overvaluation than
stock based compensation.
Because advertising expenditures create an intangible asset which may
be difficult to value while simultaneously raising the profile of the firms
spending the money on advertising, scaled advertising expenditures are
expected to be positively related to overvaluation because investors over-
estimate the value of the advertising expenditures. The average coefficients
and average t-statistics in Table 16 are inconsistent with that interpreta-
tion overall. In the models omitting delta and vega, which have larger
sample sizes due to the limited availability of delta and vega, the coef-
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Table 16
Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR Full Period Decile Assignments on
Determinants for the Baseline Specification
Average coefficients and average t-statistics are presented in this table for
ordered logistic regressions using the full period capm5 VERR decile as-
signments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable and employing the
baseline specification models. Some independent variables are not avail-
able for the full period. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated
in accordance with Sloan (1996) and Collins et al. (2003). Each column re-
ports the average coefficients and average t-statistics across the two ordered
logistic regressions performed using the specified measure of sentiment and
the two different measures of scaled cash flow and accruals in the appro-
priate baseline specification model. The average t-statistics are reported
below each average coefficient.
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.114 0.230 0.135
1.724 3.473 2.037
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.004
2.084 2.255 2.333
ADt 0.614 −0.438 0.770 0.576 0.867 −0.448
3.234 −0.844 5.566 1.734 4.596 −1.070
ADt*Sentt 0.002 0.041 −0.905 −1.102 −0.005 0.066
0.425 1.963 −4.861 −1.963 −0.468 3.052
R&D/At 6.023 6.600 6.084 6.333 5.756 6.166
39.319 16.109 52.875 22.141 40.061 17.029
R&D/At*Sentt −0.002 0.012 −0.479 2.221 −0.006 0.043
−0.273 0.730 −3.171 4.256 −0.895 2.440
PPENTt 0.684 0.837 0.458 0.587 0.669 0.817
13.815 6.509 12.087 6.754 13.412 7.287
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.015 −0.204 −0.445 −0.021 −0.023
−6.644 −3.067 −3.415 −3.009 −8.539 −4.406
INTANt 0.722 −0.334 1.156 0.149 0.667 0.168
9.680 −2.139 22.542 1.482 10.144 1.382
INTANt*Sentt 0.014 0.015 −0.515 0.184 0.003 −0.000
5.029 2.537 −6.708 1.010 0.906 −0.057
CFt −2.812 −1.914 −2.910 −1.722 −2.650 −2.003
−29.711 −4.435 −34.959 −4.876 −26.618 −5.069
CFt*Sentt −0.001 0.009 0.973 0.935 0.005 0.011
−0.488 0.978 12.224 3.577 1.490 1.208
ACCt −1.273 0.414 −1.359 0.289 −0.808 0.406
−11.812 0.706 −14.559 0.450 −6.961 0.812
ACCt*Sentt −0.001 −0.016 0.595 0.089 −0.006 −0.027
−0.190 −1.708 6.843 −0.066 −1.566 −2.579
Sentt 0.008 0.009 0.421 0.536 0.014 0.017
8.075 3.488 19.563 6.652 11.648 5.951
continued on the next page
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Table 16 – continued from the previous page
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
AltZ1t 0.058 0.076 0.057 0.072 0.051 0.072
40.449 21.989 39.791 20.771 35.381 20.814
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−18.478 −13.574 −19.785 −13.471 −21.348 −13.155
Sizet −0.135 −0.174 −0.136 −0.191 −0.158 −0.173
−27.295 −12.677 −27.380 −13.919 −29.709 −12.634
StdRett −0.004 −0.010 −0.005 −0.016 −0.006 −0.012
−22.230 −16.087 −25.309 −25.515 −29.742 −19.006
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 0.004 −0.000 0.002 −0.000
30.184 −4.090 30.021 −1.571 20.234 −1.077
StdROAt 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.024 0.000 0.020
4.943 9.975 5.202 11.619 4.327 9.732
Betat 0.586 1.005 0.623 1.121 0.702 1.018
62.831 42.902 66.452 46.713 69.864 43.481
ROAt −0.054 0.643 −0.103 0.186 −0.106 0.782
−1.045 1.676 −1.834 0.711 −1.466 2.236
Leveraget 1.043 1.326 0.989 1.181 1.141 1.201
25.385 13.501 24.086 12.020 25.855 12.215
Model Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17
Tables 19, 22 20, 23 21, 24
ficients for scaled advertising are positive and statistically significant on
average at the 1% level (H3). However, if delta and vega are included in
the ordered logistic regressions, as in columns 2, 4, and 6, scaled adver-
tising is not statistically significantly related to overvaluation in two cases
(columns 2 and 6) and only positive and statistically significantly related to
overvaluation in one case at the 10% level (column 4). Thus, although the
analyses employing the larger dataset suggest that advertising is positively
related to overvaluation, the results in the smaller sample including delta
and vega are inconclusive. Therefore, although the results for the larger
sample omitting delta and vega are suggestive, the overall findings fail to
reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between scaled advertising and
overvaluation (H3).
Across the average results in Table 16 for all three measures of sen-
timent and for both of the applicable models (Equations 16 and 17) the
coefficients for the relationship between scaled R&D and overvaluation are
uniformly positive and statistically significant on average at the 1% level,
with several of the average t-statistics an order of magnitude larger than
the threshold value for significance at the 1% level. This provides strong
evidence in favor of investors systematically overvaluing the investments in
R&D made by firms (H4). Consequently, the positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficients for scaled R&D expenditures support rejection of the
null hypothesis of no relationship between scaled R&D and overvaluation
(H4). This finding is inconsistent with market efficiency and the ambigu-
ity surrounding the investments in R&D, but it is consistent with investors
generating optimistically biased assessments of the value of R&D spend-
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ing. If ambiguity surrounding investments in R&D produced mispricing in
general, a strongly directional effect on mispricing would not be expected.
The positive and highly statistically significant relationship between scaled
R&D spending and overvaluation is consequently inconsistent with mere
ambiguity surrounding the prospects of R&D expenditures. Rather, it ap-
pears that investors are unrealistically optimistic about the impact that
R&D spending will have upon a firm’s prospects. It is also possible that
investor overconfidence plays a role in the overvaluation of scaled R&D
spending as investors more heavily rely upon their own unrealistically op-
timistic expectations.
The average results for scaled property, plant, and equipment (net fixed
assets) indicate that investors overvalue net fixed assets (H5). Across all six
columns in Table 16 the average coefficients for scaled net fixed assets are
positive and statistically significant on average at the 1% level, supporting
rejection of the null hypothesis of no relationship between scaled net fixed
assets and overvaluation (H5). The overvaluation of net fixed assets is
consistent with the finding by Barth and Clinch (1998) that stock prices
were positively related to revaluations of property, plant, and equipment
despite the fact that the revaluations of property, plant, and equipment
were negatively related to the estimated value of the firms. The results in
this study are therefore broadly consistent with the findings by Barth and
Clinch (1998) and inconsistent with the notion that investors should do
a better job of evaluating the prospects of firms’ investments in net fixed
assets due to the more tangible nature of the assets.
Although the ambiguous nature of intangible assets makes it easy to
conclude that investors are more likely to misprice stocks with larger amounts
of scaled intangible assets, the results from the baseline ordered logistic re-
gressions using the full period static CAPM VERR decile assignments as
the dependent variable are inconsistent in some respects. On one hand,
for all three measures of investor sentiment the average coefficients and
average t-statistics for the models excluding delta and vega (columns 1, 3,
and 5) indicate that scaled intangible assets are positively and statistically
significantly related to overvaluation at the 1% level on average. On the
other hand, the average coefficients and average t-statistics for the mod-
els including delta and vega (columns 2, 4, and 6) are inconsistent with
a positive and statistically significant relationship between scaled intangi-
ble assets and overvaluation. In fact, the average coefficient and average
t-statistic for column 2, which is the model employing the Investors In-
telligence measure of sentiment while including delta and vega, indicates
that scaled intangible assets are negatively and statistically significantly re-
lated to overvaluation. Columns 4 and 6 produce statistically insignificant
results for the relationship between scaled intangible assets and overval-
uation. Consequently, though there is some evidence for a positive rela-
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tionship between scaled intangible assets and overvaluation in the larger
sample excluding delta and vega, the inconsistent results overall indicate
that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no rela-
tionship between scaled intangible assets and overvaluation (H6).
Hirshleifer et al. (2011) proposed that firms with high cash flow will
be undervalued by investors with limited attention. The results summa-
rized in Table 16 are consistent with that conclusion. For all six columns of
average results the coefficients for scaled cash flow are negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level on average, leading to a rejection of the null
hypothesis of no relationship between scaled cash flow and overvaluation
(H7). Consistent with prior research and expectations, investors under-
value scaled cash flow when evaluating firms (H7). Considering the fact
that cash flow data is released in publicly available financial statements,
the negative relationship between scaled cash flow and overvaluation is in-
consistent with market efficiency. Instead, the undervaluation of scaled
cash flow is consistent with the limited attention of investors discussed by
Hirshleifer et al. (2011) or other behavioral or evaluative biases. It is also
possible that investors undervalue scaled cash flow when market conditions
are poor, as firms with high levels of scaled cash flow in poor market con-
ditions may be healthier than pessimistic investors are capable of believing
in the midst of a market rout. This could explain the negative relation-
ship between scaled cash flow and overvaluation as measured by full period
valuation deciles, and it could also indicate that investment opportunities
may exist for investors to exploit large declines in broad market prices by
buying firms with large values of scaled cash flow.
The study by Hirshleifer et al. (2011) also proposed that firms with
high levels of accruals will be overvalued by investors with limited atten-
tion. The results summarized in Table 16 are generally inconsistent with
that conclusion. Across all three measures of investor sentiment, the aver-
age coefficients and average t-statistics for the models excluding delta and
vega (columns 1, 3, and 5) indicate that accruals are negatively and sta-
tistically significantly related to overvaluation at the 1% level on average.
This relationship is exactly opposite of the relationship proposed by Hirsh-
leifer et al. (2011) in which the limited attention of investors leads to the
overvaluation of accruals. The results for the relationship between scaled
accruals and overvaluation for the remaining three columns (columns 2, 4,
and 6) are statistically insignificant on average. The analyses based upon
the larger sample excluding delta and vega support a negative and statis-
tically significant relationship between scaled accruals and overvaluation
while the analyses based upon a smaller sample size including all of the in-
dependent variables produce inconclusive results. The lack of consistency
yields an absence of adequate evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no
relationship between scaled accruals and overvaluation (H8), although the
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existing evidence which contradicts Hirshleifer et al. (2011) in the larger
sample makes this a potentially fruitful area of further research to resolve
the contradictory results.
The summarized results for the baseline specification ordered logistic
regressions using the full period static CAPM VERR valuation deciles as
the dependent variable consistently show that investor sentiment is posi-
tively related to overvaluation. For all three measures of investor sentiment
used in Table 16 there is a positive and statistically significant relationship
between investor sentiment and overvaluation on average at the 1% level
(H9). Consistent with the prior research of Brown and Cliff (2005) and
Baker and Wurgler (2006), the positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cients on average for investor sentiment support rejection of the null hy-
pothesis of no relationship between investor sentiment and overvaluation
(H9). As investors experience more positive sentiment about the market
they overvalue equities, and when investor sentiment is negative about the
market investors undervalue equities.
Investors may also be prone to misvaluing firm characteristics as a result
of investor sentiment. Several interaction terms between investor sentiment
and firm characteristics address that possibility in the ordered logistic re-
gressions. Scaled values of advertising, R&D, net fixed assets (PPENT),
intangible assets, cash flow, and accruals are each interacted with the mea-
sure of sentiment applicable to each column in Table 16. Only the interac-
tion between investor sentiment and scaled net fixed assets produces aver-
age coefficients and average t-statistics which are consistent across the three
measures of sentiment encompassing the six columns of average results. On
average, the interaction between scaled net fixed assets and investor sen-
timent is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (H12). This
indicates that as investor sentiment becomes more positive investors sys-
tematically undervalue firms with larger proportions of net fixed assets.
Interestingly, this also means that investors systematically overvalue firms
with larger proportions of net fixed assets as investor sentiment becomes
more negative. This finding is consistent with the conjecture by Baker and
Wurgler (2007) that firms with more stable and easily valued prospects
might be overvalued when sentiment is low as investors seek safety and
undervalued when sentiment is high. The positive and statistically signif-
icant coefficients for the interaction between scaled net fixed assets and
investor sentiment across the columns in Table 16 supports the rejection
of the null hypothesis of no relationship between overvaluation and the
interaction of scaled net fixed assets with investor sentiment (H12). The
remaining interaction terms between investor sentiment and scaled values
of advertising, R&D, intangible assets, cash flow, or accruals all produce
average coefficients and average t-statistics which are inconsistent in sign,
inconsistent in statistical significance, or both. The results therefore fail to
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reject the corresponding null hypotheses of no relationship between those
specified interaction terms and overvaluation (H10, H11, H13, H14, and
H15).
The remaining results displayed in Table 16 pertain to the control vari-
ables included in the ordered logistic regressions to account for risk and
information uncertainty explanations of mispricing. Firms which appear
undervalued using the full period static CAPM VERR decile assignments
as the valuation measure may actually be more risky, and firms which ap-
pear overvalued may be less risky. If that is the case, market efficiency
indicates that the firms which appear undervalued and overvalued may
actually be properly valued relative to their risks. The results in Table
16 argue strongly against that interpretation. Firm size and firm age are
negatively and statistically significantly related to overvaluation at the 1%
level on average (H16 and H20). Thus, the baseline specification results
support the rejection of the null hypotheses of no relationship between
either firm size or firm age and overvaluation (H16 and H20). Leverage,
the standard deviation of return on assets, Altman’s Z-Score, and β are
all positively and statistically significantly related to overvaluation at the
1% level on average–despite being expected to have negative relationships
with overvaluation if firms which appear undervalued are in fact more risky
(H17, H18, H23, and H24). The positive and statistically significant coef-
ficients for leverage, the standard deviation of return on assets, Altman’s
Z-Score, and β all support rejection of the corresponding null hypotheses
of no relationship between the listed risk proxies and overvaluation (H17,
H18, H23, and H24).
However, the positive relationships between overvaluation and lever-
age, the standard deviation of return on assets, Altman’s Z-Score, and β
are inconsistent with prior research by Ali et al. (2003). Importantly, the
study by Ali et al. (2003) based estimates of firm value upon an imple-
mentation of a residual income model utilizing analysts’ forecasts. As the
present study uses actual, or realized, earnings and book value outcomes
in the calculation of the intrinsic value of firms, the differences between
the results in this study and the results in the study by Ali et al. (2003)
indicate that analysts have an optimistic bias when forming forecasts for
more risky firms. Such a possibility is unsurprising given that Brown and
Cliff (2005) noted in a footnote that they found that the residual income
measure of intrinsic value used by Lee et al. (1999), which employed an-
alysts’ forecasts, responded to sentiment. Thus, prior research indicates
that analysts’ forecasts are subject to bias. In short, the present study
finds that undervalued equities tend to be the equities of older and larger
firms with less leverage, a lower standard deviation of return on assets, a
lower risk of financial distress, and less systematic risk. Clearly, firm risk
does not explain the observed mispricing of equities relative to realized
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outcomes in a manner consistent with market efficiency.
Return on assets and turnover do not support robust inferences regard-
ing their relationship with overvaluation. The results for return on assets
are inconsistent and generally statistically insignificant across columns 1
through 6 of Table 16, failing to provide sufficient evidence to justify re-
jecting the null hypothesis of no relationship between return on assets and
overvaluation (H19). Equities with high turnover appear to be overvalued
on average in the larger sample excluding delta and vega (columns 1, 3,
and 5), with average t-statistics far beyond the threshold for statistical
significance at the 1% level. However, the relationship between turnover
and overvaluation is either negative or statistically insignificant on average
in the smaller sample including delta and vega (columns 2, 4, and 6). Con-
sequently, insufficient evidence exists to robustly reject the null hypothesis
of no relationship between turnover and overvaluation (H22).
At first blush, the results in Table 16 for the standard deviation of
returns and β appear contradictory. On the one hand, the relationship
between β and overvaluation is positive and statistically significant on av-
erage at the 1% level across columns 1 through 6, suggesting that more
risky equities tend to be overvalued. On the other hand, the relationship
between the standard deviation of returns and overvaluation is negative
and statistically significant on average at the 1% level across columns 1
through 6, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no relationship
between the standard deviation of returns and overvaluation (H21). How-
ever, the negative and statistically significant coefficients on average for the
standard deviation of returns seems to imply that more risky equities tend
to be undervalued. The apparent contradiction between the results for β,
a measure of systematic risk, and the results for the volatility of returns,
which is closely related to β, can be resolved by considering the nature
of the valuation measure used in the ordered logistic regressions. The full
period static CAPM VERR valuation deciles are used as the dependent
variables in the ordered logistic regressions summarized in Table 16. Thus,
some portion of the undervaluation and overvaluation detected by the full
period static CAPM VERR measure is due to broad market fluctuations
over time since this valuation measure allows for broad market overvalu-
ation and undervaluation at different points in time. In the midst of a
market rout and general panic return volatility will increase across the
market as prices fall. The falling prices across the market will eventually
make equities undervalued broadly, producing a negative relationship be-
tween the standard deviation of returns and overvaluation. The results for
leverage, the standard deviation of return on assets, Altman’s Z-Score, and
β all suggest that more risky equities tend to be overvalued; the negative
relationship between the standard deviation of returns and overvaluation
indicates that equities are more undervaled when broad market volatility
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increases in the midst of a downturn in the market.
In summary, the baseline specification ordered logistic regression re-
sults employing the full period static CAPM VERR valuation deciles as
the dependent variable in the models represented by Equations 16 and
17 indicate that several independent variables are statistically significantly
related to overvaluation on average. Both delta and vega are positively
related to overvaluation on average (H1 and H2), although the coefficients
for vega are over an order of magnitude larger than the coefficients for
delta. Scaled values of R&D and net fixed assets are positively related to
overvaluation on average (H4 and H5), indicating that investors system-
atically overvalue R&D spending and the proportion of net fixed assets.
However, investors systematically undervalue scaled cash flow (H7), which
is consistent with the limited investor attention discussed by Hirshleifer
et al. (2011). Investor sentiment is positively related to overvaluation (H9),
but investors are prone to undervaluing net fixed assets when they are ex-
periencing higher levels of sentiment (H12). Importantly, the observed
mispricing cannot be explained by risk variables from a market efficiency
standpoint. Undervalued equities are associated with lower leverage (H17),
lower default risk (H23), lower β (H24), and a lower standard deviation of
return on assets (H18). Furthermore, undervalued equities tend to be older
and larger (H16 and H20). These risk related relationships are inconsis-
tent with the undervalued equities being more risky and the overvalued
securities being less risky.
2.6.2 Robustness
Two additional specifications are examined to evaluate the robustness of
the baseline specification results. The first robustness specification builds
on the baseline specification models in Equations 16 and 17 and adds single
digit SIC industry fixed effects. The addition of single digit SIC industry
fixed effects controls for industry specific factors which may be driving the
results reported for the baseline specification models. The industry fixed
effects specification models are presented in Equations 18 and 19. The
second robustness specification makes a series of adjustments to the base-
line specification models in order to address concerns about the potential
endogeneity of several of the independent variables used in the ordered
logistic regressions. The endogeneity specification models are presented
in Equations 20 and 21. The single digit SIC industry fixed effects spec-
ification results are summarized first, followed by the presentation of the
results for the endogeneity specification. As with the baseline specification
results discussed above, both the single digit SIC industry fixed effects and
endogeneity results discussed are derived from ordered logistic regressions
using the full period static CAPM VERR valuation decile assignments as
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the dependent variable.
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specification
Panel A of Table 43 in the Appendix presents results for the single digit
SIC fixed effects specification analyses corresponding to the baseline spec-
ification analyses summarized in Table 16. In nearly all cases the addition
of the industry fixed effects did little to affect the inferences drawn using
the baseline specification results summarized in Table 16. The only impor-
tant areas of divergence between the inferences drawn from the baseline
specification results in Table 16 and the matching analyses performed using
the single digit SIC industry fixed effects specification are the inferences for
delta and vega. When the industry fixed effects are included, vega drops
to only being statistically significant on average when the Baker-Wurgler
measure of sentiment is employed in the ordered logistic regressions (H1).
Similarly, delta is statistically insignificant on average when industry fixed
effects are included in the ordered logistic regressions using the full pe-
riod static CAPM VERR valuation decile assignments as the dependent
variable (H2). The results of the single digit SIC industry fixed effects
specification therefore provide insufficient evidence to warrant the rejec-
tion of the null hypotheses of no relationship between delta or vega and
overvaluation (H1 and H2). The loss of statistical significance for delta
and vega when industry fixed effects are included is likely due to over-
valued industries embracing compensation practices involving higher delta
and vega for CEOs. This also suggests that equity overvaluation may pre-
cede the executive compensation choices made by firms which yield higher
delta and vega for CEOs. Consequently, endogeneity may be an issue for
delta and vega. Adjustments to address that concern are made in the en-
dogeneity specification results which are discussed below. The statistically
significant and consistent inferences which may be drawn for the other
independent variables in the single digit SIC industry fixed effects specifi-
cation are qualitatively similar to the inferences discussed for the baseline
specification results in Table 16.
Endogeneity Specification
The endogeneity specification makes several adjustments to the baseline
specification in order to address potential endogeneity concerns. First, a
firm’s overvaluation may precede the creation of compensation packages
which increase delta and vega for CEOs. Second, overvalued firms may
engage in more acquisitions, thereby potentially creating an endogeneity
problem for the scaled intangible assets. To address both potential endo-
geneity problems lagged values of vega, delta, and scaled intangible assets
are used as the independent variables in the endogeneity specification mod-
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Table 17
Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR Full Period Decile Assignments on
Determinants with Endogeneity Adjustments
Average coefficients and average t-statistics are presented in this table for
ordered logistic regressions using the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable and employing the endo-
geneity specification models. Some independent variables are not available
for the full period. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in ac-
cordance with Sloan (1996) and Collins et al. (2003). Each column reports
the average coefficients and average t-statistics across the two ordered lo-
gistic regressions performed using the specified measure of sentiment and
the two different measures of scaled cash flow and accruals in the appropri-
ate endogeneity specification model. The average t-statistics are reported
below each average coefficient.
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.581 2.380 1.066
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.546 2.241 2.620
ADt 0.299 −0.718 0.338 0.288 0.448 −0.249
1.501 −1.335 2.455 0.792 2.360 −0.553
ADt*Sentt −0.005 0.048 −0.965 −0.597 −0.008 0.044
−0.363 2.173 −5.041 −0.893 −0.833 1.891
R&D/St 0.029 1.851 0.015 2.119 0.011 2.923
5.083 9.856 5.214 14.580 5.264 13.875
R&D/St*Sentt −0.001 0.013 −0.008 −0.777 0.000 −0.046
−3.797 1.765 −3.821 −3.053 2.859 −6.146
PPENTt 0.095 0.165 −0.146 0.068 0.018 0.396
1.987 1.259 −3.902 0.768 0.366 3.454
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.010 −0.136 −0.773 −0.019 −0.032
−7.209 −2.043 −2.043 −5.200 −8.334 −6.048
INTANt-1 −0.193 −1.261 0.356 −0.519 −0.142 −0.494
−2.295 −7.567 7.110 −4.875 −2.147 −3.796
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.020 0.024 −0.420 −0.252 0.004 −0.004
7.044 3.894 −5.246 −1.306 1.394 −0.695
CFt −3.350 −0.955 −3.614 −0.912 −3.378 −1.077
−34.365 −1.844 −41.732 −2.349 −32.717 −2.334
CFt*Sentt −0.010 −0.003 1.002 0.298 0.003 −0.002
−3.679 −0.253 13.503 0.997 0.782 −0.106
ACCt −1.959 0.225 −2.106 0.500 −1.640 0.758
−17.557 0.349 −21.622 0.917 −13.715 1.502
ACCt*Sentt −0.003 0.002 0.791 −0.207 −0.005 −0.035
−0.796 −0.315 8.978 −0.850 −1.304 −3.108
Sentt 0.009 0.009 0.384 0.873 0.013 0.025
10.395 3.226 20.061 11.021 13.867 9.155
continued on the next page
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Table 17 – continued from the previous page
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
AltZ1t 0.059 0.071 0.058 0.068 0.051 0.068
40.359 18.911 39.591 17.786 34.697 17.935
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−21.506 −12.848 −22.851 −12.769 −24.439 −12.295
Sizet −0.110 −0.156 −0.110 −0.172 −0.140 −0.157
−21.881 −10.825 −21.806 −11.906 −26.003 −10.883
StdRett −0.005 −0.011 −0.005 −0.016 −0.006 −0.012
−22.181 −15.996 −25.765 −25.363 −30.340 −19.035
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 0.004 −0.000 0.003 −0.000
33.916 −3.394 33.748 −1.312 23.284 −0.762
StdROAt 0.005 0.028 0.005 0.031 0.001 0.027
9.656 11.978 10.392 13.134 4.644 11.568
Betat 0.607 0.974 0.643 1.113 0.728 1.001
64.619 38.768 68.183 43.054 71.865 39.879
ROAt −0.286 0.774 −0.341 0.300 −0.299 0.914
−4.939 1.897 −5.790 1.061 −3.593 2.508
Leveraget 0.731 1.262 0.662 1.129 0.849 1.165
17.807 12.072 16.147 10.781 19.263 11.099
Model Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21
Tables 69, 72 70, 73 71, 74
els. Third, scaling R&D by assets may be cause for concern because higher
R&D spending reduces earnings, thereby reducing assets in the long run
and affecting both the earnings and book value components of the resid-
ual income model. To address that concern R&D spending is scaled by
sales for the endogeneity specification models. Aside from the adjustments
made to delta, vega, scaled intangible assets, and scaled R&D spending,
the same combinations of independent variables are used for the two endo-
geneity specification models as are employed for the baseline specification
models. The resulting endogeneity specification models are presented in
Equations 20 and 21. Table 17 parallels Table 16 but uses the endogene-
ity specification models instead of the baseline specification models. The
endogeneity specification results are based upon the ordered logistic regres-
sions performed using the full period static CAPM VERR valuation decile
assignments as the dependent variable.
Although the majority of the results summarized in Table 17 are quali-
tatively similar to the results in Table 16, there are a few important differ-
ences. Using the lagged value of vega results in a lack of statistical signif-
icance on average for the relationship between vega and overvaluation for
the models employing either the Investors Intelligence or the AAII mea-
sure of investor sentiment. Furthermore, even when vega is positive and
statistically significantly related to overvaluation using the Baker-Wurgler
measure of sentiment the coefficient is well over an order of magnitude
smaller than it is for the baseline specification results summarized in Table
16. This finding weakens support for the statistical significance of any re-
lationship between vega and overvaluation, leading to an overall failure to
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reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between vega and overvaluation
(H1).
The most curious changes in inferences which are produced by switch-
ing from the baseline specification to the endogeneity specification relate
to scaled net fixed assets and scaled intangible assets. The coefficients
for scaled net fixed assets (PPENT) are inconsistent in sign or statisti-
cally insignificant across the endogeneity specification findings presented
in columns 1 through 6 in Table 17 (H5). With the baseline specification
results summarized in columns 1 through 6 of Table 16 the coefficients
are consistently positive and statistically significant on average. Using the
endogeneity specification consequently yields results which provide insuf-
ficient evidence to justify rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship
between scaled net fixed assets and overvaluation, weakening the baseline
specification evidence previously discussed (H5).
Interestingly, utilizing lagged values of scaled intangible assets yields
stronger results for scaled intangible assets than using the baseline spec-
ification approach. Under the baseline specification approach, scaled in-
tangible assets yields inconsistent and contradictory coefficients and sig-
nificance levels for the relationship between scaled intangible assets and
overvaluation. The use of lagged values of scaled intangible assets in the
endogeneity specification yields average coefficents and average t-statistics
which support a negative and statistically significant relationship between
lagged values of scaled intangible assets and overvaluation for all columns
aside from column 3 of Table 17 (H6). It is possible that the generally
negative relationship between lagged values of scaled intangible assets and
overvaluation is produced by overvalued firms engaging in acquisitions and
then declining in overvaluation over the course of the following year as
the overvaluation fades or as the acquisitions are perceived by investors to
destroy value. Given the persistence of overvaluation documented in the
first essay, the latter explanation seems more likely. Due to the lack of
consistency in results across the baseline, single digit SIC fixed effects, and
endogeneity specifications, there is insufficient evidence to robustly reject
the null hypothesis of no relationship between scaled intangible assets and
overvaluation (H6).
Aside from the important differences just discussed, the inferences which
may be drawn from the results for the endogeneity specification are very
similar to the inferences which may be drawn from the results for the base-
line specification. Investors overvalue scaled R&D, undervalue scaled cash
flow, overvalue equities in general when sentiment is high, and undervalue
scaled net fixed assets when sentiment is high. In addition, overvalued
firms are younger (H20), smaller (H16), and more financially distressed
(H23) while having more leverage (H17), a higher standard deviation of
return on assets (H18), and higher systematic risk (H24).
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2.6.3 Summary of Results
Across the three specifications evaluated there are several findings which
are consistent. Investors systematically overvalue scaled R&D spending
(H4) while systematically undervaluing scaled cash flow (H7). High in-
vestor sentiment leads to more overvaluation in general (H9), but investors
experiencing high sentiment tend to undervalue scaled net fixed assets
(H12). According to traditional views of market efficiency, equities which
appear undervalued may be more risky while equities which appear over-
valued may be less risky. The results analyzed from the three specifications
are not compatible with that view. Overvalued equities have higher default
risk (H23), higher leverage (H17), higher systematic risk as represented by
β (H24), and a higher standard deviation of return on assets (H18). Over-
valued equities are also typically younger (H20) and smaller (H16).
2.7 Conclusion
Understanding the determinants of mispricing has significant implications
for money managers, investors, executives, and academicians. Money man-
agers and investors are naturally interested in mispriced equities as at-
tempts to short overvalued equities and buy undervalued equities are ob-
vious hallmarks of actively managed investment approaches. Severe levels
of overvaluation may affect the choices made by executives and produce
the deleterious effects identified by Jensen (2005) in the agency theory of
overvalued equity. For academicians, persistent mispricing and statistically
significant determinants of mispricing are generally indicative of inefficien-
cies in the market and suggestive of entanglements between overvaluation
and common asset pricing factors such as firm size and the market-to-book
ratio. This essay presents a thorough analysis of several possible determi-
nants of overvaluation, and a number of significant findings are identified.
It is possible that mispricing generally may result from difficulty assess-
ing intangibles. To study that possibility, three proxies for intangibles are
used: advertising expenditures, R&D expenditures, and intangible assets
listed on the balance sheet. On one hand, the results for advertising and
intangible assets from the balance sheet are mixed. On the other hand,
the most consistently statistically significant firm characteristic examined
as a determinant of overvaluation in the analyses performed is scaled R&D
expenditures. Scaled R&D expenditures are found to be positively and
statistically significantly related to overvaluation in every ordered logistic
regression summarized and analyzed in the Results section, and also in ev-
ery ordered logistic regression in the Appendix which includes scaled R&D.
This is strong evidence that investors overvalue scaled R&D expenditures.
The positive relationship between scaled R&D expenditures and overvalu-
ation is maintained regardless of the use of two different measures of cash
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flow and accruals, three different measures of investor sentiment, and the
implementation of the baseline, single digit SIC industry fixed effects, and
endogeneity specifications. Furthermore, a positive relationship between
scaled R&D and overvaluation is observed regardless of whether the R&D
expenditures are scaled by average total assets or sales. If investors merely
have a difficult time evaluating scaled R&D expenditures overall, no net
directional relationship between overvaluation and scaled R&D would be
expected to appear as both undervaluation and overvaluation would result.
The consistently positive relationship between scaled R&D expenditures
and overvaluation indicates that investors view scaled R&D with excessive
optimism, producing the observed overvaluation of scaled R&D. This sug-
gests that there may be potential investment strategies which are possible
due to the observed mispricing of scaled R&D.
On top of mispricing scaled R&D expenditures, investors are prone to
overvaluing firms when sentiment is high. The results presented in the
Results section of this essay show that investor sentiment is positively and
statistically significantly associated with overvaluation when firms are as-
signed to valuation deciles across the 1964–2009 period using the static
CAPM VERR valuation measure. The evidence supports a positive rela-
tionship between investor sentiment and overvaluation for all three mea-
sures of investor sentiment used with the full period decile assignment
analyses. In addition, the results based upon the full period static CAPM
VERR decile assignments show that investors undervalue net property,
plant, and equipment when sentiment is positive, and they overvalue net
property, plant, and equipment when sentiment is negative. Waves of sen-
timent may therefore create inefficiencies in the pricing of some equities
more than others.
Scaled cash flow is found to be negatively related to overvaluation on
average across the analyses employing the full period static CAPM VERR
valuation deciles as the dependent variable. The negative relationship be-
tween scaled cash flow and overvaluation is generally consistent with the
finding by Sloan (1996) that investors underestimate the persistence of
earnings indicated by cash flow, and it is also consistent with the con-
tention by Hirshleifer et al. (2011) that investors with limited attention
will undervalue firms with high cash flow. Consequently, the approach to
assessing the determinants of mispricing used in this essay adds to the
literature on cash flow’s relationship to positive stock returns.
One possible explanation for the observed mispricing is that the equities
which appear undervalued are more risky and the equities which appear
overvalued are less risky. The results strongly undercut that explanation.
Proxies for risk including Altman’s Z-Score, leverage, β, and the standard
deviation of return on assets are all positively related to overvaluation.
Furthermore, firm age and size are negatively related to overvaluation.
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These results all suggest that the equities which are overvalued are actually
more risky on average than the equities which are undervalued.
This study robustly analyzes numerous determinants of mispricing. In-
vestors overvalue scaled R&D spending and are prone to overvaluing equi-
ties when sentiment is high. Firms with higher scaled values of cash flow
tend towards being undervalued relative to subsequent realized earnings
and book value outcomes, and investors undervalue scaled net property,
plant, and equipment when sentiment is positive and overvalue scaled net
property, plant, and equipment when sentiment is negative. Importantly,
several conventional risk proxies are positively related to overvaluation–
indicating that undervalued firms are less risky and overvalued firms are
more risky on average. The combined effects of investor sentiment, the
undervaluation of scaled cash flow, the mispricing of scaled net fixed assets
driven by investor sentiment, the overvaluation of scaled R&D spending,
and the positive relationship between standard risk proxies and overvalua-
tion indicate that inefficiencies in market prices exist. These findings add
to the literature on market efficiency and equity mispricing when overval-
uation is viewed from the perspective of realized earnings and book value
outcomes. The results also suggest that asset pricing factors related to mar-
ket value and book-to-market are likely influenced by investor sentiment
and the overvaluation and undervaluation of various firm characteristics,
opening fruitful areas of future research.
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3 Appendix
This Appendix provides a more extensive set of results for the ordered lo-
gistic regressions performed to study the determinants of mispricing than
are discussed in the Results section of the second essay. As discussed in
the Methodology section of the second essay, three specifications are used
for the ordered logistic regressions: a baseline specification, an industry
fixed effects specification, and an endogeneity specification. Within each
specification, analyses are performed using four different dependent vari-
ables available for the 1964–2009 period: capm5 VERR full period decile
assignments, capm5 VERR annual decile assignments, capm5 eVERR full
period decile assignments, and capm5 eVERR annual decile assignments.
For each specification and each dependent variable analyses are performed
using both the Sloan (1996) and Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash
flow and accruals with each of the three measures of investor sentiment.
The three measures of investor sentiment are obtained from Investors In-
telligence data, the Baker-Wurgler monthly sentiment index, and AAII
data. The procedures followed with the sentiment data are discussed in
the Methodology section of the second essay. The combination of four dif-
ferent dependent variables, two different measures of cash flow and accru-
als, and three different measures of investor sentiment combine to produce
twenty-four separate tables for each specification.
The ordered logistic regression results in this Appendix are organized
by specification. The baseline specification results are presented in the first
subsection. The second subsection contains the industry fixed effects spec-
ification results, and the third subsection contains the endogeneity speci-
fication results. At the beginning of the subsection for each specification
a summary table is presented which summarizes the results obtained us-
ing the specification’s models from the Methodology section of the second
essay with each of the four dependent variables.
Exhibit 3 defines the independent variables used in the ordered logistic
regressions presented in this Appendix. As not all independent variables
are available for the full time period, Exhibit 3 also includes information
about the time period for which each independent variable is available prior
to the end of 2009 if the independent variable is not available for the full
1964–2009 period. Panel A displays the CEO compensation characteristics
variables, Panel B displays the firm characteristics variables, Panel C dis-
plays the investor sentiment variables, and Panel D displays the risk and
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Exhibit 3
Definitions of the Independent Variables Used in the Ordered
Logistic Regressions Presented in the Appendix
The independent variables used in the ordered logistic regressions detailed
in the Appendix are defined below. The dependent variables used in the
ordered logistic regressions are available for the 1964–2009 period. A more
detailed period of availability through the end of 2009 is indicated in paren-
theses when necessary.
Panel A: CEO Compensation Characteristics Variables
Vega = the average of the change in wealth (in millions) for a 0.01
change in the firm’s volatility of returns for all CEOs during
the fiscal year (1992–2009)
Delta = the average of the change in wealth (in millions) for a 1%
change in the firm’s stock price for all CEOs during the fiscal
year (1992–2009)
Panel B: Firm Characteristics Variables
AD = advertising expense scaled by average assets for the fiscal
year
R&D/A = R&D expense scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
R&D/S = R&D expense scaled by sales for the fiscal year
PPENT = total net property, plant, and equipment scaled by assets
INTAN = total intangible assets scaled by assets
CF = cash flow scaled by average assets for the fiscal year, with
cash flow calculated following Sloan (1996) (1964–2009) or
Collins et al. (2003) (1987–2009)
ACC = accruals scaled by average assets for the fiscal year, with
accruals calculated following Sloan (1996) (1964–2009) or
Collins et al. (2003) (1987–2009)
Panel C: Investor Sentiment Variables
Sent = investor sentiment for the month, with sentiment measured
using either the Investors Intelligence, Baker-Wurgler, or
AAII data detailed below
IIbullbear = the monthly average of the difference between the bullish and
bearish sentiment reported by Investors Intelligence
BWsent = the monthly Baker-Wurgler sentiment index (July 1965–
2009)
AAIIbullbear = the monthly average of the weekly difference between the
bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII (July 1987–
2009)
AD*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
advertising scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
continued on the next page
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Exhibit 3 – continued from the previous page
R&D/A*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
R&D scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
R&D/S*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
R&D scaled by sales for the fiscal year
PPENT*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
total net property, plant, and equipment scaled by assets for
the fiscal year
INTAN*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
intangible assets scaled by assets for the fiscal year
CF*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
cash flow scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
ACC*Sent = the interaction between investor sentiment for the month and
accruals scaled by average assets for the fiscal year
Panel D: Risk and Information Uncertainty Control Variables
AltZ1 = the Z1 version of Altman’s Z-Score
Age = the total number of months the stock appeared in CRSP
prior to and including the valuation month
Size = the natural logarithm of total assets
StdRet = the standard deviation of the natural log of daily returns
during the two month window ending eleven days before the
end of the valuation month
Turnover = the average of the percentage turnover for each day during
the six month period ending eleven days before the end of
the valuation month
StdROA = the standard deviation of return on assets using the five fiscal
years ending at the end of the valuation month
Beta = the CAPM β estimated following Dimson (1979) as modified
by Fowler and Rorke (1983) using daily return data from
the year ending eleven days before the end of the valuation
month
ROA = net income scaled by average assets
Leverage = total liabilities scaled by assets
information uncertainty control variables.
This Appendix also presents additional ordered logistic regression re-
sults for models within each specification which are not discussed in the
Results section of the second essay. The models within the baseline specifi-
cation are presented in the introduction to the first subsection, the models
within the industry fixed effects specification are presented in the intro-
duction to the second subsection, and the models within the endogeneity
specification are presented in the introduction to the third subsection. All
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of the twenty-four tables for each specification in this Appendix include
equation numbers at the bottom of each column which specify the model
used to generate the ordered logistic regression results presented in that
column.
3.1 Detailed Determinants Tables: Baseline Specifi-
cation
A series of ordered logistic regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR valua-
tion decile assignments on different combinations of independent variables
following the baseline specification is performed in Tables 19 through 42.
Decile assignments based upon the VERR and eVERR measures are made
using the full 1964–2009 period and also using each calendar year. The
combination of full period and annual decile assignments for the capm5
VERR and eVERR valuation deciles results in four different dependent
variables for the ordered logistic regressions. The results from using the
full 1964–2009 period capm5 VERR decile assignments as the dependent
variable are presented in Tables 19 through 24. The results from using the
annual VERR decile assignments as the dependent variable are presented
in Tables 25 through 30. Switching to the use of the full 1964–2009 period
capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the dependent variable in the ordered
logistic regressions produces Tables 31 through 36, and the utilization of
annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the dependent variable in the
ordered logistic regressions generates Tables 37 through 42.
Table 18 summarizes the results of the baseline specification ordered lo-
gistic regression models detailed in Equations 16 and 17 for all four depen-
dent variables. Panel A presents results using the full period capm5 VERR
decile assignments as the dependent variable, Panel B presents results us-
ing the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments as the dependent variable,
Panel C presents results using the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments as the dependent variable, and Panel D presents the results using
the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the dependent variable.
Each column of each panel in Table 18 reports the average coefficients and
average t-statistics across the two ordered logistic regressions performed
using the specified measure of sentiment and the two different measures
of scaled cash flow and accruals in the appropriate baseline specification
model with the dependent variable listed for the panel. The equation de-
tailing the model used for each column is reported near the bottom of each
column. As each column in Table 18 presents average coefficients and av-
erage t-statistics across results produced using both measures of cash flow
and accruals, the tables reporting the individual results which are averaged
to produce each column are listed at the bottom of each column in Table
18. The results displayed in Panel A of Table 18 are the same as the results
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Table 18
Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR Decile Assignments
on Determinants for the Baseline Specification
Average coefficients and average t-statistics are presented in this table for
ordered logistic regressions using the baseline specification models. Some
independent variables are not available for the full period. Scaled cash
flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Sloan (1996) and
Collins et al. (2003). Each column reports the average coefficients and
average t-statistics across the two ordered logistic regressions performed
using the specified measure of sentiment and the two different measures
of scaled cash flow and accruals in the appropriate baseline specification
model. The average t-statistics are reported below each average coefficient.
Panel A displays the average results for the ordered logistic regressions
using the full period capm5 VERR decile assignments from 1964–2009 as
the dependent variable. Panel B displays the average results for the ordered
logistic regressions using the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments from
1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Panel C displays the average results
for the ordered logistic regressions using the full period capm5 eVERR
decile assignments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Panel D
displays the average results for the ordered logistic regressions using the
annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments from 1964–2009 as the dependent
variable.
continued on the next page
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Table 18 – continued from the previous page
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Full Period VERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.114 0.230 0.135
1.724 3.473 2.037
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.004
2.084 2.255 2.333
ADt 0.614 −0.438 0.770 0.576 0.867 −0.448
3.234 −0.844 5.566 1.734 4.596 −1.070
ADt*Sentt 0.002 0.041 −0.905 −1.102 −0.005 0.066
0.425 1.963 −4.861 −1.963 −0.468 3.052
R&D/At 6.023 6.600 6.084 6.333 5.756 6.166
39.319 16.109 52.875 22.141 40.061 17.029
R&D/At*Sentt −0.002 0.012 −0.479 2.221 −0.006 0.043
−0.273 0.730 −3.171 4.256 −0.895 2.440
PPENTt 0.684 0.837 0.458 0.587 0.669 0.817
13.815 6.509 12.087 6.754 13.412 7.287
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.015 −0.204 −0.445 −0.021 −0.023
−6.644 −3.067 −3.415 −3.009 −8.539 −4.406
INTANt 0.722 −0.334 1.156 0.149 0.667 0.168
9.680 −2.139 22.542 1.482 10.144 1.382
INTANt*Sentt 0.014 0.015 −0.515 0.184 0.003 −0.000
5.029 2.537 −6.708 1.010 0.906 −0.057
CFt −2.812 −1.914 −2.910 −1.722 −2.650 −2.003
−29.711 −4.435 −34.959 −4.876 −26.618 −5.069
CFt*Sentt −0.001 0.009 0.973 0.935 0.005 0.011
−0.488 0.978 12.224 3.577 1.490 1.208
ACCt −1.273 0.414 −1.359 0.289 −0.808 0.406
−11.812 0.706 −14.559 0.450 −6.961 0.812
ACCt*Sentt −0.001 −0.016 0.595 0.089 −0.006 −0.027
−0.190 −1.708 6.843 −0.066 −1.566 −2.579
Sentt 0.008 0.009 0.421 0.536 0.014 0.017
8.075 3.488 19.563 6.652 11.648 5.951
AltZ1t 0.058 0.076 0.057 0.072 0.051 0.072
40.449 21.989 39.791 20.771 35.381 20.814
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−18.478 −13.574 −19.785 −13.471 −21.348 −13.155
Sizet −0.135 −0.174 −0.136 −0.191 −0.158 −0.173
−27.295 −12.677 −27.380 −13.919 −29.709 −12.634
StdRett −0.004 −0.010 −0.005 −0.016 −0.006 −0.012
−22.230 −16.087 −25.309 −25.515 −29.742 −19.006
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 0.004 −0.000 0.002 −0.000
30.184 −4.090 30.021 −1.571 20.234 −1.077
StdROAt 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.024 0.000 0.020
4.943 9.975 5.202 11.619 4.327 9.732
Betat 0.586 1.005 0.623 1.121 0.702 1.018
62.831 42.902 66.452 46.713 69.864 43.481
ROAt −0.054 0.643 −0.103 0.186 −0.106 0.782
−1.045 1.676 −1.834 0.711 −1.466 2.236
Leveraget 1.043 1.326 0.989 1.181 1.141 1.201
25.385 13.501 24.086 12.020 25.855 12.215
Model Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17
Tables 19, 22 20, 23 21, 24
continued on the next page
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Table 18 – continued from the previous page
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Annual VERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.199 0.206 0.162
3.006 3.136 2.455
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.214 2.287 2.346
ADt 0.909 −0.428 1.002 0.333 1.033 −0.644
4.944 −0.828 7.337 1.008 5.487 −1.539
ADt*Sentt −0.001 0.031 −0.979 −0.364 −0.011 0.062
0.197 1.499 −5.688 −0.651 −1.158 2.889
R&D/At 5.505 5.890 5.563 6.279 5.686 6.115
37.092 14.528 50.209 22.295 40.315 17.064
R&D/At*Sentt 0.001 0.025 −0.374 0.459 −0.014 0.023
0.174 1.551 −2.181 0.933 −2.017 1.347
PPENTt 0.572 0.455 0.382 0.302 0.508 0.418
11.759 3.551 10.284 3.503 10.232 3.748
PPENTt*Sentt −0.013 −0.010 −0.186 −0.225 −0.017 −0.011
−6.300 −2.026 −3.368 −1.534 −7.093 −2.193
INTANt 0.914 0.536 0.730 0.271 0.733 0.212
11.971 3.450 14.115 2.716 11.176 1.749
INTANt*Sentt −0.011 −0.014 −0.147 −0.020 −0.000 0.005
−3.754 −2.480 −1.451 −0.108 −0.149 0.805
CFt −1.831 −0.643 −2.013 −0.616 −2.338 −0.680
−18.015 −1.997 −22.391 −2.378 −23.326 −2.198
CFt*Sentt −0.004 −0.004 0.636 0.792 0.005 0.008
−1.424 −0.320 7.262 3.145 1.307 0.860
ACCt −0.242 0.955 −0.560 0.311 −0.899 0.565
−2.080 1.590 −5.602 0.231 −7.726 0.959
ACCt*Sentt −0.015 −0.043 0.243 0.414 −0.005 −0.018
−3.879 −3.943 2.606 1.112 −1.143 −1.698
Sentt 0.005 0.000 0.047 0.287 0.007 0.008
4.923 0.081 1.588 3.624 6.131 2.807
AltZ1t 0.032 0.040 0.032 0.037 0.030 0.037
27.438 13.625 27.661 12.846 25.585 12.742
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−20.941 −10.810 −21.048 −10.376 −19.734 −10.219
Sizet −0.123 −0.155 −0.123 −0.164 −0.121 −0.155
−25.635 −11.380 −25.446 −12.029 −22.821 −11.373
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001
−16.243 −4.043 −16.587 −6.356 −17.475 −2.408
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
21.508 3.177 21.730 3.743 21.589 3.935
StdROAt 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.014
4.387 7.781 4.386 7.770 4.320 7.002
Betat 0.678 0.935 0.681 0.982 0.683 0.930
73.513 40.553 73.556 41.947 68.658 40.422
ROAt −0.363 −0.112 −0.368 −0.400 −0.172 −0.114
−4.826 0.031 −4.903 −0.648 −2.157 0.042
Leveraget 0.682 0.578 0.674 0.529 0.726 0.538
17.124 6.027 16.931 5.519 16.834 5.606
Model Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17
Tables 25, 28 26, 29 27, 30
continued on the next page
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Panel C: Dependent Variable = Full Period eVERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.355 0.498 0.386
5.483 7.700 5.961
Deltat 0.009 0.008 0.008
3.692 3.505 3.615
ADt 0.506 −0.454 0.718 0.432 0.568 −0.829
2.699 −0.873 5.254 1.294 3.005 −1.968
ADt*Sentt 0.005 0.037 −0.926 −1.381 0.009 0.089
0.852 1.743 −5.014 −2.457 0.894 4.148
R&D/At 5.400 7.323 5.983 7.489 5.571 7.143
35.859 17.595 51.508 25.770 38.688 19.442
R&D/At*Sentt 0.033 0.037 −0.234 2.297 0.017 0.055
5.282 2.260 −1.812 4.339 2.296 3.085
PPENTt −0.558 −0.483 −0.799 −0.770 −0.620 −0.582
−11.400 −3.726 −21.055 −8.823 −12.400 −5.175
PPENTt*Sentt −0.012 −0.016 −0.151 −0.419 −0.017 −0.019
−5.801 −3.158 −2.743 −2.845 −6.736 −3.738
INTANt −0.279 −1.072 0.084 −0.792 −0.390 −0.724
−3.509 −6.833 1.888 −7.874 −5.967 −5.928
INTANt*Sentt 0.011 0.004 −0.456 0.009 0.008 −0.005
4.075 0.765 −6.058 0.052 2.668 −0.832
CFt −3.347 −1.940 −3.446 −1.521 −3.158 −1.687
−34.864 −4.409 −40.752 −4.323 −32.578 −4.053
CFt*Sentt 0.001 0.018 1.074 0.983 0.003 −0.002
0.179 1.935 13.245 3.727 0.864 −0.150
ACCt −1.169 1.190 −1.246 1.220 −0.700 1.619
−10.858 2.342 −13.407 2.735 −6.104 3.621
ACCt*Sentt 0.001 −0.011 0.677 0.178 −0.010 −0.054
0.413 −1.202 7.723 0.157 −2.478 −4.672
Sentt 0.008 0.011 0.425 0.627 0.013 0.018
7.738 3.856 19.796 7.784 11.151 6.555
AltZ1t 0.079 0.104 0.078 0.101 0.070 0.100
47.152 26.541 46.701 25.674 41.552 25.570
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−8.528 −10.429 −9.844 −10.268 −10.498 −9.964
Sizet −0.135 −0.126 −0.137 −0.144 −0.155 −0.124
−27.439 −9.262 −27.743 −10.579 −29.024 −9.146
StdRett −0.005 −0.013 −0.006 −0.019 −0.006 −0.014
−25.867 −19.915 −30.047 −29.588 −31.123 −22.500
Turnovert 0.003 −0.002 0.002 −0.002 0.002 −0.001
22.196 −10.393 22.110 −7.915 14.450 −6.970
StdROAt 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.030 0.000 0.025
5.141 12.130 5.438 14.180 4.678 11.925
Betat 0.641 1.120 0.686 1.259 0.743 1.135
68.212 47.121 72.528 51.414 73.200 47.698
ROAt −0.074 0.975 −0.121 0.492 −0.075 1.124
−1.278 2.885 −2.068 1.965 −1.233 3.451
Leveraget 0.298 0.588 0.230 0.460 0.347 0.464
7.253 5.965 5.567 4.652 7.818 4.697
Model Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17
Tables 31, 34 32, 35 33, 36
continued on the next page
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Panel D: Dependent Variable = Annual eVERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.514 0.502 0.454
8.148 7.997 7.223
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.132 2.220 2.232
ADt 0.913 0.336 1.050 0.704 0.899 −0.463
4.999 0.646 7.716 2.130 4.760 −1.100
ADt*Sentt 0.002 0.011 −1.070 −0.468 −0.003 0.079
0.446 0.508 −6.174 −0.837 −0.262 3.704
R&D/At 4.887 6.978 5.367 7.643 5.406 7.266
33.251 16.911 48.062 26.828 38.285 20.014
R&D/At*Sentt 0.026 0.033 −0.497 0.115 0.006 0.034
4.193 2.016 −2.903 0.230 0.819 1.992
PPENTt −0.865 −1.069 −1.029 −1.292 −0.948 −1.297
−17.653 −8.292 −27.230 −14.839 −18.993 −11.549
PPENTt*Sentt −0.011 −0.013 −0.065 −0.065 −0.008 −0.001
−5.409 −2.636 −1.384 −0.448 −3.110 −0.247
INTANt −0.011 −0.318 −0.353 −0.761 −0.400 −0.827
−0.183 −2.045 −6.915 −7.620 −6.135 −6.808
INTANt*Sentt −0.017 −0.021 0.061 0.041 0.007 0.005
−5.898 −3.662 1.133 0.233 2.338 0.812
CFt −2.383 −0.820 −2.537 −0.299 −2.788 −0.182
−23.456 −2.185 −28.151 −1.213 −28.605 −0.526
CFt*Sentt −0.001 0.011 0.716 0.597 0.001 −0.013
−0.284 1.282 8.252 2.337 0.192 −1.426
ACCt −0.198 1.645 −0.500 1.257 −0.746 1.852
−1.702 3.162 −5.006 2.755 −6.485 4.053
ACCt*Sentt −0.013 −0.042 0.346 0.090 −0.012 −0.054
−3.292 −3.699 3.797 0.037 −2.684 −4.664
Sentt 0.002 −0.004 0.002 0.326 0.002 0.004
2.570 −1.356 −0.242 4.123 1.705 1.406
AltZ1t 0.047 0.062 0.048 0.059 0.047 0.060
34.694 19.116 35.175 18.235 33.273 18.290
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001
−8.567 −6.984 −8.488 −6.272 −7.450 −6.351
Sizet −0.124 −0.100 −0.125 −0.107 −0.124 −0.097
−25.828 −7.357 −25.899 −7.885 −23.404 −7.194
StdRett −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.003
−18.543 −8.204 −18.524 −9.091 −18.262 −4.972
Turnovert 0.002 −0.000 0.002 −0.000 0.002 −0.000
16.362 −1.217 16.477 −1.030 17.422 −1.026
StdROAt 0.001 0.020 0.001 0.019 0.000 0.018
4.655 9.924 4.628 9.647 4.652 8.829
Betat 0.699 1.021 0.704 1.071 0.705 1.001
75.327 43.869 75.498 45.290 70.466 43.181
ROAt −0.284 0.491 −0.292 0.132 −0.105 0.469
−3.824 1.942 −3.944 1.095 −1.566 1.860
Leveraget −0.149 −0.255 −0.147 −0.304 −0.069 −0.283
−3.651 −2.650 −3.590 −3.162 −1.594 −2.931
Model Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17 Eq. 16 Eq. 17
Tables 37, 40 38, 41 39, 42
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in Table 16, while Panels B through D summarize the additional analyses
corresponding to the application of the other three dependent variables to
the models in Equations 16 and 17.
Tables 19 through 42 contain the results for all of the individual or-
dered logistic regressions performed using the baseline specification. The
four different dependent variables, two different measures of cash flow and
accruals, and three different measures of investor sentiment produce the
twenty-four baseline specification tables. Each table includes the coeffi-
cients and t-statistics for six models within the baseline specification which
employ the specified dependent variable, measures of cash flow and accru-
als, and measure of investor sentiment. Information about the definition
and availability of the independent variables used in the baseline specifica-
tion models is presented in Exhibit 3. The time period spanned by the data
used to generate each column of Tables 19 through 42 is therefore dictated
by the intersection of the time periods for which the variables used in each
column are available. The baseline specification models estimated are the
following:
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t
+ γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t
+ γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (22)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t + γ2Deltai,t + γ3ADi,t
+ γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (23)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t + γ2Deltai,t + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (24)
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Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (25)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ11(R&Di,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ13(INTANi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (26)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t + γ2Deltai,t + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t + γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ11(R&D/Ai,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ13(INTANi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (27)
In Tables 19 through 42 the baseline specification models in Equations
22 through 27 correspond to the columns in the tables. Equation 22 is
used to estimate the coefficients and t-statistics presented in column A
of Tables 19 through 42. Equation 23 is used to estimate the coefficients
and t-statistics presented in column B, Equation 24 is used to estimate
the coefficients and t-statistics presented in column C, and Equation 25
is used to estimate the coefficients and t-statistics presented in column
D. Equations 26 and 27, which are the same as the baseline specification
models in Equations 16 and 17 in the Methodology section of the second
essay, are used to estimate the coefficients and t-statistics presented in
columns E and F respectively.
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3.1.1 Full Period VERR Decile Assignments Used with the Base-
line Specification
For Tables 19 through 24 capm5 VERR valuation measures are used to as-
sign firm years to valuation deciles across the 1964–2009 period. The first
three tables, Tables 19 through 21, use scaled values of the Sloan (1996)
measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the baseline specification. The
data required to calculate the cash flow and accruals measures following
Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for firms prior to mid-1970, and very
consistently thereafter. Table 19 employs the Investors Intelligence mea-
sure of sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table
20 employs the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is
available beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 21 employs the AAII mea-
sure of sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more
limited availability of the AAII measure accounts for the smaller number
of observations involved in the analyses presented in Table 21.
The second three tables, Tables 22 through 24, use scaled values of
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the
baseline specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow and
accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporadically
for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and consis-
tently thereafter. Table 22 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of
sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 23 em-
ploys the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available
beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 24 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more limited
availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Tables 22 through Tables 24.
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Table 19
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Alt-
man’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total
liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.274 0.167 0.092
4.128 2.503 1.378
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.172 1.915 1.936
ADt 0.563 −0.148 0.431 0.571 0.384 −0.515
4.508 −0.450 1.311 4.574 2.361 −0.967
ADt*Sentt 0.013 0.047
1.877 2.199
R&D/At 6.312 6.495 6.326 6.292 6.341
56.744 23.001 56.872 42.496 15.440
R&D/At*Sentt 0.001 0.022
0.161 1.369
PPENTt 0.457 −0.044 0.462 0.462 0.642 0.726
13.181 −0.536 5.410 13.320 14.366 5.577
PPENTt*Sentt −0.011 −0.012
−6.318 −2.443
INTANt 1.499 −0.286 0.085 1.467 1.071 −0.367
30.134 −2.915 0.858 29.409 14.698 −2.335
INTANt*Sentt 0.018 0.016
6.686 2.808
CFsloant −2.800 −1.718 −1.445 −2.764 −2.694 −1.413
−40.104 −7.688 −6.398 −39.565 −33.226 −5.028
CFsloant*Sentt −0.003 0.015
−1.187 1.779
ACCsloant −1.833 −0.568 −0.063 −1.778 −1.902 0.111
−20.787 −1.926 −0.213 −20.122 −18.060 0.266
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.010 0.011
2.749 0.714
IIbullbeart 0.003 0.005 0.008
8.090 6.396 2.876
continued on the next page
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Table 19 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.065 0.082 0.078 0.065 0.065 0.076
45.118 22.926 21.957 44.985 44.952 21.535
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−15.144 −13.857 −13.830 −14.901 −14.884 −13.520
Sizet −0.109 −0.174 −0.174 −0.110 −0.111 −0.173
−24.456 −12.686 −12.669 −24.610 −24.813 −12.565
StdRett −0.004 −0.013 −0.013 −0.003 −0.003 −0.010
−19.112 −21.738 −20.998 −17.652 −17.004 −16.184
Turnovert 0.005 −0.000 −0.001 0.005 0.005 −0.001
42.387 −0.253 −3.049 41.640 41.492 −4.341
StdROAt 0.001 0.032 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.020
5.894 15.091 11.008 5.830 5.782 9.756
Betat 0.484 1.022 1.020 0.483 0.482 1.006
56.964 43.832 43.566 56.827 56.658 42.808
ROAt −0.129 0.120 0.504 −0.130 −0.142 0.372
−2.335 0.569 2.386 −2.346 −2.552 1.756
Leveraget 0.960 1.093 1.366 0.967 0.979 1.380
25.236 11.121 13.792 25.416 25.719 13.934
N 81,300 15,629 15,629 81,300 81,300 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.268 0.263 0.286 0.268 0.270 0.293
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 20
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and ac-
cruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and
property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.274 0.167 0.213
4.128 2.503 3.180
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.172 1.915 2.116
ADt 0.563 −0.148 0.431 0.653 0.754 0.660
4.508 −0.450 1.311 5.219 6.022 1.965
ADt*Sentt −0.979 −1.141
−6.587 −2.027
R&D/At 6.312 6.495 6.444 6.499 6.215
56.744 23.001 57.966 57.861 21.740
R&D/At*Sentt −1.231 2.430
−7.696 4.637
PPENTt 0.457 −0.044 0.462 0.442 0.453 0.533
13.181 −0.536 5.410 12.744 13.022 6.105
PPENTt*Sentt −0.108 −0.370
−2.691 −2.491
INTANt 1.499 −0.286 0.085 1.543 1.596 0.157
30.134 −2.915 0.858 30.968 31.878 1.559
INTANt*Sentt −0.760 0.221
−10.503 1.208
CFsloant −2.800 −1.718 −1.445 −2.623 −2.730 −1.501
−40.104 −7.688 −6.398 −37.461 −38.446 −6.532
CFsloant*Sentt 0.804 0.786
12.950 3.215
ACCsloant −1.833 −0.568 −0.063 −1.612 −1.745 −0.032
−20.787 −1.926 −0.213 −18.214 −19.443 −0.104
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.905 0.679
10.742 1.809
BWsentt 0.567 0.609 0.536
74.212 32.029 6.546
continued on the next page
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Table 20 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.065 0.082 0.078 0.063 0.063 0.073
45.118 22.926 21.957 43.751 44.091 20.543
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−15.144 −13.857 −13.830 −16.741 −17.180 −13.364
Sizet −0.109 −0.174 −0.174 −0.114 −0.113 −0.189
−24.456 −12.686 −12.669 −25.527 −25.300 −13.734
StdRett −0.004 −0.013 −0.013 −0.004 −0.004 −0.016
−19.112 −21.738 −20.998 −19.483 −19.184 −25.317
Turnovert 0.005 −0.000 −0.001 0.005 0.005 −0.000
42.387 −0.253 −3.049 40.226 39.860 −1.815
StdROAt 0.001 0.032 0.023 0.001 0.002 0.024
5.894 15.091 11.008 6.113 6.138 11.320
Betat 0.484 1.022 1.020 0.535 0.540 1.122
56.964 43.832 43.566 62.390 62.843 46.603
ROAt −0.129 0.120 0.504 −0.187 −0.222 0.263
−2.335 0.569 2.386 −3.335 −3.893 1.232
Leveraget 0.960 1.093 1.366 0.931 0.928 1.242
25.236 11.121 13.792 24.453 24.358 12.533
N 81,300 15,629 15,629 81,262 81,262 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.268 0.263 0.286 0.316 0.319 0.312
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 21
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly dif-
ference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising
(AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total as-
sets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT)
are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm
size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the
standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by as-
sets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each
coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.274 0.167 0.115
4.128 2.503 1.717
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.172 1.915 2.221
ADt 0.563 −0.148 0.431 0.892 0.964 −0.452
4.508 −0.450 1.311 5.916 5.127 −1.061
ADt*Sentt −0.006 0.069
−0.575 3.206
R&D/At 6.312 6.495 5.603 5.648 5.913
56.744 23.001 47.938 39.372 16.288
R&D/At*Sentt −0.002 0.054
−0.320 3.108
PPENTt 0.457 −0.044 0.462 0.405 0.636 0.755
13.181 −0.536 5.410 9.865 12.798 6.682
PPENTt*Sentt −0.020 −0.022
−8.271 −4.115
INTANt 1.499 −0.286 0.085 0.718 0.672 0.163
30.134 −2.915 0.858 13.320 10.232 1.326
INTANt*Sentt 0.004 0.001
1.162 0.148
CFsloant −2.800 −1.718 −1.445 −2.279 −2.324 −1.613
−40.104 −7.688 −6.398 −26.965 −25.296 −6.236
CFsloant*Sentt 0.005 0.018
1.460 2.081
ACCsloant −1.833 −0.568 −0.063 −0.921 −0.912 0.270
−20.787 −1.926 −0.213 −8.443 −7.421 0.747
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.000 −0.010
0.031 −0.696
AAIIbullbeart 0.009 0.013 0.016
17.900 11.436 5.525
continued on the next page
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Table 21 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.065 0.082 0.078 0.052 0.052 0.073
45.118 22.926 21.957 35.724 35.540 20.475
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−15.144 −13.857 −13.830 −21.403 −21.361 −13.055
Sizet −0.109 −0.174 −0.174 −0.157 −0.157 −0.172
−24.456 −12.686 −12.669 −29.704 −29.655 −12.493
StdRett −0.004 −0.013 −0.013 −0.006 −0.006 −0.012
−19.112 −21.738 −20.998 −29.561 −29.568 −18.921
Turnovert 0.005 −0.000 −0.001 0.002 0.002 −0.000
42.387 −0.253 −3.049 20.141 20.101 −1.251
StdROAt 0.001 0.032 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.020
5.894 15.091 11.008 4.332 4.370 9.510
Betat 0.484 1.022 1.020 0.707 0.704 1.018
56.964 43.832 43.566 70.409 70.103 43.333
ROAt −0.129 0.120 0.504 −0.235 −0.238 0.585
−2.335 0.569 2.386 −3.298 −3.310 2.764
Leveraget 0.960 1.093 1.366 1.219 1.221 1.256
25.236 11.121 13.792 27.600 27.627 12.663
N 81,300 15,629 15,629 55,986 55,986 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.268 0.263 0.286 0.300 0.301 0.301
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 22
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of
the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by
Investors Intelligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals
(ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A
version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.318 0.211 0.136
4.882 3.229 2.070
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.430 2.212 2.232
ADt 0.669 −0.323 0.295 0.700 0.843 −0.362
4.406 −1.011 0.923 4.606 4.107 −0.722
ADt*Sentt −0.010 0.035
−1.027 1.728
R&D/At 5.698 6.654 5.696 5.754 6.859
48.552 23.628 48.524 36.141 16.777
R&D/At*Sentt −0.005 0.001
−0.708 0.092
PPENTt 0.447 0.039 0.571 0.477 0.726 0.948
10.819 0.480 6.730 11.524 13.265 7.440
PPENTt*Sentt −0.016 −0.018
−6.969 −3.691
INTANt 0.704 −0.334 0.066 0.610 0.374 −0.301
13.080 −3.458 0.668 11.269 4.662 −1.942
INTANt*Sentt 0.010 0.013
3.373 2.266
CFcollinst −2.974 −3.190 −2.484 −2.929 −2.931 −2.414
−30.548 −5.353 −4.151 −30.122 −26.196 −3.843
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.001 0.002
0.211 0.176
ACCcollinst −0.899 −1.087 −0.114 −0.834 −0.645 0.717
−9.067 −1.810 −0.190 −8.417 −5.564 1.145
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.012 −0.042
−3.128 −4.130
IIbullbeart 0.008 0.011 0.011
16.185 9.755 4.099
continued on the next page
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Table 22 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.080 0.077 0.051 0.051 0.076
35.918 23.394 22.657 35.921 35.946 22.442
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.372 −14.017 −14.029 −22.174 −22.072 −13.627
Sizet −0.153 −0.178 −0.178 −0.160 −0.160 −0.174
−28.576 −13.091 −13.092 −29.935 −29.777 −12.788
StdRett −0.006 −0.013 −0.013 −0.006 −0.006 −0.010
−30.020 −22.378 −21.699 −28.302 −27.455 −15.990
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.002 0.002 −0.001
20.476 0.127 −2.564 18.806 18.875 −3.838
StdROAt 0.000 0.033 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.021
4.213 15.547 11.525 4.149 4.103 10.193
Betat 0.693 1.026 1.022 0.693 0.691 1.003
69.241 44.261 43.943 69.206 69.004 42.995
ROAt 0.027 1.061 0.883 0.031 0.033 0.914
0.377 1.856 1.542 0.433 0.462 1.596
Leveraget 1.052 0.944 1.239 1.093 1.107 1.272
23.872 9.820 12.750 24.769 25.050 13.069
N 55,108 15,880 15,880 55,108 55,108 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.299 0.266 0.290 0.303 0.304 0.298
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 23
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Collins et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by
Baker and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF),
and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (IN-
TAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the
year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation
of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on
assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.318 0.211 0.247
4.882 3.229 3.767
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.004
2.430 2.212 2.395
ADt 0.669 −0.323 0.295 0.695 0.785 0.491
4.406 −1.011 0.923 4.574 5.109 1.504
ADt*Sentt −0.832 −1.062
−3.134 −1.898
R&D/At 5.698 6.654 5.713 5.669 6.452
48.552 23.628 48.655 47.889 22.542
R&D/At*Sentt 0.274 2.013
1.354 3.875
PPENTt 0.447 0.039 0.571 0.451 0.463 0.641
10.819 0.480 6.730 10.923 11.151 7.403
PPENTt*Sentt −0.301 −0.520
−4.139 −3.528
INTANt 0.704 −0.334 0.066 0.695 0.717 0.140
13.080 −3.458 0.668 12.898 13.206 1.406
INTANt*Sentt −0.270 0.148
−2.913 0.812
CFcollinst −2.974 −3.190 −2.484 −2.956 −3.090 −1.943
−30.548 −5.353 −4.151 −30.339 −31.473 −3.221
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.143 1.085
11.497 3.938
ACCcollinst −0.899 −1.087 −0.114 −0.886 −0.973 0.611
−9.067 −1.810 −0.190 −8.915 −9.674 1.004
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.286 −0.500
2.945 −1.940
BWsentt 0.180 0.232 0.535
12.979 7.096 6.757
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Table 23 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.080 0.077 0.051 0.051 0.071
35.918 23.394 22.657 35.491 35.491 20.999
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.372 −14.017 −14.029 −22.236 −22.391 −13.579
Sizet −0.153 −0.178 −0.178 −0.159 −0.158 −0.193
−28.576 −13.091 −13.092 −29.587 −29.459 −14.103
StdRett −0.006 −0.013 −0.013 −0.007 −0.007 −0.016
−30.020 −22.378 −21.699 −31.433 −31.435 −25.714
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.002 0.002 −0.000
20.476 0.127 −2.564 20.349 20.183 −1.327
StdROAt 0.000 0.033 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.025
4.213 15.547 11.525 4.247 4.267 11.918
Betat 0.693 1.026 1.022 0.703 0.706 1.120
69.241 44.261 43.943 69.980 70.062 46.824
ROAt 0.027 1.061 0.883 0.019 0.016 0.109
0.377 1.856 1.542 0.260 0.225 0.190
Leveraget 1.052 0.944 1.239 1.060 1.050 1.120
23.872 9.820 12.750 24.039 23.814 11.507
N 55,108 15,880 15,880 55,108 55,108 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.299 0.266 0.290 0.301 0.303 0.316
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 24
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals are were calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the
weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII.
Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by aver-
age total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm
age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on as-
sets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled
by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below
each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.318 0.211 0.154
4.882 3.229 2.357
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.004
2.430 2.212 2.445
ADt 0.669 −0.323 0.295 0.726 0.770 −0.443
4.406 −1.011 0.923 4.776 4.065 −1.079
ADt*Sentt −0.004 0.062
−0.361 2.899
R&D/At 5.698 6.654 5.710 5.863 6.418
48.552 23.628 48.669 40.750 17.771
R&D/At*Sentt −0.010 0.031
−1.469 1.772
PPENTt 0.447 0.039 0.571 0.454 0.702 0.879
10.819 0.480 6.730 10.980 14.026 7.891
PPENTt*Sentt −0.022 −0.024
−8.807 −4.697
INTANt 0.704 −0.334 0.066 0.686 0.661 0.174
13.080 −3.458 0.668 12.726 10.057 1.438
INTANt*Sentt 0.002 −0.002
0.651 −0.262
CFcollinst −2.974 −3.190 −2.484 −2.920 −2.976 −2.393
−30.548 −5.353 −4.151 −30.023 −27.940 −3.902
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.006 0.003
1.519 0.334
ACCcollinst −0.899 −1.087 −0.114 −0.849 −0.705 0.541
−9.067 −1.810 −0.190 −8.563 −6.502 0.877
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.013 −0.045
−3.162 −4.462
AAIIbullbeart 0.009 0.014 0.018
18.246 11.860 6.376
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Table 24 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.080 0.077 0.050 0.050 0.072
35.918 23.394 22.657 35.348 35.223 21.152
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.372 −14.017 −14.029 −21.395 −21.335 −13.255
Sizet −0.153 −0.178 −0.178 −0.160 −0.160 −0.174
−28.576 −13.091 −13.092 −29.856 −29.764 −12.775
StdRett −0.006 −0.013 −0.013 −0.006 −0.006 −0.012
−30.020 −22.378 −21.699 −29.995 −29.915 −19.092
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.002 0.002 −0.000
20.476 0.127 −2.564 20.411 20.367 −0.903
StdROAt 0.000 0.033 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.021
4.213 15.547 11.525 4.250 4.285 9.953
Betat 0.693 1.026 1.022 0.703 0.700 1.018
69.241 44.261 43.943 69.971 69.625 43.629
ROAt 0.027 1.061 0.883 0.023 0.027 0.979
0.377 1.856 1.542 0.328 0.379 1.709
Leveraget 1.052 0.944 1.239 1.057 1.062 1.146
23.872 9.820 12.750 23.984 24.083 11.767
N 55,108 15,880 15,880 55,104 55,104 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.299 0.266 0.290 0.303 0.305 0.305
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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3.1.2 Annual VERR Decile Assignments Used with the Baseline
Specification
For Tables 25 through 30 capm5 VERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles for each calendar year during the
1964–2009 period. The first three tables, Tables 25 through 27, use scaled
values of the Sloan (1996) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of
the baseline specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow
and accruals measures following Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for
firms prior to mid-1970, and very consistently thereafter. Table 25 employs
the Investors Intelligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the
full 1964–2009 period. Table 26 employs the sentiment data from Baker
and Wurgler (2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965.
Table 27 employs the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available
in the middle of 1987. The more limited availability of the AAII measure
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Table 27.
The second three tables, Tables 28 through 30, use scaled values of
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the
baseline specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow and
accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporadically
for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and consis-
tently thereafter. Table 28 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of
sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 29 em-
ploys the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available
beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 30 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more limited
availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Tables 28 through Tables 30.
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Table 25
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are
not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and
delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Alt-
man’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total
liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.281 0.178 0.188
4.239 2.685 2.809
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.451 2.158 2.144
ADt 0.989 −0.356 0.220 0.990 0.798 −0.460
7.930 −1.090 0.673 7.936 4.909 −0.865
ADt*Sentt 0.013 0.033
1.868 1.550
R&D/At 5.514 6.310 5.515 5.474 5.636
52.352 22.741 52.358 38.531 13.857
R&D/At*Sentt 0.002 0.036
0.312 2.226
PPENTt 0.414 −0.258 0.244 0.414 0.609 0.390
12.029 −3.166 2.877 12.043 13.688 3.001
PPENTt*Sentt −0.012 −0.008
−6.760 −1.546
INTANt 0.723 −0.140 0.237 0.721 0.887 0.534
14.681 −1.435 2.390 14.590 12.195 3.410
INTANt*Sentt −0.009 −0.013
−3.380 −2.282
CFsloant −1.240 −1.131 −0.843 −1.237 −1.181 −0.967
−15.826 −5.144 −3.805 −15.765 −13.439 −3.483
CFsloant*Sentt −0.003 0.005
−1.248 0.603
ACCsloant 0.019 −0.696 −0.217 0.024 0.249 0.148
0.198 −2.381 −0.739 0.247 2.197 0.358
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.014 −0.021
−3.626 −1.391
IIbullbeart 0.000 0.004 −0.001
0.658 5.241 −0.315
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Table 25 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.034 0.044 0.041 0.034 0.033 0.041
29.524 14.575 13.761 29.512 29.452 13.706
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.010 −10.849 −10.683 −21.975 −21.903 −10.820
Sizet −0.126 −0.157 −0.157 −0.126 −0.126 −0.156
−28.487 −11.480 −11.444 −28.494 −28.634 −11.368
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
−15.831 −4.493 −3.770 −15.546 −15.443 −4.420
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.748 5.562 2.984 21.640 21.548 3.176
StdROAt 0.001 0.024 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.015
4.503 11.655 7.696 4.502 4.520 7.608
Betat 0.676 0.934 0.931 0.676 0.675 0.937
78.723 40.717 40.465 78.692 78.469 40.464
ROAt −0.721 −0.148 0.148 −0.722 −0.720 0.151
−9.581 −0.704 0.704 −9.587 −9.560 0.719
Leveraget 0.702 0.381 0.649 0.703 0.707 0.633
18.901 3.979 6.730 18.914 19.016 6.564
N 81,300 15,629 15,629 81,300 81,300 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.237 0.246 0.270 0.237 0.237 0.271
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 26
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are
not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and
delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year
assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of
returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on
assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.281 0.178 0.194
4.239 2.685 2.922
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.451 2.158 2.229
ADt 0.989 −0.356 0.220 0.986 1.096 0.349
7.930 −1.090 0.673 7.911 8.753 1.044
ADt*Sentt −1.353 −0.384
−9.088 −0.685
R&D/At 5.514 6.310 5.520 5.558 6.199
52.352 22.741 52.382 52.112 22.011
R&D/At*Sentt −0.366 0.644
−2.366 1.304
PPENTt 0.414 −0.258 0.244 0.415 0.431 0.277
12.029 −3.166 2.877 12.060 12.496 3.189
PPENTt*Sentt −0.138 −0.182
−3.492 −1.236
INTANt 0.723 −0.140 0.237 0.725 0.718 0.287
14.681 −1.435 2.390 14.704 14.498 2.867
INTANt*Sentt 0.095 0.004
1.330 0.022
CFsloant −1.240 −1.131 −0.843 −1.257 −1.287 −0.972
−15.826 −5.144 −3.805 −16.018 −16.377 −4.322
CFsloant*Sentt 0.216 0.828
3.593 3.464
ACCsloant 0.019 −0.696 −0.217 0.003 −0.008 −0.345
0.198 −2.381 −0.739 0.028 −0.079 −1.135
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.050 0.848
0.600 2.307
BWsentt −0.034 0.012 0.263
−4.590 0.631 3.267
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Table 26 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.034 0.044 0.041 0.034 0.034 0.039
29.524 14.575 13.761 29.631 29.701 12.992
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.010 −10.849 −10.683 −21.946 −21.949 −10.332
Sizet −0.126 −0.157 −0.157 −0.126 −0.126 −0.163
−28.487 −11.480 −11.444 −28.422 −28.517 −11.910
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004
−15.831 −4.493 −3.770 −15.795 −15.922 −6.358
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.748 5.562 2.984 21.961 21.983 3.691
StdROAt 0.001 0.024 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.015
4.503 11.655 7.696 4.496 4.505 7.587
Betat 0.676 0.934 0.931 0.674 0.675 0.982
78.723 40.717 40.465 78.256 78.212 41.814
ROAt −0.721 −0.148 0.148 −0.715 −0.725 0.034
−9.581 −0.704 0.704 −9.499 −9.644 0.159
Leveraget 0.702 0.381 0.649 0.704 0.706 0.583
18.901 3.979 6.730 18.939 18.983 6.040
N 81,300 15,629 15,629 81,262 81,262 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.237 0.246 0.270 0.237 0.238 0.278
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 27
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Sloan
(1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly difference
between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising (AD),
R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets;
intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are
scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size,
the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard
deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are in-
cluded as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.281 0.178 0.149
4.239 2.685 2.243
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.451 2.158 2.295
ADt 0.989 −0.356 0.220 0.957 1.095 −0.697
7.930 −1.090 0.673 6.377 5.836 −1.637
ADt*Sentt −0.011 0.065
−1.183 3.014
R&D/At 5.514 6.310 5.441 5.604 5.950
52.352 22.741 47.977 39.768 16.553
R&D/At*Sentt −0.012 0.030
−1.775 1.795
PPENTt 0.414 −0.258 0.244 0.288 0.487 0.389
12.029 −3.166 2.877 7.059 9.840 3.453
PPENTt*Sentt −0.017 −0.010
−6.968 −1.988
INTANt 0.723 −0.140 0.237 0.751 0.755 0.220
14.681 −1.435 2.390 14.005 11.514 1.804
INTANt*Sentt −0.000 0.005
−0.118 0.911
CFsloant −1.240 −1.131 −0.843 −2.005 −2.040 −0.948
−15.826 −5.144 −3.805 −22.732 −21.537 −3.721
CFsloant*Sentt 0.003 0.014
1.064 1.581
ACCsloant 0.019 −0.696 −0.217 −0.933 −0.872 0.069
0.198 −2.381 −0.739 −8.253 −6.918 0.192
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.005 −0.008
−0.949 −0.560
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.007 0.007
4.602 6.077 2.448
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Table 27 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.034 0.044 0.041 0.031 0.031 0.038
29.524 14.575 13.761 26.075 25.964 12.828
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.010 −10.849 −10.683 −19.822 −19.785 −10.164
Sizet −0.126 −0.157 −0.157 −0.120 −0.120 −0.155
−28.487 −11.480 −11.444 −22.852 −22.862 −11.289
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001
−15.831 −4.493 −3.770 −17.635 −17.676 −2.471
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.748 5.562 2.984 21.638 21.600 3.920
StdROAt 0.001 0.024 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.014
4.503 11.655 7.696 4.353 4.374 6.857
Betat 0.676 0.934 0.931 0.686 0.684 0.929
78.723 40.717 40.465 68.979 68.742 40.283
ROAt −0.721 −0.148 0.148 −0.336 −0.337 0.160
−9.581 −0.704 0.704 −4.211 −4.230 0.762
Leveraget 0.702 0.381 0.649 0.794 0.798 0.587
18.901 3.979 6.730 18.418 18.487 6.078
N 81,300 15,629 15,629 55,986 55,986 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.237 0.246 0.270 0.288 0.289 0.276
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 28
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Alt-
man’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total
liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.306 0.206 0.210
4.716 3.163 3.203
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.553 2.300 2.284
ADt 0.826 −0.392 0.224 0.826 1.021 −0.396
5.460 −1.233 0.701 5.460 4.980 −0.791
ADt*Sentt −0.014 0.029
−1.473 1.448
R&D/At 5.560 6.417 5.560 5.535 6.144
48.910 23.222 48.904 35.653 15.198
R&D/At*Sentt 0.000 0.014
0.036 0.875
PPENTt 0.320 −0.228 0.291 0.320 0.535 0.520
7.792 −2.823 3.453 7.790 9.829 4.100
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.012
−5.840 −2.506
INTANt 0.708 −0.198 0.202 0.707 0.940 0.538
13.215 −2.056 2.063 13.141 11.748 3.491
INTANt*Sentt −0.013 −0.015
−4.127 −2.678
CFcollinst −2.582 −1.140 −0.492 −2.582 −2.480 −0.320
−27.039 −1.925 −0.826 −27.025 −22.590 −0.511
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.006 −0.012
−1.600 −1.242
ACCcollinst −0.994 −0.200 0.639 −0.993 −0.733 1.762
−10.065 −0.333 1.065 −10.057 −6.357 2.822
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.016 −0.066
−4.132 −6.495
IIbullbeart 0.000 0.005 0.001
0.073 4.605 0.478
continued on the next page
186
Table 28 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.030 0.041 0.039 0.030 0.030 0.039
25.470 14.187 13.595 25.469 25.423 13.543
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−20.030 −10.914 −10.788 −20.024 −19.978 −10.800
Sizet −0.120 −0.159 −0.159 −0.120 −0.121 −0.155
−22.597 −11.728 −11.706 −22.531 −22.635 −11.392
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
−17.372 −4.571 −3.906 −17.252 −17.043 −3.666
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.633 5.545 3.108 21.529 21.467 3.177
StdROAt 0.000 0.024 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.016
4.251 11.951 7.996 4.250 4.253 7.954
Betat 0.682 0.936 0.932 0.682 0.681 0.934
68.720 41.093 40.798 68.715 68.556 40.643
ROAt −0.008 −0.257 −0.430 −0.008 −0.007 −0.375
−0.111 −0.450 −0.753 −0.111 −0.092 −0.657
Leveraget 0.651 0.254 0.540 0.651 0.658 0.522
15.099 2.702 5.686 15.085 15.232 5.489
N 55,108 15,880 15,880 55,108 55,108 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.290 0.247 0.271 0.290 0.291 0.274
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 29
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year
assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of
returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on
assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.306 0.206 0.219
4.716 3.163 3.350
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.553 2.300 2.345
ADt 0.826 −0.392 0.224 0.825 0.907 0.316
5.460 −1.233 0.701 5.452 5.921 0.972
ADt*Sentt −0.605 −0.344
−2.287 −0.618
R&D/At 5.560 6.417 5.560 5.567 6.358
48.910 23.222 48.908 48.307 22.580
R&D/At*Sentt −0.383 0.274
−1.996 0.562
PPENTt 0.320 −0.228 0.291 0.320 0.333 0.328
7.792 −2.823 3.453 7.787 8.072 3.818
PPENTt*Sentt −0.234 −0.267
−3.243 −1.831
INTANt 0.708 −0.198 0.202 0.708 0.742 0.254
13.215 −2.056 2.063 13.222 13.733 2.566
INTANt*Sentt −0.390 −0.043
−4.233 −0.238
CFcollinst −2.582 −1.140 −0.492 −2.583 −2.739 −0.260
−27.039 −1.925 −0.826 −27.045 −28.404 −0.433
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.056 0.756
10.931 2.826
ACCcollinst −0.994 −0.200 0.639 −0.994 −1.113 0.967
−10.065 −0.333 1.065 −10.070 −11.124 1.597
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.437 −0.019
4.612 −0.084
BWsentt −0.008 0.082 0.310
−0.614 2.544 3.980
continued on the next page
188
Table 29 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.030 0.041 0.039 0.030 0.030 0.036
25.470 14.187 13.595 25.471 25.622 12.699
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−20.030 −10.914 −10.788 −20.037 −20.148 −10.419
Sizet −0.120 −0.159 −0.159 −0.120 −0.119 −0.165
−22.597 −11.728 −11.706 −22.464 −22.375 −12.149
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
−17.372 −4.571 −3.906 −17.201 −17.251 −6.354
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.633 5.545 3.108 21.639 21.477 3.796
StdROAt 0.000 0.024 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.016
4.251 11.951 7.996 4.250 4.267 7.952
Betat 0.682 0.936 0.932 0.682 0.687 0.981
68.720 41.093 40.798 68.584 68.900 42.080
ROAt −0.008 −0.257 −0.430 −0.008 −0.012 −0.834
−0.111 −0.450 −0.753 −0.106 −0.162 −1.456
Leveraget 0.651 0.254 0.540 0.650 0.642 0.475
15.099 2.702 5.686 15.091 14.878 4.997
N 55,108 15,880 15,880 55,108 55,108 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.290 0.247 0.271 0.290 0.292 0.279
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 30
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins et
al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly differ-
ence between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising
(AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total as-
sets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT)
are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm
size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the
standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by as-
sets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each
coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.306 0.206 0.174
4.716 3.163 2.667
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.004
2.553 2.300 2.396
ADt 0.826 −0.392 0.224 0.838 0.972 −0.591
5.460 −1.233 0.701 5.537 5.138 −1.441
ADt*Sentt −0.011 0.058
−1.133 2.765
R&D/At 5.560 6.417 5.558 5.767 6.280
48.910 23.222 48.902 40.861 17.576
R&D/At*Sentt −0.016 0.015
−2.258 0.899
PPENTt 0.320 −0.228 0.291 0.321 0.529 0.448
7.792 −2.823 3.453 7.831 10.625 4.042
PPENTt*Sentt −0.018 −0.012
−7.218 −2.398
INTANt 0.708 −0.198 0.202 0.704 0.710 0.204
13.215 −2.056 2.063 13.137 10.837 1.693
INTANt*Sentt −0.001 0.004
−0.179 0.699
CFcollinst −2.582 −1.140 −0.492 −2.569 −2.635 −0.412
−27.039 −1.925 −0.826 −26.900 −25.115 −0.675
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.006 0.001
1.550 0.138
ACCcollinst −0.994 −0.200 0.639 −0.982 −0.925 1.062
−10.065 −0.333 1.065 −9.955 −8.534 1.726
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.005 −0.028
−1.337 −2.836
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.007 0.009
4.455 6.186 3.166
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Table 30 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.030 0.041 0.039 0.029 0.029 0.036
25.470 14.187 13.595 25.300 25.205 12.657
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−20.030 −10.914 −10.788 −19.728 −19.684 −10.273
Sizet −0.120 −0.159 −0.159 −0.121 −0.121 −0.155
−22.597 −11.728 −11.706 −22.833 −22.781 −11.457
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001
−17.372 −4.571 −3.906 −17.289 −17.274 −2.344
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.633 5.545 3.108 21.616 21.578 3.951
StdROAt 0.000 0.024 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.014
4.251 11.951 7.996 4.248 4.266 7.148
Betat 0.682 0.936 0.932 0.684 0.682 0.930
68.720 41.093 40.798 68.819 68.573 40.561
ROAt −0.008 −0.257 −0.430 −0.009 −0.006 −0.387
−0.111 −0.450 −0.753 −0.122 −0.084 −0.677
Leveraget 0.651 0.254 0.540 0.651 0.655 0.489
15.099 2.702 5.686 15.111 15.182 5.134
N 55,108 15,880 15,880 55,104 55,104 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.290 0.247 0.271 0.290 0.291 0.277
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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3.1.3 Full Period eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Baseline Specification
For Tables 31 through 36 capm5 eVERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles across the 1964–2009 period. The first
three tables, Tables 31 through 33, use scaled values of the Sloan (1996)
measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the baseline specification. The
data required to calculate the cash flow and accruals measures following
Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for firms prior to mid-1970, and very
consistently thereafter. Table 31 employs the Investors Intelligence mea-
sure of sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table
32 employs the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is
available beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 33 employs the AAII mea-
sure of sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more
limited availability of the AAII measure accounts for the smaller number
of observations involved in the analyses presented in Table 33.
The second three tables, Tables 34 through 36, use scaled values of
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the
baseline specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow and
accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporadically
for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and consis-
tently thereafter. Table 34 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of
sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 35 em-
ploys the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available
beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 36 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more limited
availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Tables 34 through Tables 36.
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Table 31
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Alt-
man’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total
liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.527 0.412 0.327
8.040 6.334 5.021
Deltat 0.007 0.008 0.008
3.402 3.380 3.493
ADt 0.598 −0.392 0.295 0.612 0.380 −0.407
4.776 −1.190 0.894 4.883 2.329 −0.757
ADt*Sentt 0.016 0.038
2.345 1.759
R&D/At 6.074 7.624 6.093 5.514 7.070
54.366 26.591 54.538 38.127 16.954
R&D/At*Sentt 0.035 0.048
5.785 2.906
PPENTt −0.768 −1.420 −0.857 −0.763 −0.606 −0.591
−22.054 −17.180 −10.017 −21.923 −13.523 −4.528
PPENTt*Sentt −0.010 −0.013
−5.464 −2.543
INTANt 0.374 −1.272 −0.873 0.329 −0.038 −1.136
7.604 −12.918 −8.740 6.664 −0.527 −7.193
INTANt*Sentt 0.016 0.006
6.130 1.126
CFsloant −3.336 −1.716 −1.344 −3.287 −3.197 −1.381
−46.694 −7.611 −5.870 −46.003 −38.920 −4.839
CFsloant*Sentt −0.004 0.024
−1.350 2.706
ACCsloant −1.858 0.114 0.830 −1.785 −1.911 1.128
−20.874 0.385 2.769 −20.015 −18.050 2.687
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.012 0.009
3.020 0.622
IIbullbeart 0.004 0.005 0.009
10.435 5.842 3.182
continued on the next page
193
Table 31 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.089 0.110 0.105 0.088 0.088 0.102
52.854 27.138 26.270 52.612 52.491 25.710
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−5.728 −10.548 −10.515 −5.417 −5.370 −10.206
Sizet −0.114 −0.124 −0.127 −0.115 −0.116 −0.125
−25.600 −9.101 −9.315 −25.843 −25.978 −9.122
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.015 −0.005 −0.004 −0.013
−25.935 −25.666 −24.806 −24.089 −23.162 −19.717
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.004 0.004 −0.002
32.804 −6.158 −9.405 31.905 31.662 −10.789
StdROAt 0.002 0.039 0.028 0.002 0.001 0.025
5.983 17.822 13.326 5.899 5.846 11.918
Betat 0.555 1.134 1.134 0.554 0.552 1.121
64.638 47.945 47.732 64.498 64.263 47.002
ROAt −0.108 0.639 0.985 −0.107 −0.118 0.795
−1.952 3.049 4.658 −1.940 −2.132 3.750
Leveraget 0.289 0.333 0.637 0.296 0.306 0.626
7.521 3.367 6.403 7.708 7.960 6.297
N 81,443 15,728 15,728 81,443 81,443 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.311 0.351 0.377 0.312 0.314 0.384
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 32
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and ac-
cruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and
property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.527 0.412 0.476
8.040 6.334 7.302
Deltat 0.007 0.008 0.007
3.402 3.380 3.359
ADt 0.598 −0.392 0.295 0.709 0.803 0.555
4.776 −1.190 0.894 5.646 6.396 1.645
ADt*Sentt −1.027 −1.430
−6.910 −2.535
R&D/At 6.074 7.624 6.172 6.207 7.380
54.366 26.591 55.377 55.157 25.422
R&D/At*Sentt −1.007 2.510
−6.229 4.718
PPENTt −0.768 −1.420 −0.857 −0.849 −0.841 −0.821
−22.054 −17.180 −10.017 −24.343 −24.025 −9.377
PPENTt*Sentt −0.118 −0.353
−2.954 −2.383
INTANt 0.374 −1.272 −0.873 0.363 0.409 −0.805
7.604 −12.918 −8.740 7.371 8.268 −7.958
INTANt*Sentt −0.669 0.046
−9.431 0.253
CFsloant −3.336 −1.716 −1.344 −3.139 −3.257 −1.363
−46.694 −7.611 −5.870 −43.925 −45.235 −5.862
CFsloant*Sentt 0.839 0.816
13.446 3.290
ACCsloant −1.858 0.114 0.830 −1.601 −1.739 0.921
−20.874 0.385 2.769 −17.948 −19.339 2.969
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.925 0.728
10.949 1.916
BWsentt 0.584 0.616 0.629
76.396 32.423 7.669
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Table 32 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.089 0.110 0.105 0.086 0.087 0.100
52.854 27.138 26.270 51.430 51.756 25.093
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−5.728 −10.548 −10.515 −7.203 −7.641 −10.008
Sizet −0.114 −0.124 −0.127 −0.121 −0.121 −0.142
−25.600 −9.101 −9.315 −27.097 −26.950 −10.387
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.015 −0.005 −0.005 −0.018
−25.935 −25.666 −24.806 −26.930 −26.726 −29.269
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.003 0.003 −0.002
32.804 −6.158 −9.405 30.235 29.859 −8.266
StdROAt 0.002 0.039 0.028 0.002 0.002 0.030
5.983 17.822 13.326 6.211 6.280 13.913
Betat 0.555 1.134 1.134 0.617 0.621 1.259
64.638 47.945 47.732 71.019 71.412 51.257
ROAt −0.108 0.639 0.985 −0.162 −0.190 0.750
−1.952 3.049 4.658 −2.916 −3.411 3.521
Leveraget 0.289 0.333 0.637 0.226 0.224 0.511
7.521 3.367 6.403 5.889 5.816 5.127
N 81,443 15,728 15,728 81,406 81,406 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.311 0.351 0.377 0.360 0.363 0.404
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 33
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly dif-
ference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising
(AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total as-
sets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT)
are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm
size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the
standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by as-
sets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each
coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.527 0.412 0.360
8.040 6.334 5.534
Deltat 0.007 0.008 0.008
3.402 3.380 3.453
ADt 0.598 −0.392 0.295 0.760 0.681 −0.790
4.776 −1.190 0.894 5.034 3.614 −1.840
ADt*Sentt 0.007 0.092
0.760 4.238
R&D/At 6.074 7.624 5.630 5.398 6.918
54.366 26.591 47.560 37.615 18.770
R&D/At*Sentt 0.022 0.066
2.993 3.732
PPENTt −0.768 −1.420 −0.857 −0.854 −0.673 −0.632
−22.054 −17.180 −10.017 −20.720 −13.505 −5.574
PPENTt*Sentt −0.016 −0.019
−6.535 −3.572
INTANt 0.374 −1.272 −0.873 −0.294 −0.410 −0.754
7.604 −12.918 −8.740 −5.503 −6.276 −6.139
INTANt*Sentt 0.009 −0.003
3.036 −0.567
CFsloant −3.336 −1.716 −1.344 −2.874 −2.888 −1.197
−46.694 −7.611 −5.870 −36.571 −33.444 −4.556
CFsloant*Sentt 0.002 0.002
0.739 0.265
ACCsloant −1.858 0.114 0.830 −1.077 −1.035 1.800
−20.874 0.385 2.769 −10.530 −8.846 4.914
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.002 −0.048
−0.431 −3.383
AAIIbullbeart 0.011 0.013 0.018
23.037 11.024 6.346
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Table 33 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.089 0.110 0.105 0.073 0.072 0.099
52.854 27.138 26.270 42.262 42.040 24.885
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−5.728 −10.548 −10.515 −10.306 −10.269 −9.739
Sizet −0.114 −0.124 −0.127 −0.155 −0.154 −0.122
−25.600 −9.101 −9.315 −29.286 −29.123 −8.961
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.015 −0.006 −0.006 −0.014
−25.935 −25.666 −24.806 −31.133 −31.005 −22.264
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
32.804 −6.158 −9.405 14.206 14.175 −7.254
StdROAt 0.002 0.039 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.025
5.983 17.822 13.326 4.652 4.707 11.683
Betat 0.555 1.134 1.134 0.749 0.745 1.134
64.638 47.945 47.732 73.923 73.483 47.510
ROAt −0.108 0.639 0.985 −0.115 −0.113 1.003
−1.952 3.049 4.658 −1.992 −1.965 4.726
Leveraget 0.289 0.333 0.637 0.455 0.454 0.505
7.521 3.367 6.403 10.268 10.229 5.062
N 81,443 15,728 15,728 56,259 56,259 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.311 0.351 0.377 0.359 0.360 0.394
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 34
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of
the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by
Investors Intelligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals
(ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A
version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.583 0.465 0.382
8.950 7.245 5.945
Deltat 0.008 0.009 0.009
3.734 3.784 3.891
ADt 0.492 −0.661 0.079 0.529 0.633 −0.501
3.238 −2.063 0.247 3.477 3.069 −0.989
ADt*Sentt −0.006 0.035
−0.642 1.727
R&D/At 5.819 7.776 5.821 5.286 7.577
48.743 27.174 48.746 33.590 18.236
R&D/At*Sentt 0.032 0.027
4.779 1.614
PPENTt −0.760 −1.329 −0.749 −0.731 −0.510 −0.374
−18.285 −16.205 −8.791 −17.599 −9.277 −2.924
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.019
−6.138 −3.773
INTANt −0.247 −1.282 −0.850 −0.371 −0.519 −1.007
−4.620 −13.195 −8.604 −6.907 −6.491 −6.473
INTANt*Sentt 0.006 0.002
2.020 0.404
CFcollinst −3.479 −3.097 −2.393 −3.424 −3.497 −2.500
−35.080 −5.209 −4.008 −34.596 −30.809 −3.979
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.006 0.012
1.707 1.163
ACCcollinst −0.639 −0.354 0.643 −0.563 −0.426 1.251
−6.438 −0.590 1.071 −5.689 −3.666 1.997
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.009 −0.031
−2.195 −3.027
IIbullbeart 0.009 0.011 0.012
19.724 9.634 4.530
continued on the next page
199
Table 34 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.070 0.108 0.106 0.070 0.070 0.106
41.930 28.093 27.604 41.881 41.814 27.372
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−12.060 −10.971 −11.001 −11.768 −11.686 −10.652
Sizet −0.146 −0.129 −0.132 −0.156 −0.155 −0.127
−27.440 −9.529 −9.768 −29.170 −28.900 −9.403
StdRett −0.007 −0.016 −0.016 −0.006 −0.006 −0.013
−31.510 −26.655 −25.808 −29.493 −28.572 −20.113
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.002
14.695 −5.532 −8.688 12.746 12.731 −9.997
StdROAt 0.000 0.040 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.026
4.528 18.273 13.779 4.465 4.437 12.342
Betat 0.731 1.139 1.138 0.731 0.729 1.119
72.353 48.439 48.160 72.374 72.162 47.240
ROAt −0.036 1.287 1.149 −0.031 −0.030 1.154
−0.505 2.256 2.013 −0.426 −0.425 2.020
Leveraget 0.239 0.185 0.527 0.282 0.290 0.550
5.403 1.919 5.408 6.369 6.547 5.632
N 55,360 15,971 15,971 55,360 55,360 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.357 0.354 0.382 0.361 0.363 0.389
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 35
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Collins et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by
Baker and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF),
and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (IN-
TAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the
year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation
of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on
assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.583 0.465 0.520
8.950 7.245 8.098
Deltat 0.008 0.009 0.008
3.734 3.784 3.652
ADt 0.492 −0.661 0.079 0.527 0.633 0.309
3.238 −2.063 0.247 3.463 4.112 0.943
ADt*Sentt −0.825 −1.333
−3.118 −2.380
R&D/At 5.819 7.776 5.843 5.759 7.597
48.743 27.174 48.915 47.860 26.119
R&D/At*Sentt 0.539 2.084
2.605 3.959
PPENTt −0.760 −1.329 −0.749 −0.758 −0.756 −0.719
−18.285 −16.205 −8.791 −18.251 −18.085 −8.269
PPENTt*Sentt −0.183 −0.484
−2.532 −3.307
INTANt −0.247 −1.282 −0.850 −0.263 −0.242 −0.779
−4.620 −13.195 −8.604 −4.923 −4.492 −7.789
INTANt*Sentt −0.244 −0.027
−2.684 −0.150
CFcollinst −3.479 −3.097 −2.393 −3.454 −3.634 −1.678
−35.080 −5.209 −4.008 −34.786 −36.269 −2.784
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.309 1.151
13.044 4.163
ACCcollinst −0.639 −0.354 0.643 −0.617 −0.754 1.520
−6.438 −0.590 1.071 −6.210 −7.474 2.500
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.430 −0.372
4.497 −1.603
BWsentt 0.228 0.235 0.626
16.494 7.169 7.900
continued on the next page
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Table 35 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.070 0.108 0.106 0.069 0.070 0.101
41.930 28.093 27.604 41.503 41.645 26.254
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−12.060 −10.971 −11.001 −11.872 −12.047 −10.529
Sizet −0.146 −0.129 −0.132 −0.154 −0.153 −0.146
−27.440 −9.529 −9.768 −28.741 −28.537 −10.771
StdRett −0.007 −0.016 −0.016 −0.007 −0.007 −0.019
−31.510 −26.655 −25.808 −33.373 −33.368 −29.907
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
14.695 −5.532 −8.688 14.563 14.362 −7.564
StdROAt 0.000 0.040 0.029 0.000 0.001 0.031
4.528 18.273 13.779 4.572 4.595 14.447
Betat 0.731 1.139 1.138 0.745 0.750 1.259
72.353 48.439 48.160 73.416 73.644 51.572
ROAt −0.036 1.287 1.149 −0.049 −0.052 0.235
−0.505 2.256 2.013 −0.684 −0.725 0.409
Leveraget 0.239 0.185 0.527 0.248 0.236 0.408
5.403 1.919 5.408 5.609 5.318 4.178
N 55,360 15,971 15,971 55,360 55,360 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.357 0.354 0.382 0.360 0.362 0.408
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 36
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the
weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII.
Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by aver-
age total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm
age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on as-
sets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled
by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below
each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.583 0.465 0.411
8.950 7.245 6.387
Deltat 0.008 0.009 0.009
3.734 3.784 3.777
ADt 0.492 −0.661 0.079 0.570 0.455 −0.868
3.238 −2.063 0.247 3.743 2.395 −2.095
ADt*Sentt 0.010 0.087
1.027 4.057
R&D/At 5.819 7.776 5.846 5.744 7.367
48.743 27.174 48.969 39.762 20.115
R&D/At*Sentt 0.012 0.044
1.600 2.438
PPENTt −0.760 −1.329 −0.749 −0.761 −0.568 −0.533
−18.285 −16.205 −8.791 −18.329 −11.295 −4.775
PPENTt*Sentt −0.017 −0.020
−6.937 −3.905
INTANt −0.247 −1.282 −0.850 −0.284 −0.370 −0.694
−4.620 −13.195 −8.604 −5.308 −5.657 −5.718
INTANt*Sentt 0.007 −0.006
2.299 −1.097
CFcollinst −3.479 −3.097 −2.393 −3.407 −3.428 −2.178
−35.080 −5.209 −4.008 −34.425 −31.712 −3.550
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.004 −0.006
0.990 −0.565
ACCcollinst −0.639 −0.354 0.643 −0.575 −0.364 1.437
−6.438 −0.590 1.071 −5.800 −3.361 2.328
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.018 −0.061
−4.525 −5.961
AAIIbullbeart 0.011 0.013 0.019
23.503 11.278 6.764
continued on the next page
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Table 36 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.070 0.108 0.106 0.068 0.068 0.101
41.930 28.093 27.604 41.206 41.065 26.255
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−12.060 −10.971 −11.001 −10.786 −10.727 −10.189
Sizet −0.146 −0.129 −0.132 −0.156 −0.155 −0.126
−27.440 −9.529 −9.768 −29.120 −28.926 −9.330
StdRett −0.007 −0.016 −0.016 −0.007 −0.007 −0.014
−31.510 −26.655 −25.808 −31.502 −31.240 −22.735
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.001
14.695 −5.532 −8.688 14.762 14.724 −6.686
StdROAt 0.000 0.040 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.026
4.528 18.273 13.779 4.599 4.649 12.167
Betat 0.731 1.139 1.138 0.744 0.740 1.136
72.353 48.439 48.160 73.390 72.918 47.887
ROAt −0.036 1.287 1.149 −0.039 −0.036 1.244
−0.505 2.256 2.013 −0.550 −0.500 2.177
Leveraget 0.239 0.185 0.527 0.237 0.239 0.424
5.403 1.919 5.408 5.363 5.407 4.332
N 55,360 15,971 15,971 55,356 55,356 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.357 0.354 0.382 0.363 0.365 0.399
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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3.1.4 Annual eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the Base-
line Specification
For Tables 37 through 42 capm5 eVERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles for each calendar year during the
1964–2009 period. The first three tables, Tables 37 through 39, use scaled
values of the Sloan (1996) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of
the baseline specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow
and accruals measures following Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for
firms prior to mid-1970, and very consistently thereafter. Table 37 employs
the Investors Intelligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the
full 1964–2009 period. Table 38 employs the sentiment data from Baker
and Wurgler (2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965.
Table 39 employs the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available
in the middle of 1987. The more limited availability of the AAII measure
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Table 39.
The second three tables, Tables 40 through 42, use scaled values of
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the
baseline specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow and
accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporadically
for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and consis-
tently thereafter. Table 40 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of
sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 41 em-
ploys the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available
beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 42 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more limited
availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Tables 40 through Tables 42.
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Table 37
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Alt-
man’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total
liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.577 0.466 0.501
9.020 7.366 7.877
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.305 2.079 2.066
ADt 1.099 −0.174 0.580 1.096 0.889 0.352
8.790 −0.531 1.767 8.767 5.451 0.657
ADt*Sentt 0.014 0.010
2.052 0.464
R&D/At 5.095 7.658 5.093 4.685 6.730
48.477 27.280 48.453 33.543 16.261
R&D/At*Sentt 0.024 0.044
4.172 2.738
PPENTt −1.074 −1.885 −1.314 −1.076 −0.899 −1.128
−31.026 −22.800 −15.364 −31.064 −20.146 −8.653
PPENTt*Sentt −0.011 −0.011
−6.130 −2.166
INTANt −0.385 −1.245 −0.820 −0.377 −0.065 −0.356
−7.879 −12.743 −8.266 −7.684 −0.901 −2.271
INTANt*Sentt −0.016 −0.020
−6.027 −3.404
CFsloant −1.765 −0.739 −0.452 −1.775 −1.756 −0.888
−22.409 −3.368 −2.026 −22.497 −19.866 −3.165
CFsloant*Sentt −0.001 0.016
−0.259 1.853
ACCsloant −0.061 0.263 0.857 −0.077 0.121 1.300
−0.621 0.899 2.904 −0.781 1.070 3.126
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.012 −0.030
−3.127 −2.030
IIbullbeart −0.001 0.003 −0.005
−2.103 3.196 −1.707
continued on the next page
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Table 37 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.049 0.065 0.061 0.049 0.049 0.062
36.640 19.593 18.583 36.667 36.488 18.647
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−9.094 −6.499 −6.446 −9.161 −9.113 −6.738
Sizet −0.127 −0.097 −0.100 −0.127 −0.127 −0.101
−28.721 −7.165 −7.379 −28.675 −28.769 −7.412
StdRett −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005
−18.727 −7.242 −6.237 −18.852 −18.838 −8.234
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
15.309 1.274 −2.021 15.421 15.280 −1.395
StdROAt 0.001 0.028 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.019
4.636 13.926 9.439 4.629 4.706 9.722
Betat 0.692 1.006 1.005 0.693 0.692 1.022
80.179 43.538 43.332 80.211 80.051 43.754
ROAt −0.543 0.280 0.684 −0.542 −0.538 0.717
−7.300 1.350 3.277 −7.278 −7.220 3.421
Leveraget −0.124 −0.523 −0.202 −0.126 −0.127 −0.222
−3.302 −5.432 −2.082 −3.348 −3.372 −2.291
N 81,443 15,728 15,728 81,443 81,443 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.289 0.330 0.359 0.289 0.290 0.362
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 38
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are
not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and
delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year
assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of
returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on
assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.577 0.466 0.491
9.020 7.366 7.747
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.305 2.079 2.156
ADt 1.099 −0.174 0.580 1.098 1.221 0.707
8.790 −0.531 1.767 8.781 9.706 2.106
ADt*Sentt −1.470 −0.451
−9.807 −0.803
R&D/At 5.095 7.658 5.105 5.169 7.578
48.477 27.280 48.533 48.453 26.587
R&D/At*Sentt −0.525 0.299
−3.384 0.602
PPENTt −1.074 −1.885 −1.314 −1.072 −1.059 −1.313
−31.026 −22.800 −15.364 −30.950 −30.490 −15.015
PPENTt*Sentt −0.084 −0.022
−2.132 −0.150
INTANt −0.385 −1.245 −0.820 −0.383 −0.407 −0.779
−7.879 −12.743 −8.266 −7.825 −8.277 −7.758
INTANt*Sentt 0.293 0.079
4.176 0.444
CFsloant −1.765 −0.739 −0.452 −1.792 −1.834 −0.519
−22.409 −3.368 −2.026 −22.721 −23.205 −2.294
CFsloant*Sentt 0.268 0.558
4.462 2.313
ACCsloant −0.061 0.263 0.857 −0.088 −0.112 0.833
−0.621 0.899 2.904 −0.903 −1.135 2.729
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.123 0.430
1.479 1.166
BWsentt −0.046 −0.028 0.313
−6.231 −1.495 3.886
continued on the next page
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Table 38 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.049 0.065 0.061 0.050 0.050 0.059
36.640 19.593 18.583 36.804 36.963 17.817
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−9.094 −6.499 −6.446 −8.989 −8.953 −5.986
Sizet −0.127 −0.097 −0.100 −0.126 −0.127 −0.107
−28.721 −7.165 −7.379 −28.632 −28.837 −7.852
StdRett −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.005
−18.727 −7.242 −6.237 −18.633 −18.893 −8.941
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
15.309 1.274 −2.021 15.621 15.692 −1.228
StdROAt 0.001 0.028 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.019
4.636 13.926 9.439 4.621 4.633 9.467
Betat 0.692 1.006 1.005 0.689 0.692 1.072
80.179 43.538 43.332 79.614 79.784 45.174
ROAt −0.543 0.280 0.684 −0.533 −0.546 0.572
−7.300 1.350 3.277 −7.160 −7.354 2.726
Leveraget −0.124 −0.523 −0.202 −0.122 −0.120 −0.276
−3.302 −5.432 −2.082 −3.238 −3.185 −2.844
N 81,443 15,728 15,728 81,406 81,406 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.289 0.330 0.359 0.290 0.291 0.368
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 39
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly dif-
ference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising
(AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total as-
sets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT)
are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm
size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the
standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by as-
sets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each
coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.577 0.466 0.439
9.020 7.366 6.934
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.305 2.079 2.177
ADt 1.099 −0.174 0.580 0.941 0.985 −0.547
8.790 −0.531 1.767 6.265 5.240 −1.281
ADt*Sentt −0.004 0.083
−0.370 3.860
R&D/At 5.095 7.658 5.370 5.283 7.148
48.477 27.280 46.960 37.483 19.610
R&D/At*Sentt 0.008 0.041
1.154 2.413
PPENTt −1.074 −1.885 −1.314 −1.071 −0.984 −1.312
−31.026 −22.800 −15.364 −26.044 −19.793 −11.595
PPENTt*Sentt −0.008 −0.001
−3.074 −0.192
INTANt −0.385 −1.245 −0.820 −0.307 −0.397 −0.855
−7.879 −12.743 −8.266 −5.767 −6.087 −7.002
INTANt*Sentt 0.007 0.006
2.388 1.008
CFsloant −1.765 −0.739 −0.452 −2.550 −2.539 −0.202
−22.409 −3.368 −2.026 −31.184 −28.605 −0.787
CFsloant*Sentt −0.000 −0.011
−0.096 −1.214
ACCsloant −0.061 0.263 0.857 −1.050 −0.919 1.811
−0.621 0.899 2.904 −9.906 −7.661 5.021
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.011 −0.055
−2.156 −3.970
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.002 0.004
3.697 1.884 1.371
continued on the next page
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Table 39 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.049 0.065 0.061 0.049 0.049 0.059
36.640 19.593 18.583 33.897 33.756 17.785
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−9.094 −6.499 −6.446 −7.260 −7.206 −6.078
Sizet −0.127 −0.097 −0.100 −0.125 −0.125 −0.097
−28.721 −7.165 −7.379 −23.786 −23.695 −7.177
StdRett −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003
−18.727 −7.242 −6.237 −18.753 −18.652 −4.877
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
15.309 1.274 −2.021 17.394 17.405 −1.171
StdROAt 0.001 0.028 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.017
4.636 13.926 9.439 4.656 4.694 8.615
Betat 0.692 1.006 1.005 0.708 0.705 1.001
80.179 43.538 43.332 70.845 70.534 43.044
ROAt −0.543 0.280 0.684 −0.185 −0.182 0.685
−7.300 1.350 3.277 −2.760 −2.730 3.275
Leveraget −0.124 −0.523 −0.202 0.027 0.027 −0.260
−3.302 −5.432 −2.082 0.629 0.620 −2.674
N 81,443 15,728 15,728 56,259 56,259 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.289 0.330 0.359 0.349 0.349 0.363
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 40
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Alt-
man’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total
liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.602 0.496 0.527
9.548 7.972 8.419
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.003
2.420 2.225 2.198
ADt 0.782 −0.228 0.580 0.777 0.937 0.319
5.160 −0.716 1.813 5.125 4.548 0.634
ADt*Sentt −0.011 0.011
−1.159 0.553
R&D/At 5.552 7.713 5.556 5.088 7.225
48.288 27.601 48.312 32.959 17.560
R&D/At*Sentt 0.028 0.021
4.214 1.295
PPENTt −1.001 −1.855 −1.274 −1.006 −0.831 −1.011
−24.187 −22.623 −15.012 −24.286 −15.160 −7.930
PPENTt*Sentt −0.011 −0.015
−4.687 −3.106
INTANt −0.314 −1.239 −0.790 −0.298 0.043 −0.280
−5.900 −12.838 −8.050 −5.568 0.534 −1.819
INTANt*Sentt −0.018 −0.022
−5.769 −3.920
CFcollinst −3.039 −1.221 −0.506 −3.048 −3.009 −0.752
−31.402 −2.068 −0.853 −31.467 −27.045 −1.205
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.001 0.007
−0.308 0.711
ACCcollinst −0.731 0.167 1.138 −0.742 −0.517 1.989
−7.431 0.280 1.901 −7.531 −4.475 3.197
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.013 −0.053
−3.457 −5.368
IIbullbeart −0.001 0.002 −0.003
−2.843 1.943 −1.005
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Table 40 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.065 0.063 0.046 0.046 0.063
33.042 20.255 19.566 33.071 32.900 19.585
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−7.976 −6.986 −7.012 −8.043 −8.022 −7.231
Sizet −0.122 −0.098 −0.101 −0.121 −0.122 −0.099
−23.108 −7.277 −7.479 −22.815 −22.886 −7.303
StdRett −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005
−18.158 −7.727 −6.777 −18.375 −18.248 −8.175
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
17.422 1.533 −1.598 17.595 17.443 −1.040
StdROAt 0.000 0.029 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.020
4.574 14.228 9.760 4.595 4.603 10.125
Betat 0.705 1.007 1.005 0.706 0.705 1.020
70.662 43.871 43.623 70.707 70.604 43.984
ROAt −0.031 0.394 0.235 −0.031 −0.031 0.264
−0.425 0.692 0.413 −0.438 −0.427 0.464
Leveraget −0.165 −0.602 −0.261 −0.171 −0.171 −0.288
−3.796 −6.351 −2.731 −3.925 −3.931 −3.009
N 55,360 15,971 15,971 55,360 55,360 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.352 0.332 0.361 0.352 0.353 0.365
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 41
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year
assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of
returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on
assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.602 0.496 0.514
9.548 7.972 8.247
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.004
2.420 2.225 2.284
ADt 0.782 −0.228 0.580 0.784 0.879 0.702
5.160 −0.716 1.813 5.172 5.727 2.154
ADt*Sentt −0.670 −0.486
−2.541 −0.872
R&D/At 5.552 7.713 5.552 5.566 7.709
48.288 27.601 48.288 47.672 27.069
R&D/At*Sentt −0.470 −0.070
−2.422 −0.142
PPENTt −1.001 −1.855 −1.274 −1.001 −0.999 −1.271
−24.187 −22.623 −15.012 −24.182 −23.971 −14.663
PPENTt*Sentt −0.046 −0.108
−0.636 −0.746
INTANt −0.314 −1.239 −0.790 −0.315 −0.298 −0.743
−5.900 −12.838 −8.050 −5.913 −5.553 −7.481
INTANt*Sentt −0.172 0.004
−1.910 0.022
CFcollinst −3.039 −1.221 −0.506 −3.038 −3.241 −0.079
−31.402 −2.068 −0.853 −31.378 −33.098 −0.132
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.163 0.637
12.042 2.361
ACCcollinst −0.731 0.167 1.138 −0.731 −0.888 1.680
−7.431 0.280 1.901 −7.422 −8.876 2.781
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.569 −0.250
6.114 −1.092
BWsentt 0.012 0.033 0.339
0.871 1.011 4.360
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Table 41 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.065 0.063 0.046 0.047 0.060
33.042 20.255 19.566 32.986 33.386 18.653
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−7.976 −6.986 −7.012 −7.958 −8.024 −6.557
Sizet −0.122 −0.098 −0.101 −0.123 −0.122 −0.107
−23.108 −7.277 −7.479 −23.093 −22.960 −7.918
StdRett −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006
−18.158 −7.727 −6.777 −18.169 −18.155 −9.241
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
17.422 1.533 −1.598 17.416 17.262 −0.833
StdROAt 0.000 0.029 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.020
4.574 14.228 9.760 4.576 4.623 9.828
Betat 0.705 1.007 1.005 0.706 0.715 1.070
70.662 43.871 43.623 70.607 71.212 45.406
ROAt −0.031 0.394 0.235 −0.031 −0.038 −0.307
−0.425 0.692 0.413 −0.434 −0.533 −0.537
Leveraget −0.165 −0.602 −0.261 −0.165 −0.174 −0.333
−3.796 −6.351 −2.731 −3.789 −3.996 −3.480
N 55,360 15,971 15,971 55,360 55,360 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.352 0.332 0.361 0.352 0.354 0.370
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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Table 42
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the
weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII.
Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by aver-
age total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. A version of Altman’s Z, firm
age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on as-
sets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled
by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below
each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.602 0.496 0.469
9.548 7.972 7.512
Deltat 0.004 0.003 0.004
2.420 2.225 2.286
ADt 0.782 −0.228 0.580 0.792 0.812 −0.378
5.160 −0.716 1.813 5.223 4.281 −0.920
ADt*Sentt −0.001 0.075
−0.154 3.547
R&D/At 5.552 7.713 5.551 5.529 7.383
48.288 27.601 48.289 39.088 20.419
R&D/At*Sentt 0.003 0.027
0.484 1.570
PPENTt −1.001 −1.855 −1.274 −1.000 −0.912 −1.281
−24.187 −22.623 −15.012 −24.169 −18.193 −11.502
PPENTt*Sentt −0.008 −0.002
−3.147 −0.303
INTANt −0.314 −1.239 −0.790 −0.318 −0.404 −0.798
−5.900 −12.838 −8.050 −5.975 −6.184 −6.614
INTANt*Sentt 0.007 0.004
2.287 0.617
CFcollinst −3.039 −1.221 −0.506 −3.028 −3.037 −0.162
−31.402 −2.068 −0.853 −31.286 −28.604 −0.266
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.002 −0.016
0.479 −1.638
ACCcollinst −0.731 0.167 1.138 −0.722 −0.573 1.893
−7.431 0.280 1.901 −7.339 −5.308 3.085
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.013 −0.052
−3.212 −5.359
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.002 0.004
3.266 1.526 1.442
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Table 42 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.065 0.063 0.046 0.046 0.061
33.042 20.255 19.566 32.883 32.790 18.795
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−7.976 −6.986 −7.012 −7.764 −7.694 −6.624
Sizet −0.122 −0.098 −0.101 −0.124 −0.123 −0.097
−23.108 −7.277 −7.479 −23.259 −23.112 −7.211
StdRett −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003
−18.158 −7.727 −6.777 −18.087 −17.872 −5.067
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
17.422 1.533 −1.598 17.434 17.439 −0.881
StdROAt 0.000 0.029 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.018
4.574 14.228 9.760 4.572 4.611 9.042
Betat 0.705 1.007 1.005 0.707 0.704 1.001
70.662 43.871 43.623 70.704 70.399 43.317
ROAt −0.031 0.394 0.235 −0.031 −0.029 0.253
−0.425 0.692 0.413 −0.432 −0.403 0.444
Leveraget −0.165 −0.602 −0.261 −0.167 −0.166 −0.306
−3.796 −6.351 −2.731 −3.841 −3.808 −3.188
N 55,360 15,971 15,971 55,356 55,356 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.352 0.332 0.361 0.352 0.353 0.366
Model Eq. 22 Eq. 23 Eq. 24 Eq. 25 Eq. 26 Eq. 27
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3.2 Detailed Determinants Tables: Single Digit SIC
Industry Fixed Effects Specification
A series of ordered logistic regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR valua-
tion decile assignments on different combinations of independent variables
following the single digit SIC industry fixed effects specification is per-
formed in Tables 44 through 67. Decile assignments based upon the VERR
and eVERR measures are made using the full 1964–2009 period and also
using each calendar year. The combination of full period and annual decile
assignments for the capm5 VERR and eVERR valuation deciles results in
four different dependent variables for the ordered logistic regressions. The
results from using the full 1964–2009 period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments as the dependent variable are presented in Tables 44 through 49.
The results from using the annual VERR decile assignments as the depen-
dent variable are presented in Tables 50 through 55. Switching to the use of
the full 1964–2009 period capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the depen-
dent variable in the ordered logistic regressions produces Tables 56 through
61, and the utilization of annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the
dependent variable in the ordered logistic regressions generates Tables 62
through 67.
Table 43 summarizes the results of the industry fixed effects specifica-
tion ordered logistic regression models detailed in Equations 18 and 19 for
all four dependent variables. Panel A presents results using the full pe-
riod capm5 VERR decile assignments as the dependent variable, Panel B
presents results using the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments as the
dependent variable, Panel C presents results using the full period capm5
eVERR decile assignments as the dependent variable, and Panel D presents
the results using the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the de-
pendent variable. Each column of each panel in Table 43 reports the av-
erage coefficients and average t-statistics across the two ordered logistic
regressions performed using the specified measure of sentiment and the
two different measures of scaled cash flow and accruals in the appropri-
ate industry fixed effects specification model with the dependent variable
listed for the panel. The equation detailing the model used for each col-
umn is reported near the bottom of each column. As each column in Table
43 presents average coefficients and average t-statistics across results pro-
duced using both measures of cash flow and accruals, the tables reporting
the individual results which are averaged to produce each column are listed
at the bottom of each column in Table 43.
Tables 44 through 67 contain the results for all of the individual ordered
logistic regressions performed using the industry fixed effects specification.
The four different dependent variables, two different measures of cash flow
and accruals, and three different measures of investor sentiment produce
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Table 43
Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR Decile Assignments
on Determinants with Industry Fixed Effects
Average coefficients and average t-statistics are presented in this table for
ordered logistic regressions using the industry fixed effects specification
models. Some independent variables are not available for the full period.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Sloan
(1996) and Collins et al. (2003). Each column reports the average coef-
ficients and average t-statistics across the two ordered logistic regressions
performed using the specified measure of sentiment and the two different
measures of scaled cash flow and accruals in the appropriate industry fixed
effects specification model. The average t-statistics are reported below
each average coefficient.
Panel A displays the average results for the ordered logistic regressions
using the full period capm5 VERR decile assignments from 1964–2009 as
the dependent variable. Panel B displays the average results for the ordered
logistic regressions using the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments from
1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Panel C displays the average results
for the ordered logistic regressions using the full period capm5 eVERR
decile assignments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Panel D
displays the average results for the ordered logistic regressions using the
annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments from 1964–2009 as the dependent
variable.
continued on the next page
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Table 43 – continued from the previous page
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Full Period VERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.089 0.204 0.107
1.350 3.071 1.610
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.679 1.831 1.943
ADt 0.729 −0.351 0.923 0.783 0.979 −0.305
3.837 −0.670 6.533 2.317 5.113 −0.721
ADt*Sentt 0.004 0.047 −0.883 −1.034 −0.002 0.070
0.716 2.253 −4.748 −1.841 −0.201 3.256
R&D/At 6.252 6.549 6.254 6.434 5.864 6.276
39.729 15.614 52.297 21.419 39.592 16.796
R&D/At*Sentt −0.005 0.015 −0.477 2.110 −0.010 0.041
−0.754 0.947 −3.116 4.029 −1.357 2.342
PPENTt 0.460 0.684 0.229 0.426 0.436 0.680
8.838 5.098 5.576 4.439 8.215 5.732
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.014 −0.194 −0.447 −0.021 −0.024
−6.555 −2.882 −3.249 −3.019 −8.476 −4.529
INTANt 0.557 −0.529 0.971 −0.056 0.487 −0.028
7.434 −3.344 18.599 −0.546 7.312 −0.223
INTANt*Sentt 0.014 0.015 −0.496 0.190 0.003 0.000
4.832 2.592 −6.462 1.040 1.029 0.083
CFt −2.736 −1.939 −2.835 −1.711 −2.591 −2.040
−28.361 −4.414 −32.237 −4.740 −25.378 −5.081
CFt*Sentt −0.002 0.009 0.983 0.947 0.005 0.013
−0.715 1.043 12.339 3.624 1.453 1.443
ACCt −1.088 0.611 −1.157 0.548 −0.649 0.610
−9.947 1.130 −11.792 1.141 −5.525 1.309
ACCt*Sentt −0.001 −0.014 0.621 0.090 −0.005 −0.026
−0.118 −1.614 7.116 −0.113 −1.252 −2.421
Sentt 0.008 0.009 0.419 0.547 0.014 0.016
8.037 3.218 19.422 6.789 11.668 5.859
AltZ1t 0.058 0.077 0.057 0.073 0.051 0.073
40.263 22.013 39.585 20.741 35.274 20.841
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−14.936 −11.773 −16.204 −11.440 −18.538 −11.231
Sizet −0.139 −0.172 −0.140 −0.190 −0.162 −0.172
−27.758 −12.523 −27.939 −13.800 −30.132 −12.486
StdRett −0.005 −0.011 −0.005 −0.016 −0.006 −0.012
−23.426 −16.655 −26.473 −26.095 −30.424 −19.588
Turnovert 0.003 −0.001 0.003 −0.000 0.002 −0.000
29.696 −3.762 29.569 −1.302 20.377 −0.857
StdROAt 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.022 0.000 0.018
4.887 9.048 5.128 10.594 4.445 8.842
Betat 0.592 1.012 0.629 1.133 0.709 1.025
63.238 42.834 66.853 46.736 70.216 43.405
ROAt −0.088 0.529 −0.151 0.046 −0.143 0.664
−1.520 1.265 −2.167 0.239 −1.789 1.817
Leveraget 1.062 1.294 1.009 1.141 1.172 1.169
25.592 13.068 24.334 11.520 26.327 11.786
Model Eq. 18 Eq. 19 Eq. 18 Eq. 19 Eq. 18 Eq. 19
Tables 44, 47 45, 48 46, 49
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Table 43 – continued from the previous page
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Annual VERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.182 0.189 0.142
2.744 2.860 2.155
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.841 1.898 1.980
ADt 1.030 −0.344 1.166 0.511 1.147 −0.504
5.565 −0.661 8.354 1.521 6.001 −1.191
ADt*Sentt 0.003 0.037 −0.967 −0.307 −0.009 0.065
0.552 1.749 −5.643 −0.549 −0.920 3.027
R&D/At 5.636 5.905 5.640 6.389 5.811 6.238
37.032 14.236 49.124 21.649 39.985 16.886
R&D/At*Sentt −0.002 0.029 −0.382 0.339 −0.017 0.021
−0.295 1.790 −2.192 0.687 −2.476 1.258
PPENTt 0.333 0.312 0.146 0.170 0.268 0.301
6.564 2.333 3.709 1.786 5.069 2.547
PPENTt*Sentt −0.013 −0.009 −0.177 −0.226 −0.017 −0.012
−6.336 −1.880 −3.226 −1.542 −7.069 −2.298
INTANt 0.757 0.351 0.559 0.072 0.548 0.020
9.827 2.232 10.604 0.699 8.247 0.161
INTANt*Sentt −0.011 −0.014 −0.130 −0.009 −0.000 0.005
−3.910 −2.486 −1.234 −0.051 −0.010 0.903
CFt −1.742 −0.662 −1.932 −0.611 −2.264 −0.713
−16.951 −1.971 −21.266 −2.274 −22.409 −2.209
CFt*Sentt −0.005 −0.003 0.643 0.799 0.004 0.009
−1.600 −0.281 7.369 3.170 1.276 1.060
ACCt −0.063 1.128 −0.380 0.530 −0.739 0.748
−0.519 1.968 −3.783 0.831 −6.384 1.415
ACCt*Sentt −0.015 −0.042 0.264 0.403 −0.004 −0.017
−3.835 −3.844 2.844 1.058 −0.824 −1.582
Sentt 0.005 −0.000 0.045 0.297 0.007 0.008
4.896 −0.171 1.475 3.755 6.119 2.737
AltZ1t 0.031 0.040 0.032 0.037 0.030 0.037
26.997 13.562 27.220 12.735 25.160 12.676
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−18.212 −8.959 −18.272 −8.470 −16.805 −8.386
Sizet −0.127 −0.153 −0.126 −0.162 −0.124 −0.152
−26.080 −11.138 −25.940 −11.798 −23.295 −11.139
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
−17.190 −4.654 −17.487 −6.921 −18.191 −2.945
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
21.507 3.461 21.709 4.031 21.802 4.187
StdROAt 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.012
4.477 7.018 4.493 6.960 4.384 6.276
Betat 0.684 0.945 0.687 0.994 0.690 0.939
73.849 40.613 73.896 42.066 69.064 40.452
ROAt −0.413 −0.206 −0.418 −0.506 −0.210 −0.205
−5.449 −0.311 −5.536 −1.014 −2.608 −0.292
Leveraget 0.708 0.531 0.700 0.477 0.748 0.492
17.634 5.496 17.458 4.941 17.204 5.085
Model Eq. 18 Eq. 19 Eq. 18 Eq. 19 Eq. 18 Eq. 19
Tables 50, 53 51, 54 52, 55
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Table 43 – continued from the previous page
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Full Period eVERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.348 0.465 0.349
5.377 7.185 5.378
Deltat 0.007 0.007 0.008
3.183 3.107 3.281
ADt 0.527 −0.458 0.795 0.576 0.583 −0.803
2.815 −0.874 5.694 1.696 3.041 −1.886
ADt*Sentt 0.002 0.042 −0.886 −1.329 0.012 0.097
0.514 2.005 −4.809 −2.362 1.228 4.498
R&D/At 3.014 5.029 6.228 7.887 5.745 7.551
23.559 15.439 51.366 25.723 38.540 19.850
R&D/At*Sentt 0.015 0.031 −0.240 2.208 0.013 0.054
−0.604 2.149 −1.800 4.136 1.814 3.035
PPENTt −1.008 −0.686 −1.086 −0.861 −0.894 −0.657
−19.341 −5.167 −26.265 −8.941 −16.759 −5.522
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.015 −0.141 −0.427 −0.016 −0.020
−6.632 −2.997 −2.610 −2.901 −6.551 −3.748
INTANt −0.676 −1.430 −0.126 −1.029 −0.588 −0.951
−8.575 −9.089 −2.128 −9.936 −8.855 −7.627
INTANt*Sentt 0.010 0.005 −0.429 0.032 0.009 −0.004
3.543 0.863 −5.705 0.179 2.798 −0.640
CFt −3.537 −1.594 −3.365 −1.592 −3.097 −1.799
−36.033 −3.827 −39.130 −4.411 −31.577 −4.237
CFt*Sentt −0.008 0.015 1.087 1.047 0.003 0.000
−2.396 1.667 13.405 3.963 0.797 0.040
ACCt −1.331 1.387 −1.061 1.473 −0.567 1.818
−12.163 2.745 −11.251 3.399 −4.895 4.101
ACCt*Sentt −0.001 −0.006 0.699 0.165 −0.009 −0.053
−0.401 −0.792 7.962 0.073 −2.245 −4.572
Sentt 0.010 0.010 0.423 0.632 0.013 0.018
10.534 3.778 19.659 7.823 11.101 6.413
AltZ1t 0.080 0.104 0.078 0.101 0.070 0.101
46.750 26.169 46.178 25.606 41.202 25.545
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001
−6.832 −7.669 −6.302 −7.187 −7.887 −6.956
Sizet −0.137 −0.123 −0.143 −0.139 −0.160 −0.119
−27.441 −9.029 −28.817 −10.147 −29.844 −8.705
StdRett −0.005 −0.013 −0.006 −0.019 −0.007 −0.014
−27.023 −20.496 −31.050 −30.247 −31.615 −23.111
Turnovert 0.003 −0.002 0.003 −0.002 0.002 −0.001
23.887 −9.773 22.134 −7.730 14.999 −6.832
StdROAt 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.028 0.000 0.024
4.938 12.161 5.478 13.392 4.795 11.229
Betat 0.667 1.142 0.699 1.281 0.756 1.152
70.337 47.455 73.519 51.727 74.118 47.926
ROAt −0.090 0.977 −0.143 0.408 −0.087 1.073
−1.545 2.744 −2.362 1.654 −1.408 3.222
Leveraget 0.203 0.551 0.242 0.391 0.365 0.404
5.072 5.518 5.791 3.925 8.168 4.046
Model Eq. 18 Eq. 19 Eq. 18 Eq. 19 Eq. 18 Eq. 19
Tables 56, 59 57, 60 58, 61
continued on the next page
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Table 43 – continued from the previous page
Panel D: Dependent Variable = Annual eVERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat 0.483 0.472 0.420
7.643 7.489 6.670
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.674 1.753 1.785
ADt 0.935 0.292 1.121 0.779 0.898 −0.473
5.083 0.558 8.061 2.312 4.690 −1.111
ADt*Sentt 0.005 0.018 −1.044 −0.418 0.001 0.085
0.857 0.843 −6.054 −0.747 0.086 3.998
R&D/At 5.098 7.242 5.522 8.044 5.588 7.709
33.681 17.124 47.476 26.821 38.229 20.531
R&D/At*Sentt 0.022 0.039 −0.527 −0.027 0.002 0.031
3.609 2.401 −3.019 −0.058 0.271 1.812
PPENTt −1.169 −1.133 −1.326 −1.332 −1.237 −1.329
−22.614 −8.417 −32.172 −13.865 −23.229 −11.187
PPENTt*Sentt −0.011 −0.012 −0.054 −0.067 −0.007 −0.001
−5.320 −2.369 −1.249 −0.463 −2.872 −0.175
INTANt −0.188 −0.526 −0.542 −0.995 −0.603 −1.056
−2.469 −3.340 −10.361 −9.673 −9.116 −8.516
INTANt*Sentt −0.017 −0.021 0.083 0.067 0.008 0.006
−6.008 −3.720 1.416 0.377 2.513 1.007
CFt −2.269 −0.888 −2.434 −0.362 −2.706 −0.271
−22.110 −2.284 −26.730 −1.320 −26.939 −0.692
CFt*Sentt −0.002 0.011 0.722 0.663 0.001 −0.012
−0.522 1.214 8.339 2.594 0.135 −1.289
ACCt −0.014 1.811 −0.319 1.478 −0.601 2.052
−0.102 3.521 −3.178 3.340 −5.119 4.538
ACCt*Sentt −0.013 −0.040 0.364 0.103 −0.011 −0.054
−3.318 −3.573 3.994 0.045 −2.465 −4.632
Sentt 0.002 −0.005 0.000 0.329 0.002 0.004
2.520 −1.669 −0.334 4.160 1.598 1.272
AltZ1t 0.047 0.062 0.048 0.059 0.047 0.060
34.074 18.950 34.546 18.018 32.738 18.105
Aget −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
−5.959 −3.947 −5.840 −3.232 −4.807 −3.345
Sizet −0.130 −0.092 −0.131 −0.099 −0.130 −0.089
−26.789 −6.733 −26.902 −7.262 −24.281 −6.576
StdRett −0.004 −0.006 −0.004 −0.006 −0.004 −0.003
−19.288 −8.857 −19.235 −9.653 −18.694 −5.482
Turnovert 0.002 −0.000 0.002 −0.000 0.002 −0.000
16.775 −0.948 16.885 −0.726 18.054 −0.749
StdROAt 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.017
4.764 9.401 4.780 9.087 4.703 8.332
Betat 0.712 1.042 0.717 1.096 0.719 1.022
76.343 44.320 76.532 45.787 71.512 43.613
ROAt −0.330 0.444 −0.339 0.067 −0.131 0.425
−4.421 1.741 −4.554 0.857 −1.760 1.670
Leveraget −0.133 −0.340 −0.130 −0.396 −0.061 −0.368
−3.229 −3.504 −3.147 −4.081 −1.383 −3.785
Model Eq. 18 Eq. 19 Eq. 18 Eq. 19 Eq. 18 Eq. 19
Tables 62, 65 63, 66 64, 67
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the twenty-four industry fixed effects specification tables. Each table in-
cludes the coefficients and t-statistics for six models within the industry
fixed effects specification which employ the specified dependent variable,
measures of cash flow and accruals, and measure of investor sentiment.
Information about the definition and availability of the independent vari-
ables used in the industry fixed effects specification models is presented in
Exhibit 3 at the beginning of the Appendix. The time period spanned by
the data used to generate each column of Tables 44 through 67 is therefore
dictated by the intersection of the time periods for which the variables used
in each column are available. The industry fixed effects are represented by
the vector of industry dummy variables included in each industry fixed
effects specification model. The industry fixed effects specification models
estimated are the following:
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t
+ γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t
+ γ24Leveragei,t + θIndDUM + εi,t) (28)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t + γ2Deltai,t + γ3ADi,t
+ γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + θIndDUM + εi,t) (29)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t + γ2Deltai,t + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t
+ θIndDUM + εi,t) (30)
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Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + θIndDUM + εi,t) (31)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ11(R&Di,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ13(INTANi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t
+ θIndDUM + εi,t) (32)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t + γ2Deltai,t + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Ai,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t + γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ11(R&D/Ai,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ13(INTANi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + θIndDUM + εi,t) (33)
In Tables 44 through 67 the industry fixed effects specification models in
Equations 28 through 33 correspond to the columns in the tables. Equation
28 is used to estimate the coefficients and t-statistics presented in column
A of Tables 44 through 67. Equation 29 is used for column B, Equation
30 is used for column C, and Equation 31 is used for column D. Equations
32 and 33, which are the same as the industry fixed effects specification
models in Equations 18 and 19 in the Methodology section of the second
essay, are used to estimate the coefficients and t-statistics presented in
columns E and F respectively.
225
3.2.1 Full Period VERR Decile Assignments Used with the Sin-
gle Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specification
For Tables 44 through 49 capm5 VERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles across the 1964–2009 period. The
first three tables, Tables 44 through 46, use scaled values of the Sloan
(1996) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the single digit SIC
industry fixed effects specification. The data required to calculate the cash
flow and accruals measures following Sloan (1996) is available sporadically
for firms prior to mid-1970, and very consistently thereafter. Table 44
employs the Investors Intelligence measure of sentiment, which is available
for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 45 employs the sentiment data from
Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available beginning in the middle of
1965. Table 46 employs the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first
available in the middle of 1987. The more limited availability of the AAII
measure accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the
analyses presented in Table 46.
The second three tables, Tables 47 through 49, use scaled values of the
Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the single
digit SIC industry fixed effects specification. The data required to calcu-
late the cash flow and accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is
available sporadically for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through
mid-1988, and consistently thereafter. Table 47 employs the Investors In-
telligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009
period. Table 48 employs the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler
(2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 49 em-
ploys the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available in the middle
of 1987. The more limited availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures
of cash flow and accruals accounts for the smaller number of observations
involved in the analyses presented in Tables 47 through Tables 49.
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Table 44
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC
codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s
Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return
on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities
scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported
below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.249 0.139 0.066
3.737 2.088 0.988
Deltat 0.003 0.002 0.002
1.647 1.519 1.543
ADt 0.711 0.279 0.641 0.721 0.518 −0.435
5.567 0.834 1.915 5.649 3.146 −0.812
ADt*Sentt 0.014 0.054
2.028 2.488
R&D/At 6.628 6.577 6.639 6.643 6.304
57.285 22.138 57.379 43.647 14.992
R&D/At*Sentt −0.002 0.026
−0.249 1.577
PPENTt 0.251 −0.050 0.315 0.255 0.431 0.569
6.684 −0.538 3.327 6.816 9.193 4.184
PPENTt*Sentt −0.011 −0.011
−6.147 −2.250
INTANt 1.313 −0.505 −0.100 1.282 0.904 −0.562
25.859 −5.019 −0.979 25.177 12.281 −3.529
INTANt*Sentt 0.017 0.016
6.362 2.856
CFsloant −2.659 −1.652 −1.377 −2.624 −2.541 −1.360
−37.428 −7.370 −6.065 −36.825 −30.586 −4.824
CFsloant*Sentt −0.004 0.016
−1.390 1.822
ACCsloant −1.561 −0.201 0.252 −1.508 −1.638 0.386
−17.437 −0.675 0.841 −16.773 −15.262 0.926
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.011 0.012
2.945 0.814
IIbullbeart 0.003 0.005 0.007
7.859 6.429 2.633
continued on the next page
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Table 44 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.065 0.083 0.078 0.064 0.065 0.076
44.657 22.933 21.888 44.534 44.502 21.461
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−10.838 −13.055 −11.932 −10.636 −10.633 −11.741
Sizet −0.113 −0.169 −0.173 −0.113 −0.114 −0.171
−25.040 −12.250 −12.549 −25.175 −25.377 −12.422
StdRett −0.004 −0.013 −0.013 −0.004 −0.003 −0.011
−20.639 −22.099 −21.517 −19.196 −18.576 −16.706
Turnovert 0.005 0.000 −0.001 0.005 0.005 −0.001
41.086 0.206 −2.864 40.375 40.261 −4.070
StdROAt 0.001 0.029 0.021 0.001 0.001 0.018
5.732 13.637 10.055 5.649 5.572 8.851
Betat 0.489 1.023 1.027 0.488 0.487 1.014
57.431 43.467 43.493 57.287 57.133 42.749
ROAt −0.187 −0.046 0.360 −0.189 −0.208 0.232
−3.257 −0.218 1.695 −3.277 −3.483 1.089
Leveraget 0.961 1.099 1.332 0.968 0.979 1.344
25.050 11.074 13.347 25.235 25.508 13.458
N 81,293 15,629 15,629 81,293 81,293 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.275 0.269 0.290 0.276 0.277 0.297
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 45
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and ac-
cruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and
property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets.
Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A ver-
sion of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock
turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and
total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics
are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.249 0.139 0.186
3.737 2.088 2.770
Deltat 0.003 0.002 0.003
1.647 1.519 1.700
ADt 0.711 0.279 0.641 0.797 0.906 0.870
5.567 0.834 1.915 6.234 7.074 2.543
ADt*Sentt −0.963 −1.076
−6.475 −1.910
R&D/At 6.628 6.577 6.746 6.784 6.321
57.285 22.138 58.325 58.102 21.054
R&D/At*Sentt −1.201 2.320
−7.447 4.410
PPENTt 0.251 −0.050 0.315 0.223 0.235 0.370
6.684 −0.538 3.327 5.929 6.250 3.835
PPENTt*Sentt −0.104 −0.373
−2.601 −2.503
INTANt 1.313 −0.505 −0.100 1.354 1.405 −0.049
25.859 −5.019 −0.979 26.608 27.473 −0.475
INTANt*Sentt −0.732 0.228
−10.116 1.248
CFsloant −2.659 −1.652 −1.377 −2.466 −2.565 −1.426
−37.428 −7.370 −6.065 −33.318 −32.925 −6.178
CFsloant*Sentt 0.816 0.790
13.132 3.232
ACCsloant −1.561 −0.201 0.252 −1.327 −1.449 0.306
−17.437 −0.675 0.841 −14.321 −14.980 0.987
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.926 0.678
10.970 1.805
BWsentt 0.566 0.603 0.549
73.998 31.684 6.692
continued on the next page
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Table 45 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.065 0.083 0.078 0.062 0.063 0.073
44.657 22.933 21.888 43.232 43.599 20.408
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−10.838 −13.055 −11.932 −12.601 −13.096 −11.373
Sizet −0.113 −0.169 −0.173 −0.118 −0.117 −0.188
−25.040 −12.250 −12.549 −26.195 −25.936 −13.623
StdRett −0.004 −0.013 −0.013 −0.004 −0.004 −0.016
−20.639 −22.099 −21.517 −20.960 −20.679 −25.861
Turnovert 0.005 0.000 −0.001 0.005 0.005 −0.000
41.086 0.206 −2.864 39.084 38.766 −1.593
StdROAt 0.001 0.029 0.021 0.001 0.001 0.021
5.732 13.637 10.055 5.869 5.873 10.302
Betat 0.489 1.023 1.027 0.541 0.545 1.134
57.431 43.467 43.493 62.858 63.263 46.642
ROAt −0.187 −0.046 0.360 −0.265 −0.316 0.109
−3.257 −0.218 1.695 −4.185 −4.532 0.510
Leveraget 0.961 1.099 1.332 0.933 0.931 1.198
25.050 11.074 13.347 24.296 24.208 11.991
N 81,293 15,629 15,629 81,255 81,255 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.275 0.269 0.290 0.322 0.326 0.317
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 46
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly dif-
ference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising
(AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total as-
sets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT)
are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to imple-
ment the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the
standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard de-
viation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included
as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.249 0.139 0.085
3.737 2.088 1.276
Deltat 0.003 0.002 0.003
1.647 1.519 1.839
ADt 0.711 0.279 0.641 1.017 1.063 −0.297
5.567 0.834 1.915 6.607 5.570 −0.688
ADt*Sentt −0.003 0.073
−0.317 3.374
R&D/At 6.628 6.577 5.689 5.771 6.031
57.285 22.138 46.704 39.001 16.096
R&D/At*Sentt −0.006 0.052
−0.770 2.993
PPENTt 0.251 −0.050 0.315 0.184 0.414 0.617
6.684 −0.538 3.327 4.107 7.831 5.155
PPENTt*Sentt −0.020 −0.022
−8.202 −4.264
INTANt 1.313 −0.505 −0.100 0.544 0.493 −0.034
25.859 −5.019 −0.979 9.890 7.394 −0.271
INTANt*Sentt 0.004 0.002
1.273 0.269
CFsloant −2.659 −1.652 −1.377 −2.150 −2.195 −1.582
−37.428 −7.370 −6.065 −24.006 −22.789 −6.095
CFsloant*Sentt 0.005 0.021
1.430 2.329
ACCsloant −1.561 −0.201 0.252 −0.678 −0.681 0.568
−17.437 −0.675 0.841 −5.941 −5.361 1.561
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.001 −0.009
0.261 −0.662
AAIIbullbeart 0.008 0.013 0.015
17.812 11.453 5.433
continued on the next page
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Table 46 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.065 0.083 0.078 0.052 0.052 0.073
44.657 22.933 21.888 35.406 35.244 20.407
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−10.838 −13.055 −11.932 −18.666 −18.614 −11.154
Sizet −0.113 −0.169 −0.173 −0.161 −0.161 −0.170
−25.040 −12.250 −12.549 −30.166 −30.111 −12.349
StdRett −0.004 −0.013 −0.013 −0.006 −0.006 −0.012
−20.639 −22.099 −21.517 −30.151 −30.153 −19.465
Turnovert 0.005 0.000 −0.001 0.002 0.002 −0.000
41.086 0.206 −2.864 20.215 20.192 −1.076
StdROAt 0.001 0.029 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.018
5.732 13.637 10.055 4.445 4.491 8.634
Betat 0.489 1.023 1.027 0.713 0.711 1.025
57.431 43.467 43.493 70.746 70.456 43.266
ROAt −0.187 −0.046 0.360 −0.307 −0.311 0.445
−3.257 −0.218 1.695 −3.899 −3.935 2.094
Leveraget 0.961 1.099 1.332 1.242 1.243 1.220
25.050 11.074 13.347 27.882 27.905 12.196
N 81,293 15,629 15,629 55,984 55,984 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.275 0.269 0.290 0.306 0.307 0.305
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 47
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of
the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by
Investors Intelligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals
(ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single
digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of
Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total li-
abilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.295 0.185 0.113
4.509 2.831 1.712
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.877 1.790 1.815
ADt 0.821 0.084 0.501 0.857 0.940 −0.267
5.290 0.257 1.536 5.524 4.529 −0.529
ADt*Sentt −0.006 0.041
−0.595 2.019
R&D/At 5.758 6.718 5.737 5.860 6.794
47.142 22.676 46.975 35.812 16.235
R&D/At*Sentt −0.009 0.005
−1.259 0.317
PPENTt 0.207 0.036 0.426 0.240 0.489 0.800
4.582 0.397 4.545 5.293 8.484 6.012
PPENTt*Sentt −0.016 −0.017
−6.964 −3.514
INTANt 0.531 −0.553 −0.120 0.441 0.209 −0.495
9.665 −5.562 −1.185 7.998 2.588 −3.160
INTANt*Sentt 0.010 0.013
3.302 2.328
CFcollinst −2.986 −3.344 −2.565 −2.944 −2.931 −2.519
−30.617 −5.606 −4.281 −30.206 −26.137 −4.004
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.000 0.003
−0.040 0.264
ACCcollinst −0.789 −0.976 0.032 −0.730 −0.537 0.836
−7.966 −1.626 0.054 −7.378 −4.633 1.334
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.013 −0.041
−3.180 −4.041
IIbullbeart 0.007 0.011 0.010
15.563 9.645 3.802
continued on the next page
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Table 47 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.052 0.082 0.078 0.052 0.052 0.078
36.009 23.635 22.791 35.993 36.024 22.565
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−19.329 −13.197 −12.056 −19.340 −19.239 −11.805
Sizet −0.157 −0.172 −0.177 −0.164 −0.163 −0.173
−29.024 −12.608 −12.963 −30.276 −30.140 −12.624
StdRett −0.006 −0.014 −0.013 −0.006 −0.006 −0.011
−30.817 −22.846 −22.305 −29.112 −28.276 −16.604
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.001
20.642 0.705 −2.270 19.061 19.131 −3.455
StdROAt 0.000 0.030 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.019
4.319 14.055 10.517 4.258 4.202 9.245
Betat 0.699 1.025 1.029 0.699 0.698 1.011
69.561 43.846 43.839 69.528 69.342 42.920
ROAt 0.026 0.997 0.790 0.030 0.032 0.826
0.359 1.742 1.380 0.414 0.443 1.441
Leveraget 1.090 0.962 1.215 1.130 1.144 1.244
24.525 9.892 12.392 25.404 25.675 12.678
N 55,105 15,880 15,880 55,105 55,105 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.306 0.273 0.295 0.310 0.311 0.302
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 48
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Collins et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by
Baker and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF),
and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (IN-
TAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the
year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed
effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of
returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on as-
sets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.295 0.185 0.222
4.509 2.831 3.372
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.877 1.790 1.961
ADt 0.821 0.084 0.501 0.852 0.941 0.696
5.290 0.257 1.536 5.487 5.991 2.091
ADt*Sentt −0.803 −0.992
−3.022 −1.772
R&D/At 5.758 6.718 5.773 5.725 6.548
47.142 22.676 47.241 46.492 21.784
R&D/At*Sentt 0.247 1.900
1.215 3.648
PPENTt 0.207 0.036 0.426 0.208 0.223 0.481
4.582 0.397 4.545 4.585 4.901 5.042
PPENTt*Sentt −0.283 −0.521
−3.897 −3.535
INTANt 0.531 −0.553 −0.120 0.518 0.538 −0.063
9.665 −5.562 −1.185 9.432 9.724 −0.617
INTANt*Sentt −0.260 0.152
−2.809 0.832
CFcollinst −2.986 −3.344 −2.565 −2.966 −3.105 −1.995
−30.617 −5.606 −4.281 −30.388 −31.549 −3.302
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.149 1.104
11.547 4.017
ACCcollinst −0.789 −0.976 0.032 −0.774 −0.864 0.789
−7.966 −1.626 0.054 −7.799 −8.603 1.296
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.315 −0.499
3.261 −2.031
BWsentt 0.186 0.235 0.546
13.404 7.160 6.885
continued on the next page
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Table 48 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.052 0.082 0.078 0.051 0.051 0.073
36.009 23.635 22.791 35.556 35.571 21.074
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−19.329 −13.197 −12.056 −19.194 −19.312 −11.506
Sizet −0.157 −0.172 −0.177 −0.163 −0.162 −0.192
−29.024 −12.608 −12.963 −30.071 −29.942 −13.976
StdRett −0.006 −0.014 −0.013 −0.007 −0.007 −0.016
−30.817 −22.846 −22.305 −32.266 −32.267 −26.328
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
20.642 0.705 −2.270 20.524 20.371 −1.012
StdROAt 0.000 0.030 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.023
4.319 14.055 10.517 4.359 4.382 10.886
Betat 0.699 1.025 1.029 0.710 0.713 1.132
69.561 43.846 43.839 70.340 70.443 46.831
ROAt 0.026 0.997 0.790 0.017 0.014 −0.018
0.359 1.742 1.380 0.238 0.197 −0.031
Leveraget 1.090 0.962 1.215 1.098 1.087 1.084
24.525 9.892 12.392 24.698 24.460 11.050
N 55,105 15,880 15,880 55,105 55,105 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.306 0.273 0.295 0.309 0.310 0.321
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 49
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data were calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the
weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII.
Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by aver-
age total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used
to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm
size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the
standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by as-
sets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each
coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.295 0.185 0.128
4.509 2.831 1.944
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.877 1.790 2.046
ADt 0.821 0.084 0.501 0.881 0.896 −0.313
5.290 0.257 1.536 5.676 4.657 −0.754
ADt*Sentt −0.001 0.067
−0.085 3.137
R&D/At 5.758 6.718 5.764 5.957 6.520
47.142 22.676 47.207 40.184 17.497
R&D/At*Sentt −0.014 0.030
−1.945 1.692
PPENTt 0.207 0.036 0.426 0.211 0.458 0.743
4.582 0.397 4.545 4.667 8.599 6.310
PPENTt*Sentt −0.021 −0.025
−8.750 −4.794
INTANt 0.531 −0.553 −0.120 0.513 0.482 −0.021
9.665 −5.562 −1.185 9.334 7.231 −0.174
INTANt*Sentt 0.002 −0.001
0.785 −0.103
CFcollinst −2.986 −3.344 −2.565 −2.931 −2.987 −2.497
−30.617 −5.606 −4.281 −30.079 −27.967 −4.066
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.005 0.006
1.476 0.558
ACCcollinst −0.789 −0.976 0.032 −0.742 −0.617 0.653
−7.966 −1.626 0.054 −7.491 −5.689 1.057
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.011 −0.042
−2.765 −4.180
AAIIbullbeart 0.009 0.014 0.017
18.067 11.884 6.285
continued on the next page
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Table 49 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.052 0.082 0.078 0.051 0.051 0.073
36.009 23.635 22.791 35.416 35.304 21.275
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−19.329 −13.197 −12.056 −18.531 −18.463 −11.307
Sizet −0.157 −0.172 −0.177 −0.164 −0.163 −0.173
−29.024 −12.608 −12.963 −30.244 −30.153 −12.624
StdRett −0.006 −0.014 −0.013 −0.006 −0.006 −0.012
−30.817 −22.846 −22.305 −30.777 −30.694 −19.711
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
20.642 0.705 −2.270 20.585 20.562 −0.639
StdROAt 0.000 0.030 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.019
4.319 14.055 10.517 4.359 4.399 9.050
Betat 0.699 1.025 1.029 0.709 0.706 1.026
69.561 43.846 43.839 70.300 69.976 43.544
ROAt 0.026 0.997 0.790 0.022 0.026 0.883
0.359 1.742 1.380 0.311 0.357 1.540
Leveraget 1.090 0.962 1.215 1.096 1.100 1.118
24.525 9.892 12.392 24.670 24.749 11.377
N 55,105 15,880 15,880 55,101 55,101 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.306 0.273 0.295 0.311 0.312 0.310
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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3.2.2 Annual VERR Decile Assignments Used with the Single
Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specification
For Tables 50 through 55 capm5 VERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles for each calendar year during the
1964–2009 period. The first three tables, Tables 50 through 52, use scaled
values of the Sloan (1996) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of
the single digit SIC industry fixed effects specification. The data required
to calculate the cash flow and accruals measures following Sloan (1996)
is available sporadically for firms prior to mid-1970, and very consistently
thereafter. Table 50 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of senti-
ment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 51 employs
the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available be-
ginning in the middle of 1965. Table 52 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more lim-
ited availability of the AAII measure accounts for the smaller number of
observations involved in the analyses presented in Table 52.
The second three tables, Tables 53 through 55, use scaled values of the
Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the single
digit SIC industry fixed effects specification. The data required to calcu-
late the cash flow and accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is
available sporadically for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through
mid-1988, and consistently thereafter. Table 53 employs the Investors In-
telligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009
period. Table 54 employs the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler
(2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 55 em-
ploys the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available in the middle
of 1987. The more limited availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures
of cash flow and accruals accounts for the smaller number of observations
involved in the analyses presented in Tables 53 through Tables 55.
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Table 50
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are
not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and
delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC
codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s
Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return
on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities
scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported
below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.264 0.160 0.169
3.975 2.396 2.532
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.965 1.795 1.778
ADt 1.158 0.049 0.397 1.159 0.944 −0.388
9.086 0.146 1.189 9.091 5.741 −0.725
ADt*Sentt 0.015 0.039
2.126 1.807
R&D/At 5.611 6.416 5.612 5.608 5.671
51.493 22.014 51.497 38.556 13.628
R&D/At*Sentt −0.000 0.039
−0.083 2.456
PPENTt 0.186 −0.244 0.120 0.187 0.380 0.246
5.002 −2.644 1.271 5.014 8.144 1.811
PPENTt*Sentt −0.012 −0.007
−6.760 −1.403
INTANt 0.567 −0.358 0.052 0.565 0.744 0.351
11.260 −3.581 0.508 11.194 10.129 2.215
INTANt*Sentt −0.010 −0.013
−3.616 −2.296
CFsloant −1.080 −1.075 −0.782 −1.078 −1.019 −0.916
−13.656 −4.874 −3.513 −13.608 −11.509 −3.290
CFsloant*Sentt −0.003 0.005
−1.370 0.632
ACCsloant 0.279 −0.362 0.065 0.283 0.498 0.399
2.829 −1.229 0.219 2.859 4.368 0.965
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.013 −0.019
−3.487 −1.294
IIbullbeart 0.000 0.004 −0.002
0.510 5.340 −0.541
continued on the next page
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Table 50 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.033 0.044 0.041 0.033 0.033 0.041
28.940 14.463 13.606 28.931 28.879 13.568
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−19.514 −10.076 −8.859 −19.491 −19.437 −8.977
Sizet −0.129 −0.151 −0.154 −0.129 −0.130 −0.153
−29.002 −10.971 −11.219 −29.006 −29.130 −11.135
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
−16.786 −4.792 −4.260 −16.513 −16.444 −4.986
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.406 6.045 3.186 21.313 21.224 3.394
StdROAt 0.001 0.021 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.014
4.635 10.374 6.937 4.633 4.637 6.852
Betat 0.681 0.937 0.940 0.681 0.679 0.947
78.976 40.465 40.506 78.948 78.729 40.532
ROAt −0.820 −0.284 0.030 −0.820 −0.818 0.033
−10.831 −1.351 0.141 −10.835 −10.796 0.156
Leveraget 0.727 0.371 0.603 0.728 0.732 0.586
19.437 3.834 6.205 19.447 19.553 6.029
N 81,293 15,629 15,629 81,293 81,293 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.242 0.252 0.274 0.242 0.243 0.276
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 51
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are
not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and
delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year
assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.264 0.160 0.176
3.975 2.396 2.637
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.965 1.795 1.847
ADt 1.158 0.049 0.397 1.156 1.270 0.521
9.086 0.146 1.189 9.068 9.916 1.528
ADt*Sentt −1.358 −0.328
−9.107 −0.584
R&D/At 5.611 6.416 5.618 5.649 6.324
51.493 22.014 51.527 51.223 21.423
R&D/At*Sentt −0.336 0.535
−2.164 1.081
PPENTt 0.186 −0.244 0.120 0.188 0.205 0.145
5.002 −2.644 1.271 5.051 5.485 1.507
PPENTt*Sentt −0.135 −0.183
−3.420 −1.241
INTANt 0.567 −0.358 0.052 0.568 0.560 0.089
11.260 −3.581 0.508 11.283 11.064 0.866
INTANt*Sentt 0.117 0.017
1.632 0.095
CFsloant −1.080 −1.075 −0.782 −1.097 −1.130 −0.910
−13.656 −4.874 −3.513 −13.854 −14.245 −4.027
CFsloant*Sentt 0.230 0.834
3.827 3.487
ACCsloant 0.279 −0.362 0.065 0.262 0.248 −0.053
2.829 −1.229 0.219 2.659 2.509 −0.174
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.072 0.852
0.864 2.318
BWsentt −0.035 0.007 0.274
−4.742 0.358 3.400
continued on the next page
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Table 51 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.033 0.044 0.041 0.033 0.034 0.038
28.940 14.463 13.606 29.057 29.135 12.803
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−19.514 −10.076 −8.859 −19.437 −19.452 −8.442
Sizet −0.129 −0.151 −0.154 −0.129 −0.129 −0.161
−29.002 −10.971 −11.219 −28.929 −29.022 −11.686
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004
−16.786 −4.792 −4.260 −16.760 −16.901 −6.898
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.406 6.045 3.186 21.617 21.651 3.922
StdROAt 0.001 0.021 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.013
4.635 10.374 6.937 4.635 4.654 6.783
Betat 0.681 0.937 0.940 0.678 0.679 0.995
78.976 40.465 40.506 78.499 78.456 41.951
ROAt −0.820 −0.284 0.030 −0.814 −0.824 −0.088
−10.831 −1.351 0.141 −10.749 −10.896 −0.417
Leveraget 0.727 0.371 0.603 0.729 0.732 0.530
19.437 3.834 6.205 19.482 19.537 5.452
N 81,293 15,629 15,629 81,255 81,255 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.242 0.252 0.274 0.242 0.243 0.282
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 52
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Sloan
(1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly difference
between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising (AD),
R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets;
intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are
scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the
industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard
deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation
of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as
control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.264 0.160 0.129
3.975 2.396 1.929
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.965 1.795 1.934
ADt 1.158 0.049 0.397 1.080 1.193 −0.560
9.086 0.146 1.189 7.045 6.263 −1.301
ADt*Sentt −0.009 0.067
−0.950 3.137
R&D/At 5.611 6.416 5.548 5.751 6.092
51.493 22.014 46.983 39.571 16.435
R&D/At*Sentt −0.016 0.029
−2.229 1.690
PPENTt 0.186 −0.244 0.120 0.061 0.257 0.271
5.002 −2.644 1.271 1.355 4.884 2.274
PPENTt*Sentt −0.017 −0.011
−6.925 −2.112
INTANt 0.567 −0.358 0.052 0.574 0.571 0.030
11.260 −3.581 0.508 10.498 8.603 0.240
INTANt*Sentt 0.000 0.006
0.012 0.995
CFsloant −1.080 −1.075 −0.782 −1.865 −1.899 −0.914
−13.656 −4.874 −3.513 −20.883 −19.826 −3.580
CFsloant*Sentt 0.003 0.016
1.030 1.784
ACCsloant 0.279 −0.362 0.065 −0.688 −0.642 0.347
2.829 −1.229 0.219 −6.025 −5.048 0.963
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.003 −0.008
−0.687 −0.561
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.007 0.007
4.383 6.062 2.379
continued on the next page
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Table 52 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.033 0.044 0.041 0.031 0.031 0.038
28.940 14.463 13.606 25.515 25.424 12.688
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−19.514 −10.076 −8.859 −16.919 −16.874 −8.334
Sizet −0.129 −0.151 −0.154 −0.124 −0.124 −0.152
−29.002 −10.971 −11.219 −23.373 −23.378 −11.060
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
−16.786 −4.792 −4.260 −18.277 −18.312 −2.972
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.406 6.045 3.186 21.760 21.737 4.116
StdROAt 0.001 0.021 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.012
4.635 10.374 6.937 4.417 4.442 6.138
Betat 0.681 0.937 0.940 0.692 0.691 0.939
78.976 40.465 40.506 69.374 69.149 40.324
ROAt −0.820 −0.284 0.030 −0.410 −0.414 0.045
−10.831 −1.351 0.141 −5.087 −5.123 0.211
Leveraget 0.727 0.371 0.603 0.809 0.813 0.540
19.437 3.834 6.205 18.644 18.715 5.549
N 81,293 15,629 15,629 55,984 55,984 15,629
Pseudo-R2 0.242 0.252 0.274 0.295 0.295 0.280
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 53
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC
codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s
Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return
on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities
scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported
below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.291 0.189 0.194
4.471 2.894 2.955
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.049 1.920 1.903
ADt 0.982 0.012 0.410 0.981 1.116 −0.300
6.356 0.037 1.261 6.347 5.389 −0.596
ADt*Sentt −0.010 0.034
−1.022 1.692
R&D/At 5.626 6.486 5.627 5.664 6.138
47.605 22.354 47.606 35.509 14.844
R&D/At*Sentt −0.003 0.018
−0.507 1.124
PPENTt 0.071 −0.213 0.166 0.069 0.286 0.378
1.567 −2.337 1.780 1.532 4.984 2.856
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.012
−5.911 −2.356
INTANt 0.528 −0.418 0.013 0.532 0.770 0.351
9.663 −4.227 0.132 9.688 9.526 2.249
INTANt*Sentt −0.013 −0.015
−4.204 −2.675
CFcollinst −2.575 −1.294 −0.569 −2.577 −2.464 −0.408
−26.911 −2.182 −0.954 −26.918 −22.393 −0.652
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.006 −0.012
−1.829 −1.195
ACCcollinst −0.886 −0.114 0.753 −0.889 −0.624 1.857
−8.981 −0.191 1.253 −9.002 −5.406 2.972
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.016 −0.065
−4.182 −6.393
IIbullbeart −0.000 0.005 0.001
−0.721 4.453 0.199
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Table 53 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.030 0.041 0.039 0.030 0.030 0.039
25.139 14.258 13.594 25.143 25.114 13.557
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−17.023 −10.153 −8.934 −17.029 −16.988 −8.941
Sizet −0.123 −0.152 −0.156 −0.123 −0.124 −0.152
−23.057 −11.180 −11.467 −22.934 −23.030 −11.141
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003
−18.163 −4.941 −4.466 −18.128 −17.936 −4.321
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.901 6.150 3.435 21.872 21.790 3.527
StdROAt 0.000 0.021 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.014
4.310 10.609 7.213 4.315 4.316 7.183
Betat 0.689 0.938 0.941 0.689 0.688 0.944
69.121 40.799 40.808 69.127 68.970 40.694
ROAt −0.008 −0.282 −0.496 −0.009 −0.007 −0.445
−0.116 −0.494 −0.867 −0.119 −0.101 −0.778
Leveraget 0.678 0.248 0.495 0.676 0.684 0.476
15.608 2.612 5.176 15.551 15.714 4.964
N 55,105 15,880 15,880 55,105 55,105 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.298 0.254 0.276 0.298 0.298 0.278
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 54
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year
assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.291 0.189 0.202
4.471 2.894 3.082
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.049 1.920 1.949
ADt 0.982 0.012 0.410 0.982 1.062 0.501
6.356 0.037 1.261 6.352 6.791 1.514
ADt*Sentt −0.577 −0.287
−2.178 −0.514
R&D/At 5.626 6.486 5.626 5.632 6.455
47.605 22.354 47.605 47.024 21.875
R&D/At*Sentt −0.429 0.143
−2.220 0.292
PPENTt 0.071 −0.213 0.166 0.071 0.087 0.196
1.567 −2.337 1.780 1.567 1.932 2.064
PPENTt*Sentt −0.219 −0.269
−3.032 −1.843
INTANt 0.528 −0.418 0.013 0.528 0.558 0.054
9.663 −4.227 0.132 9.666 10.144 0.532
INTANt*Sentt −0.378 −0.036
−4.101 −0.197
CFcollinst −2.575 −1.294 −0.569 −2.576 −2.734 −0.313
−26.911 −2.182 −0.954 −26.912 −28.287 −0.521
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.055 0.764
10.911 2.853
ACCcollinst −0.886 −0.114 0.753 −0.886 −1.008 1.113
−8.981 −0.191 1.253 −8.983 −10.074 1.836
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.456 −0.047
4.824 −0.202
BWsentt −0.004 0.084 0.321
−0.274 2.591 4.111
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Table 54 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.030 0.041 0.039 0.030 0.030 0.036
25.139 14.258 13.594 25.128 25.306 12.667
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−17.023 −10.153 −8.934 −17.025 −17.091 −8.497
Sizet −0.123 −0.152 −0.156 −0.123 −0.123 −0.162
−23.057 −11.180 −11.467 −22.951 −22.858 −11.910
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
−18.163 −4.941 −4.466 −18.031 −18.072 −6.944
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.901 6.150 3.435 21.904 21.767 4.141
StdROAt 0.000 0.021 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.014
4.310 10.609 7.213 4.309 4.331 7.136
Betat 0.689 0.938 0.941 0.689 0.695 0.994
69.121 40.799 40.808 69.002 69.336 42.180
ROAt −0.008 −0.282 −0.496 −0.008 −0.013 −0.924
−0.116 −0.494 −0.867 −0.113 −0.175 −1.611
Leveraget 0.678 0.248 0.495 0.678 0.669 0.424
15.608 2.612 5.176 15.603 15.379 4.430
N 55,105 15,880 15,880 55,105 55,105 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.298 0.254 0.276 0.298 0.300 0.284
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 55
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins et al.
(2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly difference
between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising (AD),
R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets;
intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are
scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the
industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard
deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation
of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as
control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.291 0.189 0.156
4.471 2.894 2.381
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.049 1.920 2.026
ADt 0.982 0.012 0.410 0.994 1.101 −0.448
6.356 0.037 1.261 6.427 5.738 −1.082
ADt*Sentt −0.009 0.062
−0.889 2.916
R&D/At 5.626 6.486 5.623 5.872 6.385
47.605 22.354 47.587 40.399 17.338
R&D/At*Sentt −0.019 0.014
−2.723 0.825
PPENTt 0.071 −0.213 0.166 0.072 0.279 0.330
1.567 −2.337 1.780 1.596 5.254 2.820
PPENTt*Sentt −0.018 −0.013
−7.213 −2.485
INTANt 0.528 −0.418 0.013 0.525 0.524 0.010
9.663 −4.227 0.132 9.604 7.890 0.082
INTANt*Sentt −0.000 0.005
−0.033 0.811
CFcollinst −2.575 −1.294 −0.569 −2.562 −2.630 −0.512
−26.911 −2.182 −0.954 −26.776 −24.992 −0.838
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.006 0.003
1.523 0.337
ACCcollinst −0.886 −0.114 0.753 −0.876 −0.836 1.150
−8.981 −0.191 1.253 −8.886 −7.720 1.867
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.004 −0.026
−0.960 −2.603
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.007 0.008
4.142 6.176 3.094
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Table 55 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.030 0.041 0.039 0.029 0.029 0.037
25.139 14.258 13.594 24.972 24.896 12.665
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−17.023 −10.153 −8.934 −16.791 −16.736 −8.438
Sizet −0.123 −0.152 −0.156 −0.125 −0.125 −0.153
−23.057 −11.180 −11.467 −23.268 −23.213 −11.219
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
−18.163 −4.941 −4.466 −18.081 −18.070 −2.918
Turnovert 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
21.901 6.150 3.435 21.886 21.867 4.258
StdROAt 0.000 0.021 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.013
4.310 10.609 7.213 4.305 4.326 6.414
Betat 0.689 0.938 0.941 0.691 0.689 0.939
69.121 40.799 40.808 69.209 68.980 40.580
ROAt −0.008 −0.282 −0.496 −0.009 −0.007 −0.455
−0.116 −0.494 −0.867 −0.124 −0.093 −0.795
Leveraget 0.678 0.248 0.495 0.678 0.682 0.443
15.608 2.612 5.176 15.626 15.694 4.621
N 55,105 15,880 15,880 55,101 55,101 15,880
Pseudo-R2 0.298 0.254 0.276 0.298 0.299 0.282
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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3.2.3 Full Period eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specification
For Tables 56 through 61 capm5 eVERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles across the 1964–2009 period. The first
three tables, Tables 56 through 58, use scaled values of the Sloan (1996)
measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the single digit SIC industry
fixed effects specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow
and accruals measures following Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for
firms prior to mid-1970, and very consistently thereafter. Table 56 employs
the Investors Intelligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the
full 1964–2009 period. Table 57 employs the sentiment data from Baker
and Wurgler (2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965.
Table 58 employs the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available
in the middle of 1987. The more limited availability of the AAII measure
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Table 58.
The second three tables, Tables 59 through 61, use scaled values of the
Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the single
digit SIC industry fixed effects specification. The data required to calcu-
late the cash flow and accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is
available sporadically for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through
mid-1988, and consistently thereafter. Table 59 employs the Investors In-
telligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009
period. Table 60 employs the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler
(2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 61 em-
ploys the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available in the middle
of 1987. The more limited availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures
of cash flow and accruals accounts for the smaller number of observations
involved in the analyses presented in Tables 59 through Tables 61.
252
Table 56
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC
codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s
Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return
on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities
scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported
below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.500 0.377 0.296
7.680 5.784 4.535
Deltat 0.006 0.007 0.007
2.827 3.005 3.120
ADt 0.691 0.023 0.435 0.707 0.457 −0.403
5.398 0.068 1.292 5.520 2.766 −0.745
ADt*Sentt 0.017 0.045
2.532 2.070
R&D/At 6.458 7.980 6.473 5.927 7.231
55.350 26.331 55.478 39.741 16.909
R&D/At*Sentt 0.032 0.055
5.311 3.323
PPENTt −1.048 −1.352 −0.936 −1.043 −0.890 −0.684
−27.764 −14.494 −9.870 −27.623 −18.893 −5.020
PPENTt*Sentt −0.009 −0.012
−5.271 −2.291
INTANt 0.166 −1.534 −1.089 0.121 −0.227 −1.352
3.300 −15.154 −10.585 2.409 −3.093 −8.443
INTANt*Sentt 0.016 0.006
5.811 1.081
CFsloant −3.192 −1.715 −1.331 −3.145 −3.042 −1.380
−44.523 −7.579 −5.782 −43.839 −36.890 −4.819
CFsloant*Sentt −0.004 0.024
−1.661 2.700
ACCsloant −1.599 0.484 1.142 −1.528 −1.663 1.380
−17.879 1.620 3.776 −17.048 −15.637 3.272
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.012 0.012
3.156 0.782
IIbullbeart 0.004 0.005 0.008
10.249 5.907 2.892
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Table 56 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.088 0.111 0.105 0.087 0.087 0.102
52.031 27.168 26.183 51.807 51.698 25.614
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−1.465 −8.873 −7.581 −1.196 −1.180 −7.398
Sizet −0.120 −0.115 −0.122 −0.121 −0.122 −0.119
−26.759 −8.424 −8.894 −26.981 −27.103 −8.682
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.016 −0.005 −0.005 −0.013
−27.358 −26.089 −25.383 −25.519 −24.625 −20.329
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.004 0.004 −0.002
32.061 −5.617 −9.320 31.202 30.991 −10.610
StdROAt 0.001 0.036 0.027 0.001 0.001 0.024
5.950 16.583 12.572 5.857 5.787 11.192
Betat 0.566 1.142 1.151 0.565 0.563 1.139
65.669 47.810 47.964 65.525 65.298 47.263
ROAt −0.137 0.502 0.890 −0.136 −0.148 0.706
−2.468 2.387 4.188 −2.464 −2.669 3.311
Leveraget 0.288 0.311 0.577 0.296 0.306 0.563
7.433 3.117 5.750 7.637 7.882 5.609
N 81,436 15,728 15,728 81,436 81,436 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.320 0.358 0.384 0.321 0.322 0.391
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 57
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and ac-
cruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and
property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets.
Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A ver-
sion of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock
turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and
total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics
are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.500 0.377 0.442
7.680 5.784 6.771
Deltat 0.006 0.007 0.006
2.827 3.005 2.960
ADt 0.691 0.023 0.435 0.789 0.889 0.700
5.398 0.068 1.292 6.154 6.924 2.036
ADt*Sentt −0.993 −1.379
−6.679 −2.444
R&D/At 6.458 7.980 6.546 6.567 7.768
55.350 26.331 56.225 55.913 25.364
R&D/At*Sentt −0.983 2.437
−6.016 4.544
PPENTt −1.048 −1.352 −0.936 −1.145 −1.135 −0.911
−27.764 −14.494 −9.870 −30.254 −29.919 −9.406
PPENTt*Sentt −0.119 −0.360
−2.974 −2.430
INTANt 0.166 −1.534 −1.089 0.152 0.196 −1.045
3.300 −15.154 −10.585 3.014 3.871 −10.029
INTANt*Sentt −0.636 0.071
−8.973 0.392
CFsloant −3.192 −1.715 −1.331 −2.990 −3.102 −1.353
−44.523 −7.579 −5.782 −41.524 −42.169 −5.789
CFsloant*Sentt 0.852 0.878
13.654 3.536
ACCsloant −1.599 0.484 1.142 −1.341 −1.472 1.264
−17.879 1.620 3.776 −14.907 −16.063 4.036
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.948 0.753
11.198 1.975
BWsentt 0.585 0.613 0.634
76.365 32.197 7.712
continued on the next page
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Table 57 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.088 0.111 0.105 0.084 0.085 0.100
52.031 27.168 26.183 50.515 50.876 24.938
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−1.465 −8.873 −7.581 −3.119 −3.610 −6.970
Sizet −0.120 −0.115 −0.122 −0.128 −0.127 −0.137
−26.759 −8.424 −8.894 −28.384 −28.223 −9.956
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.016 −0.005 −0.005 −0.019
−27.358 −26.089 −25.383 −28.264 −28.091 −29.910
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.003 0.003 −0.002
32.061 −5.617 −9.320 29.674 29.346 −8.128
StdROAt 0.001 0.036 0.027 0.001 0.001 0.028
5.950 16.583 12.572 6.184 6.243 13.127
Betat 0.566 1.142 1.151 0.629 0.633 1.281
65.669 47.810 47.964 72.103 72.468 51.596
ROAt −0.137 0.502 0.890 −0.195 −0.234 0.644
−2.468 2.387 4.188 −3.464 −4.011 3.010
Leveraget 0.288 0.311 0.577 0.226 0.224 0.438
7.433 3.117 5.750 5.824 5.786 4.358
N 81,436 15,728 15,728 81,399 81,399 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.320 0.358 0.384 0.368 0.371 0.412
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 58
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly dif-
ference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising
(AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total as-
sets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT)
are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to imple-
ment the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the
standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard de-
viation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included
as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.500 0.377 0.322
7.680 5.784 4.928
Deltat 0.006 0.007 0.007
2.827 3.005 3.109
ADt 0.691 0.023 0.435 0.798 0.683 −0.752
5.398 0.068 1.292 5.176 3.571 −1.733
ADt*Sentt 0.011 0.099
1.084 4.544
R&D/At 6.458 7.980 5.775 5.581 7.331
55.350 26.331 46.611 37.558 19.206
R&D/At*Sentt 0.019 0.065
2.510 3.648
PPENTt −1.048 −1.352 −0.936 −1.112 −0.934 −0.703
−27.764 −14.494 −9.870 −24.614 −17.596 −5.863
PPENTt*Sentt −0.016 −0.019
−6.346 −3.637
INTANt 0.166 −1.534 −1.089 −0.483 −0.603 −0.982
3.300 −15.154 −10.585 −8.852 −9.096 −7.827
INTANt*Sentt 0.010 −0.002
3.139 −0.401
CFsloant −3.192 −1.715 −1.331 −2.766 −2.778 −1.211
−44.523 −7.579 −5.782 −34.515 −31.650 −4.591
CFsloant*Sentt 0.002 0.004
0.656 0.444
ACCsloant −1.599 0.484 1.142 −0.887 −0.857 2.124
−17.879 1.620 3.776 −8.539 −7.236 5.759
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.001 −0.049
−0.237 −3.478
AAIIbullbeart 0.011 0.013 0.018
23.019 11.004 6.223
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Table 58 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.088 0.111 0.105 0.072 0.072 0.100
52.031 27.168 26.183 41.702 41.499 24.782
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−1.465 −8.873 −7.581 −7.886 −7.850 −6.759
Sizet −0.120 −0.115 −0.122 −0.161 −0.160 −0.117
−26.759 −8.424 −8.894 −30.144 −29.977 −8.514
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.016 −0.007 −0.006 −0.014
−27.358 −26.089 −25.383 −31.514 −31.389 −22.845
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
32.061 −5.617 −9.320 14.718 14.704 −7.165
StdROAt 0.001 0.036 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.023
5.950 16.583 12.572 4.776 4.836 10.996
Betat 0.566 1.142 1.151 0.763 0.759 1.151
65.669 47.810 47.964 74.859 74.429 47.752
ROAt −0.137 0.502 0.890 −0.141 −0.139 0.916
−2.468 2.387 4.188 −2.352 −2.330 4.295
Leveraget 0.288 0.311 0.577 0.467 0.466 0.440
7.433 3.117 5.750 10.460 10.424 4.374
N 81,436 15,728 15,728 56,257 56,257 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.320 0.358 0.384 0.366 0.367 0.401
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 59
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of
the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by
Investors Intelligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals
(ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single
digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of
Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total li-
abilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.558 0.469 0.400
8.637 7.325 6.219
Deltat 0.007 0.007 0.007
3.133 3.157 3.246
ADt 0.326 −0.247 0.170 0.377 0.597 −0.513
2.098 −0.753 0.517 2.422 2.864 −1.003
ADt*Sentt −0.014 0.040
−1.505 1.940
R&D/At 0.037 2.919 0.037 0.101 2.827
7.032 18.893 6.975 7.377 13.969
R&D/At*Sentt −0.002 0.008
−6.518 0.975
PPENTt −1.439 −1.268 −1.045 −1.405 −1.126 −0.687
−31.925 −13.757 −11.185 −31.156 −19.790 −5.314
PPENTt*Sentt −0.018 −0.018
−7.993 −3.703
INTANt −0.898 −1.543 −1.319 −1.018 −1.125 −1.507
−16.654 −15.445 −13.075 −18.796 −14.057 −9.735
INTANt*Sentt 0.004 0.004
1.275 0.645
CFcollinst −4.319 −3.394 −1.785 −4.262 −4.032 −1.807
−43.062 −5.700 −2.958 −42.755 −35.176 −2.835
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.011 0.007
−3.132 0.634
ACCcollinst −1.328 −0.333 0.932 −1.257 −1.000 1.394
−13.198 −0.555 1.542 −12.585 −8.690 2.217
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.015 −0.025
−3.959 −2.365
IIbullbeart 0.009 0.014 0.012
19.512 15.160 4.664
continued on the next page
259
Table 59 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.072 0.111 0.106 0.072 0.072 0.105
41.915 28.351 26.935 41.796 41.802 26.723
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−12.670 −9.265 −8.149 −12.646 −12.483 −7.940
Sizet −0.142 −0.120 −0.132 −0.151 −0.151 −0.128
−26.131 −8.805 −9.700 −27.751 −27.779 −9.377
StdRett −0.007 −0.016 −0.016 −0.006 −0.006 −0.013
−32.215 −27.168 −26.028 −30.146 −29.420 −20.663
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
18.562 −4.867 −7.869 16.621 16.784 −8.935
StdROAt 0.001 0.037 0.031 0.001 0.001 0.028
4.003 17.009 14.259 4.073 4.088 13.130
Betat 0.773 1.145 1.163 0.773 0.770 1.145
75.694 48.239 48.549 75.707 75.377 47.647
ROAt −0.045 1.310 1.237 −0.034 −0.031 1.248
−0.614 2.296 2.161 −0.467 −0.421 2.178
Leveraget 0.032 0.174 0.520 0.075 0.101 0.539
0.713 1.785 5.239 1.691 2.262 5.428
N 54,893 15,971 15,964 54,893 54,893 15,964
Pseudo-R2 0.331 0.363 0.383 0.336 0.338 0.389
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 60
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Collins et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by
Baker and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF),
and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (IN-
TAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the
year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed
effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of
returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on as-
sets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.558 0.432 0.489
8.637 6.721 7.599
Deltat 0.007 0.008 0.007
3.133 3.414 3.255
ADt 0.556 −0.247 0.225 0.596 0.702 0.453
3.585 −0.753 0.687 3.840 4.465 1.356
ADt*Sentt −0.779 −1.278
−2.939 −2.281
R&D/At 5.953 8.142 5.978 5.890 8.006
47.679 26.910 47.847 46.819 26.082
R&D/At*Sentt 0.504 1.979
2.417 3.728
PPENTt −1.038 −1.268 −0.831 −1.042 −1.036 −0.811
−22.782 −13.757 −8.846 −22.862 −22.611 −8.476
PPENTt*Sentt −0.162 −0.494
−2.247 −3.371
INTANt −0.444 −1.543 −1.065 −0.464 −0.447 −1.014
−8.131 −15.445 −10.461 −8.499 −8.126 −9.844
INTANt*Sentt −0.221 −0.006
−2.437 −0.034
CFcollinst −3.470 −3.394 −2.577 −3.443 −3.628 −1.832
−34.899 −5.700 −4.305 −34.584 −36.092 −3.032
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.322 1.215
13.157 4.391
ACCcollinst −0.534 −0.333 0.757 −0.511 −0.650 1.682
−5.375 −0.555 1.257 −5.137 −6.438 2.763
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.451 −0.424
4.726 −1.830
BWsentt 0.234 0.233 0.629
16.899 7.120 7.934
continued on the next page
261
Table 60 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.070 0.111 0.108 0.070 0.070 0.102
41.770 28.351 27.691 41.310 41.481 26.274
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−9.042 −9.265 −7.971 −8.859 −8.993 −7.404
Sizet −0.152 −0.120 −0.127 −0.160 −0.159 −0.141
−28.296 −8.805 −9.354 −29.623 −29.411 −10.337
StdRett −0.007 −0.016 −0.016 −0.007 −0.007 −0.019
−32.125 −27.168 −26.443 −34.010 −34.009 −30.585
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
15.232 −4.867 −8.494 15.102 14.921 −7.333
StdROAt 0.000 0.037 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.029
4.630 17.009 12.973 4.678 4.714 13.658
Betat 0.744 1.145 1.154 0.759 0.764 1.280
73.211 48.239 48.350 74.320 74.570 51.858
ROAt −0.035 1.310 1.129 −0.048 −0.051 0.171
−0.483 2.296 1.974 −0.664 −0.713 0.298
Leveraget 0.263 0.174 0.476 0.272 0.259 0.344
5.889 1.785 4.841 6.093 5.796 3.492
N 55,357 15,971 15,971 55,357 55,357 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.365 0.363 0.389 0.368 0.370 0.416
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 61
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the
weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII.
Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by aver-
age total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used
to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm
size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the
standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by as-
sets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each
coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.558 0.432 0.375
8.637 6.721 5.828
Deltat 0.007 0.008 0.008
3.133 3.414 3.453
ADt 0.556 −0.247 0.225 0.640 0.484 −0.854
3.585 −0.753 0.687 4.118 2.510 −2.039
ADt*Sentt 0.013 0.095
1.371 4.451
R&D/At 5.953 8.142 5.972 5.910 7.771
47.679 26.910 47.832 39.523 20.494
R&D/At*Sentt 0.008 0.044
1.117 2.422
PPENTt −1.038 −1.268 −0.831 −1.043 −0.853 −0.611
−22.782 −13.757 −8.846 −22.887 −15.921 −5.180
PPENTt*Sentt −0.017 −0.020
−6.755 −3.860
INTANt −0.444 −1.543 −1.065 −0.480 −0.572 −0.920
−8.131 −15.445 −10.461 −8.779 −8.614 −7.427
INTANt*Sentt 0.008 −0.005
2.457 −0.878
CFcollinst −3.470 −3.394 −2.577 −3.397 −3.417 −2.388
−34.899 −5.700 −4.305 −34.231 −31.504 −3.882
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.004 −0.004
0.938 −0.363
ACCcollinst −0.534 −0.333 0.757 −0.474 −0.277 1.512
−5.375 −0.555 1.257 −4.783 −2.555 2.443
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.017 −0.058
−4.252 −5.666
AAIIbullbeart 0.011 0.013 0.018
23.361 11.198 6.603
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Table 61 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.070 0.111 0.108 0.069 0.069 0.103
41.770 28.351 27.691 41.026 40.904 26.308
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−9.042 −9.265 −7.971 −7.980 −7.923 −7.154
Sizet −0.152 −0.120 −0.127 −0.161 −0.161 −0.121
−28.296 −8.805 −9.354 −29.903 −29.710 −8.896
StdRett −0.007 −0.016 −0.016 −0.007 −0.007 −0.014
−32.125 −27.168 −26.443 −32.103 −31.842 −23.377
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.001
15.232 −4.867 −8.494 15.310 15.294 −6.498
StdROAt 0.000 0.037 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.024
4.630 17.009 12.973 4.697 4.754 11.461
Betat 0.744 1.145 1.154 0.757 0.753 1.153
73.211 48.239 48.350 74.259 73.807 48.100
ROAt −0.035 1.310 1.129 −0.038 −0.035 1.229
−0.483 2.296 1.974 −0.530 −0.485 2.148
Leveraget 0.263 0.174 0.476 0.262 0.264 0.367
5.889 1.785 4.841 5.875 5.912 3.719
N 55,357 15,971 15,971 55,353 55,353 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.365 0.363 0.389 0.371 0.372 0.406
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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3.2.4 Annual eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the Single
Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Specification
For Tables 62 through 67 capm5 eVERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles for each calendar year during the
1964–2009 period. The first three tables, Tables 62 through 64, use scaled
values of the Sloan (1996) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of
the single digit SIC industry fixed effects specification. The data required
to calculate the cash flow and accruals measures following Sloan (1996)
is available sporadically for firms prior to mid-1970, and very consistently
thereafter. Table 62 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of senti-
ment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 63 employs
the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available be-
ginning in the middle of 1965. Table 64 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more lim-
ited availability of the AAII measure accounts for the smaller number of
observations involved in the analyses presented in Table 64.
The second three tables, Tables 65 through 67, use scaled values of the
Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the single
digit SIC industry fixed effects specification. The data required to calcu-
late the cash flow and accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is
available sporadically for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through
mid-1988, and consistently thereafter. Table 65 employs the Investors In-
telligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009
period. Table 66 employs the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler
(2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 67 em-
ploys the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available in the middle
of 1987. The more limited availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures
of cash flow and accruals accounts for the smaller number of observations
involved in the analyses presented in Tables 65 through Tables 67.
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Table 62
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC
codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s
Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return
on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities
scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported
below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.551 0.433 0.469
8.658 6.835 7.355
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.002
1.734 1.631 1.610
ADt 1.180 0.205 0.650 1.176 0.943 0.304
9.230 0.615 1.944 9.202 5.712 0.564
ADt*Sentt 0.016 0.017
2.356 0.787
R&D/At 5.283 8.032 5.281 4.923 7.000
48.330 27.125 48.316 34.255 16.499
R&D/At*Sentt 0.021 0.050
3.604 3.108
PPENTt −1.378 −1.761 −1.341 −1.380 −1.206 −1.188
−36.622 −18.893 −14.154 −36.660 −25.670 −8.733
PPENTt*Sentt −0.011 −0.010
−6.056 −1.912
INTANt −0.554 −1.504 −1.037 −0.545 −0.221 −0.562
−11.068 −14.974 −10.149 −10.867 −3.023 −3.540
INTANt*Sentt −0.017 −0.020
−6.240 −3.473
CFsloant −1.579 −0.758 −0.450 −1.589 −1.563 −0.885
−19.871 −3.438 −2.006 −19.964 −17.566 −3.144
CFsloant*Sentt −0.001 0.016
−0.490 1.803
ACCsloant 0.206 0.605 1.142 0.190 0.385 1.554
2.087 2.052 3.835 1.922 3.371 3.723
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.012 −0.029
−3.099 −1.931
IIbullbeart −0.001 0.003 −0.006
−2.150 3.333 −2.004
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Table 62 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.048 0.065 0.061 0.048 0.048 0.061
35.756 19.391 18.316 35.784 35.629 18.404
Aget −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
−6.735 −4.766 −3.486 −6.795 −6.755 −3.720
Sizet −0.133 −0.086 −0.092 −0.133 −0.133 −0.093
−29.840 −6.345 −6.765 −29.799 −29.875 −6.783
StdRett −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006
−19.564 −7.560 −6.732 −19.687 −19.716 −8.851
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
15.434 1.874 −1.815 15.548 15.404 −1.186
StdROAt 0.001 0.026 0.018 0.001 0.001 0.018
4.848 12.897 8.931 4.851 4.879 9.210
Betat 0.704 1.018 1.025 0.705 0.704 1.044
81.186 43.610 43.768 81.218 81.057 44.220
ROAt −0.639 0.179 0.612 −0.637 −0.632 0.644
−8.536 0.861 2.914 −8.516 −8.445 3.055
Leveraget −0.105 −0.575 −0.287 −0.107 −0.108 −0.309
−2.777 −5.915 −2.939 −2.829 −2.849 −3.157
N 81,436 15,728 15,728 81,436 81,436 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.297 0.338 0.367 0.297 0.298 0.370
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 63
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are
not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and
delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year
assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.551 0.433 0.459
8.658 6.835 7.226
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.734 1.631 1.691
ADt 1.180 0.205 0.650 1.179 1.303 0.779
9.230 0.615 1.944 9.221 10.130 2.278
ADt*Sentt −1.458 −0.406
−9.722 −0.722
R&D/At 5.283 8.032 5.295 5.353 7.978
48.330 27.125 48.399 48.279 26.590
R&D/At*Sentt −0.507 0.177
−3.242 0.354
PPENTt −1.378 −1.761 −1.341 −1.375 −1.361 −1.350
−36.622 −18.893 −14.154 −36.526 −36.084 −13.968
PPENTt*Sentt −0.087 −0.022
−2.198 −0.153
INTANt −0.554 −1.504 −1.037 −0.551 −0.578 −1.012
−11.068 −14.974 −10.149 −11.010 −11.489 −9.792
INTANt*Sentt 0.317 0.108
4.511 0.607
CFsloant −1.579 −0.758 −0.450 −1.606 −1.649 −0.525
−19.871 −3.438 −2.006 −20.184 −20.689 −2.307
CFsloant*Sentt 0.278 0.627
4.615 2.600
ACCsloant 0.206 0.605 1.142 0.179 0.155 1.126
2.087 2.052 3.835 1.811 1.561 3.654
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.134 0.486
1.609 1.314
BWsentt −0.046 −0.030 0.315
−6.302 −1.634 3.913
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Table 63 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.048 0.065 0.061 0.049 0.049 0.058
35.756 19.391 18.316 35.927 36.093 17.527
Aget −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
−6.735 −4.766 −3.486 −6.611 −6.567 −2.969
Sizet −0.133 −0.086 −0.092 −0.132 −0.133 −0.099
−29.840 −6.345 −6.765 −29.742 −29.954 −7.233
StdRett −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006
−19.564 −7.560 −6.732 −19.487 −19.765 −9.492
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
15.434 1.874 −1.815 15.731 15.815 −0.978
StdROAt 0.001 0.026 0.018 0.001 0.001 0.018
4.848 12.897 8.931 4.847 4.878 8.908
Betat 0.704 1.018 1.025 0.701 0.704 1.097
81.186 43.610 43.768 80.611 80.781 45.693
ROAt −0.639 0.179 0.612 −0.628 −0.642 0.494
−8.536 0.861 2.914 −8.399 −8.598 2.345
Leveraget −0.105 −0.575 −0.287 −0.103 −0.100 −0.369
−2.777 −5.915 −2.939 −2.709 −2.644 −3.775
N 81,436 15,728 15,728 81,399 81,399 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.297 0.338 0.367 0.297 0.299 0.376
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 64
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Sloan
(1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly difference
between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising (AD),
R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets;
intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are
scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the
industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard
deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation
of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as
control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.551 0.433 0.404
8.658 6.835 6.361
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.734 1.631 1.731
ADt 1.180 0.205 0.650 0.963 0.967 −0.558
9.230 0.615 1.944 6.281 5.069 −1.291
ADt*Sentt −0.000 0.089
−0.030 4.137
R&D/At 5.283 8.032 5.518 5.479 7.603
48.330 27.125 46.159 37.543 20.158
R&D/At*Sentt 0.004 0.038
0.602 2.200
PPENTt −1.378 −1.761 −1.341 −1.342 −1.262 −1.339
−36.622 −18.893 −14.154 −29.737 −23.778 −11.176
PPENTt*Sentt −0.007 −0.001
−2.829 −0.173
INTANt −0.554 −1.504 −1.037 −0.498 −0.594 −1.082
−11.068 −14.974 −10.149 −9.170 −8.982 −8.681
INTANt*Sentt 0.008 0.007
2.547 1.181
CFsloant −1.579 −0.758 −0.450 −2.412 −2.400 −0.220
−19.871 −3.438 −2.006 −27.680 −25.606 −0.855
CFsloant*Sentt −0.001 −0.009
−0.167 −1.080
ACCsloant 0.206 0.605 1.142 −0.834 −0.714 2.125
2.087 2.052 3.835 −7.492 −5.724 5.854
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.010 −0.058
−1.977 −4.131
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.002 0.004
3.593 1.800 1.249
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Table 64 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.048 0.065 0.061 0.048 0.048 0.059
35.756 19.391 18.316 33.168 33.064 17.535
Aget −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
−6.735 −4.766 −3.486 −4.770 −4.710 −3.081
Sizet −0.133 −0.086 −0.092 −0.131 −0.131 −0.089
−29.840 −6.345 −6.765 −24.699 −24.608 −6.554
StdRett −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003
−19.564 −7.560 −6.732 −19.100 −19.001 −5.369
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
15.434 1.874 −1.815 17.963 17.989 −0.946
StdROAt 0.001 0.026 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.016
4.848 12.897 8.931 4.714 4.756 8.127
Betat 0.704 1.018 1.025 0.722 0.719 1.022
81.186 43.610 43.768 71.881 71.586 43.489
ROAt −0.639 0.179 0.612 −0.239 −0.236 0.616
−8.536 0.861 2.914 −3.178 −3.150 2.930
Leveraget −0.105 −0.575 −0.287 0.031 0.030 −0.347
−2.777 −5.915 −2.939 0.697 0.695 −3.539
N 81,436 15,728 15,728 56,257 56,257 15,728
Pseudo-R2 0.297 0.338 0.367 0.357 0.357 0.371
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 65
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment, Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC
codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s
Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return
on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities
scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported
below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.580 0.465 0.497
9.236 7.465 7.932
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.836 1.770 1.738
ADt 0.842 0.136 0.658 0.834 0.927 0.279
5.443 0.418 2.018 5.392 4.454 0.551
ADt*Sentt −0.006 0.018
−0.642 0.899
R&D/At 5.673 8.080 5.682 5.274 7.484
47.245 27.408 47.297 33.106 17.749
R&D/At*Sentt 0.024 0.027
3.613 1.693
PPENTt −1.296 −1.740 −1.307 −1.304 −1.131 −1.078
−28.516 −18.897 −13.947 −28.648 −19.558 −8.101
PPENTt*Sentt −0.011 −0.014
−4.584 −2.827
INTANt −0.516 −1.500 −1.010 −0.496 −0.154 −0.491
−9.497 −15.116 −9.987 −9.093 −1.915 −3.140
INTANt*Sentt −0.018 −0.022
−5.776 −3.967
CFcollinst −3.013 −1.481 −0.647 −3.025 −2.975 −0.890
−31.055 −2.507 −1.088 −31.146 −26.653 −1.424
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.002 0.006
−0.555 0.625
ACCcollinst −0.633 0.206 1.255 −0.646 −0.413 2.068
−6.426 0.345 2.094 −6.550 −3.575 3.319
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.014 −0.052
−3.536 −5.215
IIbullbeart −0.002 0.002 −0.004
−3.534 1.708 −1.334
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Table 65 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.066 0.063 0.046 0.046 0.064
32.627 20.226 19.440 32.669 32.519 19.495
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
−5.143 −5.264 −4.005 −5.182 −5.163 −4.174
Sizet −0.128 −0.087 −0.093 −0.127 −0.127 −0.090
−23.968 −6.411 −6.864 −23.643 −23.703 −6.684
StdRett −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006
−18.668 −8.091 −7.311 −18.969 −18.861 −8.864
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
18.081 2.256 −1.275 18.314 18.147 −0.709
StdROAt 0.000 0.027 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.019
4.610 13.169 9.221 4.648 4.649 9.592
Betat 0.719 1.017 1.025 0.720 0.719 1.041
71.690 43.892 44.025 71.739 71.629 44.421
ROAt −0.028 0.426 0.213 −0.029 −0.029 0.244
−0.387 0.749 0.374 −0.403 −0.398 0.427
Leveraget −0.151 −0.651 −0.344 −0.158 −0.158 −0.372
−3.458 −6.807 −3.567 −3.615 −3.609 −3.851
N 55,357 15,971 15,971 55,357 55,357 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.361 0.340 0.369 0.361 0.362 0.373
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 66
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow, and Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), R&D, cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year
assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the industry fixed effects.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.580 0.465 0.484
9.236 7.465 7.751
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.836 1.770 1.815
ADt 0.842 0.136 0.658 0.845 0.938 0.779
5.443 0.418 2.018 5.462 5.991 2.346
ADt*Sentt −0.630 −0.431
−2.386 −0.772
R&D/At 5.673 8.080 5.673 5.691 8.109
47.245 27.408 47.244 46.673 27.052
R&D/At*Sentt −0.548 −0.232
−2.797 −0.470
PPENTt −1.296 −1.740 −1.307 −1.296 −1.292 −1.313
−28.516 −18.897 −13.947 −28.518 −28.259 −13.761
PPENTt*Sentt −0.021 −0.112
−0.300 −0.773
INTANt −0.516 −1.500 −1.010 −0.517 −0.506 −0.977
−9.497 −15.116 −9.987 −9.518 −9.232 −9.553
INTANt*Sentt −0.151 0.026
−1.678 0.148
CFcollinst −3.013 −1.481 −0.647 −3.012 −3.219 −0.199
−31.055 −2.507 −1.088 −31.028 −32.771 −0.333
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.167 0.699
12.062 2.588
ACCcollinst −0.633 0.206 1.255 −0.633 −0.793 1.831
−6.426 0.345 2.094 −6.420 −7.916 3.026
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.593 −0.280
6.379 −1.225
BWsentt 0.016 0.031 0.343
1.197 0.966 4.407
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Table 66 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.066 0.063 0.046 0.046 0.060
32.627 20.226 19.440 32.560 32.999 18.509
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
−5.143 −5.264 −4.005 −5.121 −5.112 −3.495
Sizet −0.128 −0.087 −0.093 −0.129 −0.128 −0.099
−23.968 −6.411 −6.864 −23.982 −23.851 −7.292
StdRett −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006
−18.668 −8.091 −7.311 −18.715 −18.705 −9.813
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
18.081 2.256 −1.275 18.076 17.955 −0.473
StdROAt 0.000 0.027 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.018
4.610 13.169 9.221 4.621 4.682 9.265
Betat 0.719 1.017 1.025 0.720 0.730 1.094
71.690 43.892 44.025 71.643 72.282 45.881
ROAt −0.028 0.426 0.213 −0.029 −0.037 −0.361
−0.387 0.749 0.374 −0.400 −0.510 −0.631
Leveraget −0.151 −0.651 −0.344 −0.151 −0.160 −0.423
−3.458 −6.807 −3.567 −3.441 −3.650 −4.387
N 55,357 15,971 15,971 55,357 55,357 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.361 0.340 0.369 0.361 0.363 0.379
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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Table 67
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment, Collins Accruals and Cash Flow, and
Single Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins et al.
(2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly difference
between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising (AD),
R&D, cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets;
intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are
scaled by end of the year assets. Single digit SIC codes are used to implement the
industry fixed effects. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard
deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation
of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as
control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat 0.580 0.465 0.436
9.236 7.465 6.979
Deltat 0.003 0.003 0.003
1.836 1.770 1.840
ADt 0.842 0.136 0.658 0.852 0.829 −0.388
5.443 0.418 2.018 5.508 4.311 −0.931
ADt*Sentt 0.002 0.082
0.203 3.860
R&D/At 5.673 8.080 5.671 5.696 7.814
47.245 27.408 47.234 38.916 20.905
R&D/At*Sentt −0.000 0.025
−0.060 1.424
PPENTt −1.296 −1.740 −1.307 −1.296 −1.213 −1.319
−28.516 −18.897 −13.947 −28.502 −22.681 −11.197
PPENTt*Sentt −0.007 −0.001
−2.915 −0.176
INTANt −0.516 −1.500 −1.010 −0.519 −0.612 −1.029
−9.497 −15.116 −9.987 −9.560 −9.250 −8.352
INTANt*Sentt 0.008 0.005
2.478 0.832
CFcollinst −3.013 −1.481 −0.647 −3.003 −3.012 −0.323
−31.055 −2.507 −1.088 −30.944 −28.271 −0.528
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.002 −0.015
0.436 −1.499
ACCcollinst −0.633 0.206 1.255 −0.625 −0.488 1.979
−6.426 0.345 2.094 −6.347 −4.514 3.222
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.012 −0.050
−2.953 −5.133
AAIIbullbeart 0.001 0.002 0.004
3.048 1.397 1.296
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Table 67 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.066 0.063 0.045 0.045 0.061
32.627 20.226 19.440 32.472 32.412 18.676
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
−5.143 −5.264 −4.005 −4.979 −4.903 −3.609
Sizet −0.128 −0.087 −0.093 −0.129 −0.129 −0.089
−23.968 −6.411 −6.864 −24.098 −23.954 −6.598
StdRett −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003
−18.668 −8.091 −7.311 −18.598 −18.387 −5.594
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
18.081 2.256 −1.275 18.093 18.119 −0.553
StdROAt 0.000 0.027 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.017
4.610 13.169 9.221 4.606 4.650 8.536
Betat 0.719 1.017 1.025 0.721 0.719 1.022
71.690 43.892 44.025 71.720 71.438 43.737
ROAt −0.028 0.426 0.213 −0.028 −0.027 0.234
−0.387 0.749 0.374 −0.393 −0.371 0.411
Leveraget −0.151 −0.651 −0.344 −0.153 −0.152 −0.390
−3.458 −6.807 −3.567 −3.495 −3.460 −4.030
N 55,357 15,971 15,971 55,353 55,353 15,971
Pseudo-R2 0.361 0.340 0.369 0.361 0.361 0.374
Model Eq. 28 Eq. 29 Eq. 30 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 33
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3.3 Detailed Determinants Tables: Endogeneity Spec-
ification
A series of ordered logistic regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR valua-
tion decile assignments on different combinations of independent variables
following the endogeneity specification is performed in Tables 69 through
92. Decile assignments based upon the VERR and eVERR measures are
made using the full 1964–2009 period and also using each calendar year.
The combination of full period and annual decile assignments for the capm5
VERR and eVERR valuation deciles results in four different dependent
variables for the ordered logistic regressions. The results from using the
full 1964–2009 period capm5 VERR decile assignments as the dependent
variable are presented in Tables 69 through 74. The results from using the
annual VERR decile assignments as the dependent variable are presented
in Tables 75 through 80. Switching to the use of the full 1964–2009 period
capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the dependent variable in the ordered
logistic regressions produces Tables 81 through 86, and the utilization of
annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the dependent variable in the
ordered logistic regressions generates Tables 87 through 92.
Table 68 summarizes the results of the endogeneity specification ordered
logistic regression models detailed in Equations 20 and 21 for all four depen-
dent variables. Panel A presents results using the full period capm5 VERR
decile assignments as the dependent variable, Panel B presents results us-
ing the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments as the dependent variable,
Panel C presents results using the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments as the dependent variable, and Panel D presents the results using
the annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments as the dependent variable.
Each column of each panel in Table 68 reports the average coefficients and
average t-statistics across the two ordered logistic regressions performed
using the specified measure of sentiment and the two different measures of
scaled cash flow and accruals in the appropriate endogeneity specification
model with the dependent variable listed for the panel. The equation de-
tailing the model used for each column is reported near the bottom of each
column. As each column in Table 68 presents average coefficients and av-
erage t-statistics across results produced using both measures of cash flow
and accruals, the tables reporting the individual results which are averaged
to produce each column are listed at the bottom of each column in Table
68.
Tables 69 through 92 contain the results for all of the individual or-
dered logistic regressions performed using the endogeneity specification.
The four different dependent variables, two different measures of cash flow
and accruals, and three different measures of investor sentiment produce
the twenty-four endogeneity specification tables. Each table includes the
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Table 68
Average Coefficients and t-Statistics for Ordered Logistic
Regressions of capm5 VERR and eVERR Decile Assignments
on Determinants with Endogeneity Adjustments
Average coefficients and average t-statistics are presented in this table
for ordered logistic regressions using the endogeneity specification models.
Some independent variables are not available for the full period. Scaled
cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Sloan (1996)
and Collins et al. (2003). Each column reports the average coefficients and
average t-statistics across the two ordered logistic regressions performed
using the specified measure of sentiment and the two different measures of
scaled cash flow and accruals in the appropriate endogeneity specification
model. The average t-statistics are reported below each average coefficient.
Panel A displays the average results for the ordered logistic regressions
using the full period capm5 VERR decile assignments from 1964–2009 as
the dependent variable. Panel B displays the average results for the ordered
logistic regressions using the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments from
1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Panel C displays the average results
for the ordered logistic regressions using the full period capm5 eVERR
decile assignments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Panel D
displays the average results for the ordered logistic regressions using the
annual capm5 eVERR decile assignments from 1964–2009 as the dependent
variable.
continued on the next page
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Table 68 – continued from the previous page
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Full Period VERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.581 2.380 1.066
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.546 2.241 2.620
ADt 0.299 −0.718 0.338 0.288 0.448 −0.249
1.501 −1.335 2.455 0.792 2.360 −0.553
ADt*Sentt −0.005 0.048 −0.965 −0.597 −0.008 0.044
−0.363 2.173 −5.041 −0.893 −0.833 1.891
R&D/St 0.029 1.851 0.015 2.119 0.011 2.923
5.083 9.856 5.214 14.580 5.264 13.875
R&D/St*Sentt −0.001 0.013 −0.008 −0.777 0.000 −0.046
−3.797 1.765 −3.821 −3.053 2.859 −6.146
PPENTt 0.095 0.165 −0.146 0.068 0.018 0.396
1.987 1.259 −3.902 0.768 0.366 3.454
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.010 −0.136 −0.773 −0.019 −0.032
−7.209 −2.043 −2.043 −5.200 −8.334 −6.048
INTANt-1 −0.193 −1.261 0.356 −0.519 −0.142 −0.494
−2.295 −7.567 7.110 −4.875 −2.147 −3.796
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.020 0.024 −0.420 −0.252 0.004 −0.004
7.044 3.894 −5.246 −1.306 1.394 −0.695
CFt −3.350 −0.955 −3.614 −0.912 −3.378 −1.077
−34.365 −1.844 −41.732 −2.349 −32.717 −2.334
CFt*Sentt −0.010 −0.003 1.002 0.298 0.003 −0.002
−3.679 −0.253 13.503 0.997 0.782 −0.106
ACCt −1.959 0.225 −2.106 0.500 −1.640 0.758
−17.557 0.349 −21.622 0.917 −13.715 1.502
ACCt*Sentt −0.003 0.002 0.791 −0.207 −0.005 −0.035
−0.796 −0.315 8.978 −0.850 −1.304 −3.108
Sentt 0.009 0.009 0.384 0.873 0.013 0.025
10.395 3.226 20.061 11.021 13.867 9.155
AltZ1t 0.059 0.071 0.058 0.068 0.051 0.068
40.359 18.911 39.591 17.786 34.697 17.935
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−21.506 −12.848 −22.851 −12.769 −24.439 −12.295
Sizet −0.110 −0.156 −0.110 −0.172 −0.140 −0.157
−21.881 −10.825 −21.806 −11.906 −26.003 −10.883
StdRett −0.005 −0.011 −0.005 −0.016 −0.006 −0.012
−22.181 −15.996 −25.765 −25.363 −30.340 −19.035
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 0.004 −0.000 0.003 −0.000
33.916 −3.394 33.748 −1.312 23.284 −0.762
StdROAt 0.005 0.028 0.005 0.031 0.001 0.027
9.656 11.978 10.392 13.134 4.644 11.568
Betat 0.607 0.974 0.643 1.113 0.728 1.001
64.619 38.768 68.183 43.054 71.865 39.879
ROAt −0.286 0.774 −0.341 0.300 −0.299 0.914
−4.939 1.897 −5.790 1.061 −3.593 2.508
Leveraget 0.731 1.262 0.662 1.129 0.849 1.165
17.807 12.072 16.147 10.781 19.263 11.099
Model Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21
Tables 69, 72 70, 73 71, 74
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Table 68 – continued from the previous page
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Annual VERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.520 0.847 0.026
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.831 2.667 2.874
ADt 0.600 −0.879 0.607 −0.070 0.600 −0.415
3.241 −1.641 4.504 −0.193 3.166 −0.925
ADt*Sentt −0.006 0.040 −0.947 0.174 −0.013 0.033
−0.388 1.860 −5.474 0.262 −1.319 1.429
R&D/St 0.006 1.799 0.008 1.745 0.006 2.772
5.204 9.725 4.752 13.764 4.417 14.073
R&D/St*Sentt 0.000 −0.009 −0.003 −0.878 0.000 −0.052
3.297 −1.245 −2.015 −7.600 2.148 −8.732
PPENTt 0.052 −0.103 −0.160 −0.239 −0.103 0.030
1.268 −0.782 −4.134 −2.699 −2.162 0.267
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.010 −0.101 −0.387 −0.015 −0.021
−6.914 −2.046 −2.029 −2.736 −6.381 −4.116
INTANt-1 0.174 −0.208 0.071 −0.292 0.051 −0.283
2.292 −1.260 1.400 −2.758 0.765 −2.187
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.006 −0.007 −0.071 −0.207 0.000 −0.000
−2.103 −1.214 −0.539 −1.105 0.044 −0.063
CFt −2.502 0.320 −2.809 0.059 −3.153 0.142
−24.503 0.391 −30.597 −0.352 −30.987 0.129
CFt*Sentt −0.011 −0.023 0.662 0.297 0.002 −0.006
−3.894 −2.107 8.035 1.081 0.599 −0.594
ACCt −0.979 1.049 −1.365 0.368 −1.769 0.770
−8.311 1.696 −13.254 0.398 −14.908 1.377
ACCt*Sentt −0.017 −0.045 0.437 0.325 −0.004 −0.025
−4.554 −3.842 4.746 0.749 −0.963 −2.256
Sentt 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.487 0.006 0.017
6.412 1.309 0.179 6.935 6.599 6.348
AltZ1t 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.034 0.036 0.034
30.172 11.397 30.425 10.520 27.879 10.498
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−23.562 −10.449 −23.723 −10.028 −22.366 −9.732
Sizet −0.105 −0.135 −0.103 −0.142 −0.106 −0.135
−21.538 −9.398 −21.230 −9.902 −19.846 −9.458
StdRett −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001
−16.096 −3.200 −16.843 −5.898 −18.235 −1.838
Turnovert 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001
24.601 3.697 24.844 4.409 24.076 4.495
StdROAt 0.002 0.023 0.002 0.022 0.001 0.020
6.000 9.972 6.253 9.793 4.832 8.835
Betat 0.701 0.899 0.705 0.962 0.709 0.903
75.531 36.345 75.617 38.244 70.660 36.630
ROAt −0.587 0.093 −0.600 −0.212 −0.369 0.133
−7.546 0.566 −7.740 −0.067 −4.469 0.691
Leveraget 0.461 0.511 0.445 0.446 0.525 0.492
11.555 5.010 11.178 4.369 12.106 4.807
Model Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21
Tables 75, 78 76, 79 77, 80
continued on the next page
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Table 68 – continued from the previous page
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Full Period eVERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.984 6.304 4.785
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
4.832 4.051 4.648
ADt 0.225 −0.889 0.321 0.129 0.157 −0.783
1.160 −1.623 2.413 0.349 0.824 −1.723
ADt*Sentt −0.002 0.054 −0.992 0.009 0.007 0.083
0.028 2.445 −5.232 0.013 0.724 3.605
R&D/St 0.108 3.431 0.043 3.673 0.032 3.430
7.273 13.815 7.586 21.316 6.449 15.227
R&D/St*Sentt −0.002 0.014 −0.009 2.536 0.001 0.017
−5.888 1.443 −1.495 7.504 3.626 1.623
PPENTt −1.037 −0.948 −1.319 −1.140 −1.167 −0.893
−21.593 −7.063 −35.519 −12.644 −24.218 −7.684
PPENTt*Sentt −0.015 −0.011 −0.091 −0.205 −0.017 −0.024
−7.298 −2.210 −1.557 −1.373 −7.197 −4.450
INTANt-1 −1.019 −1.774 −0.554 −1.266 −0.994 −1.240
−13.107 −10.557 −10.354 −11.825 −15.055 −9.479
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.017 0.015 −0.314 0.374 0.008 −0.003
5.852 2.382 −4.063 1.954 2.448 −0.420
CFt −3.613 −0.504 −3.967 −0.331 −3.769 −0.554
−35.914 −0.759 −44.474 −0.768 −35.956 −0.967
CFt*Sentt −0.015 0.006 1.098 0.972 −0.001 0.007
−5.060 0.609 14.297 3.310 −0.179 0.666
ACCt −1.639 1.399 −1.854 1.695 −1.437 2.083
−14.605 2.572 −18.868 3.683 −11.850 4.310
ACCt*Sentt −0.007 0.007 0.872 0.487 −0.012 −0.043
−1.743 0.202 9.953 1.045 −2.788 −3.494
Sentt 0.011 0.010 0.395 0.466 0.014 0.020
12.585 3.581 20.538 5.748 14.646 7.025
AltZ1t 0.080 0.099 0.079 0.095 0.071 0.095
47.221 23.452 46.622 22.356 41.186 22.320
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−10.920 −9.596 −12.312 −9.575 −12.890 −9.061
Sizet −0.118 −0.131 −0.117 −0.148 −0.143 −0.130
−23.465 −9.039 −23.404 −10.176 −26.560 −8.982
StdRett −0.005 −0.013 −0.006 −0.019 −0.007 −0.014
−26.137 −19.204 −30.579 −28.493 −31.634 −21.866
Turnovert 0.003 −0.002 0.003 −0.002 0.002 −0.002
25.690 −10.549 25.478 −8.620 17.359 −7.354
StdROAt 0.005 0.034 0.006 0.037 0.002 0.033
10.036 13.931 11.128 15.399 5.128 13.594
Betat 0.665 1.092 0.710 1.241 0.773 1.114
70.266 42.814 74.600 47.118 75.502 43.642
ROAt −0.341 1.137 −0.423 0.696 −0.268 1.251
−5.591 3.284 −6.833 2.554 −3.352 3.752
Leveraget 0.024 0.705 −0.063 0.594 0.088 0.567
0.570 6.701 −1.567 5.636 1.981 5.367
Model Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21
Tables 81, 84 82, 85 83, 86
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Table 68 – continued from the previous page
Panel D: Dependent Variable = Annual eVERR Decile
Inv. Intelligence Baker-Wurgler AAII
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.108 5.313 4.378
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.979 2.822 3.025
ADt 0.657 −0.289 0.705 0.218 0.501 −0.370
3.601 −0.532 5.245 0.605 2.635 −0.816
ADt*Sentt −0.004 0.033 −1.060 0.896 −0.004 0.062
−0.257 1.503 −6.056 1.341 −0.380 2.703
R&D/St 0.035 3.748 0.027 3.402 0.018 3.951
5.589 14.576 6.910 21.383 6.893 17.698
R&D/St*Sentt −0.001 −0.017 −0.011 1.398 0.001 −0.030
−2.466 −1.795 −2.638 4.593 5.042 −3.261
PPENTt −1.290 −1.427 −1.486 −1.689 −1.452 −1.476
−26.870 −10.638 −40.158 −18.757 −30.144 −12.739
PPENTt*Sentt −0.012 −0.013 0.022 0.218 −0.007 −0.014
−6.360 −2.445 0.022 1.467 −2.965 −2.612
INTANt-1 −0.563 −0.837 −0.828 −1.056 −0.867 −1.062
−7.351 −5.047 −15.932 −9.942 −13.174 −8.179
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.013 −0.010 0.184 0.420 0.005 0.002
−4.371 −1.621 2.540 2.214 1.757 0.368
CFt −2.780 0.651 −3.127 0.784 −3.395 0.923
−26.810 1.471 −33.628 2.025 −32.924 2.417
CFt*Sentt −0.014 −0.009 0.722 0.540 −0.003 −0.015
−4.692 −0.788 8.851 1.894 −1.009 −1.428
ACCt −0.705 2.179 −1.137 1.524 −1.428 2.314
−5.945 3.965 −10.997 3.354 −11.923 4.778
ACCt*Sentt −0.020 −0.049 0.512 0.452 −0.013 −0.058
−5.300 −3.969 5.786 1.067 −2.958 −4.715
Sentt 0.004 −0.001 −0.041 0.140 0.003 0.011
5.459 −0.486 −2.146 1.754 2.928 3.975
AltZ1t 0.049 0.064 0.049 0.058 0.048 0.060
34.847 17.334 35.162 15.919 33.045 16.439
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−10.609 −6.470 −10.595 −5.804 −9.488 −5.782
Sizet −0.113 −0.099 −0.113 −0.105 −0.116 −0.096
−23.228 −6.902 −23.162 −7.290 −21.789 −6.681
StdRett −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.002
−18.906 −6.636 −19.149 −7.764 −19.250 −3.723
Turnovert 0.002 −0.000 0.002 −0.000 0.002 −0.000
19.717 −0.885 19.688 −0.476 20.312 −0.328
StdROAt 0.002 0.026 0.002 0.025 0.001 0.023
6.205 11.410 6.423 10.898 5.053 10.258
Betat 0.727 0.981 0.732 1.035 0.737 0.968
77.749 39.311 78.000 40.712 72.939 38.944
ROAt −0.521 0.732 −0.541 0.414 −0.333 0.712
−6.789 2.545 −7.050 1.777 −4.093 2.435
Leveraget −0.408 −0.083 −0.416 −0.165 −0.319 −0.130
−10.074 −0.807 −10.259 −1.602 −7.324 −1.253
Model Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21 Eq. 20 Eq. 21
Tables 87, 90 88, 91 89, 92
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coefficients and t-statistics for six models within the endogeneity specifica-
tion which employ the specified dependent variable, measures of cash flow
and accruals, and measure of investor sentiment. Information about the
definition and availability of the independent variables used in the endo-
geneity specification models is presented in Exhibit 3 at the beginning of
the Appendix. The time period spanned by the data used to generate each
column of Tables 69 through 92 is therefore dictated by the intersection of
the time periods for which the variables used in each column are available.
The endogeneity specification models estimated are the following:
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Si,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t−1 + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t
+ γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t
+ γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (34)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t−1 + γ2Deltai,t−1 + γ3ADi,t
+ γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t−1 + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (35)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t−1 + γ2Deltai,t−1 + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Si,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t−1 + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (36)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Si,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t−1 + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (37)
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Decilei,t = f(α+ γ3ADi,t + γ4R&D/Si,t + γ5PPENTi,t
+ γ6INTANi,t−1 + γ7CFi,t + γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t
+ γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ11(R&D/Si,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ13(INTANi,t−1 ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ16AltZ1i,t + γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t
+ γ19StdReti,t + γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t
+ γ22Betai,t + γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (38)
Decilei,t = f(α+ γ1V egai,t−1 + γ2Deltai,t−1 + γ3ADi,t
+ γ4R&D/Si,t + γ5PPENTi,t + γ6INTANi,t−1 + γ7CFi,t
+ γ8ACCi,t + γ9Senti,t + γ10(ADi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ11(R&D/Si,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ12(PPENTi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ13(INTANi,t−1 ∗ Senti,t) + γ14(CFi,t ∗ Senti,t)
+ γ15(ACCi,t ∗ Senti,t) + γ16AltZ1i,t
+ γ17Agei,t + γ18Sizei,t + γ19StdReti,t
+ γ20Turnoveri,t + γ21StdROAi,t + γ22Betai,t
+ γ23ROAi,t + γ24Leveragei,t + εi,t) (39)
In Tables 69 through 92 the endogeneity specification models in Equa-
tions 34 through 39 correspond to the columns in the tables. Equation 34
is used to estimate the coefficients and t-statistics presented in column A
of Tables 69 through 92. Equation 35 is used to estimate the coefficients
and t-statistics presented in column B, Equation 36 is used to estimate
the coefficients and t-statistics presented in column C, and Equation 37
is used to estimate the coefficients and t-statistics presented in column D.
Equations 38 and 39, which are the same as the endogeneity specification
models in Equations 20 and 21 in the Methodology section of the second
essay, are used to estimate the coefficients and t-statistics presented in
columns E and F respectively.
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3.3.1 Full Period VERR Decile Assignments Used with the En-
dogeneity Specification
For Tables 69 through 74 capm5 VERR valuation measures are used to as-
sign firm years to valuation deciles across the 1964–2009 period. The first
three tables, Tables 69 through 71, use scaled values of the Sloan (1996)
measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the robustness specification.
The data required to calculate the cash flow and accruals measures follow-
ing Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for firms prior to mid-1970, and
very consistently thereafter. Table 69 employs the Investors Intelligence
measure of sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Ta-
ble 70 employs the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is
available beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 71 employs the AAII mea-
sure of sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more
limited availability of the AAII measure accounts for the smaller number
of observations involved in the analyses presented in Table 71.
The second three tables, Tables 72 through 74, use scaled values of
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the
robustness specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow and
accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporadically
for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and consis-
tently thereafter. Table 72 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of
sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 73 em-
ploys the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available
beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 74 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more limited
availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Tables 72 through Tables 74.
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Table 69
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by
average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equip-
ment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales.
Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A ver-
sion of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock
turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and
total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics
are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.015 1.155 0.158
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.456 2.384 2.409
ADt 0.196 −0.060 0.216 0.203 0.083 −0.804
1.556 −0.170 0.610 1.610 0.509 −1.452
ADt*Sentt 0.009 0.054
1.327 2.389
R&D/St 0.012 2.010 0.012 0.028 1.783
4.727 14.123 4.753 4.891 9.570
R&D/St*Sentt −0.001 0.018
−3.487 2.426
PPENTt −0.106 −0.299 −0.095 −0.102 0.090 0.063
−3.142 −3.485 −1.091 −3.036 2.079 0.472
PPENTt*Sentt −0.012 −0.007
−6.851 −1.462
INTANt-1 0.724 −0.835 −0.661 0.693 0.177 −1.341
14.381 −7.935 −6.227 13.736 2.405 −8.020
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.024 0.027
8.863 4.375
CFsloant −3.276 −1.533 −0.729 −3.247 −3.028 −0.497
−45.022 −6.449 −2.964 −44.604 −36.454 −1.562
CFsloant*Sentt −0.011 0.009
−4.489 0.868
ACCsloant −2.365 −0.446 0.228 −2.319 −2.364 0.016
−25.968 −1.419 0.715 −25.414 −22.114 0.035
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.006 0.032
1.730 1.980
IIbullbeart 0.003 0.006 0.007
7.592 8.215 2.542
continued on the next page
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Table 69 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.068 0.080 0.072 0.067 0.067 0.070
45.776 20.728 18.687 45.645 45.618 18.098
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−18.321 −13.657 −13.296 −18.097 −17.998 −12.835
Sizet −0.076 −0.146 −0.156 −0.077 −0.078 −0.154
−16.923 −10.158 −10.778 −17.075 −17.466 −10.628
StdRett −0.004 −0.014 −0.014 −0.003 −0.003 −0.011
−19.131 −22.397 −21.489 −17.733 −16.754 −15.961
Turnovert 0.006 −0.000 −0.001 0.006 0.006 −0.001
46.770 −0.945 −2.589 46.066 45.987 −3.520
StdROAt 0.008 0.036 0.030 0.008 0.008 0.028
15.429 15.202 12.894 15.255 14.972 11.742
Betat 0.502 0.978 0.996 0.501 0.499 0.976
58.771 39.213 39.662 58.666 58.436 38.701
ROAt −0.601 0.175 0.602 −0.598 −0.603 0.432
−10.251 0.788 2.674 −10.209 −10.287 1.914
Leveraget 0.622 1.100 1.292 0.628 0.649 1.291
16.458 10.557 12.275 16.615 17.166 12.263
N 80,626 13,958 13,951 80,626 80,626 13,951
Pseudo-R2 0.230 0.252 0.267 0.230 0.232 0.275
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 70
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals
(ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D
is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega
are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of
returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on as-
sets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.015 1.155 2.040
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.456 2.384 2.136
ADt 0.196 −0.060 0.216 0.274 0.380 0.343
1.556 −0.170 0.610 2.173 3.004 0.931
ADt*Sentt −0.967 −0.589
−6.475 −0.876
R&D/St 0.012 2.010 0.014 0.017 2.094
4.727 14.123 5.102 5.692 14.505
R&D/St*Sentt −0.009 −0.694
−5.325 −2.704
PPENTt −0.106 −0.299 −0.095 −0.121 −0.116 0.018
−3.142 −3.485 −1.091 −3.603 −3.436 0.203
PPENTt*Sentt −0.016 −0.698
−0.398 −4.678
INTANt-1 0.724 −0.835 −0.661 0.787 0.817 −0.519
14.381 −7.935 −6.227 15.611 16.168 −4.831
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.568 −0.200
−7.602 −1.043
CFsloant −3.276 −1.533 −0.729 −3.110 −3.222 −0.753
−45.022 −6.449 −2.964 −42.627 −44.021 −3.002
CFsloant*Sentt 0.969 0.118
16.068 0.430
ACCsloant −2.365 −0.446 0.228 −2.153 −2.298 0.178
−25.968 −1.419 0.715 −23.558 −25.022 0.537
ACCsloant*Sentt 1.082 0.392
12.894 0.956
BWsentt 0.564 0.519 0.893
73.959 31.055 11.066
continued on the next page
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Table 70 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.068 0.080 0.072 0.065 0.065 0.067
45.776 20.728 18.687 44.271 44.480 17.355
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−18.321 −13.657 −13.296 −19.988 −20.313 −12.735
Sizet −0.076 −0.146 −0.156 −0.080 −0.080 −0.169
−16.923 −10.158 −10.778 −17.894 −17.817 −11.647
StdRett −0.004 −0.014 −0.014 −0.004 −0.004 −0.016
−19.131 −22.397 −21.489 −19.510 −19.563 −25.264
Turnovert 0.006 −0.000 −0.001 0.005 0.005 −0.000
46.770 −0.945 −2.589 44.726 44.340 −1.381
StdROAt 0.008 0.036 0.030 0.008 0.009 0.031
15.429 15.202 12.894 15.590 15.938 12.954
Betat 0.502 0.978 0.996 0.554 0.556 1.113
58.771 39.213 39.662 64.282 64.428 42.936
ROAt −0.601 0.175 0.602 −0.657 −0.675 0.408
−10.251 0.788 2.674 −11.133 −11.491 1.800
Leveraget 0.622 1.100 1.292 0.579 0.581 1.168
16.458 10.557 12.275 15.305 15.374 11.077
N 80,626 13,958 13,951 80,588 80,588 13,951
Pseudo-R2 0.230 0.252 0.267 0.280 0.283 0.293
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 71
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly dif-
ference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising
(AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets;
intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are
scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled
by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm
age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on as-
sets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled
by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below
each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.015 1.155 0.710
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.456 2.384 2.499
ADt 0.196 −0.060 0.216 0.450 0.574 −0.278
1.556 −0.170 0.610 2.954 3.030 −0.608
ADt*Sentt −0.010 0.049
−1.012 2.102
R&D/St 0.012 2.010 0.013 0.011 2.809
4.727 14.123 4.942 5.421 13.371
R&D/St*Sentt 0.000 −0.041
2.928 −5.188
PPENTt −0.106 −0.299 −0.095 −0.219 0.002 0.328
−3.142 −3.485 −1.091 −5.523 0.047 2.839
PPENTt*Sentt −0.019 −0.030
−8.390 −5.649
INTANt-1 0.724 −0.835 −0.661 −0.049 −0.104 −0.532
14.381 −7.935 −6.227 −0.896 −1.564 −4.066
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.005 −0.002
1.489 −0.353
CFsloant −3.276 −1.533 −0.729 −2.869 −2.882 −0.667
−45.022 −6.449 −2.964 −31.599 −29.803 −2.350
CFsloant*Sentt 0.003 0.006
0.827 0.595
ACCsloant −2.365 −0.446 0.228 −1.627 −1.611 0.656
−25.968 −1.419 0.715 −14.147 −12.672 1.668
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.000 −0.012
−0.035 −0.780
AAIIbullbeart 0.009 0.013 0.025
18.271 14.055 8.812
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Table 71 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.068 0.080 0.072 0.053 0.053 0.067
45.776 20.728 18.687 35.530 35.284 17.303
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−18.321 −13.657 −13.296 −24.654 −24.572 −12.266
Sizet −0.076 −0.146 −0.156 −0.138 −0.138 −0.154
−16.923 −10.158 −10.778 −25.826 −25.824 −10.638
StdRett −0.004 −0.014 −0.014 −0.006 −0.006 −0.012
−19.131 −22.397 −21.489 −30.370 −30.330 −19.018
Turnovert 0.006 −0.000 −0.001 0.003 0.003 −0.000
46.770 −0.945 −2.589 23.262 23.231 −0.751
StdROAt 0.008 0.036 0.030 0.001 0.001 0.027
15.429 15.202 12.894 4.909 4.841 11.397
Betat 0.502 0.978 0.996 0.733 0.731 1.001
58.771 39.213 39.662 72.454 72.178 39.747
ROAt −0.601 0.175 0.602 −0.624 −0.624 0.702
−10.251 0.788 2.674 −7.525 −7.526 3.119
Leveraget 0.622 1.100 1.292 0.948 0.950 1.193
16.458 10.557 12.275 21.468 21.501 11.285
N 80,626 13,958 13,951 55,144 55,144 13,951
Pseudo-R2 0.230 0.252 0.267 0.263 0.265 0.283
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
292
Table 72
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of
the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by In-
vestors Intelligence. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by
sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.861 1.962 1.004
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.769 2.685 2.683
ADt 0.177 −0.237 0.098 0.211 0.515 −0.633
1.154 −0.691 0.285 1.373 2.493 −1.217
ADt*Sentt −0.019 0.041
−2.052 1.957
R&D/St 0.011 2.007 0.011 0.030 1.919
4.541 14.082 4.534 5.274 10.142
R&D/St*Sentt −0.001 0.008
−4.107 1.105
PPENTt −0.193 −0.199 0.002 −0.161 0.100 0.267
−4.819 −2.335 0.024 −4.029 1.894 2.046
PPENTt*Sentt −0.017 −0.013
−7.566 −2.625
INTANt-1 −0.119 −0.868 −0.668 −0.218 −0.563 −1.181
−2.197 −8.408 −6.388 −4.019 −6.995 −7.114
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.016 0.021
5.224 3.413
CFcollinst −3.908 −2.953 −1.735 −3.867 −3.673 −1.413
−38.789 −4.782 −2.778 −38.559 −32.275 −2.127
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.010 −0.015
−2.868 −1.375
ACCcollinst −1.833 −0.871 0.028 −1.767 −1.554 0.434
−17.583 −1.398 0.045 −17.043 −13.000 0.664
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.013 −0.029
−3.322 −2.609
IIbullbeart 0.008 0.012 0.010
17.138 12.574 3.909
continued on the next page
293
Table 72 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.079 0.073 0.051 0.051 0.073
34.987 21.486 19.911 34.998 35.101 19.724
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−25.399 −13.775 −13.367 −25.199 −25.015 −12.861
Sizet −0.134 −0.152 −0.162 −0.142 −0.142 −0.158
−24.881 −10.632 −11.318 −26.383 −26.297 −11.022
StdRett −0.006 −0.014 −0.014 −0.006 −0.006 −0.011
−30.540 −22.969 −22.061 −28.698 −27.608 −16.031
Turnovert 0.003 −0.000 −0.001 0.003 0.003 −0.001
23.474 −0.785 −2.393 21.646 21.844 −3.269
StdROAt 0.001 0.037 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.029
4.743 15.570 13.349 4.422 4.340 12.214
Betat 0.717 0.983 0.997 0.717 0.714 0.972
71.079 39.633 39.962 71.073 70.802 38.835
ROAt 0.010 1.021 0.986 0.026 0.031 1.116
0.137 1.724 1.662 0.342 0.409 1.880
Leveraget 0.742 0.969 1.212 0.786 0.812 1.233
16.904 9.497 11.694 17.882 18.448 11.881
N 54,246 14,181 14,174 54,246 54,246 14,174
Pseudo-R2 0.261 0.256 0.270 0.265 0.267 0.278
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 73
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced
by Baker and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year as-
sets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and
lagged vega are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard
deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation
of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as
control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.861 1.962 2.720
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.769 2.685 2.346
ADt 0.177 −0.237 0.098 0.204 0.296 0.232
1.154 −0.691 0.285 1.329 1.905 0.653
ADt*Sentt −0.962 −0.606
−3.608 −0.911
R&D/St 0.011 2.007 0.012 0.014 2.143
4.541 14.082 4.553 4.737 14.656
R&D/St*Sentt −0.007 −0.861
−2.317 −3.402
PPENTt −0.193 −0.199 0.002 −0.188 −0.175 0.118
−4.819 −2.335 0.024 −4.710 −4.368 1.333
PPENTt*Sentt −0.256 −0.847
−3.688 −5.722
INTANt-1 −0.119 −0.868 −0.668 −0.121 −0.106 −0.520
−2.197 −8.408 −6.388 −2.248 −1.948 −4.918
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.272 −0.304
−2.890 −1.568
CFcollinst −3.908 −2.953 −1.735 −3.889 −4.005 −1.070
−38.789 −4.782 −2.778 −38.593 −39.444 −1.696
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.034 0.477
10.938 1.564
ACCcollinst −1.833 −0.871 0.028 −1.822 −1.914 0.822
−17.583 −1.398 0.045 −17.465 −18.222 1.296
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.500 −0.806
5.061 −2.657
BWsentt 0.173 0.248 0.854
12.377 9.066 10.976
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Table 73 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.079 0.073 0.050 0.051 0.068
34.987 21.486 19.911 34.548 34.702 18.216
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−25.399 −13.775 −13.367 −25.275 −25.388 −12.804
Sizet −0.134 −0.152 −0.162 −0.140 −0.139 −0.175
−24.881 −10.632 −11.318 −25.862 −25.795 −12.166
StdRett −0.006 −0.014 −0.014 −0.007 −0.007 −0.016
−30.540 −22.969 −22.061 −31.875 −31.967 −25.461
Turnovert 0.003 −0.000 −0.001 0.003 0.003 −0.000
23.474 −0.785 −2.393 23.377 23.157 −1.242
StdROAt 0.001 0.037 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.032
4.743 15.570 13.349 4.782 4.845 13.315
Betat 0.717 0.983 0.997 0.727 0.730 1.112
71.079 39.633 39.962 71.772 71.938 43.173
ROAt 0.010 1.021 0.986 0.000 −0.007 0.191
0.137 1.724 1.662 0.006 −0.090 0.321
Leveraget 0.742 0.969 1.212 0.747 0.743 1.089
16.904 9.497 11.694 17.019 16.921 10.485
N 54,246 14,181 14,174 54,246 54,246 14,174
Pseudo-R2 0.261 0.256 0.270 0.263 0.265 0.296
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 74
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 VERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average
of the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by
AAII. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by aver-
age total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged
INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A version of
Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total li-
abilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.861 1.962 1.421
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.769 2.685 2.741
ADt 0.177 −0.237 0.098 0.240 0.322 −0.219
1.154 −0.691 0.285 1.565 1.690 −0.499
ADt*Sentt −0.006 0.038
−0.654 1.680
R&D/St 0.011 2.007 0.012 0.011 3.037
4.541 14.082 4.626 5.107 14.379
R&D/St*Sentt 0.000 −0.052
2.790 −7.105
PPENTt −0.193 −0.199 0.002 −0.186 0.033 0.464
−4.819 −2.335 0.024 −4.656 0.685 4.069
PPENTt*Sentt −0.019 −0.034
−8.279 −6.447
INTANt-1 −0.119 −0.868 −0.668 −0.134 −0.180 −0.456
−2.197 −8.408 −6.388 −2.483 −2.731 −3.525
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.004 −0.006
1.300 −1.037
CFcollinst −3.908 −2.953 −1.735 −3.864 −3.874 −1.487
−38.789 −4.782 −2.778 −38.525 −35.631 −2.318
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.003 −0.009
0.737 −0.806
ACCcollinst −1.833 −0.871 0.028 −1.788 −1.669 0.861
−17.583 −1.398 0.045 −17.231 −14.757 1.336
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.010 −0.059
−2.573 −5.437
AAIIbullbeart 0.009 0.013 0.025
18.820 13.678 9.498
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Table 74 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.079 0.073 0.050 0.049 0.069
34.987 21.486 19.911 34.334 34.111 18.566
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−25.399 −13.775 −13.367 −24.392 −24.306 −12.324
Sizet −0.134 −0.152 −0.162 −0.142 −0.141 −0.159
−24.881 −10.632 −11.318 −26.258 −26.181 −11.128
StdRett −0.006 −0.014 −0.014 −0.006 −0.006 −0.012
−30.540 −22.969 −22.061 −30.506 −30.350 −19.052
Turnovert 0.003 −0.000 −0.001 0.003 0.003 −0.000
23.474 −0.785 −2.393 23.407 23.338 −0.773
StdROAt 0.001 0.037 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.028
4.743 15.570 13.349 4.519 4.447 11.740
Betat 0.717 0.983 0.997 0.727 0.724 1.001
71.079 39.633 39.962 71.862 71.552 40.010
ROAt 0.010 1.021 0.986 0.020 0.026 1.126
0.137 1.724 1.662 0.267 0.340 1.897
Leveraget 0.742 0.969 1.212 0.744 0.747 1.137
16.904 9.497 11.694 16.961 17.024 10.914
N 54,246 14,181 14,174 54,242 54,242 14,174
Pseudo-R2 0.261 0.256 0.270 0.265 0.267 0.287
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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3.3.2 Annual VERR Decile Assignments Used with the Endo-
geneity Specification
For Tables 75 through 80 capm5 VERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles for each calendar year during the
1964–2009 period. The first three tables, Tables 75 through 77, use scaled
values of the Sloan (1996) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of
the robustness specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow
and accruals measures following Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for
firms prior to mid-1970, and very consistently thereafter. Table 75 employs
the Investors Intelligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the
full 1964–2009 period. Table 76 employs the sentiment data from Baker
and Wurgler (2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965.
Table 77 employs the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available
in the middle of 1987. The more limited availability of the AAII measure
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Table 77.
The second three tables, Tables 78 through 80, use scaled values of
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the
robustness specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow and
accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporadically
for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and consis-
tently thereafter. Table 78 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of
sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 79 em-
ploys the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available
beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 80 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more limited
availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Tables 78 through Tables 80.
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Table 75
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are
not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and
delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by
average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equip-
ment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales.
Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A ver-
sion of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock
turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and
total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics
are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.954 0.202 0.243
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.901 2.804 2.782
ADt 0.683 −0.319 −0.087 0.684 0.525 −0.954
5.434 −0.904 −0.247 5.437 3.209 −1.729
ADt*Sentt 0.011 0.043
1.583 1.931
R&D/St 0.008 1.607 0.008 0.007 1.678
5.056 12.888 5.057 5.524 9.191
R&D/St*Sentt 0.000 −0.004
3.701 −0.496
PPENTt −0.069 −0.487 −0.322 −0.069 0.138 −0.173
−2.074 −5.702 −3.713 −2.066 3.200 −1.309
PPENTt*Sentt −0.013 −0.008
−7.362 −1.490
INTANt-1 0.134 −0.526 −0.373 0.132 0.210 −0.280
2.672 −5.029 −3.537 2.639 2.854 −1.688
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.005 −0.004
−1.655 −0.652
CFsloant −1.798 −1.049 −0.272 −1.797 −1.634 −0.112
−22.660 −4.488 −1.125 −22.605 −18.549 −0.355
CFsloant*Sentt −0.009 −0.009
−3.760 −0.894
ACCsloant −0.584 −0.678 −0.052 −0.581 −0.302 0.255
−5.933 −2.176 −0.164 −5.892 −2.671 0.562
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.016 −0.016
−4.467 −0.996
IIbullbeart 0.000 0.005 0.002
0.335 6.617 0.799
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Table 75 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.040 0.043 0.037 0.040 0.040 0.038
32.793 13.082 11.343 32.784 32.697 11.374
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−24.804 −10.859 −10.487 −24.779 −24.660 −10.523
Sizet −0.102 −0.127 −0.134 −0.102 −0.103 −0.133
−23.034 −8.824 −9.290 −23.035 −23.281 −9.238
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002
−15.532 −4.318 −3.492 −15.296 −14.878 −3.524
Turnovert 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
25.636 5.090 3.822 25.542 25.379 3.904
StdROAt 0.003 0.027 0.022 0.003 0.003 0.022
7.523 11.795 9.866 7.511 7.308 9.813
Betat 0.700 0.882 0.898 0.700 0.698 0.899
80.975 35.941 36.415 80.955 80.682 36.221
ROAt −1.168 −0.025 0.287 −1.169 −1.157 0.294
−15.051 −0.111 1.287 −15.055 −14.860 1.316
Leveraget 0.467 0.386 0.550 0.467 0.478 0.551
12.581 3.787 5.366 12.586 12.865 5.375
N 80,626 13,958 13,951 80,626 80,626 13,951
Pseudo-R2 0.206 0.234 0.247 0.206 0.207 0.248
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 76
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are
not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and
delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker and
Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC)
are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by
sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.954 0.202 0.608
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.901 2.804 2.621
ADt 0.683 −0.319 −0.087 0.681 0.795 −0.096
5.434 −0.904 −0.247 5.417 6.294 −0.263
ADt*Sentt −1.310 0.182
−8.751 0.272
R&D/St 0.008 1.607 0.008 0.009 1.713
5.056 12.888 5.044 4.992 13.583
R&D/St*Sentt −0.005 −0.851
−3.512 −6.970
PPENTt −0.069 −0.487 −0.322 −0.069 −0.056 −0.257
−2.074 −5.702 −3.713 −2.065 −1.674 −2.896
PPENTt*Sentt −0.099 −0.363
−2.586 −2.544
INTANt-1 0.134 −0.526 −0.373 0.132 0.124 −0.276
2.672 −5.029 −3.537 2.635 2.462 −2.586
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.153 −0.201
2.069 −1.077
CFsloant −1.798 −1.049 −0.272 −1.815 −1.848 −0.360
−22.660 −4.488 −1.125 −22.845 −23.198 −1.465
CFsloant*Sentt 0.256 0.315
4.432 1.199
ACCsloant −0.584 −0.678 −0.052 −0.601 −0.620 −0.251
−5.933 −2.176 −0.164 −6.101 −6.271 −0.767
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.131 0.729
1.591 1.825
BWsentt −0.032 −0.013 0.486
−4.339 −0.814 6.830
continued on the next page
302
Table 76 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.040 0.043 0.037 0.041 0.041 0.035
32.793 13.082 11.343 32.903 32.965 10.636
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−24.804 −10.859 −10.487 −24.749 −24.747 −10.073
Sizet −0.102 −0.127 −0.134 −0.102 −0.102 −0.139
−23.034 −8.824 −9.290 −22.944 −23.045 −9.664
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004
−15.532 −4.318 −3.492 −15.516 −15.715 −5.992
Turnovert 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
25.636 5.090 3.822 25.813 25.830 4.592
StdROAt 0.003 0.027 0.022 0.003 0.003 0.022
7.523 11.795 9.866 7.587 7.679 9.715
Betat 0.700 0.882 0.898 0.697 0.698 0.962
80.975 35.941 36.415 80.497 80.451 38.103
ROAt −1.168 −0.025 0.287 −1.162 −1.170 0.209
−15.051 −0.111 1.287 −14.971 −15.080 0.933
Leveraget 0.467 0.386 0.550 0.469 0.470 0.483
12.581 3.787 5.366 12.623 12.645 4.709
N 80,626 13,958 13,951 80,588 80,588 13,951
Pseudo-R2 0.206 0.234 0.247 0.206 0.207 0.257
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
303
Table 77
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Sloan
(1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly difference
between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising (AD),
cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible
assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by
end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets,
lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age,
firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets,
the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by
assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each
coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 −0.000
0.954 0.202 −0.212
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.901 2.804 2.821
ADt 0.683 −0.319 −0.087 0.526 0.692 −0.504
5.434 −0.904 −0.247 3.459 3.664 −1.103
ADt*Sentt −0.014 0.037
−1.405 1.614
R&D/St 0.008 1.607 0.007 0.006 2.696
5.056 12.888 4.714 4.424 13.725
R&D/St*Sentt 0.000 −0.049
2.110 −8.212
PPENTt −0.069 −0.487 −0.322 −0.286 −0.110 −0.004
−2.074 −5.702 −3.713 −7.230 −2.319 −0.034
PPENTt*Sentt −0.015 −0.020
−6.515 −3.797
INTANt-1 0.134 −0.526 −0.373 0.100 0.107 −0.300
2.672 −5.029 −3.537 1.838 1.617 −2.306
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.000 0.001
−0.103 0.191
CFsloant −1.798 −1.049 −0.272 −2.675 −2.686 −0.094
−22.660 −4.488 −1.125 −29.858 −28.142 −0.336
CFsloant*Sentt 0.002 −0.000
0.558 −0.048
ACCsloant −0.584 −0.678 −0.052 −1.692 −1.627 0.351
−5.933 −2.176 −0.164 −14.820 −12.881 0.902
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.005 −0.011
−1.032 −0.704
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.006 0.016
5.056 6.750 6.096
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Table 77 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.040 0.043 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.035
32.793 13.082 11.343 28.769 28.552 10.511
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−24.804 −10.859 −10.487 −22.600 −22.550 −9.764
Sizet −0.102 −0.127 −0.134 −0.105 −0.105 −0.133
−23.034 −8.824 −9.290 −19.738 −19.764 −9.236
StdRett −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001
−15.532 −4.318 −3.492 −18.597 −18.599 −1.958
Turnovert 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
25.636 5.090 3.822 24.284 24.189 4.716
StdROAt 0.003 0.027 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.020
7.523 11.795 9.866 5.046 5.006 8.741
Betat 0.700 0.882 0.898 0.713 0.711 0.904
80.975 35.941 36.415 71.054 70.811 36.524
ROAt −1.168 −0.025 0.287 −0.725 −0.721 0.333
−15.051 −0.111 1.287 −8.768 −8.714 1.497
Leveraget 0.467 0.386 0.550 0.619 0.622 0.523
12.581 3.787 5.366 14.262 14.315 5.080
N 80,626 13,958 13,951 55,144 55,144 13,951
Pseudo-R2 0.206 0.234 0.247 0.252 0.253 0.256
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 78
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins
et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by
average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equip-
ment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales.
Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A ver-
sion of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock
turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and
total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics
are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.561 0.740 0.797
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.031 2.927 2.880
ADt 0.343 −0.333 −0.037 0.346 0.675 −0.804
2.244 −0.975 −0.109 2.258 3.272 −1.552
ADt*Sentt −0.022 0.038
−2.358 1.789
R&D/St 0.007 1.635 0.007 0.006 1.920
4.666 13.116 4.667 4.884 10.259
R&D/St*Sentt 0.000 −0.014
2.893 −1.994
PPENTt −0.267 −0.446 −0.291 −0.265 −0.035 −0.033
−6.711 −5.255 −3.369 −6.653 −0.663 −0.256
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.013
−6.466 −2.602
INTANt-1 0.002 −0.582 −0.404 −0.004 0.139 −0.137
0.028 −5.670 −3.889 −0.077 1.730 −0.833
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.008 −0.011
−2.550 −1.777
CFcollinst −3.620 −1.057 0.088 −3.617 −3.370 0.751
−36.816 −1.722 0.142 −36.783 −30.458 1.136
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.013 −0.037
−4.028 −3.320
ACCcollinst −1.967 −0.144 0.583 −1.962 −1.656 1.844
−19.035 −0.231 0.934 −18.991 −13.951 2.830
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.018 −0.074
−4.641 −6.688
IIbullbeart 0.001 0.006 0.005
1.074 6.207 1.819
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Table 78 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.035 0.040 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036
27.654 12.669 11.287 27.650 27.648 11.419
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.592 −10.858 −10.434 −22.564 −22.464 −10.374
Sizet −0.105 −0.131 −0.139 −0.106 −0.106 −0.136
−19.657 −9.219 −9.763 −19.675 −19.795 −9.557
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
−18.033 −4.337 −3.518 −17.785 −17.315 −2.877
Turnovert 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
24.087 4.798 3.542 23.870 23.823 3.490
StdROAt 0.001 0.027 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.023
4.760 12.004 10.068 4.737 4.692 10.130
Betat 0.707 0.885 0.899 0.707 0.705 0.899
70.623 36.306 36.688 70.609 70.381 36.469
ROAt −0.022 −0.136 −0.174 −0.021 −0.018 −0.109
−0.290 −0.230 −0.294 −0.279 −0.232 −0.184
Leveraget 0.425 0.258 0.473 0.428 0.443 0.471
9.847 2.583 4.674 9.893 10.245 4.646
N 54,246 14,181 14,174 54,246 54,246 14,174
Pseudo-R2 0.253 0.234 0.248 0.253 0.254 0.250
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 79
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins et
al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker and
Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC)
are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by
sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.561 0.740 1.085
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.031 2.927 2.713
ADt 0.343 −0.333 −0.037 0.342 0.420 −0.043
2.244 −0.975 −0.109 2.233 2.714 −0.123
ADt*Sentt −0.584 0.167
−2.198 0.252
R&D/St 0.007 1.635 0.007 0.007 1.778
4.666 13.116 4.665 4.512 13.946
R&D/St*Sentt −0.002 −0.905
−0.518 −8.229
PPENTt −0.267 −0.446 −0.291 −0.268 −0.264 −0.220
−6.711 −5.255 −3.369 −6.721 −6.594 −2.501
PPENTt*Sentt −0.102 −0.411
−1.472 −2.928
INTANt-1 0.002 −0.582 −0.404 0.002 0.018 −0.308
0.028 −5.670 −3.889 0.028 0.338 −2.929
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.295 −0.213
−3.147 −1.134
CFcollinst −3.620 −1.057 0.088 −3.621 −3.769 0.477
−36.816 −1.722 0.142 −36.827 −37.996 0.760
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.068 0.279
11.637 0.962
ACCcollinst −1.967 −0.144 0.583 −1.967 −2.110 0.986
−19.035 −0.231 0.934 −19.042 −20.238 1.563
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.744 −0.080
7.901 −0.328
BWsentt −0.012 0.032 0.487
−0.884 1.171 7.040
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Table 79 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.035 0.040 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.033
27.654 12.669 11.287 27.662 27.886 10.403
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.592 −10.858 −10.434 −22.604 −22.700 −9.983
Sizet −0.105 −0.131 −0.139 −0.105 −0.104 −0.145
−19.657 −9.219 −9.763 −19.510 −19.416 −10.140
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
−18.033 −4.337 −3.518 −17.827 −17.970 −5.803
Turnovert 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
24.087 4.798 3.542 24.094 23.858 4.227
StdROAt 0.001 0.027 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.022
4.760 12.004 10.068 4.758 4.827 9.870
Betat 0.707 0.885 0.899 0.706 0.712 0.963
70.623 36.306 36.688 70.456 70.782 38.386
ROAt −0.022 −0.136 −0.174 −0.021 −0.030 −0.633
−0.290 −0.230 −0.294 −0.281 −0.400 −1.067
Leveraget 0.425 0.258 0.473 0.425 0.420 0.408
9.847 2.583 4.674 9.841 9.710 4.029
N 54,246 14,181 14,174 54,246 54,246 14,174
Pseudo-R2 0.253 0.234 0.248 0.253 0.255 0.257
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 80
Determinants of Annual capm5 VERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the annual capm5 VERR decile assignments
from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables are not
available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega and delta,
are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in millions.
Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with Collins et al.
(2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly difference
between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising (AD),
cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible
assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by
end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets,
lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age,
firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets,
the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by
assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each
coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.561 0.740 0.265
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.031 2.927 2.927
ADt 0.343 −0.333 −0.037 0.359 0.507 −0.327
2.244 −0.975 −0.109 2.344 2.667 −0.746
ADt*Sentt −0.012 0.028
−1.233 1.244
R&D/St 0.007 1.635 0.007 0.006 2.848
4.666 13.116 4.682 4.410 14.421
R&D/St*Sentt 0.000 −0.054
2.185 −9.251
PPENTt −0.267 −0.446 −0.291 −0.265 −0.096 0.064
−6.711 −5.255 −3.369 −6.647 −2.005 0.567
PPENTt*Sentt −0.014 −0.023
−6.247 −4.435
INTANt-1 0.002 −0.582 −0.404 −0.001 −0.006 −0.266
0.028 −5.670 −3.889 −0.022 −0.086 −2.068
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.001 −0.002
0.191 −0.318
CFcollinst −3.620 −1.057 0.088 −3.605 −3.619 0.379
−36.816 −1.722 0.142 −36.711 −33.833 0.593
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.002 −0.012
0.640 −1.139
ACCcollinst −1.967 −0.144 0.583 −1.954 −1.912 1.189
−19.035 −0.231 0.934 −18.933 −16.936 1.852
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.004 −0.040
−0.893 −3.807
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.006 0.017
5.146 6.448 6.600
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Table 80 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.035 0.040 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.033
27.654 12.669 11.287 27.424 27.206 10.485
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−22.592 −10.858 −10.434 −22.236 −22.181 −9.700
Sizet −0.105 −0.131 −0.139 −0.107 −0.107 −0.138
−19.657 −9.219 −9.763 −19.961 −19.928 −9.680
StdRett −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.001
−18.033 −4.337 −3.518 −17.938 −17.872 −1.719
Turnovert 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
24.087 4.798 3.542 24.068 23.963 4.275
StdROAt 0.001 0.027 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.020
4.760 12.004 10.068 4.702 4.658 8.929
Betat 0.707 0.885 0.899 0.709 0.707 0.903
70.623 36.306 36.688 70.750 70.508 36.736
ROAt −0.022 −0.136 −0.174 −0.020 −0.017 −0.068
−0.290 −0.230 −0.294 −0.268 −0.224 −0.115
Leveraget 0.425 0.258 0.473 0.425 0.428 0.461
9.847 2.583 4.674 9.847 9.898 4.535
N 54,246 14,181 14,174 54,242 54,242 14,174
Pseudo-R2 0.253 0.234 0.248 0.253 0.254 0.257
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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3.3.3 Full Period eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the
Endogeneity Specification
For Tables 81 through 86 capm5 eVERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles across the 1964–2009 period. The first
three tables, Tables 81 through 83, use scaled values of the Sloan (1996)
measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the robustness specification.
The data required to calculate the cash flow and accruals measures follow-
ing Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for firms prior to mid-1970, and
very consistently thereafter. Table 81 employs the Investors Intelligence
measure of sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Ta-
ble 82 employs the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is
available beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 83 employs the AAII mea-
sure of sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more
limited availability of the AAII measure accounts for the smaller number
of observations involved in the analyses presented in Table 83.
The second three tables, Tables 84 through 86, use scaled values of
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the
robustness specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow and
accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporadically
for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and consis-
tently thereafter. Table 84 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of
sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 85 em-
ploys the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available
beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 86 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more limited
availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Tables 84 through Tables 86.
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Table 81
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by Investors In-
telligence Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by
average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equip-
ment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales.
Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A ver-
sion of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock
turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and
total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics
are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.858 4.624 3.432
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
4.181 4.472 4.624
ADt 0.277 −0.380 0.102 0.288 0.119 −0.875
2.190 −1.072 0.285 2.279 0.727 −1.548
ADt*Sentt 0.013 0.055
1.808 2.422
R&D/St 0.042 3.601 0.043 0.107 3.339
7.738 20.616 7.726 7.017 13.754
R&D/St*Sentt −0.002 0.020
−5.203 2.178
PPENTt −1.244 −1.561 −1.216 −1.241 −1.046 −1.054
−36.618 −18.053 −13.737 −36.531 −23.928 −7.814
PPENTt*Sentt −0.012 −0.009
−6.974 −1.642
INTANt-1 −0.240 −1.643 −1.380 −0.283 −0.763 −1.897
−4.796 −15.561 −12.946 −5.644 −10.387 −11.253
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.022 0.018
8.077 2.955
CFsloant −3.688 −1.422 −0.187 −3.645 −3.313 −0.000
−49.312 −5.925 −0.745 −48.729 −38.681 −0.001
CFsloant*Sentt −0.017 0.014
−6.499 1.404
ACCsloant −2.302 0.285 1.454 −2.237 −2.174 1.366
−24.926 0.901 4.508 −24.186 −20.078 2.959
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.001 0.030
0.378 1.800
IIbullbeart 0.003 0.008 0.008
9.779 10.229 2.962
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Table 81 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.091 0.109 0.099 0.091 0.091 0.095
53.472 25.165 22.815 53.221 53.283 22.160
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
−8.322 −10.407 −9.889 −8.030 −7.869 −9.405
Sizet −0.088 −0.113 −0.131 −0.089 −0.091 −0.127
−19.605 −7.816 −9.057 −19.855 −20.256 −8.777
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.016 −0.005 −0.004 −0.013
−26.199 −25.796 −24.477 −24.421 −23.328 −18.850
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.004 0.004 −0.002
36.716 −6.815 −9.854 35.872 35.806 −10.776
StdROAt 0.009 0.045 0.036 0.008 0.008 0.033
15.827 18.501 14.927 15.551 15.123 13.644
Betat 0.577 1.085 1.113 0.576 0.574 1.094
66.798 43.020 43.674 66.698 66.376 42.755
ROAt −0.565 0.646 1.208 −0.565 −0.576 0.999
−9.580 2.914 5.362 −9.597 −9.813 4.417
Leveraget −0.008 0.406 0.730 −0.002 0.019 0.707
−0.213 3.876 6.882 −0.060 0.490 6.661
N 80,752 14,066 14,061 80,752 80,752 14,061
Pseudo-R2 0.281 0.342 0.370 0.282 0.284 0.377
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
314
Table 82
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals
(ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D
is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega
are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of
returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on as-
sets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.858 4.624 5.857
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
4.181 4.472 3.874
ADt 0.277 −0.380 0.102 0.380 0.475 0.205
2.190 −1.072 0.285 3.004 3.747 0.551
ADt*Sentt −1.016 −0.055
−6.805 −0.082
R&D/St 0.042 3.601 0.049 0.047 3.686
7.738 20.616 8.218 8.093 21.404
R&D/St*Sentt −0.021 2.702
−3.239 7.951
PPENTt −1.244 −1.561 −1.216 −1.324 −1.319 −1.190
−36.618 −18.053 −13.737 −38.844 −38.598 −13.158
PPENTt*Sentt −0.043 −0.139
−1.094 −0.926
INTANt-1 −0.240 −1.643 −1.380 −0.226 −0.203 −1.293
−4.796 −15.561 −12.946 −4.510 −4.040 −11.987
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.473 0.397
−6.457 2.085
CFsloant −3.688 −1.422 −0.187 −3.467 −3.584 −0.208
−49.312 −5.925 −0.745 −46.182 −47.667 −0.817
CFsloant*Sentt 0.981 0.862
16.055 3.071
ACCsloant −2.302 0.285 1.454 −2.018 −2.155 1.440
−24.926 0.901 4.508 −21.774 −23.176 4.299
ACCsloant*Sentt 1.070 1.131
12.662 2.726
BWsentt 0.585 0.543 0.462
76.448 32.161 5.585
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Table 82 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.091 0.109 0.099 0.088 0.089 0.093
53.472 25.165 22.815 51.829 52.160 21.381
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−8.322 −10.407 −9.889 −9.903 −10.229 −9.390
Sizet −0.088 −0.113 −0.131 −0.094 −0.094 −0.144
−19.605 −7.816 −9.057 −20.960 −20.936 −9.918
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.016 −0.005 −0.005 −0.019
−26.199 −25.796 −24.477 −27.020 −27.209 −28.227
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.004 0.004 −0.002
36.716 −6.815 −9.854 34.204 33.860 −8.779
StdROAt 0.009 0.045 0.036 0.009 0.009 0.036
15.827 18.501 14.927 15.899 16.392 15.074
Betat 0.577 1.085 1.113 0.640 0.642 1.243
66.798 43.020 43.674 73.265 73.444 47.016
ROAt −0.565 0.646 1.208 −0.648 −0.679 1.021
−9.580 2.914 5.362 −10.946 −11.517 4.483
Leveraget −0.008 0.406 0.730 −0.084 −0.083 0.612
−0.213 3.876 6.882 −2.200 −2.173 5.753
N 80,752 14,066 14,061 80,715 80,715 14,061
Pseudo-R2 0.281 0.342 0.370 0.332 0.335 0.398
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 83
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of the weekly dif-
ference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Advertising
(AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets;
intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are
scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled
by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm
age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on as-
sets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled
by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported below
each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.858 4.624 4.307
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
4.181 4.472 4.469
ADt 0.277 −0.380 0.102 0.353 0.300 −0.773
2.190 −1.072 0.285 2.311 1.578 −1.667
ADt*Sentt 0.005 0.086
0.528 3.677
R&D/St 0.042 3.601 0.041 0.032 3.316
7.738 20.616 7.571 6.834 14.792
R&D/St*Sentt 0.001 0.026
3.841 2.456
PPENTt −1.244 −1.561 −1.216 −1.389 −1.196 −0.956
−36.618 −18.053 −13.737 −34.690 −24.922 −8.188
PPENTt*Sentt −0.017 −0.022
−7.339 −4.093
INTANt-1 −0.240 −1.643 −1.380 −0.876 −0.977 −1.313
−4.796 −15.561 −12.946 −16.155 −14.771 −9.991
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.008 0.000
2.672 0.024
CFsloant −3.688 −1.422 −0.187 −3.443 −3.405 −0.110
−49.312 −5.925 −0.745 −37.547 −34.901 −0.381
CFsloant*Sentt −0.001 0.012
−0.378 1.176
ACCsloant −2.302 0.285 1.454 −1.791 −1.714 2.251
−24.926 0.901 4.508 −15.612 −13.477 5.658
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.005 −0.029
−0.980 −1.926
AAIIbullbeart 0.011 0.015 0.019
23.223 15.066 6.640
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Table 83 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.091 0.109 0.099 0.074 0.074 0.092
53.472 25.165 22.815 42.373 42.210 21.234
Aget −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−8.322 −10.407 −9.889 −12.870 −12.747 −8.891
Sizet −0.088 −0.113 −0.131 −0.142 −0.142 −0.126
−19.605 −7.816 −9.057 −26.596 −26.600 −8.691
StdRett −0.005 −0.016 −0.016 −0.007 −0.007 −0.014
−26.199 −25.796 −24.477 −31.729 −31.568 −21.692
Turnovert 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
36.716 −6.815 −9.854 17.159 17.209 −7.453
StdROAt 0.009 0.045 0.036 0.002 0.002 0.032
15.827 18.501 14.927 5.277 5.184 13.365
Betat 0.577 1.085 1.113 0.779 0.776 1.115
66.798 43.020 43.674 76.162 75.840 43.546
ROAt −0.565 0.646 1.208 −0.426 −0.425 1.200
−9.580 2.914 5.362 −5.278 −5.250 5.307
Leveraget −0.008 0.406 0.730 0.223 0.224 0.568
−0.213 3.876 6.882 4.999 5.031 5.339
N 80,752 14,066 14,061 55,398 55,398 14,061
Pseudo-R2 0.281 0.342 0.370 0.329 0.330 0.387
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 84
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average of
the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by In-
vestors Intelligence. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by
sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
6.843 5.615 4.536
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
4.619 4.948 5.041
ADt 0.028 −0.629 −0.034 0.067 0.331 −0.903
0.180 −1.825 −0.098 0.436 1.594 −1.698
ADt*Sentt −0.017 0.053
−1.752 2.469
R&D/St 0.041 3.570 0.041 0.110 3.523
7.308 20.511 7.284 7.528 13.877
R&D/St*Sentt −0.003 0.007
−6.574 0.707
PPENTt −1.321 −1.451 −1.111 −1.292 −1.027 −0.841
−32.680 −16.876 −12.596 −31.954 −19.257 −6.313
PPENTt*Sentt −0.017 −0.014
−7.622 −2.779
INTANt-1 −0.900 −1.634 −1.326 −1.026 −1.275 −1.650
−16.716 −15.764 −12.629 −18.970 −15.826 −9.861
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.011 0.011
3.628 1.808
CFcollinst −4.209 −2.845 −1.129 −4.168 −3.913 −1.009
−40.343 −4.621 −1.810 −40.265 −33.147 −1.516
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.012 −0.002
−3.621 −0.187
ACCcollinst −1.420 −0.151 1.204 −1.359 −1.104 1.431
−13.455 −0.243 1.921 −12.986 −9.133 2.185
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.015 −0.016
−3.865 −1.396
IIbullbeart 0.010 0.014 0.011
20.368 14.941 4.200
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Table 84 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.070 0.109 0.104 0.069 0.070 0.103
41.212 26.361 24.939 41.130 41.159 24.744
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−14.453 −10.814 −10.247 −14.148 −13.971 −9.787
Sizet −0.133 −0.120 −0.139 −0.144 −0.144 −0.134
−24.786 −8.334 −9.682 −26.687 −26.673 −9.300
StdRett −0.007 −0.017 −0.016 −0.006 −0.006 −0.013
−32.095 −26.728 −25.309 −29.972 −28.946 −19.558
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
17.412 −6.508 −9.492 15.334 15.573 −10.323
StdROAt 0.002 0.046 0.037 0.002 0.002 0.034
5.661 18.894 15.421 5.071 4.950 14.218
Betat 0.758 1.090 1.112 0.759 0.756 1.089
74.377 43.446 43.909 74.463 74.157 42.872
ROAt −0.139 1.259 1.218 −0.113 −0.105 1.275
−1.798 2.133 2.058 −1.471 −1.368 2.152
Leveraget −0.043 0.277 0.693 0.001 0.029 0.704
−0.971 2.706 6.648 0.025 0.651 6.740
N 54,486 14,282 14,277 54,486 54,486 14,277
Pseudo-R2 0.324 0.346 0.372 0.329 0.331 0.379
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 85
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced
by Baker and Wurgler (2007) are used. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year as-
sets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and
lagged vega are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard
deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation
of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets are included as
control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
6.843 5.615 6.752
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
4.619 4.948 4.228
ADt 0.028 −0.629 −0.034 0.063 0.168 0.053
0.180 −1.825 −0.098 0.407 1.078 0.148
ADt*Sentt −0.969 0.072
−3.658 0.108
R&D/St 0.041 3.570 0.042 0.039 3.661
7.308 20.511 7.452 7.080 21.229
R&D/St*Sentt 0.003 2.370
0.248 7.057
PPENTt −1.321 −1.451 −1.111 −1.321 −1.318 −1.090
−32.680 −16.876 −12.596 −32.663 −32.440 −12.130
PPENTt*Sentt −0.140 −0.271
−2.021 −1.820
INTANt-1 −0.900 −1.634 −1.326 −0.908 −0.904 −1.239
−16.716 −15.764 −12.629 −16.862 −16.669 −11.664
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.154 0.351
−1.670 1.823
CFcollinst −4.209 −2.845 −1.129 −4.184 −4.350 −0.454
−40.343 −4.621 −1.810 −40.080 −41.280 −0.719
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.216 1.082
12.538 3.548
ACCcollinst −1.420 −0.151 1.204 −1.405 −1.553 1.949
−13.455 −0.243 1.921 −13.294 −14.560 3.068
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.673 −0.158
7.245 −0.637
BWsentt 0.219 0.247 0.470
15.744 8.916 5.912
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Table 85 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.070 0.109 0.104 0.069 0.070 0.097
41.212 26.361 24.939 40.770 41.084 23.332
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−14.453 −10.814 −10.247 −14.299 −14.394 −9.760
Sizet −0.133 −0.120 −0.139 −0.141 −0.140 −0.151
−24.786 −8.334 −9.682 −26.017 −25.872 −10.434
StdRett −0.007 −0.017 −0.016 −0.007 −0.007 −0.019
−32.095 −26.728 −25.309 −33.807 −33.949 −28.759
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
17.412 −6.508 −9.492 17.301 17.096 −8.462
StdROAt 0.002 0.046 0.037 0.002 0.002 0.038
5.661 18.894 15.421 5.690 5.864 15.723
Betat 0.758 1.090 1.112 0.772 0.778 1.240
74.377 43.446 43.909 75.382 75.757 47.219
ROAt −0.139 1.259 1.218 −0.152 −0.167 0.372
−1.798 2.133 2.058 −1.957 −2.149 0.625
Leveraget −0.043 0.277 0.693 −0.037 −0.043 0.577
−0.971 2.706 6.648 −0.829 −0.962 5.519
N 54,486 14,282 14,277 54,486 54,486 14,277
Pseudo-R2 0.324 0.346 0.372 0.327 0.329 0.400
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 86
Determinants of Full Sample capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions use the full period capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data are calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment is calculated as the monthly average
of the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by
AAII. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by aver-
age total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged
INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A version of
Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total li-
abilities scaled by assets are included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
6.843 5.615 5.263
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
4.619 4.948 4.827
ADt 0.028 −0.629 −0.034 0.114 0.013 −0.793
0.180 −1.825 −0.098 0.738 0.070 −1.779
ADt*Sentt 0.009 0.081
0.920 3.533
R&D/St 0.041 3.570 0.041 0.032 3.544
7.308 20.511 7.409 6.065 15.661
R&D/St*Sentt 0.001 0.008
3.412 0.790
PPENTt −1.321 −1.451 −1.111 −1.324 −1.138 −0.829
−32.680 −16.876 −12.596 −32.754 −23.513 −7.180
PPENTt*Sentt −0.016 −0.026
−7.054 −4.807
INTANt-1 −0.900 −1.634 −1.326 −0.931 −1.011 −1.166
−16.716 −15.764 −12.629 −17.276 −15.340 −8.966
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.007 −0.005
2.224 −0.863
CFcollinst −4.209 −2.845 −1.129 −4.161 −4.134 −0.997
−40.343 −4.621 −1.810 −40.241 −37.010 −1.553
CFcollinst*Sentt 0.000 0.002
0.020 0.156
ACCcollinst −1.420 −0.151 1.204 −1.378 −1.161 1.915
−13.455 −0.243 1.921 −13.178 −10.223 2.963
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.018 −0.056
−4.597 −5.062
AAIIbullbeart 0.011 0.014 0.021
23.858 14.225 7.409
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Table 86 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.070 0.109 0.104 0.068 0.067 0.098
41.212 26.361 24.939 40.353 40.162 23.407
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−14.453 −10.814 −10.247 −13.156 −13.034 −9.232
Sizet −0.133 −0.120 −0.139 −0.144 −0.143 −0.134
−24.786 −8.334 −9.682 −26.601 −26.520 −9.274
StdRett −0.007 −0.017 −0.016 −0.007 −0.007 −0.014
−32.095 −26.728 −25.309 −32.035 −31.699 −22.041
Turnovert 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002
17.412 −6.508 −9.492 17.497 17.509 −7.255
StdROAt 0.002 0.046 0.037 0.002 0.002 0.033
5.661 18.894 15.421 5.124 5.072 13.822
Betat 0.758 1.090 1.112 0.773 0.769 1.113
74.377 43.446 43.909 75.505 75.163 43.738
ROAt −0.139 1.259 1.218 −0.119 −0.111 1.303
−1.798 2.133 2.058 −1.551 −1.453 2.197
Leveraget −0.043 0.277 0.693 −0.050 −0.047 0.565
−0.971 2.706 6.648 −1.128 −1.070 5.395
N 54,486 14,282 14,277 54,482 54,482 14,277
Pseudo-R2 0.324 0.346 0.372 0.331 0.332 0.390
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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3.3.4 Annual eVERR Decile Assignments Used with the Endo-
geneity Specification
For Tables 87 through 92 capm5 eVERR valuation measures are used to
assign firm years to valuation deciles for each calendar year during the
1964–2009 period. The first three tables, Tables 87 through 89, use scaled
values of the Sloan (1996) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of
the robustness specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow
and accruals measures following Sloan (1996) is available sporadically for
firms prior to mid-1970, and very consistently thereafter. Table 87 employs
the Investors Intelligence measure of sentiment, which is available for the
full 1964–2009 period. Table 88 employs the sentiment data from Baker
and Wurgler (2007), which is available beginning in the middle of 1965.
Table 89 employs the AAII measure of sentiment, which is first available
in the middle of 1987. The more limited availability of the AAII measure
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Table 89.
The second three tables, Tables 90 through 92, use scaled values of
the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals as part of the
robustness specification. The data required to calculate the cash flow and
accruals measures following Collins et al. (2003) is available sporadically
for firms beginning in 1987 and continuing through mid-1988, and consis-
tently thereafter. Table 90 employs the Investors Intelligence measure of
sentiment, which is available for the full 1964–2009 period. Table 91 em-
ploys the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is available
beginning in the middle of 1965. Table 92 employs the AAII measure of
sentiment, which is first available in the middle of 1987. The more limited
availability of the Collins et al. (2003) measures of cash flow and accruals
accounts for the smaller number of observations involved in the analyses
presented in Tables 90 through Tables 92.
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Table 87
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions used the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to
be in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data were calculated in accor-
dance with Sloan (1996). Sentiment was calculated as the monthly average of
the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by In-
vestors Intelligence. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by
sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets were included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.703 4.294 4.697
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.917 2.948 2.913
ADt 0.851 −0.180 0.281 0.848 0.681 −0.367
6.752 −0.511 0.793 6.726 4.148 −0.659
ADt*Sentt 0.011 0.034
1.651 1.512
R&D/St 0.026 3.458 0.026 0.038 3.627
7.158 21.330 7.152 5.855 14.334
R&D/St*Sentt −0.001 −0.010
−2.423 −1.063
PPENTt −1.467 −2.010 −1.680 −1.469 −1.271 −1.495
−43.384 −23.207 −18.985 −43.422 −29.172 −11.065
PPENTt*Sentt −0.012 −0.010
−7.064 −1.926
INTANt-1 −0.789 −1.406 −1.129 −0.779 −0.553 −0.952
−15.832 −13.430 −10.675 −15.589 −7.542 −5.725
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.012 −0.006
−4.415 −1.030
CFsloant −2.154 −0.547 0.698 −2.167 −1.986 0.603
−26.984 −2.341 2.850 −27.086 −22.274 1.885
CFsloant*Sentt −0.011 −0.003
−4.518 −0.329
ACCsloant −0.518 0.302 1.423 −0.537 −0.213 1.915
−5.261 0.970 4.476 −5.437 −1.875 4.176
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.020 −0.034
−5.415 −2.042
IIbullbeart −0.001 0.004 −0.002
−2.454 6.040 −0.689
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Table 87 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.070 0.060 0.051 0.051 0.062
37.051 18.941 16.265 37.086 37.092 16.515
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−11.315 −6.683 −6.101 −11.392 −11.271 −6.318
Sizet −0.111 −0.080 −0.097 −0.111 −0.112 −0.098
−24.990 −5.607 −6.707 −24.933 −25.156 −6.782
StdRett −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
−18.755 −6.638 −5.171 −18.935 −18.800 −6.547
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
18.976 1.515 −1.280 19.099 19.076 −0.880
StdROAt 0.003 0.032 0.024 0.003 0.003 0.025
7.400 14.234 10.791 7.457 7.307 11.140
Betat 0.721 0.942 0.970 0.722 0.720 0.982
82.974 38.247 38.984 83.010 82.742 39.205
ROAt −0.955 0.281 0.875 −0.953 −0.937 0.938
−12.442 1.285 3.934 −12.405 −12.207 4.199
Leveraget −0.389 −0.415 −0.092 −0.391 −0.383 −0.082
−10.375 −4.053 −0.891 −10.421 −10.204 −0.789
N 80,752 14,066 14,061 80,752 80,752 14,061
Pseudo-R2 0.263 0.318 0.349 0.263 0.264 0.350
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 88
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions used the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data were calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced by Baker
and Wurgler (2007) were used. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals
(ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D
is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega
are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation
of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return
on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets were included as control
variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.703 4.294 4.955
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.917 2.948 2.752
ADt 0.851 −0.180 0.281 0.851 0.975 0.159
6.752 −0.511 0.793 6.751 7.686 0.430
ADt*Sentt −1.434 0.920
−9.513 1.371
R&D/St 0.026 3.458 0.026 0.030 3.421
7.158 21.330 7.110 7.526 21.500
R&D/St*Sentt −0.015 1.539
−3.517 5.016
PPENTt −1.467 −2.010 −1.680 −1.466 −1.455 −1.710
−43.384 −23.207 −18.985 −43.338 −42.921 −18.917
PPENTt*Sentt −0.052 0.263
−1.342 1.761
INTANt-1 −0.789 −1.406 −1.129 −0.790 −0.813 −1.087
−15.832 −13.430 −10.675 −15.847 −16.256 −10.166
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.374 0.439
5.146 2.328
CFsloant −2.154 −0.547 0.698 −2.182 −2.220 0.639
−26.984 −2.341 2.850 −27.291 −27.676 2.568
CFsloant*Sentt 0.309 0.588
5.326 2.137
ACCsloant −0.518 0.302 1.423 −0.546 −0.568 1.294
−5.261 0.970 4.476 −5.539 −5.738 3.926
ACCsloant*Sentt 0.179 0.951
2.164 2.329
BWsentt −0.042 −0.054 0.121
−5.793 −3.293 1.480
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Table 88 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.070 0.060 0.052 0.052 0.057
37.051 18.941 16.265 37.213 37.322 15.160
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−11.315 −6.683 −6.101 −11.220 −11.155 −5.637
Sizet −0.111 −0.080 −0.097 −0.110 −0.112 −0.103
−24.990 −5.607 −6.707 −24.885 −25.116 −7.116
StdRett −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.005
−18.755 −6.638 −5.171 −18.698 −19.025 −7.656
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
18.976 1.515 −1.280 19.253 19.329 −0.484
StdROAt 0.003 0.032 0.024 0.003 0.003 0.024
7.400 14.234 10.791 7.458 7.596 10.672
Betat 0.721 0.942 0.970 0.718 0.721 1.038
82.974 38.247 38.984 82.412 82.569 40.655
ROAt −0.955 0.281 0.875 −0.945 −0.958 0.775
−12.442 1.285 3.934 −12.318 −12.482 3.465
Leveraget −0.389 −0.415 −0.092 −0.387 −0.386 −0.171
−10.375 −4.053 −0.891 −10.314 −10.285 −1.647
N 80,752 14,066 14,061 80,715 80,715 14,061
Pseudo-R2 0.263 0.318 0.349 0.263 0.265 0.359
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 89
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Sloan Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions used the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be in
millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data were calculated in accordance with
Sloan (1996). Sentiment was calculated as the monthly average of the weekly
difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by AAII. Ad-
vertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total
assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT)
are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN
scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A version of Altman’s
Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover, return
on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities
scaled by assets were included as control variables. The t-statistics are reported
below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.703 4.294 4.005
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.917 2.948 2.960
ADt 0.851 −0.180 0.281 0.553 0.615 −0.507
6.752 −0.511 0.793 3.634 3.245 −1.104
ADt*Sentt −0.005 0.067
−0.528 2.884
R&D/St 0.026 3.458 0.021 0.018 3.910
7.158 21.330 6.274 6.911 17.502
R&D/St*Sentt 0.001 −0.025
4.955 −2.771
PPENTt −1.467 −2.010 −1.680 −1.558 −1.473 −1.510
−43.384 −23.207 −18.985 −38.954 −30.705 −12.945
PPENTt*Sentt −0.007 −0.012
−3.147 −2.328
INTANt-1 −0.789 −1.406 −1.129 −0.773 −0.834 −1.136
−15.832 −13.430 −10.675 −14.341 −12.657 −8.704
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.005 0.005
1.724 0.793
CFsloant −2.154 −0.547 0.698 −3.071 −3.009 0.988
−26.984 −2.341 2.850 −33.871 −31.199 3.489
CFsloant*Sentt −0.004 −0.014
−1.219 −1.391
ACCsloant −0.518 0.302 1.423 −1.663 −1.509 2.366
−5.261 0.970 4.476 −14.524 −11.905 6.026
ACCsloant*Sentt −0.012 −0.053
−2.474 −3.543
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.003 0.011
4.217 3.388 3.936
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Table 89 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.051 0.070 0.060 0.050 0.050 0.058
37.051 18.941 16.265 34.087 33.896 15.640
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−11.315 −6.683 −6.101 −9.476 −9.363 −5.611
Sizet −0.111 −0.080 −0.097 −0.116 −0.117 −0.094
−24.990 −5.607 −6.707 −21.930 −21.984 −6.504
StdRett −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
−18.755 −6.638 −5.171 −19.820 −19.695 −3.684
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
18.976 1.515 −1.280 20.363 20.372 −0.273
StdROAt 0.003 0.032 0.024 0.002 0.002 0.023
7.400 14.234 10.791 5.131 5.088 10.062
Betat 0.721 0.942 0.970 0.740 0.738 0.970
82.974 38.247 38.984 73.293 73.078 38.903
ROAt −0.955 0.281 0.875 −0.575 −0.566 0.878
−12.442 1.285 3.934 −6.995 −6.876 3.945
Leveraget −0.389 −0.415 −0.092 −0.203 −0.200 −0.142
−10.375 −4.053 −0.891 −4.632 −4.566 −1.366
N 80,752 14,066 14,061 55,398 55,398 14,061
Pseudo-R2 0.263 0.318 0.349 0.316 0.316 0.354
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 90
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Investors Intelligence Sentiment and Collins Accruals and
Cash Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions used the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data were calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment was calculated as the monthly average of
the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by In-
vestors Intelligence. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are
scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant,
and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by
sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used.
A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns,
stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets,
beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets were included as control variables.
The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
6.517 5.080 5.520
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.080 3.107 3.044
ADt 0.342 −0.198 0.373 0.337 0.633 −0.212
2.230 −0.580 1.086 2.202 3.053 −0.405
ADt*Sentt −0.020 0.032
−2.165 1.494
R&D/St 0.022 3.391 0.022 0.033 3.870
6.195 21.094 6.200 5.323 14.818
R&D/St*Sentt −0.001 −0.025
−2.509 −2.528
PPENTt −1.507 −1.957 −1.643 −1.511 −1.308 −1.360
−37.344 −22.736 −18.667 −37.403 −24.568 −10.211
PPENTt*Sentt −0.013 −0.015
−5.655 −2.964
INTANt-1 −0.835 −1.380 −1.067 −0.824 −0.574 −0.722
−15.593 −13.407 −10.233 −15.317 −7.160 −4.370
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.013 −0.013
−4.327 −2.213
CFcollinst −3.856 −1.278 0.543 −3.862 −3.574 0.698
−38.267 −2.090 0.875 −38.280 −31.345 1.058
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.016 −0.014
−4.866 −1.246
ACCcollinst −1.527 0.030 1.357 −1.534 −1.198 2.443
−14.725 0.049 2.177 −14.774 −10.016 3.754
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.020 −0.065
−5.184 −5.896
IIbullbeart −0.001 0.005 −0.001
−2.088 4.878 −0.283
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Table 90 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.070 0.064 0.046 0.046 0.065
32.582 19.714 17.892 32.604 32.601 18.152
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−10.012 −7.065 −6.453 −10.061 −9.947 −6.622
Sizet −0.114 −0.084 −0.101 −0.114 −0.115 −0.101
−21.380 −5.934 −7.091 −21.129 −21.300 −7.023
StdRett −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
−19.159 −7.094 −5.614 −19.275 −19.012 −6.725
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
20.250 1.500 −1.206 20.343 20.357 −0.891
StdROAt 0.002 0.033 0.025 0.002 0.002 0.027
5.118 14.505 11.191 5.162 5.103 11.679
Betat 0.735 0.943 0.964 0.735 0.733 0.980
72.933 38.520 39.061 72.960 72.755 39.417
ROAt −0.107 0.596 0.516 −0.109 −0.105 0.526
−1.401 1.014 0.875 −1.430 −1.371 0.891
Leveraget −0.440 −0.484 −0.083 −0.444 −0.433 −0.085
−10.118 −4.809 −0.808 −10.207 −9.944 −0.825
N 54,486 14,282 14,277 54,486 54,486 14,277
Pseudo-R2 0.317 0.319 0.349 0.317 0.318 0.352
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 91
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using Baker-Wurgler Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash
Flow: R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions used the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data were calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Monthly orthogonalized sentiment values introduced
by Baker and Wurgler (2007) were used. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and
accruals (ACC) are scaled by average total assets; intangible assets (INTAN)
and property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) are scaled by end of the year as-
sets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and
lagged vega are used. A version of Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard
deviation of returns, stock turnover, return on assets, the standard deviation
of return on assets, beta, and total liabilities scaled by assets were included as
control variables. The t-statistics are reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
6.517 5.080 5.671
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.080 3.107 2.893
ADt 0.342 −0.198 0.373 0.343 0.435 0.277
2.230 −0.580 1.086 2.240 2.804 0.780
ADt*Sentt −0.685 0.871
−2.600 1.312
R&D/St 0.022 3.391 0.022 0.023 3.382
6.195 21.094 6.197 6.294 21.267
R&D/St*Sentt −0.007 1.258
−1.759 4.170
PPENTt −1.507 −1.957 −1.643 −1.507 −1.517 −1.669
−37.344 −22.736 −18.667 −37.337 −37.395 −18.597
PPENTt*Sentt 0.095 0.173
1.386 1.173
INTANt-1 −0.835 −1.380 −1.067 −0.836 −0.842 −1.024
−15.593 −13.407 −10.233 −15.595 −15.608 −9.717
INTANt-1*Sentt −0.006 0.400
−0.065 2.099
CFcollinst −3.856 −1.278 0.543 −3.855 −4.035 0.929
−38.267 −2.090 0.875 −38.247 −39.579 1.483
CFcollinst*Sentt 1.135 0.493
12.375 1.651
ACCcollinst −1.527 0.030 1.357 −1.527 −1.706 1.755
−14.725 0.049 2.177 −14.720 −16.256 2.782
ACCcollinst*Sentt 0.846 −0.048
9.408 −0.195
BWsentt 0.009 −0.027 0.159
0.641 −0.999 2.027
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Table 91 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.070 0.064 0.046 0.047 0.060
32.582 19.714 17.892 32.531 33.002 16.678
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−10.012 −7.065 −6.453 −9.999 −10.034 −5.971
Sizet −0.114 −0.084 −0.101 −0.115 −0.114 −0.107
−21.380 −5.934 −7.091 −21.351 −21.208 −7.464
StdRett −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005
−19.159 −7.094 −5.614 −19.137 −19.272 −7.872
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
20.250 1.500 −1.206 20.246 20.048 −0.469
StdROAt 0.002 0.033 0.025 0.002 0.002 0.025
5.118 14.505 11.191 5.120 5.250 11.124
Betat 0.735 0.943 0.964 0.735 0.744 1.033
72.933 38.520 39.061 72.849 73.432 40.770
ROAt −0.107 0.596 0.516 −0.107 −0.124 0.053
−1.401 1.014 0.875 −1.407 −1.619 0.089
Leveraget −0.440 −0.484 −0.083 −0.440 −0.445 −0.160
−10.118 −4.809 −0.808 −10.114 −10.232 −1.557
N 54,486 14,282 14,277 54,486 54,486 14,277
Pseudo-R2 0.317 0.319 0.349 0.317 0.320 0.359
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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Table 92
Determinants of Annual capm5 eVERR Decile Assignments
Using AAII Sentiment and Collins Accruals and Cash Flow:
R&D/S, and Lagged INTAN, Delta, and Vega
The ordered logistic regressions used the annual capm5 eVERR decile assign-
ments from 1964–2009 as the dependent variable. Some independent variables
are not available for the full period. CEO compensation characteristics, vega
and delta, are obtained from Professor Naveen’s website and are rescaled to be
in millions. Scaled cash flow and accruals data were calculated in accordance
with Collins et al. (2003). Sentiment was calculated as the monthly average
of the weekly difference between the bullish and bearish sentiment reported by
AAII. Advertising (AD), cash flow (CF), and accruals (ACC) are scaled by aver-
age total assets; intangible assets (INTAN) and property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) are scaled by end of the year assets; R&D is scaled by sales. Lagged
INTAN scaled by assets, lagged delta, and lagged vega are used. A version of
Altman’s Z, firm age, firm size, the standard deviation of returns, stock turnover,
return on assets, the standard deviation of return on assets, beta, and total li-
abilities scaled by assets were included as control variables. The t-statistics are
reported below each coefficient.
A B C D E F
Vegat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
6.517 5.080 4.752
Deltat-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.080 3.107 3.091
ADt 0.342 −0.198 0.373 0.356 0.386 −0.233
2.230 −0.580 1.086 2.320 2.025 −0.528
ADt*Sentt −0.002 0.057
−0.233 2.521
R&D/St 0.022 3.391 0.022 0.018 3.991
6.195 21.094 6.217 6.874 17.894
R&D/St*Sentt 0.001 −0.034
5.128 −3.751
PPENTt −1.507 −1.957 −1.643 −1.505 −1.431 −1.443
−37.344 −22.736 −18.667 −37.304 −29.583 −12.533
PPENTt*Sentt −0.006 −0.015
−2.783 −2.896
INTANt-1 −0.835 −1.380 −1.067 −0.838 −0.900 −0.988
−15.593 −13.407 −10.233 −15.635 −13.691 −7.653
INTANt-1*Sentt 0.006 −0.000
1.790 −0.057
CFcollinst −3.856 −1.278 0.543 −3.845 −3.781 0.858
−38.267 −2.090 0.875 −38.209 −34.650 1.345
CFcollinst*Sentt −0.003 −0.016
−0.798 −1.466
ACCcollinst −1.527 0.030 1.357 −1.518 −1.348 2.261
−14.725 0.049 2.177 −14.658 −11.941 3.529
ACCcollinst*Sentt −0.014 −0.063
−3.442 −5.887
AAIIbullbeart 0.002 0.002 0.011
4.065 2.468 4.014
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Table 92 – continued from the previous page
A B C D E F
AltZ1t 0.046 0.070 0.064 0.046 0.046 0.062
32.582 19.714 17.892 32.376 32.195 17.239
Aget −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
−10.012 −7.065 −6.453 −9.737 −9.613 −5.954
Sizet −0.114 −0.084 −0.101 −0.116 −0.116 −0.098
−21.380 −5.934 −7.091 −21.604 −21.594 −6.857
StdRett −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
−19.159 −7.094 −5.614 −19.069 −18.804 −3.762
Turnovert 0.002 0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.000
20.250 1.500 −1.206 20.269 20.252 −0.382
StdROAt 0.002 0.033 0.025 0.001 0.001 0.024
5.118 14.505 11.191 5.052 5.018 10.453
Betat 0.735 0.943 0.964 0.737 0.735 0.966
72.933 38.520 39.061 73.004 72.799 38.985
ROAt −0.107 0.596 0.516 −0.105 −0.100 0.547
−1.401 1.014 0.875 −1.372 −1.310 0.925
Leveraget −0.440 −0.484 −0.083 −0.443 −0.439 −0.117
−10.118 −4.809 −0.808 −10.180 −10.082 −1.141
N 54,486 14,282 14,277 54,482 54,482 14,277
Pseudo-R2 0.317 0.319 0.349 0.318 0.318 0.354
Model Eq. 34 Eq. 35 Eq. 36 Eq. 37 Eq. 38 Eq. 39
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